Voyage to the Heart of Europe 1953-2009

This book invites you to discover the role played by one of the major political forces to have grown up in the European Parliament, from its creation in 1953 to its comprehensive victory in the European elections in June 2009.

The Christian Democrat Group, which subsequently became the Group of the European People’s Party, brings together most of the centre, moderate and Conservative parties in the Europe of 27. Its views have a decisive and growing influence on EU decision-making. The EPP Group, which has played a part in major European events from the birth of the Community in the midst of the Cold War to the introduction of the Single Market and the euro, from the reunification of the continent after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the impact of globalisation and the economic crisis, is above all a collection of men and women who share the same values and the same commitment to European integration.

Drawn from unpublished archives and interviews, the book is a valuable source of information for anyone wanting a better knowledge and understanding of the history of European integration.

The author, Pascal Fontaine, a Doctor of Political Sciences at the University of Paris, was the last assistant to Jean Monnet, Europe’s founding father, with whom he worked from 1974 to 1979. He was an administrator in the EPP Group from 1981, Chef de cabinet to EP President Pierre Pflimlin from 1984 to 1987, and Deputy Secretary-General of the EPP Group from 1985 to 2008. Since then he has been a Special Adviser to the Group. The preface is by Hans-Gert Pöttering, an MEP since 1979, Chairman of the EPP-ED Group from 1999 to 2007, President of the European Parliament from 2007 to 2009, and re-elected as an MEP in June 2009.

The foreword is by Joseph Daul, an MEP since 1999 and Chairman of the EPP Group since 2007, a post to which he was re-elected in June 2009.
Voyage to the Heart of Europe

1953-2009
Pascal Fontaine

Voyage to the Heart of Europe 1953-2009


Preface by Dr Hans-Gert Pöttering
Foreword by Joseph Daul

Racine
This book, the original version of which is French, will be released simultaneously in French with the title *Voyage au cœur de l'Europe. 1953-2009. Histoire du Groupe Démocrate-Chrétien et du Parti Populaire Européen au Parlement européen*, and in German with the title *Herzenssache Europa. Eine Zeitreise. 1953-2009. Geschichte der Fraktion der Christdemokraten und der Europäischen Volkspartei im Europäischen Parlament*.

English translation by The Peer Group, coordinated by David Harris and Julie Barnes
Layout: MC Compo, Liège
Printing and binding: Drukkerij Lannoo, Tielt

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

© Éditions Racine, 2009
52, rue Defacqz • B-1050 Brussels
www.racine.be
D. 2009, 6852. 39
Legal registration: November 2009
Published in Belgium
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Preface** by Dr Hans-Gert Pöttering 19

**Foreword** by Joseph Daul 23

**List of Acronyms and Abbreviations** 25

**Acknowledgements** 31

**Introduction**  Why write a history of the Group? 33

- Passing on our legacy and memories 33
- The Group as an historical subject and object 34
- The method used: written sources, personal accounts and a desire for transparency 36
- Why is the book called ’Voyage to the Heart of Europe’? 36
- Structure of the book 37

**Part one**  The pioneers (1952-1979) 41

## 1  Beginning to build a United Europe 43

- The birth of the Christian-Democratic Group 43
- The Schuman initiative of 9 May 1950 and the ‘founding fathers’ 45
- The ECSC as the first stage on the road to European integration 47
- The Group as an institution within an institution 48
- The Christian-Democratic family and its values 50
- The EDC: a disappointment for the Christian-Democratic Group (1953-1954) 52
- A second wind at Messina leads to the signing of the Rome treaties (1955-1957) 55
II The rise and rise of the new European Communities

The single Parliamentary Assembly (1958): ‘a butterfly emerges’
Parliament asserts its independence with the choice of Robert Schuman as its President (March 1958)
Euratom – ‘a problem of political will’
The Christian-Democratic Group supports swifter completion of the common market (1958-1968)
Emergence of a people’s Europe
Europe asserts itself as a combined commercial power
Completion of the customs union (1968-1969)

III Defending the community model (1961-1966)

The Fouchet Plans: misunderstandings and clashes over future political union (1961-1962)
The Christian-Democratic Group refuses to settle for mere inter-governmental cooperation
The ‘empty chair’ crisis and the so-called Luxembourg ‘compromise’ (June 1965-January 1966)

IV The Common Agricultural Policy, darling of the Christian Democrats

The Stresa Conference sets out the broad lines of the CAP (1958)
The three agricultural marathons (1962-1968)
The Mansholt Plan (1968) heralds a profound reform of the CAP
Nonetheless, the CAP remains ‘the very essence of the Community, the core of its integration’

V The long march to monetary Union

The collapse of the Bretton Woods system (1971) sparks a monetary crisis in Europe
The ‘snake’ reduces currency fluctuations
The Paris Summit: objective ‘European Union’ (October 1972)
The Group calls for a European Monetary Fund with strong resources
Christian Democrats strengthened by the birth of the European Monetary System (1978)
VI  The Christian-Democratic Group plays the European Parliament’s budget card  93

Enhanced budgetary powers: the financial treaties of 1970 and 1975  94
The Court of Auditors under the protective wing of Heinrich Aigner  95
The ‘Notenboom procedure’  96

VII  The first enlargement of the Community (1972)  99

Relaunching Europe at The Hague (1969): a fresh impetus: completing, deepening and enlarging the Community  99
The vagaries of the United Kingdom’s application to join the European Community  100
New Irish Members join the Christian-Democratic Group… but the British still have a long wait ahead  103
Further progress towards political union (1972-1974)  105

VIII  Democratic change in the States of Southern Europe (1974-1975)  107

The Carnation Revolution in Portugal (April 1974)  108
The Cyprus crisis leads to the fall of the Greek colonels (July 1974)  109
The death of General Franco and democracy in Spain (November 1975)  110

IX  The Community’s social policy: an avant-garde policy spearheaded by the Christian Democrats (1953-1979)  113

The early achievements of the ECSC  113
Economic and social issues must go hand in hand, ‘like flames and fire’  114
Practical benefits for citizens: the free movement of workers  115
The Christian-Democratic Group’s social dialogue with undertakings and trade unions  118

X  The Christian-Democratic Group’s solidarity with the nations oppressed by the Soviet Union  121

Berlin: the ‘Wall of Shame’ (1961)  122
Repression in Hungary (October 1956) and Czechoslovakia (August 1968)  123
The Helsinki Summit of 1975 – was East-West détente a reality or an illusion? 124
An audacious initiative by the Group: European arms cooperation (1978) 126

XI Aid to Africa – a historical and moral legacy 129
The contribution of the Christian Democrats to the Yaoundé I (July 1963) and Yaoundé II (July 1969) Agreements 130
The Lomé Conference: a turning point towards relations based on mutual solidarity (February 1975) 131
The Christian-Democratic Group and the uphill struggle for human rights in Africa: a tale of contrasts 133

XII Everyday life in the Christian-Democratic Group from 1952 to 1979 135
A German-Italian condominium within the Christian-Democratic Group? 135
The first chairmen 137
A Europeans’ Club 138
Travelling and discovering Europe 139
The birth of a supranational secretariat 141
‘Veritable monks, serving the institutions from morn till night’ 144

XIII Towards the first european elections (June 1979) 149
Birth of the European People’s Party 149
The Christian-Democratic Group steals a march on the Socialist Group 152
Direct election by universal suffrage: the ‘great hope’ of Christian Democrats 153
10 June 1979: ‘D-Day’ for the Christian-Democratic Group and the EPP 156

Part two The builders (1979-1994) 161

XIV Anatomy of the new elected Group (July 1979) 163
Impressive German delegation 165
The other ‘big’ delegation, the Italians 168
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XV</td>
<td>Politics and structure of the Group in the first parliamentary term (1979-1984)</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Giampaolo Bettamio put in charge of building up the Secretariat and maintaining its supranational character</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The EPP Group persuades Greek Members to join (December 1981)</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egon Klepsch fails to be elected President of the European Parliament and Paolo Barbi is elected Chairman (1982)</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVI</td>
<td>The ‘Van Aerssen initiative’ starts the institutional debate within the EPP Group (1979-1984)</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dual strategy: ‘small steps’ and a new treaty</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII</td>
<td>Full recognition of the European Parliament as joint budget authority (1979-1984)</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rejection of the 1980 budget: ‘the first moment of truth’ for the elected Parliament</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The ‘Adonnino doctrine’ (1981): the budget as a political lever, not just an accounting document</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resolution of the budget crises (1981-1984)</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refusal of a discharge for the 1982 budget: a warning to the Commission</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII</td>
<td>The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): a drain on resources</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The scandal of surpluses</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modernising agriculture</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The EPP Group supports the Commission reforms</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIX</td>
<td>Continuing to face up to the soviet threat</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disillusionment with détente</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Neither red nor dead’: the Euromissile crisis (1979-1984)</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Towards a common defence</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The new wave of EPP members after the elections of June 1984

Failure or success in the elections of 14 and 17 June 1984? Egon Klepsch regains long-term control of the Group

The European coronation of Pierre Pflimlin as President of the European Parliament on 24 July 1984

The speaking time war: ‘prima donnas’ versus ‘backbenchers’

Mid-term adjustments (January 1986 and January 1987)

A new Secretary-General: Sergio Guccione (February 1986)

Towards the single Act and the great internal market – the ‘1992 Objective’

A favourable political context (June-July 1984)

The ‘Kangaroo Group’ gives momentum to the Internal Market

The Commission’s white paper – the document that founded the internal market

The European Council in Milan: a victory for Europeans (June 1985)

The EPP Group decides to make the best of the Single European Act (February 1986)

The EPP Group’s increasing commitment to the ‘1992 Objective’

The internal market: by and large a success story

A Europe of symbols and citizens – from the Adonnino Committee (1984) to the Maastricht treaty (1992)

The twelve stars of Alexander and Beethoven’s Ninth

The abolition of border controls

Exchange visits for young people

European citizenship

The European Ombudsman

Voting rights and eligibility for municipal and European Parliament elections

Upholding human rights and combating poverty

Establishment of the Sakharov Prize

The Committee on Women’s Rights

Refugees from the crisis in Yugoslavia
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>XXIV</th>
<th>The third term of the directly elected Parliament: the EPP’s political family grows bigger (1989-1994)</th>
<th>261</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bringing Spain’s Partido Popular into the fold</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The British Conservatives’ application is ‘frozen’…</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(July 1989)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>… and ultimately accepted (April 1992)</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An increasingly female and younger EPP Group</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong characters join the EPP ranks</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A surprise: the arrival of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(December 1991)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changes in the Group’s leadership: the chairmanship of Leo Tindemans and new members of the Secretariat (January 1991 - July 1994)</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>XXV</th>
<th>The fall of the Berlin wall (November 1989), german reunification and the end of the soviet empire (1991)</th>
<th>275</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An unexpected revolution</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First signs of change in the Soviet Union</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EPP Group Presidency in Moscow (March 1987)</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cracks in the Wall of Shame (early 1989)</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group’s reaction to the fall of the Berlin Wall (November 1989)</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EPP Group advocates rapid reunification of Germany within the European Union</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Break-up of the USSR (December 1991)</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Baltic region regains ‘its place on the maps of Europe and in the minds of the West’</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
XXVI  The yugoslavian conflict (1990-1995) and its consequences 289
A return to war in Europe 289
Towards independence for the Western Balkan states 290
War, massacres and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia (1992-1995) 294
The Vance-Owen Plan 295
EPP Group takes humanitarian and political initiatives 296
End of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina 296

XXVII  The role of the EPP Group in the genesis of the Maastricht treaty (1992) 299
At the Rome Assises (November 1990) national and European parliamentarians set their sights on a federal Europe 299
Rapid response to the realisation that Europe was coming together again as a continent 300
EPP Congress in Dublin (15-16 November 1990) sets out its demands on the eve of the 1991 Intergovernmental Conferences 301
‘EPP Group of Six’, a political catalyst during the Maastricht negotiations (1991-1992) 302

XXVIII  The Christian Democrats leave their mark on the Maastricht treaty 305
A major step forward for European integration 305
The Danish referendum: a painful rejection by the people (June 1992) 307
Herman report on the European Constitution (February 1994) 308

XXIX  Enlargement to include Austria, Sweden and Finland 311
The ephemeral European Economic Area (1992) 311
The neutrality problem 312
No widening without deepening? 313
EPP Group votes in favour of the three countries’ accession 315
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part three The reformers (1994-2009)</strong></td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The development of the EPP Group from 1994 to 2009: a success story</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>XXX The EPP Group under the Chairmanship of Wilfried Martens</strong></td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1994-1999)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Members join the Group in June 1994</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Party President takes the reins (July 1994)</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The mortal danger of competition from the right:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Kohl-Martens strategy and response</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>XXXI The EPP-ED Group under the Chairmanship of Hans-Gert Pöttering</strong></td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1999-2007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans-Gert Pöttering becomes Group Chairman (13 July 1999)</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The new Chairman’s first political moves – renaming as the EPP-ED Group – the EPP-ED takes over the Presidency of Parliament – the delicate matter of Austria</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘To be or not to be in the Group’: the British Conservatives once again consider their options</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New MEPs arrive in June 2004 and January 2007</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>XXXII The EPP Group Secretariat from 1994 to 2009</strong></td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Secretaries-General: Gerhard Guckenberger, Mário David, Klaus Welle, Niels Pedersen and Martin Kamp</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New faces and professionalisation</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifts in the Tower of Babel and wheeled suitcases</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day labourers or cathedral builders?</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>XXXIII Reuniting the continent: from a Union of 15 members to a union of 27</strong></td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening the door to Europe: the historic Copenhagen decision in June 1993</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The inescapable date in Article N of the Maastricht Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Amsterdam Treaty (October 1997): between light and shade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Union faces the same old dilemma: does enlargement mean the end of deepening?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The failure of Nice (December 2000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>XXXV</th>
<th><strong>Giving Europe a future: from the European Constitution (October 2004) to the treaty of Lisbon (October 2007)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Following the failure of the Nice Intergovernmental Conference (December 2000) comes the success of the European Convention (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The influence of the EPP-ED in the Convention Praesidium (February 2002 - June 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Towards the Constitutional Treaty (October 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The ‘thunderclap’ of the ‘no’ votes in the referendums in France and the Netherlands (May 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland’s turn to say ‘no’ (13 June 2008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interinstitutional relations between Parliament and the Commission after Maastricht (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Santer Commission embarks on the gradual ‘parliamentarisation’ of the European political system (1994-1999)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Prodi Commission gives the EPP-ED Group cause to make demands (1999-2004) 414
The Barroso Commission enjoys strong support from the EPP-ED Group (2004-2009) 417

XXXVII The single market and globalisation 421
The 1993 ‘Single Market’, an engine for growth? 421
A Europe ‘of growth and employment’ builds on the Lisbon Strategy 424
Three success stories for citizens: cheaper telephone charges, higher quality services and respect for the environment 427
The Group supports expansion of global trade (the Seattle, Doha and Cancun rounds) 430

XXXVIII The euro, a buffer against international monetary disorder (1999-2009) 433
‘The long road to the euro’ 433
The battle over convergence criteria 438
The need for an independent European Central Bank 440
The euro, a success for the EPP 441
October 2008: Europe faces the global financial crisis by relying on the Eurogroup and the strength of the single currency 444
A European economic government? 444

XXXIX The Group’s new international strategy in an enlarged Europe 447
The European orientation of the Western Balkans 447
EPP-ED Group support for the democratic forces in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia 449
Difficult relations with Russia 455
Remaining open to the Mediterranean and Arab world 456
The Turkey issue: ‘a matter of conscience’ (2004) 458

XL Freedom, security and justice in the European Union 461
The Schengen area (1985-1995): achieving the free movement of persons… 461
…while also ensuring their safety 463
The fight against drugs 464
New terrorist threats 466
EUROPOL 468
Monitoring immigration policy 472
For a safer Europe 475

XLI  The spiritual values of the EPP-ED Group: dialogue and tolerance 477
‘We are establishing a Union of values’ 477
Fundamental rights 478
EPP values in the European Constitution: the debate on the inclusion of a reference to Europe’s ‘Judaeo-Christian heritage’ 480
Dialogue with the Orthodox Church 484
Establishing contacts with the Muslim world 487
Meetings with the Dalai Lama 488
A Group core value: tolerance 489
The EPP Group’s iconic figure – Robert Schuman 491

XLII  The EPP-ED Group broadens its base in civil society and european politics 493
Engaging with the people of Europe 493
Study Days and Bureau meetings in other places 493
Maintaining the special relationship with the national parliaments 504

The election of Joseph Daul and the new EPP-ED Group Presidency (9 January 2007) 507
Organising parliamentary work as efficiently as possible 510
Joseph Daul’s personal commitment to supporting sister parties in Central and Eastern Europe 514
The EPP-ED Chairman at the heart of the German and French Presidencies (January-June 2007 and July-December 2008) 519
Trouble in Prague: the perilous Czech EU Presidency (1 January-30 June 2009) 523
The political preparations for the European elections in June 2009 526
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EPP Group’s stunning success on 7 June 2009</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Daul takes matters in hand after re-election to the Group Presidency on 23 June 2009</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conclusion</strong> Roots, legacy, future</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explaining the meaning of the Group’s history</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crises as symptoms of change</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conviction and tolerance</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons to be learned from the British episode</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The new ‘founding members’ of a reunited Europe</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The responsibility of the next generations</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five conditions for the future success of the EPP</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Europe is a matter of war and peace’</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Annexes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex 1</th>
<th>Chronology</th>
<th>551</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex 2</td>
<td>List of members of the CD, EPP and EPP-ED Group since 1952</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 3</td>
<td>Parliamentary Terms, Chairmen, Secretaries-general</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 4</td>
<td>Winners of the Robert Schuman medal</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 5</td>
<td>Representation of the EPP Group within the European Parliament and breakdown of the national delegations within the Group</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 6</td>
<td>External meetings of the EPP Group</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 7</td>
<td>Index of names</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 8</td>
<td>List of Group staff on 31 December 2008</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 9</td>
<td>List of members elected on 7 June 2009</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 10</td>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>647</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
European integration has been the greatest peaceful endeavour not just in the history of our continent, but in the history of the world. Many people may find this historical viewpoint and judgment exaggerated, inappropriate or over-emotional, but it is still true.

People all too easily forget just how far Europe has come from being a continent of enemies to a European Union founded on shared values and principles, in which nearly 500 million people from 27 countries now live together on the basis of ‘unity in diversity’. Only if we know where we have come from can we know who we are and where we want to go. We need to keep memories of our history alive and pass them on to young people in particular, as the ones who will shape the future, so that past experiences can provide a foundation for the path we take in future.

After the horrors of the Second World War Germany’s partners had the courage, the strength and the far-sightedness to reach out to Germany and begin the work of European integration. Robert Schuman, whose example and actions made him one of the great figures of European integration, put into practice the revolutionary plan for a ‘European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)’ that he had developed with Jean Monnet. This marked the start of a long and successful process, albeit one accompanied by repeated setbacks. It was a historical stroke of luck that Robert Schuman found like-minded friends in Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi and others. We can be proud that it was Christian Democrats in particular who began the work of reconciliation and integration in Europe. Everyone knew, and this is still true today, that European integration would not just happen overnight, and would require constantly renewed efforts. Small steps are just as significant as big decisions. What is and always will be important is that we should steer in the right direction: our principles call not for a Europe of governments, an intergovernmental Europe, but for a
European Union committed to the Community method, to a Europe that acts together through strong institutions. ‘Nothing is possible without men, nothing is lasting without institutions’, as Jean Monnet put it.

The European Parliament is one of these institutions. It has developed from what was originally an ‘assembly’, and now wields considerable power and influence. Without the European Parliament the European Union would not be what it is today. The European Parliament was and is a pioneer in many respects, and the Christian-Democratic Group, now known as the Group of the European People’s Party, is at the forefront of this, having always seen itself as the champion of a new Europe that is capable of taking action and that is based on democracy and parliamentarianism. Our Group – since 1999 the largest group in the European Parliament by some distance – was and is more successful here than even those of the general public who take an interest in such matters realise. Until the British Conservatives left the Group after the 2009 European elections – a major strategic mistake – our Group was the only one in the European Parliament with MEPs from all 27 countries of the European Union. Before I stood down as Group Chairman in January 2007 I suggested to the Group Presidency that we should write a history of our Group. The Presidency unanimously supported this idea. You now have the result before you. Pascal Fontaine, who was for many years our Group’s Deputy Secretary-General, has succeeded in producing an objective, shrewd and historically precise academic history of the Christian Democrats in the European Parliament since its earliest days in 1953. I would like to offer my sincerest thanks to Pascal Fontaine and all those who worked with him on this project. I would also like to thank the man who succeeded me as Group Chairman, my colleague and friend Joseph Daul, who has given this project his wholehearted support.

As a Member of the European Parliament since the first direct elections in 1979 I have lived through and helped to shape more than half of our Group’s history. I have worked very cordially with all the Group Chairmen since 1979: Egon Klepsch, Paolo Barbi, Leo Tindemans, Wilfried Martens – whose Vice-Chairman I was from 1994 to 1999 – and now Joseph Daul. I am particularly grateful to have served as Chairman of our Group (from July 1999 to January 2007) and as President of the European Parliament (from January 2007 to July 2009). During this period I was loyally supported by the Group’s Secretaries-General Klaus Welle (1999-2004) and Niels Pedersen (2004-2007). Klaus Welle was also with me as my Chef de Cabinet during my time as President and is now Secretary-General of the European Parliament. It has been
one of the happiest experiences of my life in politics to have him at my side for so many years. We have almost always shared the same views on political and personal issues, which I felt was not just unusual, but for which I also felt very fortunate.

