Europe must stop being afraid to respond

Russia’s hybrid war against Europe did not begin with its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, nor in recent years. The Kremlin intelligence services have been conducting hostile operations across Europe since Vladimir Putin came to power.

For too long, Europe has failed to respond adequately. Some worried that a stronger response would provoke Moscow. But the opposite has happened. The Kremlin interprets hesitation and fear of escalation as weakness, inviting further aggression. Every weak response teaches the Kremlin that it can test the next boundary, create more disruption and chaos inside our societies without facing consequences serious enough to change its behaviour. Putin goes as far as he is allowed to go. Fear of escalation has not prevented escalation: it has further encouraged it.

Europe is a target of Russian hybrid warfare that is becoming increasingly less hybrid. It combines military and non-military tools often designed to remain below the threshold of open armed conflict, including cyber operations, disinformation, economic coercion, sabotage and weaponising migration. The line between hybrid and conventional warfare has blurred. We hear daily about acts of sabotage and sabotage attempts on our infrastructure and drones violating our airspace and even being laden with explosives, like in Leipzig. Around elections, Russian cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns intensify. GPS jamming and spoofing are everyday occurrences in Europe’s eastern border regions. 

Russia remains the primary threat to Europe’s democratic integrity. It targets us through information manipulation and hybrid interference. By deploying hundreds of thousands of fake social media accounts, particularly around elections, it seeks to influence people’s minds, portray Russia as strong and invincible, and amplify narratives and candidates favourable to the Kremlin.

Russia does not act alone: it has partners in authoritarian states such as Belarus, China, Iran and North Korea. Belarus, for example, has weaponised migration at the EU’s borders, with over 36,000 coordinated crossing attempts recorded in 2024. In the Baltic Sea, Chinese-linked vessels have been involved in incidents damaging critical data and electricity cables.

Russia, its allies and its proxies must face real consequences, not just condemnation. We need a common threat picture, stronger tools, greater preparedness, real operational capacity and the will to use them. Any violation of a Member State's sovereignty must be met with effective retaliatory measures.

EU Member States have yet to develop a coordinated response to hybrid warfare nationally, at European level and, where relevant, with NATO.

Europe’s eastern flank is its first line of defence, and we need faster implementation of the Eastern Flank Watch, an EU initiative intended to strengthen surveillance and defence along the bloc’s borders with Russia and Belarus.

We must also introduce tougher rules for Russian passport holders entering the EU. The minimum is to ban entry for anyone serving in Russian security and intelligence organisations, including former members who have fought in Ukraine. 

The EU must use its economic and diplomatic power to stop the de facto Russian fleet from operating and bypassing sanctions. The owners and operators of these ships must be penalised. Furthermore, the consequences for damaging critical underwater infrastructure (CUI) must be significantly increased to serve as an effective deterrent. 

We need better intelligence-sharing, more resources to counter disinformation and stronger protection of our critical infrastructure. But most of all we need sanctions that hit Russia’s economy at the heart. 

Since the beginning of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the EPP Group demanded decisive sanctions, but the Council’s step-by-step approach was slow, and the Russian economy had time to adapt. Kremlin propaganda claims sanctions do not work. This is false. Sanctions do work but require stronger enforcement and bolder measures.

In July, EU adopted 21^st package of sanctions against Russia. By the end of the year, Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) will be banned from the EU and pipeline gas imports will be phased out by 30 September 2027. The European parliament strengthened the European Commission’s initial proposal towards a ban on oil and its products, ending long-term contracts sooner than originally proposed. 

These are welcome decisions, but more must be done. The European Parliament’s proposals are set out in the report that the plenary adopted on 16 September. Europe can be strong if it wants to. But this resolve is challenged by a huge, lying Russian propaganda machinery. 

European leaders must stop fearing the measures needed to defend our security. Today, Ukraine is an example of the will to defend and to win. So are Moldova and Armenia, which have faced massive hybrid attacks using every tool in Moscow’s arsenal, and whose leaders and people have nevertheless stood firm.