The finest experiences in my many years in the European Parliament were when Parliament – unlike many of Europe’s capital cities – welcomed German unification on 3 October 1990, and when we were able to welcome the former Communist countries of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia to the European Union on 1 May 2004. Freedom won in the end, and the fact that we have lived to see this is still, for me, the greatest miracle of our age. The division of Europe was overcome because we in the western half held firmly to our values, which gradually began to attract people in Central and Eastern Europe who then wanted to attain those values themselves and won their freedom by peaceful means.

Today, as the Berlin Declaration of 25 March 2007 puts it so beautifully, we have ‘united for the better’.

Our political and moral task for the future is to protect the legacy of our Christian-Democratic convictions and to remain true to our values: to a continent united on the basis of human dignity, human rights, freedom, democracy, law and the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity. If we adhere to those values the Group of the European People’s Party will continue to enjoy success in the future and win people’s support for the Europe that we so passionately believe in.

Dr Hans-Gert Pöttering
MEP
President of the European Parliament (2007-2009)
Chairman of the EPP-ED Group (1999-2007)
European integration, from the Declaration by Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950 to the Lisbon Treaty, has been a tremendous human venture. The history of the EPP Group has been a tremendous human venture, too.

It has been a venture that has brought the 500 million Europeans living in our reunited continent today more than 60 years of peace and relative prosperity.

The EPP political family, to which I am proud to belong and whose Group in the European Parliament – the largest and most influential for three terms now – I currently lead, has played a crucial role in this epic European story.

From Europe’s Founding Fathers – Adenauer, De Gasperi, Monnet, Schuman and Pflimlin, to mention just a few, the vast majority of them members of the EPP – to those currently engaged in this field today – Heads of State and Government, MPs, MEPs and activists – the European People’s Party has always believed in Europe. It has always worked to support it and has made it what it is today: a community of men and women bound by the values of respect, freedom, responsibility and tolerance.

The people of Europe have a long history, and they are largely the product of that history. However, there is no escaping globalisation and everything that comes with it, both liberating and frightening, and their ambition now is to share their ideals and their humanist view of society with pride but without arrogance.

The history of our Group reflects the history of our continent since the end of the Second World War. Over the course of those years, which have seen the world and Europe transformed at an ever quickening pace, the EPP has admittedly changed, but I like to think too that it has helped to change the world for the better.

We wanted this book to be lively, honest and accurate. As someone from Alsace, a Frenchman and a European, I have found it very moving.
Its aim is to satisfy the curiosity of the younger generation, who sometimes ask me, because European thinking comes so naturally to them, why my generation and all those whose shared passion and ambition are described in this book worked so hard to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.

The book is also intended to shed light on Europe’s current decision-makers and the difficulties of their day-to-day work, and to encourage them to face the challenges of today’s world with the same selflessness, vision and political courage as their predecessors.

The values championed by the EPP are obviously more contemporary than ever, as the trust which the people of Europe placed in our plans in the 2009 European elections clearly demonstrated.

I hope that reading this book will help everyone to take a more objective and, perhaps, dispassionate view of current developments. For me personally, it encourages me to persevere with my political efforts to promote a stronger, more supportive and more visionary Europe.

Joseph Daul
Chairman of the EPP Group
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AASM  Associated African States and Madagascar
ACP countries  African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
AKP  Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, Turkey)
ALDE Group  Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BSE  Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
CAP  Common Agricultural Policy
CD Group  Christian-Democratic Group
CDA  Christen Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal, Netherlands)
CDH  Centre démocrate humaniste belge francophone (French-speaking Belgian Humanist Democratic Centre Party)
CD&V  Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (Flemish Christian Democrats, Belgium)
CDS  Partido do Centro Democrático Social (Democratic and Social Centre Party, Portugal)
CDS  Centre des Démocrates Sociaux (Social Democratic Centre Party, France)
CDU  Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union, Germany)
CEEC  Central and Eastern European Countries
CEO  Chief Executive Officer
CET  Common External Tariff
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CE  Compulsory expenditure
COBU  Committee on Budgets
COCOBU  Committee on Budgetary Control
COM  Common Organisation of the Market
COMECON  Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COMETT  Programme on cooperation between universities and enterprises regarding training in the field of technology
COSAC  Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Christlich Soziale Partei (Christian Social Party, German-speaking Belgium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union, Bavaria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSV</td>
<td>Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei (Christian Social People's Party, Luxembourg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVP</td>
<td>Christelijke Volkspartij (Flemish Belgian Christian People's Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democratic Party, Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td>Démocratie Libérale (Liberal Democratic Party, France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Deutsche Mark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAEC or Euratom</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAGGF</td>
<td>European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>European Currency Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed</td>
<td>editor's note</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ED Group</td>
<td>Group of European Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDU</td>
<td>European Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIN</td>
<td>European Ideas Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMCF</td>
<td>European Monetary Cooperation Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMI</td>
<td>European Monetary Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPA</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>European Monetary System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>European Parliamentary Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPP</td>
<td>European People's Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPP Group</td>
<td>Group of the European People's Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPP-ED Group</td>
<td>Group of the European People's Party and European Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPU</td>
<td>European Political Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESCB</td>
<td>European System of Central Banks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCD</td>
<td>European Union of Christian Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurodac</td>
<td>System for comparing the fingerprints of asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Eurojust  European Judicial Cooperation Unit
Europol  European Police Office
EUSF  European Union Solidarity Fund
EUYCD  European Union of Young Christian Democrats
FAES  Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales (Foundation for Analysis and Social Studies, Spain)
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organisation (United Nations)
FDP  Freie Demokratische Partei (Liberal Democratic Party, Germany)
FED  Federal Reserve System (USA)
FIDESZ  Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége (Federation of Young Democrats, Hungary)
FNSEA  Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles (National Federation of Farmers' Unions, France)
FORCE  Community action programme for the development of continuing vocational training
FPÖ  Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria)
FRG  Federal Republic of Germany
FYRM  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GDR  German Democratic Republic
GERB  Grazhdani za Evropeysko Razvitie na Bulgariya (Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria)
HDF  Hungarian Democratic Forum
IDC  Christian Democratic International
IGC  Intergovernmental Conference
Infodoc  Information document produced by the EPP-ED Group for its members and staff
IRA  Irish Republican Army
KD  Kristdemokraterna (Christian-Democratic Party, Sweden)
KDH  Krest'anskodemokratické hnutie (Christian-Democratic Movement, Slovakia)
KDNP  Keresztény Demokrata Néppárt (Christian Democratic People's Party, Hungary)
KDS  Kristdemokratiska Samhällspartiet (Christian Democratic Party, Sweden)
KDU-CSL  Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová (Christian-Democratic Union, Czechoslovak People's Party)
KGB  Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security)
LICRA  International League against Racism and Antisemitism
MCA  Monetary Compensatory Amounts
MDF  Magyar Demokrata Fórum (Hungarian Democratic Forum)
MRP  Mouvement Républicain Populaire (Popular Republican Movement, France)
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NCE</td>
<td>Non-compulsory expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSi</td>
<td>Nova Slovenija – Krščanska ljudska stranka (Democratic Party of Slovenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>Občanská Demokratická Strana (Civic Democratic Party, Czech Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organisation for European Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJ/OJEC</td>
<td>Official Journal/Official Journal of the European Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLAF</td>
<td>European Anti-Fraud Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÖVP</td>
<td>Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People’s Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASD Group</td>
<td>Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima (Panhellenic Socialist Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PdL</td>
<td>Popolo della libertà (People of Freedom Party, Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDL</td>
<td>Partidul democrat-liberal (Liberal-Democratic Party, Romania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PES Group</td>
<td>Socialist Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETRA</td>
<td>Action programme for the vocational training of young people and their preparation for adult and working life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>Programme of Community aid for the Central and Eastern European Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>Partit Nazzjonalista (Nationalist Party, Malta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNV</td>
<td>Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque National Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>Platforma obywatelska (Polish Civic Platform)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Partido Popular (People’s Party, Spain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>Partito Popolare Italiano (Italian People’s Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Parti Social Chrétien (Christian Social Party, French-speaking Belgium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Partido Social Democrata (Social Democratic Party, Portugal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>Polskie stronnictwo ludowe (Polish People’s Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDE Group</td>
<td>Group of the European Democratic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REACH</td>
<td>Regulatory framework for the management of chemical substances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPR</td>
<td>Rassemblement Pour la République (Rally for the Republic, France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAB</td>
<td>Supplementary and Amending Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDKU-DS</td>
<td>Slovenská demokratická a krest’anská únia - Demokratická strana (Slovak Christian-Democratic Union – Slovak Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Slovenska demokratska stranka (Democratic Party of Slovenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>Schengen Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small and Medium-sized Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMK-MKP</td>
<td>Strana mad’arskej koalicie – Magyar Koalíció Pártja (Hungarian Coalition Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party, Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPS</td>
<td>Soyuz Pravykh Sil (Union of Right Forces, Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STABEX</td>
<td>Stabilisation of Export Earnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVP</td>
<td>Südtiroler Volkspartei (Parti populaire sud-Tirolien italien (South Tyrolean People’s Party, Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYSMIN</td>
<td>Scheme for Mineral Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEMPUS</td>
<td>Trans-European Mobility Scheme for University Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TREVI Group</td>
<td>Group of Interior Ministers set up to combat terrorism, radicalism, extremism and international violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>Unit of account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCK</td>
<td>Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>Unione dei democratici cristiani e democratici di centro (Union of Christian Democrats and Democrats of the Centre, Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (Democratic Union of Catalonia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>Union pour la Démocratie Française (Union for French Democracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDMR</td>
<td>Uniunea democrată maghiără din România (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEN Group</td>
<td>Union for a Europe of the Nations Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFE Group</td>
<td>Union for Europe Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMFDC</td>
<td>World Union of Christian Democratic Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMP</td>
<td>Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (Union for a Popular Movement, France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNR</td>
<td>Union pour la Nouvelle République (Union for the New Republic, France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAT</td>
<td>Value-added tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks go to President Hans-Gert Pöttering for entrusting me with the task of writing this book, which he has prefaced, and to the Chairman, Joseph Daul, who agreed to its publication and wrote the foreword.

I am also grateful to Niels Pedersen and Martin Kamp, who, as Secretaries-General of the Group, provided me with constant support from 2006 to 2009.

My thanks go to all those friends, colleagues, occasional co-workers and trainees who helped and supported me on this long and painstaking ‘voyage to the heart of Europe’, in particular Sandrine Dauchelle, Emma Petroni, Pascaline Raffegeau and Baptiste Thollon.

The book presents an account and a point of view and is not intended to be an official history of the Group. The author alone is responsible for the comments accompanying the facts described, the dates and quotations, the events chosen and how they are explained, the chronological breakdown and the thumbnail portraits. I have endeavoured to be as objective as possible and to take the necessary step back from history. I would emphasise that I was given the greatest possible freedom by my superiors in writing the book.
European integration, which has been an ongoing process since the Second World War ended in 1945, is already part of history. No-one now, in 2009, can tell how this story is going to end. Events, as historians know, always turn out to be more unpredictable than we expect, the ‘hidden march of history’ as Raymond Aron described it.

How many survivors of the slaughter and suffering east and west of the Rhine and throughout Europe would, in 1945, have dared to hope that Franco-German reconciliation, initiated by Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer, would, just five years later in 1950, lay the foundations of a new destiny for the peoples of Europe, freed forever from the scourge of war?

**Passing on our legacy and memories**

How many people in western Europe or the Soviet bloc could have foreseen in 1988 that the Berlin Wall would come down in November 1989, leading to the collapse of the Soviet empire, the most authoritarian and rigid empire ever to rule central and eastern Europe?

We decided to publish a ‘Group History’ because, as both academics and politicians have acknowledged, the European Parliament is an institution which has, over sixty years, acquired huge moral authority and broad influence in political decision-making in the Community. What started out in 1951 as just a Consultative Assembly for a specialised coal and steel community is, in 2009, being elected by direct universal suffrage for the seventh time and represents the peoples and nations of 27 European countries with a total of 500 million inhabitants.

From one treaty to the next Parliament has gradually acquired legislative powers that have made it a key discussion partner for the Member States, with an increasingly direct influence on people’s everyday lives.
It is also acknowledged that Parliament’s political driving force is fed by the vitality of its political groups. These have, since the European Parliament’s earliest days under the founding treaty, taken the revolutionary approach in international relations of having their Members sit not in national delegations, but in transnational political families.

The Christian Democrats from the six founding countries – the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – formally decided on 23 June 1953 to sit together in the House, like the two other political families of the period, the socialists and the liberals.

The time has come for this Group, which has become increasingly diverse and powerful over the years, to set about the vital task of recording its history, which will give it a stronger sense of identity and help to give greater direction to what it is doing today.

The Group as an historical subject and object

Since it was created the Christian-Democratic Group, which in 1979 became the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats), in 1999 the Group of the European People’s Party and European Democrats (EPP-ED), and in June 2009 the Group of the European People’s Party, has constantly influenced the life and development of the European Parliament and, through that institution, the process of European integration itself.

The EPP Group in the European Parliament has thus become an historical ‘object’ whose actions must now be assessed and the most important lessons passed on to both researchers and the general public. This ‘historical object’ is both a rich and complex one.

What was and is the Christian-Democratic Group? First of all, it is an institution which has progressively asserted its position, power and political authority in the European Parliament itself. Next, it is an actor which has assumed an ever greater role in the process of European integration by exercising a direct influence on the Heads of State and Government as political decision-makers. The Group has been able to call on increasingly substantial resources and has adopted a proactive European strategy in order to achieve this. Last but not least, the Group is the structure which has enabled men and women from a wide variety of socio-professional backgrounds, political persuasions and cultural and regional origins to work together to promote a particular concept of European integration and shared values.
All sorts of prominent figures have left their mark on the Group over the years, some more so than others. Some MEPs, like shooting stars, only had time to shine in the Group for the two months, or sometimes less, that they were formally members, after leading their party list in the European elections and before they rejoined the rough-and-tumble of national politics. By contrast, others would decide to build a lasting career in the European Parliament, gradually taking over the reins of command and deploying all the necessary skills in dealing with the most important key issues. Karl von Wogau, Hans-Gert Pöttering and Ingo Friedrich are the only MEPs in the Group and, apart from a few very rare exceptions, in Parliament as a whole, to have been Members continuously from 1979 to 2009.

What this means is that the Group as an historical ‘subject’ is anything but a homogeneous organisation with spontaneously converging aims. Ultimately it is this diversity, the different types of people, national cultures, parliamentary traditions and working methods, that makes the Group what it is. A melting-pot for the complexities of a post-modern world where soft power allows interests to be managed over time and through negotiation, the EPP Group is one of a number of prototypes for the collective actors that are shaping today’s world.

Between 1952 and 2009 the Group has had 1061 MEPs. It has met more than 200 times in locations other than the normal working places of Strasbourg, Brussels and Luxembourg. From Andalucia to Lapland, from Berlin and Riga to Malta, the Group has been the travelling salesman of Christian Democracy, Moderates and Conservatives in Europe, supporting governments and parties belonging to its political family. It has particularly promoted groups which hold the centre-right together, thereby stabilising democracy in Europe.

The decision to examine the past also demonstrates our conviction that the future of European integration, which we cannot predict because it is constantly developing, needs to be based on experience. Knowledge of the past always provides useful lessons in politics. Those involved in the life of the Group since 1953, both MEPs and officials, have gradually made the Group what it is. The MEPs elected by the people of Europe in 2009 from the political forces represented by the EPP Group will thus benefit from the legacy of those who have gone before, and will, in their turn, have to take up that legacy and add to it.

---

a To be precise, between 1952 and January 2009.

Ed.: The footnotes are explanatory and are in characters; the endnotes are references and are in Arabic numerals (Annex 10).

b The CD Group, which became the EPP Group then the EPP-ED Group, has met in all the 27 EU Member States (except Lithuania) as well as in Croatia, Bosnia and Turkey.
The method used: written sources, personal accounts and a desire for transparency

This history of the Group, covering more than 50 years, has been largely drawn from three sources.

– First and foremost, written sources: the unpublished minutes of meetings of the Group’s various bodies, the proceedings of Symposia and Study Days, personal memoirs and internal notes, and reports of the debates and votes in the European Parliament.

– Secondly, oral accounts obtained by interviewing the Group’s former chairmen and Secretaries General. Interviewing more widely would undoubtedly have provided us with a host of other very interesting opinions, but we would then have had to decide who to choose, and the exercise would soon have reached its methodological limits.

– Lastly, the author’s own experiences in the institution since 1979 gave him enough information to attempt to reconstruct the daily lives of the MEPs and officials endlessly travelling between their home region, their national capital, Brussels and Strasbourg; and also to describe the Group’s culture, procedures, traditions, points of reference and even rituals, as well as the expectations, sources of pride and disappointments of the men and women who give such a commitment to the cause, thereby becoming members if not of a family, then at least of a tribe governed by its own codes and taboos.

Any account given by an ‘insider’ must try to be both fair and objective, though absolute objectivity is, by definition, impossible to achieve. The main aim was therefore to try to be objective by adopting the position of an observer wherever possible.

Why is the book called ‘Voyage to the Heart of Europe’?

It is an invitation to travel through time across almost sixty years of European history.

It is also a journey to the ‘heart’ of an institution, studying its mechanisms, its motivations and its customs. This ‘inside view’ can be seen as a contribution to the efforts to achieve transparency which all those involved in the political life of the EU institutions need to undertake in order to establish, or restore, the greatest possible trust between the people of Europe and their representatives.

Lastly, the EPP Group has positioned itself at the centre of Parliament since its earliest days, even if it has tended to move further to the right over the last decade for strategic reasons which will be explained in detail. It is clear that the EPP is firmly rooted in the
popular, moderate middle classes that form the core of our societies. It has always occupied this central position in Parliament, not just in terms of its political stance, but also in the responsibilities it has shouldered. In the period between 1979 and 2009, for instance, which covers the six elected terms, the Group has provided five of the 12 European Parliament Presidents\(^a\) compared with four for the Socialist Group, two for the Liberal Group and one for the Conservative Group. The election of Jerzy Buzek on 14 July 2009 gave the EPP a further President of Parliament for the period from July 2009 to January 2012.

In August 1988 the Group decided to adopt ‘the heart of Europe’ as its logo and slogan. In January 2009 the Group, now called the EPP-ED Group, added to its ‘brand image’ by adopting the label ‘The EPP-ED Group: Europe’s driving force’.

There may be documents, legislation, rules and slogans, but there are also men and women with their commitment, energy and enthusiasm. The symbolism is there for everyone to interpret in their own way.

Structure of the book

The book presents almost 60 years of history covering three generations of MEPs:

– Those born before the First World War, who lived through the dramatic events that flanked the rise of extremist violence and the outbreak of the Second World War. The Founding Fathers and most of the members of the Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) belonged to this generation, and they were primarily motivated by the desire for peace and to rebuild Europe on a sound economic footing.

  These were the pioneers: 1952-1979 (Part I).

– Those born just before or during the Second World War, whose own family memories were vivid enough to make them feel a personal interest in building a Europe that would promote reconciliation and economic well-being. They ensured the success of the Treaty of Rome and the Single Act, and were determined to bring about practical European integration that would enable Europe’s economy to modernise and develop into a huge marketplace. This generation also came up with

---

\(^a\) Pierre Pfimlin, Egon Klepsch, José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado, Nicole Fontaine, Hans-Gert Pöttering. Lord Plumb was President of Parliament before the Conservative Group joined the EPP Group.
the idea of introducing common policies promoting social solidarity and regional cohesion. They used the advent of direct, universal elections to the European Parliament as a springboard to increase Parliament’s powers in relation to the Council and Commission, to win for it new powers in the EU’s institutional system and to ensure its involvement in the major project for monetary union and the euro through the Maastricht Treaty.

These were the builders: 1979-1994 (Part II).

– The third generation, born after the war, see the European Union as the natural stage for their political activities. They realise that ordinary people in the Member States want to be more involved in the various aspects of European integration. Their main objectives now are greater transparency, greater closeness to citizens, greater control over the Commission and less anonymous bureaucracy. At the same time this generation has helped and supported the awakening of the other Europe, the Europe which, in the words of Milan Kundera1 had been ‘kidnapped’ by Stalin until the rebirth of democracy from 1989/1990 onwards. The priority then for the Members of the EPP Group was to adapt the European Union to the demands of reuniting the continent. The priority had to be to try to put right the injustices of history.

The move from a Union of 12 to 27 members meant that institutional reforms were needed. How could enlargement be achieved without inevitable dilution? This was the challenge which the Group hoped to overcome by lending majority support to the draft European Constitution, until it was rejected in two referenda in 2005. The Lisbon Treaty, once it was finally adopted, proved to be a less spectacular but probably equally effective alternative for giving the European Parliament extra powers after its seventh elections in 2009, particularly in the field of legislative co-decision.

The EPP Group has itself adapted to the changes in the political model that have proved necessary at the start of the 21st century. The post-war Christian-Democratic parties have gradually readjusted their beliefs and aims to take account of the changing electorate. While still confirming their commitment to humanist and personalist values, they have expanded to incorporate moderate and Conservative political groups in Scandinavia and Central and Eastern Europe, which place the emphasis on efficiency and individual responsibility to stimulate the economy. In the end the EPP Group has identified itself with the broad centre-right family that has become the majority in Europe. It changed its name to the EPP-ED Group in 1999 in order to secure an
Alliance with the British Conservatives, who do not share all of its pro-European ideas. Thanks to this strategy of openness and inclusiveness the EPP-ED Group has been able to consolidate its leading position in the European Parliament since 1999.

These have been the reformers: 1994-2009 (Part III).

The elections of 4 and 7 June 2009 were a spectacular success for the Group. Even though the British Conservatives and the Czech ODS representatives (which formed the European Democrat (ED) Part) had already said that they were leaving, the Group has 265 MEPs elected in 26 countries, representing 36% of all MEPs, i.e. a total more or less equivalent to what it had in the previous term. The Group has again become the ‘Group of the EPP’ and is further distancing itself from the Socialist Group. The 2009 elections would therefore seem to have provided the EPP Group with the trump cards in the European game opening up for the 2009-2014 term.

These three generations of Europeans in the CD/EPP-ED/EPP Group thus correspond to three major cycles in history. We are already beginning to see the handover to the fourth generation of the Group’s MEPs, who have grown up in the era of the Internet, globalisation, post-Communism and Jihadist terrorism.

There will continue for a few years to be a certain cultural and memory gap between those raised and educated on either side of the former Iron Curtain. Some will have physically lost contact with family memories of the horrors of Fascism, Nazism and the Second World War. Others will still have friends and family who suffered under or witnessed Communism and dictatorship, and will still see freedom and national identity as vitally necessary. As these two collective memories gradually merge, they will help to achieve a new and necessary ambition, which is to create a Europe ready to confront the as yet unknown challenges of the 21st century.

---

a In February 2009 the EPP-ED Group had 288 MEPs compared with 217 for the Socialist Group in a Parliament of 785 Members. It should be noted that the number of officials of all categories attached to the Group on that date was also 288. The seven political groups in Parliament employ 809 people. The European Parliament administration employs 5100 officials.
Part one
THE PIONEERS (1952-1979)
Chapter I
BEGINNING TO BUILD A UNITED EUROPE

The birth of the Christian-Democratic Group

At nine o’clock on the morning of Tuesday 16 June 1953, 12 Christian-Democratic MPs from France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg sat down together in Room 054 of the Maison de l’Europe in Strasbourg for the first official meeting of the Christian-Democratic Group in the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Chairing the gathering, Emmanuel Sassen welcomed the other participants: Margaretha Klompé, Alfred Bertrand, Antonio Boggiano-Pico, Eugen Gerstenmaier, Hermann Kopf, Nicolas Margue, Georg Pelster, Willem Rip, Armando Sabatini, Italo Mario Sacco, Franz Josef Strauss and Pierre Wigny. A number of meetings had already been held since the Common Assembly’s inaugural sitting on 10 September 1952 but no formal decisions had been taken. There was no provision in the ECSC Treaty for the formation of political groups. Articles 20-25 merely stipulated that ‘representatives of the peoples of the Member States’ were to be designated by the national parliaments once a year.

The number of delegates to the Common Assembly reflected the population of each Member State, with more generous representation for the medium-sized and smaller countries. Thus Germany, France and Italy each had 18 members, Belgium and the Netherlands had 10 each and Luxembourg had four. The Treaty provided that the Assembly should hold an annual session, split into a number of periods. It was endowed with powers of supervision over the High Authority (the ECSC executive), including the ultimate sanction of a vote of censure by a two-thirds majority. Crucially the Assembly was empowered to adopt its own rules of procedure, and it was on that basis that the political groups would come into being.

The Christian Democrats confirmed Dutch member Emmanuel Sassen as Group Chairman and appointed his fellow countryman Willem J. Schuijt – seconded to the Group by the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales in Paris – as acting secretary to take the minutes.
The Group bureau was to be made up of two members from each of the three larger countries (France, Germany and Italy) and one from each of the Benelux countries. Its initial membership thus comprised Chairman Emmanuel Sassen and eight other members – two German, two French, two Italian, one Belgian and one from Luxembourg – namely, Hermann Kopf and Franz Josef Strauss, Ernst Müller-Hermann and Alain Poher, Ludovico Montini and Italo Mario Sacco, Théodore Lefèvre (temporarily replaced by Pierre Wigny) and Nicolas Margue. The Group was to be run by the presidency and the bureau. The presidency, comprising the Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen, was empowered to call and direct Group meetings, to lead the Group in the Common Assembly’s plenary sittings and to represent it externally.

This first official meeting was opened by the Chairman at 9.25 a.m. There were two items on the agenda. The first was a report by Belgian delegate Alfred Bertrand, a leading figure in the Christian-Democratic movement, on behalf of the Social Affairs Committee. It concerned plans for public rented housing for steel workers, financed by the ECSC: Europe was thus already exploring the economic and social dimension of the common market that it was seeking to create in the coal and steel sectors.

The second item for discussion concerned the official constitution of the political group in accordance with Article 33 of the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure. The members present agreed unanimously that the Christian-Democratic Group – which, like the Socialist and Liberal Groups, had been meeting informally up to that point – must now enjoy formal recognition.

The Assembly was in favour and so, on 23 June, the Christian-Democratic Group was able to announce its official existence: ‘I the undersigned, Emmanuel Sassen, hereby declare that on this day, 23 June 1953, in accordance with Article 33 bis of the Rules of Procedure of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community, a political group, to be known in French as the “Groupe Démocrate-Chrétien”, in German as the “Christlich-Demokratische Fraktion”, in Italian as the “Gruppo Democratico-Cristiano” and in Dutch as the “Christen-Democratische Fractie”, has been constituted in Strasbourg.’ Thirty-eight of the Common Assembly’s 78 delegates were members, making this the leading political group.

A new institution had been established. Much work now lay ahead.
The Schuman initiative of 9 May 1950 and the ‘founding fathers’

In September 1952, when the Common Assembly of the ECSC held its first meeting, the European adventure was in its infancy. It had begun just two years previously on 9 May 1950, when an initiative by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman offered Germany and the other countries struggling to their feet after the Second World War a chance to reshape Europe’s destiny. No longer should they be doomed to re-enact centuries-old conflicts: it was imperative to build a new structure within which the victors and the vanquished would enjoy equal treatment and would come to regard their future as a shared enterprise. The vicious circle built on dreams of domination and revenge needed to be broken. Nationalism needed to be eradicated and Western Europe needed to be rebuilt both spiritually and materially. For the continent had been split in two since 1945, a large part of it having been occupied by Soviet forces and placed under Communist dictatorship.

This was the background against which Robert Schuman took his historically significant initiative.

Who was this Robert Schuman? A true child of the borderlands, he was born in 1886 in Luxembourg where his father lived as an exile from Lorraine; he studied law and set up in practice in Metz in 1912. First elected to represent Moselle in the French Parliament in 1919, he was arrested by the Nazis during the Second World War but escaped and went on the run. After serving as Finance Minister in 1946 and Prime Minister in 1947, he became Minister for Foreign Affairs in July 1948 and held the post until July 1953. His vision, indeed his obsession, was the re-establishment of trust between France and Germany. During the spring of 1950, in conversations with Jean Monnet, whom he held in high regard, he repeatedly raised the issue of ‘What do we do about Germany?’. The United States was pressurising France in the quest for a lasting solution that would allow the defeated Germany to return to the Western fold. Jean Monnet came up with the answer on 3 May when he outlined plans to pool coal and steel production. Robert Schuman immediately grasped the potential of the idea and shouldered political

a It is fair to think of Jean Monnet as the inspiration for the European Community, as it was he who proposed the necessary decision-making and institutional mechanisms. Having served as Deputy General Secretary of the League of Nations just after the First World War, he played a key role alongside Franklin Roosevelt in convincing the United States to lend its full weight to the struggle against Nazism. He was summoned by General de Gaulle in 1945 to direct the economic modernisation of France, and from then until 1979, although never himself in the limelight, he exercised great influence with the political leaders of Western Europe.
responsibility for it. His initiative, presented on behalf of France, was supported by Konrad Adenauer in Germany and by Alcide De Gasperi in Italy.

Konrad Adenauer was born on 1 January 1876 in Cologne. He became the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and held the post from 1949 to 1963. A native of the Rhineland, he developed a humanist, historically informed vision of his country and its relations with France. As one of the founders of the Christian-Democratic movement in the Federal Republic, he grasped the full potential for Germany, and for continuing peace in Europe, of the proposed equality among nations within shared European institutions – the nub of Robert Schuman's plan.

Alcide De Gasperi was a man of essentially the same political stripe – his own destiny intertwined with that of the European cause. Born on 3 April 1881, he was elected to the Italian Parliament in 1921 to represent the province of Trentino, which prior to the First World War had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. A German-speaking Italian and, like Schuman and Adenauer, a practising Catholic, he supported the vision of a Europe based on common values. As Prime Minister of Italy and a founder of the Christian-Democratic movement there, he put the full authority of his office behind Schuman's plan.

Christian Democrat and other democratic forces in the Benelux countries were also thinking along similar lines. The free world had to be capable of a robust response to aggression from Moscow. The North Atlantic Treaty had been signed on 4 April 1949 but the free peoples of Europe needed to do more than surround themselves with military guarantees and rely on the American presence. They needed to rebuild Europe's economy on a basis of free competition and open borders. That was why the ECSC Six had initially decided to run with Jean Monnet's idea, focusing their efforts on those basic industries that had so often in the past been a bone of contention between France and Germany as each side strove to maximise its holdings and its output.

By proposing to put French and German coal and steel under the control of a single authority and to enable both products to move freely within the Community, the Schuman Plan settled the question of production levels in the Ruhr and calmed French fears of the German industrial cartels reforming. The ECSC was to establish the principle of equal rights and equal duties among the victorious and the vanquished powers within a new organisation to which certain areas of sovereignty would be freely delegated. The Schuman Plan method was truly revolutionary inasmuch as it established an authority independent of
national governments yet empowered to take decisions that would be binding on the Member States.

The Treaty of Paris, signed on 18 April 1951, was the instrument that brought the ECSC into being: the first post-war organisation to put all participating states on an equal footing in law. Most importantly, it was the first supranational political system in the history of international relations. The High Authority was set up with considerable powers in its areas of competence for the common market in coal and steel. A Council of Ministers represented the governments of the Member States, and this unprecedented interinstitutional ensemble was completed by a Common Assembly composed of national MPs designated by their respective parliaments and a Court of Justice to deliver consistent interpretation of the law. In the eyes of some observers the ECSC was ‘pre-federal’ in character; for others, including the Christian Democrats, the key word in its name was ‘community’. Its establishment marked the birth of the community-based institutional system. It was the kernel around which – year upon year, treaty upon treaty, through crisis after crisis and enlargement after enlargement – the European Union would gradually take shape.

The ECSC as the first stage on the road to European integration

This prototype community delivered very real achievements. The early years saw an intensification of trade among the six Member States. At the instigation of the High Authority and under the Common Assembly’s supervision, they abolished customs duties and quotas as well as export taxes in transport tariffs, while at the same time introducing direct international tariffs. Intra-Community trade in coal and steel increased substantially. Finally, the coal shortage, which had almost killed off the European iron and steel industry after the war, was largely overcome. The regular supply of iron ore, scrap metal and coal made it possible to regulate industrial growth within the Six.

February 1953 saw the beginning of the common market in coal, scrap metal and iron ore; and in May of the same year the arrangement was extended to cover steel products. Jean Monnet, as President of the High Authority, could state with conviction that: ‘Since 10 February 1953, there has been no German, Belgian, French, Italian or Luxembourg coal – only European coal moving freely between our six countries, which in this respect form a single territory.'
On 1 January 1953, the first European tax – the ECSC levy – began to be applied. Steel producers had a five-year period to adapt to the new conditions of competition. Thanks to state aid, Italy successfully modernised its iron and steel industry.

The ECSC played an important role in the social field. It encouraged improvements in health and safety at work and improvements in vocational training. The Treaty of Paris, which aimed among other things to improve the standard of living of the ECSC’s workforce, provided for Community financial aid for the retraining of dismissed workers and banned the practice of lowering wages as a competitive device.

The achievements of the ECSC were felt on two fronts. It did away with customs duties and quotas in coal and steel trading among the Member States and eliminated discriminatory practices in transport pricing, at the same time helping to promote smoother industrial growth within the Six. In addition, it implemented a social policy that benefited coal-mining communities affected by restructuring. Ultimately it constituted a major advance on the road to European integration. As Jean Monnet put it: ‘This Community of ours is not a coal and steel producers’ association: it is the beginning of Europe.’

The Group as an institution within an institution

In the act of establishing itself in 1953, the Christian-Democratic Group in the ECSC Common Assembly made a defining contribution to the spirit of Europe’s institutions.

The MPs sent to the Assembly by their respective national parliaments had a choice under the terms of the ECSC Treaty. On arrival in Strasbourg, the provisional seat of the new Assembly, they could have organised themselves in national delegations. There would thus have been a German delegation, an Italian delegation and so on, in the familiar manner of international parliamentary assemblies. But such a configuration would have been at odds with the founding fathers’ vision. The whole process of European integration initiated by Schuman’s declaration was essentially political. Its aim was to change the prevailing mind-set in intra-European relations – the mind-set that made national interest the first and only consideration, the mind-set of the Vienna Congress, of inter-state alliances and of one-off, fragile and impermanent coalitions. The Community, by contrast, set out to accomplish a ‘peaceful revolution’. Such had been the aim of the Christian Democrats when they met informally in Chaudfontaine in Belgium in May 1947. That was where they set up the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI), forerunner of the European Union of Christian Democrats
(UEDC) founded in 1965 and later to become the European People’s Party (EPP), which in turn was established in 1976 as a federation of Christian-Democratic parties involved in preparations for the 1979 European elections.

Similar steps were taken by the Socialists and the Liberals, the only other democratic political forces on the post-war scene who decided to organise themselves as transnational ‘families’.

A consensus thus emerged among the three groups, in favour of creating a legal structure for transnational parliamentary groups in the ECSC Assembly, thereby making them key players in the institution right from the outset. Over the years the role of political groups in the European Parliament was to grow apace. With sufficient funding and enough personnel at their disposal to be organisationally independent, the MPs in the Group could focus on making their political efforts as cohesive as possible, guided by their common European values and goals. It is reasonable to see the European Parliament’s remarkable internal energy – and the vitality it displayed in asserting itself as a major protagonist in the Community’s interinstitutional dynamic – as products of those first members’ instinctive understanding of the role and potential of political groups.

Controlling the agenda through the Conference of Presidents, the group chairmen dictated the Assembly’s workrate and its political programme.

In accordance with the ‘d’Hondt method’, which was to be established among the groups, all parliamentary offices (committee chairmanships and membership of the Bureau) were shared on a proportional basis, with the leading group first in line. The Christian Democrats were not slow to grasp the importance of their position as the numerically strongest group. It meant that the Group Chairman was the first speaker called to respond to any address by the President-in-Office of the Council or the President of the Commission. The political profile of the groups as a reflection of their numerical strength thus became an influential factor in the Assembly’s life, effectively turning the Christian-Democratic Group, as the largest among them, into an institution within the institution. The Christian-Democratic Group remained the largest in the Assembly/Parliament from 1953 to 1975, and it has been the largest in the European Parliament from 1999 to

a Accordingly, the Christian-Democratic Group held the presidency of the Assembly 10 times between 1952 and 1979 (with Presidents Alcide de Gasperi, Giuseppe Pella, Hans Furler twice, Robert Schuman, Jean Duvieusart, Victor Leemans, Alain Poher, Mario Scelba and Emilio Colombo). This compares with the Socialists’ record of four presidencies and the Liberals’ of one during the same period.
2009. It has thus been the leading group for 32 of the 56 years that a European parliamentary forum has existed.

The Christian-Democratic family and its values

It took a measure of foresight and political courage for the representatives of the six countries concerned to embark on the shared enterprise of a political group. Their ‘family ties’ had to be patiently cultivated, overcoming both physical borders and mental barriers. Prior to 1950, contacts among them had been infrequent and prejudices stubbornly persisted. When Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi, the Christian-Democratic leaders in their respective countries, came together and experienced a meeting of minds it was a decisive moment. Each man was inspired by the same Christian conviction that reconciling hereditary foes and moving beyond aggressive nationalism was a moral duty they were bound to assume on behalf of France, Germany and Italy. They had no difficulty in convincing their respective party members in the ECSC Assembly to join forces in a single Christian-Democratic Group. The Christian-Democratic parties in the three Benelux countries supported the movement and played an active part in it.

It was a mind-set in which the European ideal became one with Christian-Democratic values. As Hans-August Lücker explained, ‘it was certainly no accident of history but rather the workings of providence that after the second world war, in Europe’s greatest hour of need, Alcide De Gasperi found in Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer two comrades-in-arms who have gone into the pages of history with him as men worthy of the high task to which history called them. Their task was to discern accurately the destiny that awaited Europe in a radically changed world and they succeeded in finding within themselves the great courage and moral strength to surmount discouragement and despair and to open the eyes of the peoples of Europe to a new goal. As well as this they awakened new hope and spurred new energies which in the years to follow were to build up the new Europe of peace, zeal for the common good and social justice. Truly Alcide De Gasperi, Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer had grasped the hem of Christ’s mantle, that same Christ that walks through all History!’

For these men of the post-war era, the European ideal was a spiritually innovative one inasmuch as it prioritised the pursuit of peace over struggles for power and the spirit of democratic equality over discrimination and authoritarianism. These values of peace, democracy and freedom were a radical counterpoint to the woes that had afflicted
the continent since the fall of the four empires – Austro-Hungarian, German, Russian and Ottoman – which had shaped the geopolitical landscape before 1914. Since 1918, on the ruins of that landscape and the graves of 50 million soldiers and civilians, a series of the most tragic and absurd experiments had been conducted. Extreme ideologies had once again led people into the abyss of war. Democratic forces had failed to withstand the resurgence of violence at home and conflict abroad.

In the 1930s, certain precursors of Christian Democracy advocating a federal Europe had been thinking along the right lines but they had not been heeded. Don Sturzo attempted in Italy, and among other political movements inspired by Catholic social doctrine, to put the new current of thought on a federal footing at European level by creating a transnational team. He prepared the ground for what was to develop after 1945 into the Christian-Democratic movement, but conditions in the inter-war years did not favour realisation of his vision. Italy, Germany, France and Belgium – where Emmanuel Mounier’s Personalist Movement had aroused a degree of sympathy – found themselves sucked into the maelstrom of the Second World War.

The members of the Christian-Democratic Group had followed the vision of a federated Europe because peace seemed to them a complex and fragile edifice. The political priority of the day was to consolidate it and to maintain the freedom that the Western European democracies enjoyed. Naturally the long-term aim was reunification of the continent under the banner of freedom.

Hans-August Lücker recalled with feeling his first encounter, at a Christian-Democratic Group meeting, with one of the French members of the Group, René Charpentier. The place was Strasbourg, the date 1953. Charpentier had approached with hand outstretched and said: ‘You’re Hans-August Lücker. I’ve heard about you. I’m coming to talk to you because I want to be your friend.’ Lücker continued: ‘I didn’t ask him, but I knew that he had been tortured by the Nazis in Dachau. Both his legs had been broken and he was on crutches. I felt extremely uncomfortable and I told him so. “Don’t worry about it,” he replied. “I survived, didn’t I?” He had a big farm in the Champagne region. That was the beginning of our friendship and our work together.’

Looking back, it is vital to recall the basic values that Christian Democracy espoused in those years: the dignity and primacy of the human individual, freedom coupled with responsibility, fundamental personal rights, justice, solidarity between individuals and communities, rejection of totalitarian ideologies and the concept of action at the core of political life.
Hans-Gert Pöttering conveyed a sense of the founding fathers’ initial commitment when the EPP-ED Group celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Schuman Plan in May 2000: ‘Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi urged France, Germany, Italy and the other countries of Europe to pool their material resources and their political will in working together to develop their common interests, with the support of institutions committed to upholding the rule of law and the principle of equality. With the success of their political initiative those statesmen were enabled to deliver an effective impetus for a return to civilised values in Europe. We, as Christian Democrats and European Democrats, well know that the Community project had assumed a moral significance from its very foundations and found its rightful place in the humanist tradition that underpins our fundamental values.’

The EDC: a disappointment for the Christian-Democratic Group (1953-1954)

The specific threat to that set of values shared by the western world was the Soviet Union. Powerless to act in support of the central and eastern European nations subjected to Soviet control and, in the cases of East Germany in 1951 and Hungary in 1956, to bloody repression, Europeans in the west had to endure an offensive on the home front by Stalinist Communist parties, as well threats of war directed by Moscow against ‘German revanchists’ and capitalist democracies.

On 25 June 1950, east-west antagonism was ratcheted up with the outbreak of war in Korea. The USA signalled clearly that it wanted Europeans to make a practical contribution to defence of the western camp. France – hostile to the re-emergence of an unfettered German army – floated the idea of integrating Germany’s armed forces into a joint European army. Negotiations on the French plan opened in Paris on 15 February 1951, with the six ECSC Member States around the table, and concluded with the signing of the European Defence Community Treaty on 27 May 1952.

The treaty provided for some 40 national divisions, with a combined total of 13,000 soldiers, to serve in European uniform. Supplies and equipment would be managed by a nine-member Board of Commissioners similar to the ECSC High Authority. A Parliamentary Assembly (the ECSC Common Assembly with the addition of three members for each of the larger states) would be able to dismiss the Board of Commissioners by a vote of censure and would participate in drawing up a common budget. A Council of Ministers would determine EDC policy.
and would be required to decide all important issues on a unanimous vote.

The fledgling Christian-Democratic Group was necessarily committed to active support for the EDC project, seeing the creation of a joint European army as a stride towards European federalism. Their support was intensified by the fact that Alcide De Gasperi, as Prime Minister of Italy, had just taken a major initiative of his own: urging that military integration be accompanied by political union. Surely – given the responsibilities that were at stake – the Defence Community required a government capable of taking the ultimate decisions on behalf of Europe’s citizens?

Alcide De Gasperi was tireless in arguing his case. ‘The European Army is not an end in itself,’ he said. ‘It is the instrument of a patriotic foreign policy. But European patriotism can develop only in a federal Europe.’

It was in order to achieve that aim more quickly that he had Article 38 inserted into the draft EDC treaty, providing for a common Assembly elected by direct universal suffrage and tasked with planning for a federal structure based on the separation of powers and a two-chamber parliament. A decision on the treaty still seemed like a distant and uncertain prospect, however, and for that reason De Gasperi proposed to Schuman that the ECSC Assembly should assume the task in the meantime. On 10 September 1952, Ministers from the six countries, meeting in Luxembourg, adopted this extremely bold suggestion. The following day the new Strasbourg-based Assembly was given six months to produce appropriate proposals, and it began by appointing an ‘ad hoc’ constitutional committee comprising those of its members best qualified for the task. As a form of constituent assembly, this ad hoc committee was required to sketch out what a European political community would look like.

Christian-Democratic delegates Heinrich von Brentano, Alain Poher, Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Pierre Wigny and Théodore Lefèvre understood that the defence of Europe was neither possible nor feasible in the absence of an institutional authority enjoying democratic legitimacy. A constitution therefore had to be drafted.

On 10 March 1953 the ad hoc committee adopted a draft text proposing a highly ambitious political structure: a parliament with two chambers, one of which was to be elected by direct universal suffrage and to be endowed with legislative powers; an executive council; a council of ministers; and a court of justice. Both the ECSC and the EDC would be subsumed into this future European Political Community (EPC).

On 30 August 1954, however, a majority in the French National Assembly, composed of Communists and Gaullists, a section of the
socialist bloc and a number of radicals, blocked ratification of the EDC Treaty by voting in favour of a preliminary question. The Italian Government, which had been awaiting the outcome of the French vote, also declined to ratify the draft.

The EPC project outlined by the ad hoc committee was thus rendered null and void – a severe blow to the European ideal.

Why did France turn its back on the plan that it had originally instigated for a European army? The explanation lay in the changing international situation. Stabilisation of the Korean conflict and Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953 had served to ease Cold War tensions. The anti-EDC lobby argued that creation of a defence community could split the French army in two, with part of it under integrated command in Europe and the rest in the French overseas territories. Opponents of the project in France also drew on hostility to German rearmament, and on emotive arguments about the nature of the army as an ultimate symbol of national sovereignty.

With hindsight, the spring of 1953 would seem to represent the zenith of the European federalist ideal. Was it a realistic aspiration, or was it too far ahead of its time?

**Christian Democrats unbowed**

While the Christian-Democratic Group voiced its disappointment after the collapse of the EDC project, it refused to give up. On 29 November 1954, Giuseppe Pella, in his first address as President of the ECSC Common Assembly, stated the position in his own lyrical and passionate fashion: ‘A thick, dark curtain would seem to have fallen across the bright horizon of our hopes – or, more accurately, our convictions. I beg to be allowed, however, to eschew pessimism; to reject it with the determination of one who refuses to break his stride on account of evanescent misgivings. And I say “no” to pessimism both on the broader front of our vision for Europe and in the narrower arena of our Community […]. Our aspiration is nothing less than the creation of Europe: a Europe based on the principle of supranationalism, a Europe built not on conflict between nations but on genuine cooperation among nations […]. The first task is to ensure that all the institutions of the Community are pulling together to achieve in full the aims of treaty in the most meaningful sense, in other words in a spirit of solidarity, cooperation and integration […]. Secondly – and without demagoguery but with the most vigorous determination – the work of the Community needs to be imbued with the social spirit that these times demand, within each country and also at international and supranational level, focusing on improved wellbeing and greater justice […]. The third task is to create the right conditions
beginning to build a united Europe

and complete the preliminary steps for forging and steadily strengthening the links between our Community and those countries that are not members of it." On 1 December 1954 Pierre Wigny expanded on the theme: ‘We have to be capable of learning from experience and we must listen to the objections in order to be able to refute them. The task of taking Europe’s economic institutions forward now rests almost entirely on our shoulders.”

A second wind at Messina leads to the signing of the Rome treaties (1955-1957)

The impetus to get Europe moving again came partly from Jean Monnet and partly from the Benelux countries. In the immediate aftermath of the EDC setback, Monnet decided that he needed more freedom of movement and announced that he would not seek another term as President of the ECSC High Authority. He then set out his vision for a new European Community specifically concerned with civil nuclear energy. Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak and his Dutch and Luxembourg counterparts, Johan Willem Beyen and Joseph Bech respectively, were more interested in developing a broader commercial and industrial common market among the ECSC Six: an economic imperative already identified by members of the Christian-Democratic Group. Both these approaches – one centring on a European Atomic Energy Community and the other, promoted by the Benelux nations, on creation of a more wide-ranging common market – won strong support from the CDU Minister for the Economy in Bonn, Ludwig Erhard, father of the ‘economic miracle’ in the German Federal Republic. The two proposals were combined in what became known as the ‘Benelux memorandum’.

On 9 May 1955 the Christian-Democratic Group voted with the great majority of Assembly members to support the relaunch. The memorandum was adopted by the six Foreign Ministers when they met in Messina on 1-2 June 1955 to appoint a successor to Jean Monnet. The fresh injection of momentum at Messina revived the hopes of the Christian-Democratic Group. What mattered was the continuing pursuit of solidarity and integration. A working party was set up under the chairmanship of Paul-Henri Spaak.

Christian Democrats on the alert as negotiations progress

The Christian-Democratic Group threw itself into the role of supporting the relaunch and focusing it in line with the European convictions
of its members. The key dynamic here was close cooperation between the negotiating committee, set up by the Member States, and the Common Assembly. Giuseppe Pella, as President of the Assembly, commented: ‘[…] Over recent months the Assembly has successfully performed the political task incumbent on it under the Treaty and it will continue to play the role of instigator both within the terms of the Treaty and in relation to the broader aim of building a new Europe.’

The Christian Democrats sought to exert parliamentary control over the work of the intergovernmental working party (the so-called Brussels Committee) and to make practical proposals both to its members and to the governments of the ECSC Member States. The common market had to be based on a customs union and on an economic union with provision for the free movement not only of goods, services and capital but also of workers. In keeping with the spirit of solidarity, Community support needed to be put in place in the form of a readaptation fund, and measures were required to harmonise social costs. It was also necessary to establish institutions with the powers required for translating these principles into practice: ‘We call on the Governments of the Member States, as a matter of urgency, to conclude a treaty based on these principles.’

On 29 May 1956 the working party’s final report was submitted to the conference of Foreign Ministers in Venice. It contained detailed proposals for the creation of a European Atomic Energy Community and a European Economic Community. The proposals addressed technical arrangements for economic integration and solutions to the institutional problem that had been highlighted by the failure of the EDC. The new institutions were to be a Council of Ministers, a European Commission, a Court of Justice and a Parliamentary Assembly. The ECSC Common Assembly was to be the new Parliamentary Assembly, although certain changes were to be made: there were to be more seats and they were to be shared differently among the Member States. The Assembly was also to have additional powers to supervise the Commission.

The outcome of the negotiations was the signing on 25 March 1957 of the Rome treaties: one establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), the other the EAEC, better known as Euratom. The process of European unification had found a second wind.

---

a The report covered the structure of a common market, provisions for customs duties and the elimination of quotas, agriculture, free movement of persons, investment funds to assist under-developed countries, Europe’s familiar energy difficulties and the problem of institutions. A final section was devoted to the use of nuclear energy and Euratom.
Chapter II
THE RISE AND RISE
OF THE NEW EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES

The single Parliamentary Assembly (1958): ‘a butterfly emerges’

When the two new treaties came into force on 1 January 1958, the European Communities possessed three executive bodies: the ECSC High Authority; the Commission of the EEC, under Walter Hallstein, a close associate of German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who had been involved in negotiations both about the Schuman Plan and about the Rome treaties, and who was soon to make his authority felt; and the Euratom Commission.

Since 29 November 1954 the presidency of the ECSC Assembly had been held by Giuseppe Pella, successor to Alcide De Gasperi, whose early death had cut short his very significant commitment to the cause of European integration. Another Christian Democrat, the German Hans Furler, took over from Pella on 27 November 1956, the Christian-Democratic, Socialist and Liberal Groups having agreed that the presidency, held for a year with the possibility of renewal, should automatically go to the largest political group.

In February 1958, the Belgian Pierre Wigny was elected Chairman of the Christian-Democratic Group. When he was subsequently asked to take over the Belgian Foreign Ministry he was replaced by French colleague Alain Poher, on 6 October 1958.

Poher, a close associate of Robert Schuman, threw himself into the job and chaired the Group with a mixture of diplomacy and foresight until 7 March 1966, when he was elected to the presidency of the European Parliament. Meanwhile, in accordance with the agreed principle, the presidency had remained in the hands of the majority Christian-Democratic Group. Hans Furler, re-elected on 28 March 1960, served until 28 March 1964; his successor was the Belgian Christian Democrat Jean Duvieusart, who in turn was succeeded on 24 September 1965 by a fellow countryman, Victor Leemans, Alain Poher’s immediate predecessor. Poher held the office from 1966 to 1969.
Hans Furler’s top priority as President of the ECSC Assembly was to ensure that the influence of the parliamentary authority was not diluted through division of the institution into three assemblies. For him it was imperative that the three Communities should share a single assembly, supervising the three executives in accordance with the powers conferred on it by the treaties. In his presidential address to an extraordinary sitting of the Common Assembly on 27 November 1956, he argued his case: ‘On the basis of its development over the last few years, it is fair to say that the Common Assembly has acquired – through its energetic yet considered approach to its work – a position that reflects the power of the parliamentary ideal. Its achievements to date make it worthy of the trust that must necessarily be invested in it if it is to assume the parliamentary functions that will follow from enlargement of the existing Community or creation of the new Economic Community. The European Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and the general common market cannot have more than one parliamentary institution and that institution must emerge from the Common Assembly.’

This was commonsense and it was readily accepted by the Member States’ governments, so the European Parliamentary Assembly (EPA), which held its constituent meeting on 19 March 1958, became the common assembly for all three institutions.

Italian Christian Democrat Emilio Battista was later to recall his enthusiasm for this development: ‘The new Community institutions came into being on 11 January 1958, and the ECSC Common Assembly – a worthy body in many respects – prepared to metamorphose into the European Parliamentary Assembly, conscious of something like the state of grace that a butterfly must experience when it emerges from its chrysalis and lifts into flight for the first time.’

The number of Assembly members was increased from 78 to 142 and the Christian-Democratic representation rose from 38 to 67, ensuring that the Group remained the largest in the Chamber. This was the Assembly that officially assumed the name ‘European Parliament’ in 1962 and continued to expand at regular intervals, reflecting the first enlargements, the first direct elections in 1979, and then a further series of enlargements bringing its membership to a total of 785 by 2008.

Parliament asserts its independence with the choice of Robert Schuman as its President (March 1958)
The Rome treaties provided for the Assembly to appoint its President and officers (Article 140 of the EEC Treaty and Article 110 of the Euratom Treaty), but made no stipulations as to the means of appointment. At its constituent sitting in March 1958, the Assembly resisted attempts to undermine this measure of organisational autonomy after a conference of the six governments recommended to their respective representatives in the Assembly that they should vote for a candidate selected by the Member States. The parliamentary Bureau and the chairmen of the political groups responded by issuing a statement to the effect that the new Assembly intended to exercise its sovereign authority by taking its own decision on such recommendations. The candidacy of Robert Schuman was supported by all the political groups and it was he who was elected on 19 March 1958. Prior to the establishment of the Parliament elected by direct universal suffrage, the election of the President and 12 Vice-Presidents was generally held on the second Tuesday of March – the day of the opening sitting of the annual parliamentary session. In practice and in keeping with the rules of procedure applicable at that time, the President’s term of office covered the annual session. This relatively short term made it hard for Presidents to develop distinctive policies as the representatives of Parliament, scarcely affording them enough time to adapt to their various duties, so it became customary to renew the mandate by acclamation for a further year.

When Schuman took office in Strasbourg on 19 March 1958, he observed that, by virtue of its political activities and the many resolutions it had passed urging progress with political union, the Assembly was serving as a pioneer for Europe. Commission President Walter Hallstein also highlighted this role, commenting that: ‘The parliamentary Assembly is not only the guarantor of the Community’s supranational character, it is also the vigorous expression of its essentially political nature.’

On the same occasion, Pierre Wigny restated the major principles advocated by the Christian-Democratic Group. On the institutional front he affirmed that: ‘The Group is glad to see supervision of the three Communities entrusted to a single Assembly, whose Members will be elected by direct universal suffrage as soon as possible […]. In accordance with the established practice of the Common Assembly and its cooperation with the High Authority, the role of supervision will include initiative taking as well as censure; it will be exercised both in advance of decision making and after it; through the work of the parliamentary committees it will be ongoing; and it will extend to all the organs of the executive.’
added that: ‘Confrontation between the Council of Ministers and the Assembly is not simply a political option – it is a statutory duty.’

The entry into force of the Rome treaties thus led to the establishment of three distinct Communities with one Assembly and three Commissions. As Pierre-Henri Teitgen put it, however: ‘These are not three separate, different and rival governments; they are three ministries of what is a single, powerful government in emergence, the government of a federated, integrated Europe.’

**Euratom – ‘a problem of political will’**

On 19 March 1958, Pierre Wigny, speaking as co-rapporteur on the future European Atomic Energy Community when it was still under discussion among the Member States, had explained to the Assembly his keen interest in the project: ‘Euratom needs to be a shared venture so that the new and as yet relatively unharnessed forces for which it is responsible can finally be tamed for the good of humanity.’

‘Nuclear-sector activities are already so extensive and complex that it is impossible to work within a single-nation framework. So if Euratom did not exist we would have to invent it: without coordination of the nuclear sector at Community level, Europe could end up spreading its resources too thinly and achieving little.’

For his part, Christian-Democratic spokesman Hans Furler had declared: ‘Personally, and despite all the inherent political problems, I think there can be no doubt that this idea merits a warm welcome. The Atomic Energy Community, as we intend it, will be established not to produce nuclear weapons, but to give Europe the energy sources that it needs. Moreover, we are already part of the broader Atlantic community in that respect.’

The Suez Crisis of 1956 had constricted the supply of oil products to Europe. It was imperative that European unity be sustained so that the continent could be economically independent. France made a number of concessions to its partners concerning the common market, and in exchange Germany took a conciliatory tone on Euratom. The intergovernmental conference of October 1956 requested Louis Armand, (head of the French national railways), Franz Etzel (Vice-President of the ECSC High Authority) and Francesco Giordani (former Chairman of the Italian Committee for Nuclear Research) to draw up a report on Europe’s requirements and potential for generating electricity from nuclear energy. In May 1957, the report of the ‘Three Wise Men’ – entitled ‘A Target for Euratom’ – noted the extent to which European countries were dependent on oil from the Middle East. The Six were responsible for just 15% of the world’s energy production, so there was
a constant risk of oil becoming a device for exerting huge international pressure. The document anticipated energy imports into Europe doubling, even tripling over the next few years. Accordingly, it recommended the building of nuclear power stations. Euratom was therefore established in parallel to the EEC, and the new parliamentary assembly became responsible for supervising all three executives.

Soon, however, certain fundamental differences began to emerge among the six Euratom members with regard to the aims and resources of the new Atomic Energy Community, and these were compounded when the coming to power of General de Gaulle in France ushered in a new political era. The French wanted Euratom merely to complement their own nuclear programme and they attempted to impose their view that there should be no involvement by the European project in French nuclear weapons production. The other partners, by contrast, saw Euratom as a means of developing their national nuclear industries. Promoters of nuclear energy were convinced that this new power source would gradually offer a replacement for oil and coal. Their forecasts seemed all the more justified as the crisis triggered by events in Suez sent the price of oil products soaring. When supplies of oil from the Middle East were cut off, Europeans suddenly realised just how dependent they were with regard to energy – and reducing that dependency became a priority for European energy policy.

Italian member Mario Pedini proved to be the expert on energy issues within the Christian-Democratic Group. In a debate on Euratom’s general activity report, he predicted: ‘We shall not achieve security of supply until the day when Europe is able to look to the atom as a reliable, independent source of power that cannot be cut off and is immune to any form of political or economic blackmail by other markets.’

With a calmer political situation in the Middle East, oil prices fell again, making nuclear power uncompetitive. The most alarmist forecasts turned out to be mistaken as world oil reserves proved sufficient following the discovery of new deposits. The international supply was now well in excess of demand, and prices were driven downwards. Atomic energy was also made less competitive by delays on the completion of the new nuclear power stations. All in all, it no longer seemed to be a universal panacea. On the other hand, however, the Community’s dependence on imported oil doubled between 1958 and 1968.

The French Government made clear its lack of enthusiasm for Euratom in late 1961 when it opposed renewal of Etienne Hirsch’s term of office as President of the Euratom Commission: an ardent federalist, Hirsch had the backing of the Christian Democrats and wanted to give the Euratom Commission an effective role. Mario Pedini supported his
stance: ‘In the field of nuclear energy, as elsewhere, only a spirit of community is capable of putting Europe in the vanguard in terms of science, and providing a European response to what is the most important problem we face in this progressive century.’

He spoke in vain. Etienne Hirsch was replaced by one of General de Gaulle’s former ministers, Pierre Chatenet. Euratom began to look increasingly like an intergovernmental institution. Its budget, drawn from national contributions and not from its own resources like that of the ECSC, was based not on Community spending but rather on the cumulative cost of the individual member countries’ own research projects.

During the plenary sitting of the European Parliament in September 1964, Christian-Democratic spokesman Joseph Illerhaus highlighted the fact that Euratom had not yet effectively agreed on the means of implementing a common European nuclear energy policy.

There was, nonetheless, an evident need for such a policy because Europe was becoming increasingly dependent on external energy sources. Imported energy as a proportion of overall consumption grew from 25 % in 1950 to 57 % in 1958. As Mario Pedini noted with some chagrin when he addressed the Parliament on Tuesday, 18 October 1966, the crisis in Euratom reflected aspects of a broader malaise afflicting the European communities generally: ‘We will not be able to build a modern, integrated Europe unless we implement a uniform policy for nuclear energy, and scientific collaboration demands the creation of a single market in this Europe of ours – something that the Euratom Treaty actually provides for. We need to turn nuclear energy into an effective tool for consolidating the process of European integration. Pooling our nuclear research is not merely a scientific option: it is also, and above all, a matter of the utmost political significance. Not only have we failed to develop a powerful European reactor, we have also failed to realise one of the key aims of the Rome treaty, namely the creation of a joint nuclear enterprise. This is a matter very close to Parliament’s heart; it is a matter on which we have already exerted considerable pressure on more than one occasion, because the Christian Democrats are convinced that the nuclear energy market demands not only input from scientific experts but also an associative, multinational enterprise.’

Pedini concluded: ‘Ultimately the Euratom problem is neither a technical nor a scientific problem. We may be discussing atomic theory and nuclear science, but this is a problem of political will and the will of the Community.’

Fresh efforts were made but none yielded the results that the Christian Democrats wanted to see in terms of a common energy policy.
Hanna Walz, the only female member of the Group’s German delegation in the European Parliament prior to the first direct election in 1979, turned her attention to the problem during the 1970s and continued to pursue it following her election as Chair of the Energy Committee. Europe’s energy dependency was one of the crucial issues that figured repeatedly on the agenda.

The Christian-Democratic Group supports swifter completion of the common market (1958-1968)

Disappointed as they were in the Euratom project, the Christian Democrats had the satisfaction of seeing another aspect of the Messina relaunch succeed: the rapid realisation of a common market for industry and commerce, bringing a new dimension to economic development for the people of Europe. The Christian Democrats wanted the common market to be a real economic force. Their position was stated in the 1950s in the stark prediction that: ‘If we fail to put the common market in place, Europe’s ruin will be assured.’ In 1956, Pierre Wigny envisaged a way forward when he stated: ‘We in the Christian-Democratic Group want a common market for its own sake, not necessarily tied to Euratom. We want it to be achieved gradually and automatically: in other words, it will not be possible to put the process in reverse and, as we move from one phase to the next, no new parliamentary decisions will be required.”

In signing the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC, the Member States undertook gradually to replace their six separate markets by a single, common policy area with the characteristics of one national market, an area within which people, goods, capital and services would be able to move freely. In order to improve the standard of living of the 180 million European citizens concerned, it was necessary to create the right conditions for technical progress and economic expansion, enabling them to operate within a market on a modern scale. This meant establishing a customs union by eliminating gradually over 12 years all the barriers to free movement not just of goods but of all the factors of production, the main such barrier being customs duties. At the same time, it meant standardising the conditions on which imports from the rest of the world would enter the new common customs area, i.e. establishing a common external tariff to be applied at all the Communities’ outer borders.

The process that would lead to complete removal of trade barriers among the Six began on 1 January 1959 when customs duties within
the common market were reduced by an initial 10%. The Community economy advanced apace as producers were encouraged by the prospects that a single market offered. In 1958 General de Gaulle authorised a devaluation of the French franc, triggering a remarkable financial upturn in France, which had looked like being the EEC’s weak link. Balance-of-payments figures in the six Member States improved and trade among them grew by an average of 22%.

Between 28 and 30 March 1960, the European Parliamentary Assembly spent three days debating a proposal by the EEC Commission to speed up implementation of the common market treaty. A draft resolution tabled on the Group’s behalf by Dutch member Pieter A. Blaisse approved the proposed acceleration: ‘The EEC cannot be regarded as a limited free-trade area or a mere customs union. It must be seen as a united and powerful entity.’ The Christian-Democratic Group’s input was decisive in urging the Assembly to look more favourably on the Commission proposal.

At a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 12 May 1960, it was decided to step up the pace of implementation of the EEC Treaty. Customs duties were to be completely eliminated by 1 July 1968.

Building on the progress achieved, the Commission produced a proposal for full abolition of internal customs duties and for implementation of the common market in agriculture from 1 July 1967. The Christian-Democratic Group supported the proposal, which was tabled by Commission President Walter Hallstein during the October 1964 part-session. The plan was to eliminate customs duties and apply the common tariff definitively from 1 January and to abolish border controls on trade among the Six. Parliament gave a favourable opinion on the Commission proposal. The rapporteur – Italian Christian Democrat Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, a fervent pro-European who, like fellow countryman Giuseppe Caron, was later to become a member of the Commission – supported elimination of customs duties in the Community, application of common tariffs and harmonisation of customs legislation.

During the March 1965 part-session the Group adopted a report by Karl Hahn on gradual implementation of a common trade policy. The point was made that ‘trade with third countries is a sine qua non for a healthy industrial sector and full employment in the Community’. Ever closer coordination of bilateral trade agreements within the framework of a common trade policy was urged as a ‘pressing necessity’.

The year 1967 saw the Community preparing for the major step to be taken on 1 July 1968, the completion date for the customs union and the CAP. The Commission was endeavouring to eliminate anything
that constituted a barrier to the free movement of goods. In early 1967 two important decisions were taken that marked fresh progress: on 11 April the Council of Ministers and the Governments of the Six adopted the first medium-term economic policy programme (for 1966-1970). They also decided to harmonise turnover tax systems in preparation for the application by the Six of a common VAT system in 1970. This was a source of satisfaction to Dutch assembly member Barend Willem Biesheuvel, a future Christian Democrat Prime Minister of his country, who had stated in 1965 that: ‘For too long, too much emphasis has been placed on eliminating economic borders, i.e. building a customs union, rather than putting in place a common economic and social system – in effect economic union.’

However, non-tariff barriers among the Six remained, notably in the form of different tax arrangements and administrative standards. Eliminating those barriers was the aim of all the work that was to be done during the 1980s on completion of the single market.

Italian Group member Giuseppe Caron (the future Commissioner) hailed the advances already achieved during the 1960s on the basis of the Treaty of Rome: ‘The Treaty is a living symbol of the inspiration that moved the six nations of Europe. They sought to create a broader area to facilitate and regularise trade among themselves. They introduced a common external tariff, as a vital prerequisite for this common market, and they also successfully observed the provisions of Article 18 of the Treaty, which requires the Member States to conclude agreements to promote international trade on a basis of reciprocity and mutual advantage.’ Establishment of the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) followed the same staged process as the deregulation of intra-Community trade.

**Emergence of a people’s Europe**

At this time, public interest in European integration was growing. Unlike the ECSC and Euratom, which affected only certain sectors of the economy, the common market in industrial and agricultural products impacted on Europeans’ daily lives – and everyone could see its advantages. This was the era when it became common for the prefix ‘Euro’ to be attached to brand and company names.

The decisions that the Communities needed to take were increasingly important and their political impact was considerable. It became clear in the long discussions prior to adoption of the first regulations that the common market would require compromises between major interests and that these would be achievable only if there was a will to succeed as a community. At the same time, the Six laid down joint rules
on ‘understandings’ between commercial companies within the common market. The main aim here was to prevent consumers being victimised by agreements among producers to carve up their markets and to keep prices high. The first European ‘anti-trust’ legislation was born.

**Europe asserts itself as a combined commercial power**

Alongside these developments, trade talks were taking place in Geneva in the so-called ‘Kennedy Round’ of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The aim of these negotiations, initiated in May 1963 and officially opened a year later, was a general reduction in customs duties and the removal of various types of trade barrier, as well as the development of trade in agricultural products within a global market system. As Walter Hallstein put it, addressing the European Parliament on 27 March 1963: ‘The Kennedy Round is a means of confronting specific economic problems and also a genuine basis on which to build a bipolar Atlantic alliance.’ Group spokesman Pieter A. Blaisse added that: ‘Harmonious development of world trade, gradual elimination of barriers to international trade and the reduction of customs duties are the goals that the Treaty of Rome sets for the Community in the realm of commercial policy.’ More than 70 countries took part in the GATT talks. The Community, as the world’s leading trade bloc, defended a common position for which the EEC Commission made the case. A final agreement was signed on 30 June 1967. ‘The Kennedy Round is an exceptional event for Europe and for the entire Western economy,’ asserted Luxembourg Assembly member Jean Bech. Three years of discussions, in the most wide-ranging trade negotiations since the war, had come to a conclusion – producing an average reduction of 35-40 % in customs duties on industrial products, a world agreement on cereals and an agreement on the cost of food aid programmes. The Christian-Democratic Group had no desire to turn the European common market into a fortress against major international trade flows. Far from it!

A treaty merging the executive authorities – i.e. establishing a single Council and a single Commission for the common market, the ECSC and Euratom – entered into force on 1 July 1967. The new 14-member Commission under President Jean Rey had four Vice-Presidents: Sicco Mansholt, Lionello Levi-Sandri, Fritz Hellwig and Raymond Barre. The institutional merger made the Communities more cohesive and enabled them to rationalise their work.
Completion of the customs union (1968-1969)

The year 1968 saw an important milestone reached on 1 July when the customs union among the six Member States was completed 18 months ahead of schedule: customs duties within the Community were completely abolished. The common external tariff was implemented at the same time as the first two phases of tariff reduction agreed in the Kennedy Round. This European achievement was, of course, overshadowed throughout the continent and particularly in France by the events of May and June 1968 and then by the Soviet authorities’ crushing of the ‘Prague Spring’.

The following year was the last in the 12-year transitional period which the authors of the Rome Treaty had allowed for completion of the customs union. At the end of that year the Community embarked on the definitive era of application of an open-ended treaty.

This was a prosperous period for Europe and it contributed in spectacular fashion to raising western European standards of living. The years 1958-1970 saw a sixfold increase in trade among the EEC Member States and average GDP growth of 70%. The gulf between the ‘two Europes’ was widening. This was the period during which the Soviet Union confined and impoverished eastern Europe within the institutional structures of COMECON, an attempt by the Communist regimes to counter the common market – but in reality a pale reflection of it.
The 1960s were not just characterised by the achievements of the common market. They were also marked by confrontation between France under General de Gaulle, President from 1958 to 1969, and its five partner countries. That said, in 1958 the Christian-Democratic Group – which included French members from the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), one of the big three parties in France in the post-war period – had formally noted de Gaulle’s desire to honour the signing of the treaty by the last Government of the Fourth Republic, committing France to the EEC. General de Gaulle had also been swift to support implementation of what was to prove a particularly integrationist measure, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The method of financing this policy and the decision to entrust its management to the European Commission were essentially supranational developments. The aim was to support Europe’s main agricultural products and to secure prices. France was in favour of the policy so long as it promoted the modernisation of French farming. In 1962 however – and even more markedly in 1965 during the so-called ‘empty chair crisis’ – it was clear that thinking in Paris no longer coincided with that of the Christian Democrats.

The Fouchet Plans: misunderstandings and clashes over future political union (1961-1962)

General de Gaulle – having seen his plans for reform of NATO bluntly rejected by the USA and the UK in 1959 and 1960 – shifted some of the focus of his international efforts towards achievement of a political Europe. In July 1960 he shared his ideas about European political union with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. The General sought to bring about reform of the European Communities with the aim of establishing a ‘Europe of states’. Essentially what de Gaulle proposed to Adenauer
was nothing other than a sort of Franco-German confederation with common citizenship. He counted on the influence of the Franco-German partnership to gain the support of the other European partners for the building of an autonomous Europe. This led to the first Community negotiations, despite the Chancellor’s guarded response and the differing views among the Six on the subject of British participation.

At a summit held in Paris on 10 and 11 February 1961, the Six agreed to develop political cooperation. De Gaulle accordingly proposed to his five partners the establishment of a Research Committee composed of representatives of the six governments and responsible for studying the potential forms of diplomatic and political cooperation among the Member States of the EEC. The Research Committee was set up under the chairmanship of French diplomat and former Gaullist MP Christian Fouchet. On 18 July 1961, at Bad Godesberg near Bonn, the Six issued a declaration reiterating their intention to create a politically united Europe, though without defining what this meant.

The Christian-Democratic Group refuses to settle for mere inter-governmental cooperation

The Christian-Democratic Group supported the concept of political union and encouraged the governments of the Six to take practical steps towards a democratic, federal Europe. Parliament was to take a stance on the issue in resolutions adopted at the part-sessions of June, September and December 1961.³⁵

Heinrich von Brentano, Christian Democrat rapporteur for the Political Affairs Committee, argued that the ultimate goal of the union should be a United States of Europe. The first task, however, was to establish close cooperation with the United States of America in order to ensure complete unity in NATO.³⁶ The Bonn conference of the six European Heads of State was an important step towards that aim.³⁷ Von Brentano went on: ‘There is one thing that we as Christian Democrats must not and cannot let slip from view, and that is our goal of European union. Whether we call it federation or confederation is of secondary importance, just so long as that is the aim towards which we are moving.’³⁸

On 19 October 1961, Christian Fouchet put before the Research Committee a preliminary draft treaty (Fouchet Plan I) establishing an indissoluble union of states based on intergovernmental cooperation and respect for the identity of Member States and their peoples.³⁹ It proposed cooperation, alongside the Community treaties, in the areas of foreign policy and defence, science, culture and human rights protection.
Defending the community model

René Charpentier commented: ‘The Fouchet Plan was basically underpinned by the concept of cooperation, which was justifiable as a first step but not as an end in itself.’

France’s partners were unconvinced by the plan, which they saw as an attempt to bring existing Community-based procedures in the EEC under the control of the governments. In the light of this opposition, de Gaulle hardened his stance. In a Parliamentary Assembly debate on the Fouchet initiative, the Christian-Democratic Group spokesman Alain Poher defended the Community-based system: ‘What we want is a functioning economic Europe and to achieve that we need to establish a political Europe.’ Throughout the year, in a series of debates on the political union project, the Group’s three key priorities were restated: to intensify Community activity, to elect a European parliament by universal suffrage and to merge the executive bodies.

Persistent disagreement ends in deadlock

On 18 January 1962, Christian Fouchet tabled a new version of his proposals (Fouchet Plan II), providing for the existing European economic institutions to be placed under the authority of a political community. However, at the point when the common market was proceeding to the second stage of implementation, the Benelux countries rejected the plan. They accordingly drew up counter-proposals, which were rejected in turn by the French Government.

The Christian-Democratic Group was dismayed by this failure and backed a resolution by the Parliamentary Assembly on 9 May 1962 urging that the plans for political union be pursued: ‘The European Parliament [...] calls for an immediate resumption of talks in the conference of the six Foreign Ministers.’ Jean Duvieusart gave voice to his disappointment: ‘Ten months after the Bonn Declaration, there has been no valid, positive or genuine follow-up to it and the efforts made by this parliament have found no echo.’ Emilio Battista added: ‘Sadly, in Paris in April 1962, the hopes raised by the Bonn conference of July 1961 were buried and we find ourselves back to square one with regard to political union in Europe.’ By then the plan was a dead letter. On 15 May, at what became known as the ‘Volapük’ press conference, General de Gaulle condemned European federalist policies and spoke scathingly of British and American tactics: ‘It is only the states that are valid, legitimate and capable of achievement. I have already said and I repeat that at the present time there cannot be any other Europe than a Europe of states, apart, of course, from myths, stories and parades.’

---

a This was the occasion on which General de Gaulle famously stated that: ‘Dante,
The situation grew increasingly tense. The Christian Democrat (MRP) ministers in General de Gaulle’s Government – led by Pierre Pflimlin, a former Prime Minister, who was to become President of the European Parliament in the years 1981-1984 – resigned on the spot. A page was turning in the political life of both France and Europe. The Christian-Democratic movement in France, which had emerged from the French Resistance and had at first been closely associated with General de Gaulle, was firmly distancing itself from his conceptions of Europe. The MRP was to pay a high price for opposing de Gaulle: at the French parliamentary elections in 1962 it lost most of its seats to the pro-de Gaulle Union pour la nouvelle république (UNR). Christian Democrat representation in the European Parliament was correspondingly reduced: the Group was left in 1962 with just three French members, and a new group with a mainly French Gaullist membership – the Rassemblement des Démocrates Européens (RDE) – was set up.

It was not until 1999 that the French moderate right and centre came together again in the EPP Group.

The failure on 17 April 1962 of the Fouchet Plan for European political union, coupled with French rejection on 14 January 1963 of Britain’s bid to join the common market, produced fresh tension among the other five EEC Member States. Franco-German rapprochement, meanwhile, found practical expression with the conclusion of the Élysée Treaty of 22 January 1963, a formal bilateral agreement strengthening the ties between the two countries in the areas of security and diplomacy. While this treaty was important in terms of rapprochement and bilateral cooperation between the two countries, it was not, in the eyes of the Christian Democrats, an alternative to the plan for European political union. In the Bundestag, moreover, the CDU-CSU secured adoption of an explanatory preamble to the treaty, limiting its political impact and underscoring Germany’s continuing belief in European integration and in NATO. As a political entity, Europe was marking time.

On 19 January 1965, Emilio Battista came to the sad conclusion that: ‘We are still in year zero as far as political union in Europe is concerned […] and what matters now is that the Heads of State and Government

——

Goethe and Chateaubriand belong to all Europe to the very extent that they were respectively and eminently Italian, German and French. They would not have served Europe very well if they had been stateless or if they had thought and written in some kind of integrated Esperanto or Volapük.’

a The Élysée Treaty was to be amended by the addition of two protocols, signed on 22 January 1988 on the occasion of its 25th anniversary, establishing two new structures: a Franco-German Security and Defence Council and a Franco-German Economic and Financial Council.
Defending the community model

and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs should resume meetings and regular consultations. In the debate on adoption of a final report, Hans Furler pointed out that: ‘Political union is not the sole means of attaining our aim of a united, federal Europe. The approach we have been following now for some time, working through our European Communities, is equally justifiable and has political implications of the highest order.’

The Communities’ internal problems came to a head with what was dubbed the ‘empty chair crisis’ in 1965.

The ‘empty chair’ crisis and the so-called Luxembourg ‘compromise’ (June 1965-January 1966)

The proposal on financing of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) tabled in the European Parliament on 24 March 1965 by Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission, marked the beginning of a particular severe crisis for the EEC.

Hallstein’s proposal resembled a three-stage rocket. First a Community would be launched into orbit with its own financial resources, independent of the Member States. Those resources would be used to finance the first integrated common policy, the CAP. Hallstein further proposed that supervising these own resources would be the task not of the national parliaments but, in future, of the European Parliament. This was where the third stage of the rocket came into play – reinforcing the European Parliament’s powers and legitimacy by introducing election of its Members via direct, universal suffrage. Moreover, the progression on 1 January 1966 to the third stage of the transitional period preceding establishment of the common market was to involve application of the majority vote in the Council of Ministers. Apart from initiatives outside the scope of the treaties, only the most important issues, such as the accession of new Member States, or the most divisive ones, such as harmonisation of legislation and short-term economic policy, would be subject to the unanimity rule.

The Hallstein package was welcomed by the Christian-Democratic Group but it ran directly counter to General de Gaulle’s thinking. De Gaulle wished at all costs to avoid application of the majority-voting rule, which was incompatible with his concept of each Member State having absolute sovereignty. In fact, the General had played no part in negotiating the Rome treaties and had accepted them in 1958 only for economic reasons and because implementation of majority voting had been postponed.
France, clearly signalling its hostility to the concept of qualified-majority voting in the Council and greater powers for the Commission and the Parliament, was not prepared to continue discussions on the basis of Hallstein’s proposals. Maurice Couve de Murville, French President-in-Office of the Council, concluded on 30 June 1965 that agreement was impossible and suspended the sitting. This was the beginning of the ‘empty chair’ crisis that was to paralyse the Community for just over six months: it was the first time since the Treaty of Rome had come into force in 1958 that the operation of the EEC had been crippled by a Member State. General de Gaulle, speaking at a press conference on 9 September 1965, called into question the implementation of the treaty provisions, asserting that: ‘What happened in Brussels on 30 June […] highlighted certain errors or fundamental ambiguities in the treaties concerning economic union among the Six. That is why, sooner or later, a crisis was inevitable.’ His statement was the signal for a resumption of negotiations, subject to initiation of intergovernmental talks, agreement on the financing of the agricultural policy and a change in the way the treaty was implemented.

On 24 September 1965, the European Parliament, at the initiative of its Political Affairs Committee chaired by Edoardo Martino, spoke out on the crisis in a resolution noting that ‘no Member State is entitled to shirk the commitments entered into under the Paris and Rome treaties’. The Parliament called for the crisis to be overcome without delay. Mariano Rumor, President of the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD), issued a press statement on 12 October 1965 concerning the crisis in the Community process: ‘We have sought to determine a line of conduct that will prevent the current stasis from becoming a perpetual crisis. That line of conduct takes as its starting point the inviolable nature of the Rome and Paris treaties and aims to continue the work of the Community by systematically seeking agreement among the five countries concerned, with a view to bringing France back into dialogue […]. European Christian Democracy is prepared to engage in interpretation of the political will by seeking the right basis for a major relaunch of the supranational Community concept.’

Alain Poher’s response to the crisis was to assert that the Christian Democrats had ‘opted definitively for a united, Community-based Europe as opposed to the interchangeable, revocable axes and alliances of the past’, and he continued: ‘The fact that we now face a serious crisis is all the more reason to resist defeatism and anxiety […]. We shall give a vote of confidence to the Commission which has worked so well thus far for the future of the United States of Europe.’ In November 1965, Hans Furler summed up the situation when he noted that: ‘The Council went back
to work after the summer break and worked conscientiously even though France was not represented. My group [Christian Democrats] approves of the attitude that the five Member States have adopted – the only acceptable attitude under the terms of the Rome treaties [...]. The treaty provision for taking more decisions on a majority vote from 1 January 1966 onwards is very important. It is a provision that was well and truly considered and one that cannot be renounced if the Rome treaties are to retain their authority as tools of integration."\textsuperscript{50} Despite the disapproval of Council members, the Group continued to argue in favour of the institutional proposals on own resources and powers for the Assembly, which the Commission had made in the spring of 1965 and which, in part, had led to the empty chair crisis and the Luxembourg compromise.

For the Christian-Democratic Group and its Chairman Alain Poher this was a difficult and testing time. The very survival of European integration on the Community model was in jeopardy. The majority of members in the Assembly supported the firm positions taken by the Christian Democrats in defence of the validity of the Community model, observance of the treaties and the primacy of the rule of law. Some of the Christian Democrats were also members of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe, chaired by Jean Monnet since 1955, an influential group that had the ear of the major governments.

The ‘Luxembourg compromise’ as the beginnings of an enduring institutional crisis

The plans for a political Europe had been seriously undermined. For the first time since the signing of the Rome treaties, the current of progress towards European integration had ceased to flow. A wind of mistrust cast its chill over Brussels, Strasbourg, Paris and other partner capitals until the Six finally came to an accommodation in Luxembourg in January 1966.

The ‘Luxembourg compromise’ of 29 January 1966\textsuperscript{a} allowed any Member State to block a Community decision taken by a majority of the others if it considered its national interests to be seriously threatened. In the eyes of Christian Democrat spokesman Joseph Illerhaus

\textsuperscript{a} While the Luxembourg arrangement may have offered the Six a means of breaking their deadlock, it created a situation that could result in inertia through fear of negotiations being blocked, and one that effectively limited the European Commission’s right of initiative. This unwelcome political trend – increasingly a problem as the number of Member States increased – was, however, partially countered by application of the Single European Act, which, as of 1 July 1987, significantly extended the scope of qualified-majority decision making.
what the Community gained from the Luxembourg compromise was not certitude but simply a means of overcoming the problems that the crisis had thrown up.51

The agreement between France and its partners, which the Group regarded as no more than an ‘agreement to disagree’, enabled the Community institutions to get back to work. However, the implicit acknowledgement of a right of veto within the Council – for which only France actively argued in 1966 – gradually distorted the way that the Community functioned. Ever since the 1965-1966 crisis, application of majority voting in the areas stipulated by the treaties and its extension to other areas of Community activity has been a core priority for the Christian Democrats.

The decisions taken in Luxembourg did not fully resolve the difficulties.52 At the EUCD conference in Taormina, members of the European Christian-Democratic parties undertook to use their influence with their governments so that no opportunity would be overlooked for advancing unification on the basis of the Rome treaties, or for stimulating and encouraging a renewed European awareness.53 Alain Poher, addressing the European Parliament the day after his election as President (7 March 1966), declared that the crisis in the Communities had resulted in a loss of momentum – all the more reason for reinforcing one of the first practical achievements of the European Community, the Common Agricultural Policy.54
Chapter IV
THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY, DARLING OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS

After the Second World War, agriculture still featured large in the national economies of the Member States of the Community. It was a sector that continued to employ one out of five workers in Europe at the end of the 1950s. Yet agricultural structures differed widely from country to country and region to region.

The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) provided that the common market extended to agriculture and trade in agricultural products. Christian Democrats regarded this as a vital issue. A part of its electorate came from a rural environment. From the outset, therefore, the Group gave its support to the European Commission, which was responsible for applying the Treaty. The Treaty assigned the CAP five objectives: to increase agricultural productivity; to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community; to stabilise markets; to assure the availability of supplies to the Six; and to ensure that supplies reached consumers at reasonable prices.

The Stresa Conference sets out the broad lines of the CAP (1958)

Pursuant to Article 43 of the Treaty, the Commission convened a conference, held in Stresa from 3 to 12 July 1958, at which it asked a delegation of economic and social representatives from the Community to draw up a list of the problems that would be presented by including agriculture in the common market. The conference was convened in response to a request by France, which wanted to see the broad guidelines of the future agricultural policy of the Six fixed as soon as possible: single markets, Community preference and financial solidarity.

As Hans-August Lücker pointed out, ‘The Stresa Conference of July 1958 was the first step towards a Common Agricultural Policy; subsequently, the Conference of EEC Ministers for Agriculture became
institutionalised and the discussions in the Economic and Social Committee and the reports and debates of the European Parliamentary Assembly made a major contribution to the formulation of the Common Agricultural Policy. Finally, the EEC Commission drafted its first proposal.

In 1959 the European Parliament began discussing agricultural policy, markets, prices and structures. In March 1960, speaking at the plenary part-session, Hans-August Lücker emphasised that the citizens of the Community needed to be better informed about the principles of the CAP. Describing the situation of agriculture, he pointed to the obstacles it faced because of its historical structure, its links with industry and trade, and competition with agriculture in third countries.

The Lücker report advocated moving from a first stage, which involved coordinating independent market systems, to the final stage, namely common European regulation of the markets. Naturally, the institutional system would encourage majority decision-making. Hans-August Lücker noted that agricultural policy must take account of the natural and economic laws governing agricultural activity: ‘For us Christian Democrats it is a duty and an obligation to establish this philosophy of a harmonious synthesis between the interests of producers and consumers of agricultural products, the interests of our Community’s agricultural policy and the requirements of foreign trade policy.’ He called on the European Commission to speak for the Member States in international discussions of these issues.

**The Group welcomes the Commission’s proposals (1960)**

On 30 June 1960, Commission President Walter Hallstein, accompanied by Vice-President Sicco Mansholt, submitted his agricultural proposals to the Council of Ministers. The Commission proposed creating a unified agricultural market based on the free movement of products, organising the markets by products by gradually standardising and guaranteeing prices, establishing a Community preference system, allowing for joint intervention, setting up a European agricultural guidance and guarantee fund (EAGGF) and establishing financial solidarity within the Community.

The CAP was to adjust supply and demand. To that end the EEC bodies would be able to buy back surplus production in order to restrict supply and thereby stabilise prices. Protective measures would be taken to restrict third-country imports and thereby prevent the Community market from being swamped by the advent of lower-cost and therefore lower-price products. The prices paid to European farmers
did in fact remain higher than the world market prices, in order to protect their standard of living.

The Christian Democrats fully supported these proposals. According to the Dutch MEP Philippus van Campen, ‘these proposals are actually more than just an acceptable starting point, they also prove that it is possible, regardless of the differences between the situation and structure of agriculture in the various Community countries and between the agrarian systems applied in the Member States, to achieve an agricultural policy that really is common to all the Member States.’\(^{58}\)

The Christian Democrats hoped that ‘this policy will contribute to the establishment, as soon as possible, of a free internal market for agricultural products, the development of world trade and the flourishing of family farming in the Community.’\(^{59}\)

The three agricultural marathons (1962-1968)

In May and July 1961 the Commission presented proposals to the Council on the organisation of the markets in cereals, pigmeat, eggs, poultry, fruit and vegetables, and wine. The proposals provided not only for the gradual achievement of complete free movement of these products within the Community but also for fixing common prices. It was also proposed that the Community should gradually take responsibility for expenditure on aid to exports to third countries and measures to support the rates on the Community markets. In October 1961, the European Parliament responded positively to these proposals. In December 1961 the Council of Ministers adopted the principles of the free movement of products and fixed the first common prices. The Commission was then in a position to draft the first regulations in this area. Yet it was to take another eight years instead of the scheduled six to achieve a unified market for the main agricultural products.

‘Each of the six national agricultural policies is up against a real revolution, because they have to make way for a common policy, for the free movement of products between countries and, in the case of most products, for markets organised at the level of the Six’, according to René Charpentier, French MEP and MRP specialist on agricultural questions.\(^{60}\) On 14 January 1962, when the common market moved into its second stage, the Council did indeed adopt the first six agricultural regulations (cereals, pigmeat, poultry, eggs, fruit and vegetables, wine) and, on a proposal from the Commission, set up the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, which was to shoulder the heavy responsibility of financing the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The Fund was split into two sections, covering two specific objectives: to
guarantee prices and to guide structural measures. EAGGF expenditure alone accounted for 60% of the Community budget.

In the view of the Group’s Chairman, Alain Poher, ‘the real political significance of the decision taken by the Council of Ministers in Brussels on 14 January 1962 to create a common agricultural market becomes apparent when you consider that the fate of all our farmers will now be linked. The associated interests of the urban and rural masses are the best guarantee for the future. True, the ministers had some difficult moments in Brussels, but as one of them so rightly said: “we are condemned to agree”. That is proof enough that once Europe has been made, it can no longer be unmade. Indeed, during the month of ministerial talks, nobody could have even contemplated abandoning the discussion, or not moving on to the second stage of the common market. Even those who raised that unpleasant possibility were well aware that the only possible outcome was the “flight forwards” towards greater European integration.’

During the first six months of 1962, the Council embarked on a major effort to finalise the many implementing regulations needed to ensure that the basic regulations adopted in January 1962 could enter into force. They did so on 30 July 1962.

The first great agricultural marathon was a success and paved the way for the Council of Ministers to move on to the next stage of the transitional period, with a view to achieving customs union.

The second stage of establishing the agricultural policy proved more difficult. It was decided that the second agricultural marathon would end on 23 December 1963. The Council then adopted three new regulations, on beef and veal, dairy products and rice. It adopted a resolution setting out the broad lines of a common policy in the sector of oils and fats and even set out certain procedures for financing this common policy by introducing a tax on margarine. During this marathon, the Council also completed the provisions relating to the financing of the EAGGF. Lastly, the Council adopted guidelines relating to the Community’s position on industry and agriculture for the ‘Kennedy Round’.

The first obstacles arose in 1964. Several Councils of Ministers, responsible for fixing wheat prices, were unable to reach agreement. In September that year, General de Gaulle demanded a rapid solution to the organisation of the market in cereals, threatening that otherwise he would reconsider France’s participation in the Community. The threat was a serious one and various MEPs stated their position regarding the situation created by this ultimatum. Alain Poher, Chairman of the Group, declared that ‘resorting to an ultimatum has proved a disaster in the past, such as during the negotiations on Great Britain’s
accession to the common market. Generally speaking, an ultimatum is the wrong approach when it comes to diplomatic negotiations.\textsuperscript{62}

The third agricultural marathon ended on 15 December 1964. It resulted on 1 July 1967 in the opening of the common market to cereals, pigmeat, poultry, and eggs, with common prices for each product. The institutional crisis that arose in 1965 put a temporary brake on this process. In May and July 1966, decisions were finally taken on fixing the common prices of dairy products and beef and veal from 1 April 1968, the organisation of the sugar market from 1 July 1968 and the organisation of the olive oil market from 1 November 1966.\textsuperscript{a}

The Mansholt Plan (1968) heralds a profound reform of the CAP

The 1960s saw the gradual implementation of the common organisations of the markets, or COMs. Over that period, the CAP came to swallow up more and more of the budget and the Commission, faced with uncontrollable mounting surpluses, especially in the cereals and milk sector, wanted to limit expenditure in that area. Intervention expenditure, which guaranteed prices, and market support put a further strain on the Community budget at a time when the number of farmers was declining.

The first attempt to reform the CAP came ten years after its creation. On 21 December 1968, the European Commissioner for Agriculture Sicco Mansholt submitted a memorandum on the reform of agriculture in the European Community to the Council of Ministers. In his long-term plan for a new socio-structural policy for European agriculture, Commissioner Mansholt set out the limits of the policy on prices and markets. His plan proposed reducing the number of people employed in agriculture and encouraging the creation of larger and more efficient production units.

In 1972, three directives were adopted to implement the Mansholt Plan, relating to the modernisation of farms, the cessation of farming and the training of farmers.

The EPP Group believed that meant ‘the foundations of the CAP are at risk.’

\textsuperscript{a} Similarly, in April 1970, decisions were taken at the request of Italy to organise the markets in wine and tobacco. During the same period, the definitive financing of the CAP was adopted. The CAP could now be considered completed. It covered nearly all agricultural products.
The CAP was now regarded as a ‘supporting structure of the Community’, as noted by Giosuè Ligios during the Group’s Study Days in Bressanone (Italy) in June 1977: ‘Over the years, the Common Agricultural Policy has followed a course virtually analogous to the development of the common market: the crises and successes of the Common Agricultural Policy were very often the same as those of the Community. […] In no other area – whether economic, monetary or political, let alone transport and energy – have the Member States yet attained a level of integration comparable to that achieved by the Common Agricultural Policy […]’.63

Yet despite the great success of the CAP, there were some signs of doubt within the Group, relating mainly to the CAP’s growing cost. During its Study Days in Berlin in 1974 and The Hague in 1975, the Group had already ‘decided to make a detailed examination of agricultural problems, so as to be in a position to contribute constructive ideas and criticisms to the major parliamentary debate on the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy’.64 Although the Commission of the European Communities seemed to give credence to the idea that the overall outcome of the CAP was positive,65 the Group noted that the ‘foundations of the Common Agricultural Policy are at risk’.66

During the second half of the 1970s, at a time of increasingly lively debate within the Community, the Group fine-tuned its position in face of the great variety and complexity of the problems posed by the Common Agricultural Policy. The four pillars of the CAP – single market, Community preference, financial solidarity and adjustment of agricultural structures – were under threat from several interdependent crises. In the report67 he presented at Bressanone, Giosuè Ligios pointed to a number of them, including the costly system of monetary compensatory amounts.

**The adverse effects of monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs)**

For the common agricultural market to operate, the prices of agricultural products had to remain equivalent. Unfortunately, the monetary fluctuations that affected European countries from the 1970s caused guaranteed prices to fluctuate in those countries. A system of countervailing charges at borders, linked not to the agricultural market but purely to the monetary situation, was brought in to rectify this market distortion.

Introduced in 1969 following the devaluation of the French franc and the revaluation of the Deutschmark, this system was intended as a buffer, to cushion and spread over time the impact of the monetary decisions on farm incomes. In fact, any revaluation of a national currency led to a fall in common agricultural prices expressed in
that national currency and a rise in countries with a devalued currency.\textsuperscript{68}

In the view of some members of the Group, such as Giosuè Ligios, the diagnosis was beyond doubt: ‘The system of monetary compensatory amounts has, therefore, not only been the cause of considerable distortions of competition but has virtually reduced common agricultural prices to a fiction and destroyed the unity of the market; moreover, it has created serious grounds for dispute and mutual distrust between Member States: the controversies about exports of German milk to Italy or subsidies for butter consumption in Great Britain are events of too recent a date for us to need dwell on them any longer.’\textsuperscript{69}

Isidor Früh, the German coordinator of the Committee on Agriculture, was quick to link the difficulties connected with the Common Agricultural Policy with the absence of an economic and monetary union\textsuperscript{70}: ‘Since 1969, the growing economic imbalances have had repercussions in the monetary field. As a result, the common agricultural market has been feeling the effects of the absence of an economic and monetary union, which has further affected the system of agricultural prices and markets. That system worked satisfactorily only so long as the purchasing powers of the various currencies tended to level out and parities between Community currencies did not change […] Conversely, any change in exchange rates widens the nominal gap between agricultural prices expressed in the various national currencies: as a result, any depreciation automatically triggers a rise in the guidance and intervention prices and any appreciation does the reverse. The only way to avoid such brutal repercussions on production and consumption prices was to introduce a system of compensatory amounts, which, despite the formation of seven partial markets, has become the binding element of the common agricultural market […] The current situation is the result of the failure of efforts to create an economic and monetary union.’\textsuperscript{71}

Nonetheless, the CAP remains ‘the very essence of the Community, the core of its integration’

Despite the criticism levelled at it, there is no doubt that the CAP had a positive impact on a significant scale. It stabilised the Community market at a time when world markets were fluctuating widely, it assured consumers security of supplies at reasonable prices, and it offered farmers a degree of guaranteed income, even if the level differed from case to case. Moreover, for a number of years it constituted, in the
words of Giosuè Ligios, ‘the very keystone of the Community, the focal point of its integration.’

In 1977, the CAP went through a serious crisis, although this was often connected with factors unrelated to the CAP itself, specifically the economic and monetary situation and the Community’s inadequate or non-existent integration in other areas of policy. That meant reforms were needed to safeguard the future of the CAP.

To that end, the Christian-Democratic Group considered the various facets of the CAP during its Study Days in Bressanone in May 1977. Chaired by Egon Klepsch, the Group focused on a number of aspects that would determine the future of the CAP. Giosuè Ligios was asked to draft a report on the future prospects of the CAP, Ferruccio Pisoni a report on the policy of markets, prices and incomes, Peter Brugger, the Italian MEP from South Tyrol, a report on agricultural structural policy, especially in mountain regions, and Isidor Früh a report on agricultural policy in the framework of a common economic, monetary and commercial policy. The Christian-Democratic Group in the European Parliament then decided, with the direct elections to the European Parliament in view, to set up a working party with the aim of determining guidelines for the agricultural sector. A conference was held with representatives of the national parties in order to formulate an overall approach for the European Community’s future agricultural policy.

The CAP contributed towards the process of European unification in the 1960s. A victim of its own success and financial cost, it would be reviewed again in the 1980s.
A look at the economic and political climate prevailing in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s shows the emergence of a gradual, if rather slow awareness that one day a European economic and monetary union would have to be established. Each state had its own national currency, which it regarded as the most symbolic attribute, alongside its language and flag, of national sovereignty and identity. The Germans were proud of the strong Deutschmark that signalled the reconstruction of their economy and symbolised their hard-won ability to curb inflation once and for all. The French identified with their franc, the new franc that General de Gaulle introduced in 1958. The franc had formed part of their national history since the end of the monarchy. The Dutch were similarly attached to their florin, the gulden, which reminded them of their centuries of maritime commerce and flourishing trade. Luxembourg and Belgium had signed a monetary agreement just after the war that turned the Belgo-Luxembourg franc into a single currency, although it was represented in the two countries by coins and notes of different appearances. The UK was intrinsically identified by the pound sterling. And even Spain, Portugal and Greece could not have imagined the disappearance of the peseta, the escudo or the drachma.

The early experts and the European institutions were thus courageously clear-sighted when they became convinced that the process of opening the markets, once it had gone so far as freedom of movement, would inevitably be accompanied and eventually crowned by economic and monetary union. Without monetary union, the distortions of competition that could result from manipulating exchange rates, devaluation or revaluation would in the long term jeopardise the existence of this common market.

The Christian-Democratic Group was firmly committed to achieving the internal market and the single currency together. Men such as
Friedrich Burgbacher, Hermann Schwörer, Ernst Müller-Hermann, Harry Notenboom and Richie Ryan, replaced after the 1979 election by Karl von Wogau, Fernand Herman, Otmar Franz and Ingo Friedrich, fought tirelessly to persuade their colleagues and the general public to take the spectacular leap forward that was to lead, on 1 January 2002, to the introduction in nine countries of euro notes and coins and the rapid disappearance of national currencies. That success was due to the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in November 1993, but it can be understood only by looking back at the origins of this grand project and its long and difficult history.

The prospect of a common monetary policy was referred to in Articles 103 to 108 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which also enshrined the idea of the liberalisation of payments and capital. Yet the Treaty provisions in the monetary field remained rather timid and neither the Commission nor the Council had binding powers with regard to monetary coordination. The Treaty merely refers to the creation of a Monetary Committee with advisory status. At the time, monetary cooperation evidently did not seem particularly urgent, given that the six Community countries enjoyed a balance of payments that was generally in surplus and that this was a period of international monetary stability.

On 6 March 1970, the Council set up a group of experts chaired by Pierre Werner, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg. This group was responsible for drawing up an analytical report identifying the fundamental options for the phased realisation of economic and monetary union in the European Community, to be completed by the year 1980. The report was revised again and again until eventually a compromise was reached. The final report was presented on 8 October 1970.

Pierre Werner is one of the historic figures of Christian Democracy in Luxembourg, where he was very popular, and in the European Community, where his commitment to Europe followed in the tradition of the founding fathers. His report on monetary union was used as a point of reference for all the further activities that eventually resulted in a single currency. Regarded and admired as one of the wise men of Europe, Pierre Werner was often asked to address the Christian-Democratic Group and later the EPP Group. Pierre Werner, Jacques Santer and Jean-Claude Juncker, successive Prime Ministers of Luxembourg, served the European cause loyally and faithfully. Their cultural and linguistic ties with France and Germany, their sensitivity that came from being citizens of a small country at the heart of Europe and being European campaigners, won them the confidence and liking of the Group’s members.
The Council eventually took an important political step on 22 March 1971 when it adopted the Commission’s suggestions for achieving EMU by stages within ten years. This stage-by-stage plan was a major development which provided for the gradual unification of the economic policies of the Six and the creation of a monetary organisation that should have resulted in a common currency in 1980.

The collapse of the Bretton Woods system (1971) sparks a monetary crisis in Europe

Unfortunately, this was not a good time for the Six’s monetary plans. The crisis of confidence in the dollar very soon made the difficulties crystal clear. In an attempt to curb speculation against the dollar, which triggered a massive run on the Deutschmark, Germany and the Netherlands decided to let their currencies float upwards. The other countries ‘clung’ to exchange control measures. This process jeopardised the unity of the agricultural markets and the Six had to introduce compensatory measures. On 15 August 1971, President Richard Nixon destroyed the foundation of the Bretton Woods system by deciding to suspend the convertibility of the dollar into gold. That marked the dramatic highpoint of the international monetary crisis of the time.

The ‘snake’ reduces currency fluctuations

On 21 March 1972, the Council of Ministers fixed the margin of fluctuation between two Community currencies at 2.25 % and decided that any central bank intervention would have to be in a Community currency. That meant the dollar would no longer be regarded as central to the European monetary system. On 10 April 1972, the currency ‘snake’ was created by the Basel agreements. The governors of Member State central banks narrowed the intra-Community margin of fluctuation, allowing a maximum momentary fluctuation from the fixed parity of no more than 2.25 %. The unit of account (UA), defined in relation to gold, replaced the dollar as the accounting currency in the European Economic Community. In the absence of a genuine monetary union, the snake served as a prop for creating an area of relative stability in a climate of international monetary confusion.

The Paris Summit: objective ‘European Union’ (October 1972)
The Heads of State or Government of the Nine, meeting in Paris on 19 to 21 October 1972, noted that despite what the Six had achieved over the past 16 years the European Community was nowhere near completion in economic and monetary terms. Europe had recently enlarged and needed to be given new tasks. It seemed increasingly necessary to create a Europe with both internal and external responsibilities. If Europe was to be ‘able to make its voice heard in world affairs, and to make an original contribution commensurate with its human, intellectual and material resources,’ the Nine needed to establish an ‘Economic and Monetary Union, the guarantee of stability and growth, the foundation of their solidarity and the indispensable basis for social progress, and [to] end […] disparities between the regions’.73 In the short term, that meant strengthening the existing Community policies, launching new policies, increasingly close coordination between economic and monetary policies, as well as more intensive political cooperation and strengthening the institutional structure of the Community. The nine Heads of State or Government saw it as their major objective to transform the whole complex of relations between the Member States into a European Union before the end of the 1970s.

It was in this new climate that early in 1973 a new Commission of the Communities was appointed, presided by the UK’s Roy Jenkins. It immediately began preparing many of the proposals called for by the Paris Summit. Yet the international system remained very unstable and in February and March a new crisis erupted. Nevertheless, the Community managed to avoid the break up of the monetary system: six member States, Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Denmark, decided to keep to a 2.25 % margin of fluctuation between their currencies and to let them float against the dollar in an orderly manner.

The Group calls for a European Monetary Fund with strong resources

The Group strongly advocated the creation of a European Monetary Cooperation Fund. On 5 June 1973, the German MEP Friedrich Burghbacher explained why to the European Parliament: ‘The European Monetary Fund is a necessary institution. It has already been said, however, that in its present form it is not capable of solving European monetary problems. If the fund is to be effective, a great deal more of our currency reserves will have to be transferred to it.’74
The monetary crisis that occurred in the first six months of 1973 seriously delayed the decisions needed for moving to the second stage of EMU, at a time when inflation was speeding up throughout Europe and reaching an annual rate of between 8% and 9%. Added to that, a new crisis arose with the outbreak of the fourth Middle Eastern war in October. The oil restrictions decided by the Arab countries, accompanied by a complete embargo on supplies to the Netherlands, threatened to block the European economies very quickly. Community solidarity was severely tested. In October 1973 the Nine agreed a ‘Declaration on European Identity’ to enable them to speak to the United States with a single voice.

It was time to move on to the second stage of EMU, scheduled for 1 January 1974, as Hermann Schwörer pointed out at the European Parliament’s plenary part-session in January 1974: ‘Entry into the second stage should remind us of those omissions [from the first stage] which must eventually be made good, i.e. the need for a joint attack on inflation… a harmonised budget policy in the nine Member States. In addition, the second stage should introduce important measures, e.g. permanent consultations in economic and monetary fields… the coordination of social policy, taxation policy and competition policy. If we say the second stage should be completed by 1 January 1976, he added, the Council must be strongly urged to take the necessary decisions to allow the transition to this second stage.’

1974-1977: lost in a monetary wilderness

During the first months of 1974 the crisis became more acute, with growing anxiety about the fate of Europe. In January, this crisis of confidence was reflected in the decision taken in Paris to allow the franc to float. That meant France lost contact with the hard core of EMU, which was now confined to the Deutschmark, the Belgian and Luxembourg francs, the Danish krone and the Dutch florin. The deadlock reached in the creation of the European Regional Development Fund, one of the showpieces of Economic Union, and the differences of opinion that emerged between France and its European partners in February at the Washington Conference of the main oil-consuming countries completed this sombre picture.

Between the years 1974 and 1977 the plan for monetary union became lost in a wilderness. During that period, galloping inflation and balance of payments deficits weakened the British, Italian, French and Irish currencies, forcing them to abandon the currency snake on several occasions. By January 1974 the snake only encompassed the Deutschmark zone, i.e. the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark
and the three Benelux countries. Reduced to a minimum, it came to a standstill.

After that failure, the European leaders sought a new approach to stabilising their currencies. This was the time when the finance ministers of the IMF’s Interim Committee were meeting in Kingston where, on 8 January 1976, they adopted a reform of the international monetary system. That reform, known as the Jamaica Agreement, legalised floating exchange rates and thereby put an end to the system of fixed and adjustable parities.

On 27 October 1977 in Florence, Roy Jenkins, the President of the European Commission, proposed moving towards monetary union, which he presented as the surest means of relaunching European economic growth and combating the scourges of inflation and unemployment.

**Christian Democrats strengthened by the birth of the European Monetary System (1978)**

In January 1978, the Christian-Democratic Group in the European Parliament unanimously adopted a motion for a resolution on relaunching EMU, drawn up by a working party chaired by Ernst Müller-Hermann. The Group believed it was urgent to relaunch EMU before enlargement of the Community, which it supported because of the vital need to integrate the Nine more deeply, actually took place. Moreover, the partial economic crisis in the Community had increasingly led Member States to adopt national and protectionist measures, which was contrary to the Treaty of Rome. Lastly, given its strong economic potential, the Community ought to be aware of the important responsibility it bore towards the Third World and its role in stabilising the global economy. To that end, Member States must take joint action. The Christian Democrats were convinced that if the Community was to meet the objective of EMU, it must move towards concerted and parallel activities in a number of areas. It must make greater efforts to achieve growth without inflation, make the Community’s economic policy more coherent, put an end to regional imbalances and, lastly, ensure closer cooperation in the field of monetary policy.

At the Copenhagen European Council on 7 and 8 April 1978, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt put forward the idea of a new European monetary system (EMS) open to all the Member States of the Community. The outcome of the deliberations on creating a European monetary system showed that it was vital to achieve greater
convergence in the field of economic development if the system was to be sustainable. Harry Notenboom, Ernst Müller-Hermann, Camillo Ripamonti and Richie Ryan, spokesmen for the Christian-Democratic Group, focussed on this point during the European Parliament’s debates in the last three months of 1978. Against a generally favourable economic backdrop the Bremen European Council confirmed the principle of EMS on 7 July 1978. The Community institutions and the finance ministers of the Nine were immediately instructed to draw up precise proposals, which the Brussels European Council formally adopted on 4 and 5 December 1978. Ernst Müller-Hermann, speaking on behalf of the Group, welcomed the plan for a monetary system based on fixed exchange rates ‘If this project is successful it will undoubtedly take the Community a significant step closer to integration, to an efficiently-run economy and to greater political solidarity and authority.’

Harry Notenboom saw the decision taken in Bremen as a major step forward. He pointed out that monetary instability made it impossible to carry out some of the tasks the Christian Democrats had set themselves. The Christian-Democratic Group wanted to see a fairer distribution among social groups and regions. The monetary uncertainty also jeopardised the success of the plans for enlargement: ‘Without integration, Europe will never be able to fulfil the role we all wish for it. After all, we want to reduce the serious internal level of unemployment, we want to adapt our socio-economic structures to the new international relationships and to a new international division of labour, and we want the major enlargement of the Community to be a success.’

EMS was born on 13 March 1979 without the UK, which did not join because it wanted to allow the pound to continue to float. As the successful starting point for the forthcoming economic and monetary union, the main new feature of EMS compared with the snake was the creation of the ecu (European Currency Unit).

It was to take another two decades before Europeans saw the ecu, converted and christened the ‘euro’, in their purses.
How did the national parliaments of the European Member States acquire their powers in the course of the history of democracy? Through the budgetary procedure, financial control and a dialogue between equals with the governments on all matters connected with the budget. That was how the Group’s pioneers in the Committee on Budgets, ‘the budgetarists’, saw it. Indeed, the Christian Democrats in the European Parliament fought from the early days to give this democratic institution genuine budgetary co-decision powers within the institutional triangle of the Community.

The 1951 Treaty of Paris set out budgetary rules that were both ‘brief and simplistic’, a mark of the originality of this system. The High Authority created revenue in the form of ‘levies’ and authorised operational expenditure, the main form of spending, while administrative expenditure was authorised by the ‘College of four Presidents’, now defunct.

The Treaties of Rome devoted much more attention to budgets than the Treaty of Paris. Budgetary authority no longer lay with the Commission, which embodied supranationality, but with the Council, which represented the States. The European Parliament had virtually no budgetary powers. It had the right to propose modifications to the Council’s draft budget, but it was the Council that finally adopted the budget after consulting the Commission.

On 8 April 1965, the Merger Treaty between the executives of the three Communities (ECSC, EEC, Euratom) created a Community budget by merging the ECSC administrative budget, the EEC budget and the Euratom budget.

The Christian-Democratic Group decided to take the offensive on two issues: replacing Member States’ financial contributions with own resources, and strengthening the European Parliament’s budgetary powers.
On 2 July 1969, during a debate on an oral question on the Communities’ own resources and Parliament’s budgetary powers, Helmut Karl Artzinger pointed out that: ‘so long as the Community basically depends on Member States’ contributions, Parliament will have no real budgetary power [...] But there is no doubt that it is this Parliament’s inalienable objective to obtain full budgetary powers.’

On 10 December 1969, Hans Furler set out the Group’s objectives: ‘You know that the struggle for the European Parliament’s budgetary powers has been going on for years and that we have always been at one in upholding the view that as soon as common resources have been created, Parliament must be given real budgetary powers [...] We are not asking for full budgetary powers, but we will not be content with consultation that is not obligatory. What we want is genuine cooperation involving a right of approval.’

Enhanced budgetary powers: the financial treaties of 1970 and 1975

On 21 April 1970, the Council of Ministers decided to give the European Community enough financial autonomy for it to be financed entirely from resources assigned to it automatically; at the same time, Member States’ budgetary authorities would no longer have to enter European expenditure in their annual national budget. However, the first category of ‘own resources’ appears in the Treaty establishing the ECSC, which at the time gave the High Authority (later to become the Commission of the European Communities) the power to impose annual levies on Member States’ coal and steel undertakings as part of the European coal and steel policy. Agricultural levies made up another category of ‘own resources’, Customs duties were also paid to the European budget as ‘own resources’. The European Community had in practice introduced a common external tariff of entry taxes. The necessary outstanding balance to cover expenditure as a whole was made up from the national contributions, i.e. the contributions payable by the Member States.

This led to Parliament acquiring real budgetary power, in two stages. Pleased with the decision of 21 April 1970 replacing financial contributions by own resources and the Luxembourg Treaty of 22 April 1970 strengthening Parliament’s powers, on 5 July 1972 the Group stated in clear terms what Christian Democrats wanted. Speaking on their behalf, Heinrich Aigner said: ‘Let me tell you that my Group regards the question of budgetary power as a cornerstone of the democratic develop-
ment of the Communities, from the dual aspect of the right to vote on appropriations and the right of control.”

The budgetary treaty signed in Luxembourg was innovatory for several reasons. It modified certain aspects of budgetary power (expenditure, adoption of the budget, discharge) and introduced the concepts of ‘compulsory expenditure’ (CE), and ‘non-compulsory expenditure’ (NCE). The European Parliament obtained its own power of decision over NCE and had the ‘final say’ on it. The Treaty gave Parliament the right to ‘declare that the budget has been finally adopted’. Eventually, the Council undertook to consult the European Parliament more closely when examining legal acts with appreciable budgetary implications. The Interinstitutional Agreement concluded on 4 March 1975 laid down the implementing rules for this consultation procedure.

The financial treaty signed in Brussels on 22 July 1975 was the second ‘budgetary’ treaty. It amended certain budgetary provisions of the Treaties, introduced the conciliation procedure and created the Court of Auditors. Secondly, it strengthened the European Parliament’s budgetary powers and power of budgetary control over the implementation of expenditure by recognising Parliament’s right to reject in its entirety the draft budget adopted by the Council and by transferring responsibility to Parliament for giving a discharge to the Commission on the implementation of the budget. The budgetary discharge procedure was an example of the European Parliament’s rise in power. Beginning with a posteriori control, Parliament began to obtain continuous control over the management of Community finances. It checked the implementation of the budget and gave the Commission a discharge every year.

Some obstacles were nevertheless encountered on the way to gaining this budgetary power. For the Council, the strengthening of Parliament’s role meant it had to share its budgetary and legislative power, i.e. find a common position with Parliament and reach compromises. That often proved difficult, and budgetary crises put the smooth running of the budgetary Authority to the test.

The Court of Auditors under the protective wing of Heinrich Aigner

Heinrich Aigner, co-rapporteur of the report on amending relations between the institutions of the Community, supported the idea of creating the Court of Auditors. In his view, the only way to reduce the ‘shockingly high level of hidden frauds’ was to set up a tight network of
external and internal supervision. The Court of Auditors was to assist the budgetary authority and the budgetary control authority to ‘correct the lacunae that were sometimes also found in budgetary decisions. The Court, a fully independent body, must perform on-the-spot checks in the institutions and the Member States. It must have the right to demand all the documents or information necessary for it to perform its duties.’ Heinrich Aigner managed to obtain the right for Parliament to play a full part in the appointment of members of the Court. Parliament also gained some influence in the preparation of the association and trade agreements concluded by the Community.

The ‘Notenboom procedure’

It is to the Dutch Christian Democrat Harry Notenboom that the European Parliament owes the introduction in 1976 of a procedure of parliamentary control over the course of the financial year with a view to providing information on the sound implementation of the budget by the Commission and making the budgetary process more transparent. The ‘Notenboom procedure’ that is still applied today, although in a more sophisticated form, was initiated by the Committee on Budgetary Control, which wanted to ‘ensure that the debate on the following year’s budget reflected utilisation of that of the previous and current year.’ The procedure, now enhanced and enshrined in institutional tradition, was born of Christian Democrat MEPs’ resolve that budgetary control should not just be a deliberative activity but instead should take the form of a modern and effective parliamentary power of control.

On the eve of the direct elections in 1979, the European Parliament had thus acquired a new power, which signalled the start of its rising position within the Community system. Men such as Heinrich Aigner and Harry Notenboom gave the parliamentary committees responsible for the budget a new credibility. There was no secret or magic recipe for these men’s success: they had to show the members of the Council, who were assisted by high-level budgetary experts, that they were just as pugnacious and competent. This was not a struggle for power so much as a struggle for the creation of a stringent parliamentary system. Members of the Group sitting on the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Budgetary Control before and after 1979 talked with some pride about the atmosphere that reigned in those committees. They felt they belonged to a kind of elite, which had control over all the budgetary figures and was capable of accomplishing a heavy workload, often including night sittings. Horst Langes, Efthimios Christodoulou,
James Elles and many others were to continue this pioneering work during the following parliamentary terms. Jan Westenbroek, the Dutch official in the Group responsible for budgetary affairs, and an obstinate and highly competent man, provided the ‘budgetary’ members of the Group with a great deal of judicious advice.

The Christian Democrats pursued their struggle to give Parliament new budgetary powers after the 1979 elections in the form of a ‘guerrilla’ war, armed with the powers already obtained.
Chapter VII
THE FIRST ENLARGEMENT
OF THE COMMUNITY (1972)

Relaunching Europe at The Hague (1969): a fresh impetus: completing, deepening and enlarging the Community

When Georges Pompidou came to power in France on 10 July 1969, replacing General de Gaulle who had resigned in April that year, this opened up new horizons for the Community. The new French President very soon proposed a summit conference between the Six to discuss, among other things, further enlargement of the European Community. At that time, the Netherlands held the Presidency of the EEC. A meeting of Heads of State or Government was therefore convened at The Hague on 1 and 2 December 1969. The French Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann, wanted the summit to consider three political issues: completing, deepening and enlarging the Community. That inspired new hope among the general public and Community leaders.

Completing the Community: new own resources

The Six agreed at The Hague to pass from the 12-year transitional period to the final stage of the European Community. The customs union and the Common Agricultural Policy were operational and proved that the common market was running smoothly. However, there was still ground to be covered and problems remained. Financing the CAP remained the most important budgetary issue and the Heads of State or Government therefore agreed gradually to replace Member States’ financial contributions by the Community’s own resources.

Deepening the Community: towards monetary union?

For its part, the European Commission wanted to give fresh impetus to European integration and deepen it more quickly, by expanding its own powers and strengthening the Community institutions. France backed the idea and suggested extending Community cooperation to new areas, such as currency, transport, technology and energy. With a
view to achieving this in practical terms, the European Heads of State or Government instructed a committee of experts chaired by Luxembourg’s Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Pierre Werner, to consider a monetary plan.

**Enlarging the Community: lifting the French veto on UK accession**

The most important decision taken at the summit was the agreement by the Heads of Government and the French President to open negotiations between the Community and the four candidate countries for accession (Denmark, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Norway). The story of relations between the Europe of Six and the United Kingdom dated back to the very beginning of European integration.

**The vagaries of the United Kingdom’s application to join the European Community**

In May 1950, the United Kingdom refused to take part in the negotiations on the Schuman Plan based on the new principles of delegating sovereignty and creating Community institutions. In the view of Jean Monnet, its refusal was not the end of the world: ‘*Let us begin Europe with those who want to create it alongside us. The English, who are pragmatic, will decide to join us once we have succeeded*’.83 The United Kingdom was only just recovering from the humiliation of the Suez crisis and the political fallout from the resignation of Anthony Eden as Prime Minister. His successor, Harold MacMillan, was to reveal himself, with the passage of time, a committed European.

For many years, the UK’s approach was based on the idea of an association with the rest of Europe.

The Christian Democrats regarded the cooperation provided for in the Association Treaty signed on 21 December 1954 as a useful basis. They began by calling for joint meetings to be organised between members of the ECSC Assembly and Members of the British Parliament. The Dutch MEP Margaretha Klompé had this to say on the subject: ‘[…] *The agreement shows the solidarity that exists between the members of the Community and the United Kingdom, which, although separated from them by a stretch of water, is nevertheless very close. I hope this first step will be followed by many others, to the greater advantage of the Community and the United Kingdom, and consequently of Europe.*’84

In spring 1960, Harold MacMillan was astonished to discover in Washington how strongly the American administration was in favour
The first enlargement of the Community of speeding up the Community’s timetable. Soon after, Whitehall began to consider joining the Community.

**First UK application for accession in 1961, first French veto on 14 January 1963**

On 9 August 1961, Harold MacMillan submitted the first official request for the opening of negotiations to the President of the EEC Council, accompanied by a whole number of conditions intended to safeguard the special relations the United Kingdom continued to maintain with the Commonwealth States, especially in the economic and monetary fields. That same day, the United Kingdom applied for accession to the ECSC and to Euratom.

The issue of UK accession was to be the focus of many debates within the European Parliament from that date on. The Christian-Democratic Group was very broadly in favour of the UK’s EEC membership. In the Group’s view, a Europe that was not open to this great democratic country would remain a ‘little Europe’. Obviously, candidate states must, however, subscribe to the rules and objectives of the Treaties. The report by Pieter A. Blaisse on the commercial and economic aspects of the UK’s accession to the EEC, presented on 23 January 1962, pointed out that ‘all States that wish to join the EEC must accept the economic and institutional philosophy of the Treaty of Rome, with a minimum of temporary and restricted derogations.’

On 9 May 1962, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the negotiations on the accession of the United Kingdom to the Communities in which it called for ‘negotiations on accession to be crowned with success as soon as possible.’ On 28 June 1962, the Christian-Democratic Group adopted a declaration in which it expressed the hope that ‘the negotiations undertaken on the accession of the United Kingdom and other European countries to the EEC, the ECSC and Euratom will lead without delay to a harmonious extension of the Community in the framework of the Treaties of Rome and Paris.’

‘In January 1963 a severe frost settled on the negotiations and indeed on our whole Community.’ Despite his five partners’ support for the pursuit of the negotiations, General de Gaulle felt that the excessive requests for derogations by the United Kingdom, especially in the field of trade, the Common Agricultural Policy and relations with the Commonwealth made the discussions pointless at that stage. Basically, General de Gaulle did not want the British, whom he considered too closely linked to the United States in terms of their defence policy, to join a Community which he wanted to stamp with his own concept of independence from the United States.
The Christian-Democratic Group reacted to the interruption in the negotiations with the United Kingdom with a resolution that the European Parliament adopted on 6 February 1963, largely at the Group’s initiative: ‘The European Parliament (...) has decided in favour of the accession of Great Britain and other countries to the European Communities, provided that accession does not jeopardise the integration process and that the Treaties of Rome and Paris are in no way affected as regards their material rules or their institutional structure’.

Pieter A. Blaisse, on behalf of the Group, pointed out once again that the Group was looking to a ‘United States of Europe, not a Community of Six, but a Community that includes more countries. A piecemeal Europe will never be a strong Europe’. Within the Group, the Dutch delegation proved the most obstinate supporters of British accession. As one of the Secretaries General of the Group shrewdly pointed out at the time, ‘de Gaulle wanted a Europe à l’anglaise\(^a\) without the English. And the Dutch wanted a Europe à la Schuman, but with the English.’\(^b\)

Second application for accession, second French veto: the Christian-Democratic Group opposes misuse of the veto

On 11 May 1967, the UK, together with Denmark, the Irish Republic and Norway, submitted another application for accession to the EEC in a much more favourable political climate. That was a turning point, because this time the application came from a Labour government that had by now overcome its fundamental reservations about European integration. What Jean Monnet had foretold actually came to pass, because this time the British, impressed by the success of the common market, were clearly keener to join without demanding too many exemptions.

Yet France once again vetoed the accession of the United Kingdom, at a press conference held on 27 November 1967. This time General de Gaulle categorically rejected the application on the grounds that France feared the UK might act as a ‘Trojan horse’ of the United States within the Community. Indeed, the UK’s pro-American stance, together with its sense of national identity and refusal to become involved in any kind of federal European structure, made it unlikely that it would join the European Community without ulterior motives. Yet the only way to find out whether this was true was at least to open new negotiations.

\(^a\) i.e. purely intergovernmental and with a large number of derogations.
\(^b\) Interview with Carl Otto Lenz, 15 November 2007, in Bensheim.
Following the French decision, the Chairman of the Christian-Democratic Group, Joseph Illerhaus, pointed out that ‘the Group has always actively supported the idea of enlarging the Community of Six. [...] The question that arises – and to which I will immediately answer yes – is whether it is not a misuse of power to pointlessly apply this right of veto’. According to Mario Scelba, for the Communities enlargement actually meant ‘the possibility of making progress towards the political integration of Europe, which is, in our view, a guarantee of freedom, peace and social progress’. Illerhaus noted that the Community needed enlargement and the accession of the UK for political and economic reasons. The Christian Democrats had always supported enlargement of the Community on one condition: the States wishing to join must accept the Treaties and the rules applied by the Community. They were convinced that the UK was more than ever ‘dependent on Europe and on cooperation with Europe’.

**The UK’s application is finally accepted at The Hague summit**

Following the agreement reached by the Six during The Hague Summit Conference in 1969, on 30 June 1970 the EEC resumed negotiations with the countries applying for accession – the UK, Denmark, Ireland and Norway – which accepted the conditions, i.e. acceptance of the Treaties and secondary legislation, and confirmation of the EEC’s ultimate political objectives.

In 1970, when the Conservative Government led by Edward Heath, a strong supporter of European integration, came to power, discussions became easier. The negotiations concluded with the Luxembourg Agreement of 23 June 1971. Hans-August Lücker presented the Group’s position on enlargement. He emphasised the innovatory nature of the Community: ‘We are witnessing the formation of a Community that has no model, no precedent in any nation, a Community that is introducing a new type of cooperation between peoples and States, an open Community that is not directed against anybody, either in Europe or in the rest of the world, a Community that is prepared to make a fair contribution, in the world and to the world and, obviously also, to Europe, a Community resolved to tackle the difficulties that face it’. The House of Commons voted in favour of UK accession on 28 October 1971, in what can be described as an historic vote. The vote in favour had cross-party support and on 22 January 1972 the United Kingdom signed its Treaty of Accession in Brussels. Following ratification, the United Kingdom, like Ireland and Denmark, became a Member State of the European Community on 1 January 1973.
New Irish Members join the Christian-Democratic Group…
but the British still have a long wait ahead

Parliament now entered a new phase in its history. From a Parliament of the Six, it became the Parliament of an enlarged European Community made up of nine Member States. With 142 Members, its ranks had increased by 41 new MEPs. Enlargement also brought an increase in the membership of the Christian-Democratic Group with the entry of three Irish MEPs from Fine Gael, Richie Ryan, Anthony Esmonde and Charles McDonald. It now had 55 Members and was the largest group in the European Parliament, followed by the Socialist Group with 43 seats. The British Labour Party members, who disagreed with the accession conditions, had decided not to take their seat in Parliament, depriving the Socialist Group of their support until July 1975.

The British Conservatives and the Danish Conservatives formed a group of their own, the Group of European Democrats, made up of 18 British and 2 Danish Members. At the same time, the Conservatives wanted to establish cooperation with the Christian Democrats. The Chairman of the Conservative Group, Peter Kirk, believed the centre parties must group together if they wanted successfully to advance their views in the European Parliament. Following a joint decision taken on 18 September 1972, the bureaus of the two groups met at the beginning of each part-session to consider the agenda and the issues arising from it. Although the Christian-Democratic Group and the Conservative Group together did not make up an absolute majority in the Assembly, they became its strongest and most coherent force, especially when the advent of Labour Members in Strasbourg later led to divisions in the Socialist Group.

The question of the Conservatives joining the Christian-Democratic Group had not even arisen. The members from Benelux and Italy were not in favour. Hans-August Lücker, the then Chairman of the Group, held discussions with Edward Heath, leader of the Conservative Party, whom he regarded as a first-rate man, a committed European. The two men agreed on the principle of close cooperation between the two groups, especially within the parliamentary committees. They believed the two groups’ coordinators could exchange useful information and agree their position; their chairmen would sit side by side in the Chamber. Joint Study Days would be organised in London.

The Conservative MEPs took the initiative from their very first plenary part-session. From the outset they proved very active and

---

a Interview with Hans-August Lücker in Bonn, 16 March 2004.
introduced some of the same practices into the European Parliament that gave such vitality to British parliamentary life. Their Chairman, Peter Kirk, after noting the role the UK had played in promoting European integration, launched a huge campaign to strengthen the European Parliament’s role, believing that on its health depended the health of the Community. Following Peter Kirk’s acceptance speech, the Conservative Group distributed a memorandum on improving procedures within Parliament.

Subsequently, the Christian-Democratic Group sought to lay the foundations for regular cooperation. Twenty years later, in 1992, that led the British and Danish Conservatives to join the EPP Group as Allied members and in 1999 the Group was renamed the EPP-ED Group.

Further progress towards political union (1972-1974)

The Paris Summit of 21 October 1972 once again set out ambitious objectives, though these were far from achieved by the deadline. The final communiqué set out the objective of ‘transforming, before the end of the decade and with the fullest respect for the Treaties already signed, the whole complex of the relations between Member States into a European Union’. For its part, the Group appointed Alfred Bertrand rapporteur for the European Parliament’s Committee on Political Affairs. Bertrand, who was responsible with Emilio Colombo and Hans-August Lücker for setting out the Group’s positions, stubbornly upheld the dual institutional strategy the CD Group had been pursuing ever since 1958.

Firstly, it wanted to define the contours of a federal Europe that would result from the successive transfer of sovereignty to common, democratic and executive authorities. At the time, the Group spoke less of a ‘delegation of sovereignty’ than of the ‘joint exercise of delegated sovereignties’. Such a Europe could be built on the basis of a constitution that would transform the Commission into an executive, the European Parliament into a lower chamber and the Council into a senate of Member States. For two decades, from 1959 to 1979, that ambitious objective enshrined the Group’s concept of an ideal Europe, in accordance with the basic doctrine of the Community’s large Christian Democrat parties.

Secondly, it wanted to pursue the policy of ‘small steps’ by immediately negotiating interinstitutional agreements with the Council and the Commission and obtaining new financial agreements from the Member States.
This strategy resulted in two major successes, the drafting and ratification of the 1970 and 1975 financial treaties and the decision taken by the European Council on 5 December 1974 to elect the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage in 1978. At the time, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing had become President of the Republic following the death of Georges Pompidou in 1973.

For his election as President in 1974 Giscard d’Estaing, a committed and active European since entering political life, had won the support of the Centre of Social Democrats party, chaired by Jean Lecanuet, whose members were represented in the European Parliament in the Christian-Democratic Group. A committed pro-European, Giscard d’Estaing was a member of the EPP Group from 1991 to 1994 and chaired the European Convention from 2004 to 2006.

The institutionalisation of the European Council, i.e. the regular meeting of Heads of State or Government also attended by the President of the Commission, from 1974 changed the power structure in the Community. While introducing a degree of intergovernmentalism into the institutional system, it also confirmed that European integration had made headway and reached a point of no return. The leaders of the Member States and the representatives of the people would henceforth be more directly involved in the pursuit of Europe’s objectives.
In the space of 18 months, three southern European states made unexpected moves towards democracy. The Carnation Revolution in Portugal in April 1974, the Greek military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and, lastly, the death of General Franco in Spain in November 1975 spelled the end of the authoritarian regimes of, respectively, Marcelo Caetano, the successor to Salazar, the military junta of the Greek colonels headed by General Ioannidis and the Franco regime.

These countries, which had been ruled by conservative, militarist and authoritarian regimes, nonetheless managed once and for all to make the transition to democracy. Disregarded during the first stages of European integration, the fledgling southern European democracies were, however, supported by the European Christian Democrats until they joined the Community, for Christian Democrats believed that ‘these countries’ accession to the Community fully corresponds to the European Christian Democrats’ cultural, historical and political concept of Europe.’ Accordingly, on 2 March 1977, Leo Tindemans, the then Chairman of the European People’s Party, stated that ‘Spain, Greece and Portugal should be admitted to the Community as soon as possible,’ and also noted ‘that the practical problems involved are no justification for a policy of procrastination.’

In the European Parliament, the debate on enlargement showed that the Christian-Democratic Group was unanimous about the prospects for accession. On 12 October 1977, the Group, joined by the European Conservatives, the European Progressive Democrats and the Communists, tabled a joint resolution on the negotiations on enlargement of the European Community. Speaking on behalf of the Group, Egon Klepsch declared: ‘By approving the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain, we shall be making a political contribution towards leading these countries once and for all out of political isolation and into the European Community of States. We believe that by absorbing these countries into a
free Europe, we shall be making the best and most effective possible contribution to the maintenance of political and economic stability in the Mediterranean countries of Europe, a contribution that will serve to strengthen these young democracies.”

The Carnation Revolution in Portugal (April 1974)

In 1971, the European Union of Young Christian Democrats (EUYCD) secretly set up a Portuguese group. Members of Catholic Action, militants within the democratic opposition to Salazar’s regime, took part in the movement. When the Portuguese armed forces, supported by the people, took power and restored democracy, Christian Democrats gave them unswerving support.

Serious disturbances broke out, however, with demonstrations by left-wing sympathisers of pro-Soviet neutralism, inspired by a junta of officers who had brought an end to the colonial wars in Angola and Mozambique. Moreover, when demonstrators besieged the congress held on 25 January 1975 by the Democratic and Social Centre, the party close to the Christian Democrats, and the forces of law and order did not react, the CD Group did not hesitate to raise the matter in plenary. Alfred Bertrand made the Christian Democrats’ concern very clear at the time: ‘These questions are of concern to us, since we feel that Portugal must now have the chance of further developing its democracy by free elections.’ The Oporto incidents, which had certainly caused concern to Community countries, raised various issues, including whether the elections would indeed be held. ‘Will they [the elections] be free or secret? Will the candidates be able to campaign freely without danger, or will the electorate be intimidated to prevent them from casting their votes freely? We feel that Portugal, as a democratic country, has a right to its proper place within the European Community, but it cannot solve all its problems without a return to genuine democracy within its own borders.’

At the legislative elections on 25 April 1976 the Democratic and Social Centre doubled its votes and increased the number of its members in the national parliament from 16 to 41, which meant it was now an important force on the Portuguese political scene. On 28 March 1977, now that there no longer seemed to be any doubt about its democratic stability, Portugal officially applied for accession to the European Community. Following lengthy negotiations, which concluded with Portugal’s accession on 1 January 1986, the EPP Group was immediately joined by the DSC members and then, ten years later, by members
The Cyprus crisis leads to the fall of the Greek colonels (July 1974)

The attempted coup d’État of 15 July 1974 by the Greek colonels against Cyprus, ruled at the time by the Primate of the Cypriot Orthodox Church Makarios III, led five days later to military intervention by Turkey to defend the Turkish minority on Cyprus. For some years the three countries had been linked economically with the European Community by association agreements. The Christian-Democratic Group therefore called on the Community to seek a solution to the conflict, which risked worsening at any moment: ‘with the Council and the Commission of the European Communities adopting an extremely cautious approach to the Cyprus conflict, the European Parliament’s Christian-Democratic Group asked in Parliament why the Community of the Nine had seen this conflict spread and had taken no steps to convene the Association Council; the Christian-Democratic Group proceeds from the premise that the European Economic Community has an association agreement with Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, the aim of the association being to create, by establishing a customs union, close economic and commercial relations between these three countries and the European Community. Economic relations, however, necessarily entail political relations and, in the ultimate analysis, relations do not exist as an end in themselves. They are established to contribute to the well-being and the peace of the peoples concerned.’

Already weakened by the Politechnion student revolts, the colonels’ regime collapsed. Four months later, during the November 1974 elections, the Nea Demokratia party led by Konstantinos Karamanlis won 54.37 % of the votes. The new democratic government headed by Karamanlis applied for accession to the European Community on 12 June 1975.

The Christian-Democratic Group closely followed the situation, and its Vice-Chairman, Hans-August Lücker, accompanied by its Secretary General Alfredo De Poi, visited Athens in November 1975. There they met the Minister for Economic Affairs, Anastasios Papaligouras, and the Minister for Foreign Trade, Ioannis Varvitsiotis, together with senior figures from the party of Prime Minister Karamanlis. Nea Demokratia would join the EPP Group on 23 December 1981. Ioannis Varvitsiotis was to pursue an important ministerial career in his coun-
try, and later joined the European Parliament, where he became leader of the Greek delegation in the EPP-ED Group in 2004.

On 1 January 1981, Greece joined the European Community as its tenth Member State.

**The death of General Franco and democracy in Spain (November 1975)**

On 20 November 1975, General Franco died following a long illness. Two days later, Don Juan de Borbón y Borbón, grandson of former King Alphonso XIII, was crowned King Juan Carlos I of Spain. The Caudillo had chosen the young prince as successor in 1969. The situation in Spain was extremely tense at the time. Shortly before General Franco’s death, in September 1975, five Basque dissidents had been executed, despite the European Community’s appeals for clemency.

In October 1975, speaking on behalf of the Christian-Democratic Group, Hans-August Lücker confirmed its position on Spain: ‘This House has always been a guarantor of human rights and has condemned special courts and military summary courts with the insufficient possibilities of defence that they entail. Respect for human rights, to which also belong the rights of defence for those standing trial, is an indispensable element in our European tradition, culture and civilisation. Any country wishing to join the Community must respect those rights.’

The CD Group not only condemned the Franco government’s acts of violence, but also the acts of terrorism that then began to occur: ‘At the same time we condemn just as firmly all terror and violence aimed at attaining political goals, no matter which side it stems from. I would like to add that the Christian-Democratic group includes the murder of policemen in this category of acts of terror and we object just as strongly to this form of terrorism used by certain organisations as a means of attaining political goals in Spain.’

Yet the Christian-Democratic Group remained optimistic and believed that Spain would one day join the Community: ‘For the future, we can do two things: firstly together with the democratic forces in Spain which remain in touch with the European Parliament and with the CD Group, we should do everything possible to find a way out for the Spanish people towards democracy in freedom; secondly, we can play our part by ensuring that Spain and its people can one day take their place among the peoples of the Community, for we remain convinced that Spain and the Spanish people, with their culture and tradition, belong here.’
Very soon after his accession to the throne, Juan Carlos I realised that the Spanish people wanted more democracy and began to liberalise the regime.

Hans-August Lücker went on an official visit to Spain in 1976. There he met the Archbishop of Toledo, the Primate of Spain: ‘What can we do to promote democracy?’, Lücker asked. ‘Above all, avoid a Spanish party that refers to Christianity,’ the Primate replied. ‘That warning made good sense.’ Lücker also met Manuel Fraga Iribarne, the Galician leader. However, his all too recent links with Franco’s regime put him out of the reckoning to lead any moderate Spanish national party. Lücker then met Adolfo Suarez, who made a good impression on him. He had been the last Chairman of Franco’s youth movement, but was on good terms with King Juan Carlos I, who agreed that Adolfo Suarez should play a part in the reconstruction of Spain.a

The Group’s bureau, chaired by Alfred Bertrand, met in Madrid on 1 and 2 February 1977. The CDEU was also present, at the highest level. A delegation led by Alfred Bertrand and Kai-Uwe von Hassel was received by King Juan Carlos and the new Prime Minister, Adolfo Suarez, who had formed a moderate, centrist government.

The Group made it quite clear that it supported democratisation in Spain and Spanish membership of the European Community. A few months later, Spain officially applied for accession. Like Portugal, it joined the Community on 1 January 1986. As long-standing members of the Christian Democrat movement, the two regional parties, Convergence y Union from Catalonia, and the PNV from the Basque Country, immediately joined the Group. It took until the elections of June 1989 for the elected members of the only large centre-right Spanish party represented at national level, the Partido Popular, to join the EPP Group. Henceforth, it was to be one of the Group’s most influential delegations.

---

a (Interview with Hans-August Lücker in Bonn on 16 March 2004). Two months after that meeting, a delegation from the Group and from the CDEU attended the constituent conference of Adolfo Suarez’ Centre Union. Mariano Rumor and Hans-August Lücker were well received there. The idea was to set up a large Spanish People’s Party. It took a long time, in fact until José María Aznar became leader of the People’s Party, for this project to become reality, with the help of the European Christian Democrats. Cf. Part II.
Chapter IX
THE COMMUNITY’S SOCIAL POLICY: AN AVANT-GARDE POLICY SPEARHEADED BY THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (1953-1979)

‘Friends, let us not scorn socialism, but rather let us forestall it through the social structuring of economic life. In all sectors we can, better than the socialists, combat injustice and oppose all oppression, in as much as we are the followers of a religion based on justice’. Alcide De Gasperi

The early achievements of the ECSC

From its foundation in 1953, the Christian-Democratic Group was opposed to drawing ‘any distinction between problems of an economic and social nature, between economic policy and social policy’. For the Christian Democrats, the main social objectives were wage equalisation, reducing working hours, especially for young workers and those engaged in heavy manual work, and longer leave. The prime objective, however, remained full employment. Emmanuel Sassen, Chairman of the Group, emphasised that ‘the High Authority has a broader scope for action and greater responsibility for social policy than provided for in the Treaty […] Article 3 gives the High Authority the role of promoter’.

The Christian-Democratic Group was the first to draft and support reports on all the sectors of social policy for the Common Assembly of the ECSC and then the European Parliament. On 16 June 1953, at its first meeting, held in Room 54 of the Maison de l’Europe in Strasbourg, the Group called for a social policy that would produce concrete benefits for workers affected by the establishment of the common market in coal and steel. The first report drafted by Alfred Bertrand on behalf of the Committee on Social Affairs gave him an opportunity to express his ‘social fibre’. The Minutes of that meeting noted that Members present agreed on the need to ‘draw the Assembly’s attention to the religious and family aspects of the High Authority’s social policy. It is important to reaffirm the Christian Democrats’ doctrine, especially as regards
any religious and family issues that might arise from the projects to build workers’ houses and from the migration of workers’.117

From that time, emphasis was put on what was to form a specific part of Christian Democrat social doctrine for decades to come, a doctrine closely related to the beliefs of the Church and the Christian trade unions formed after the war. Between the capitalism of pure profit and a socialism that led to bureaucracy and weakened individual economic initiative, there was a third way worth exploring, one that aimed to reconcile economic efficiency with social justice.

The ECSC housing programme was to give thousands of workers access to home ownership. The High Authority submitted a memorandum on the subject on 12 October 1953.118 The first housing unit was built, with financial participation from the High Authority, at Marchienne-au-Pont in the coal-mining area of Charleroi, on 30 September 1954. By 1 January 1961, the programmes (the fourth ECSC programme) involved 51 783 housing units.119 Between 1952 and 1979 the ECSC financed and constructed no less than 150 000 workers’ housing units in the Community as a whole.

Economic and social issues must go hand in hand, ‘like flames and fire’

In terms of broad social approach, the Group declared that it preferred ‘the social market economy’, because it basically combined economic success with social solidarity. During this post-war period of strong growth, it was possible to create wealth and to redistribute it fairly. The spokesman of the German delegation, Hermann Kopf, took the same approach, saying in 1956: ‘You must never forget that we cannot organise our economic life along liberal lines unless the social conditions are satisfactory and the six States governed by the Treaty make up not only a Coal and Steel Community but also a genuine Community of workers and employers.’120

Alfred Bertrand for his part pointed out that the only way to build a peaceful Europe was with the trust and support of workers: ‘it will only be possible to extend the united Europe if workers have confidence in the Community. If it is not to disappoint them, therefore, the High Authority must define and apply a broad and complete social programme that will encourage them to join together in building Europe.’

In 1957, the Treaty of Rome made no provision for a common social policy, given the rigid nature of national social systems. Yet it did acknowledge the need for some harmonisation, as called for by France, which would result, firstly, from the very way the common market
The Community’s social policy

functioned and, secondly, from Community action and the approximation of national legislation. The Treaty provided for measures aimed at achieving the highest possible standard of living and level of employment, the free movement of workers, the functioning of the European Social Fund, a common vocational training policy, harmonising living and working conditions and, eventually, harmonising social legislation.

The Christian Democrats believed that attempts should be made to harmonise the national systems and laws governing social policy at European level and to integrate them in other policies, such as economic and regional policy. The objectives were clear but hard to achieve: full employment, greater social justice, equal opportunities.

A basic tenet of the Christian Democrats was that economic and social affairs were closely linked and without a flourishing economy there could be no social progress. The Italian Leopoldo Rubinacci explained this at the Assembly’s debate on 9 January 1959: ‘When the Treaties of Rome were signed, the idea was not just to achieve a political goal and not just to set an economic objective. It was mainly to fix a social objective. We cannot achieve any results on a social level unless we manage effectively to coordinate and harmonise the economic policy of the Community and of our six countries. I am profoundly convinced that social and economic affairs are intimately linked and we cannot expect social progress, or any substantial improvement in the living conditions of the less prosperous classes unless we also make economic efforts and develop economic activity.’

It took until the part-session of 11 to 15 January 1960 for a plenary debate to centre on social issues. Until then, the social aspects of European integration had been relegated to the bottom of the agenda and regarded with some indifference.

The Dutch Christian Democrat Cornelis P. Hazenbosch welcomed this new focus: ‘In fact it is on a social level that any attempt to achieve economic integration attains much of its full value. The aim here is to consolidate the foundations of our prosperity and above all to ensure that all strata of our populations have a fair share of the growing prosperity. For us Christian Democrats, creating prosperity and distributing its benefits constitute, so to speak, a single and indivisible process. If we want to achieve our objective within a Europe that is uniting, the two must go hand in hand, like flames and fire.’

Practical benefits for citizens: the free movement of workers

In October 1960, the Assembly debated a regulation on the free movement of workers in the Community. In the view of Leopoldo Rubinacci,
'the introduction of these regulations also satisfies our Community’s economic requirements, in the sense that we are making labour available to all regions where there is a shortage, which means that available resources and capital can be used to expand the economic process to the benefit of our entire Community. The free movement of labour will make it easier to raise the standard of living of the workers of the six countries; in the end it will contribute to the harmonisation of wage levels, standards and social welfare systems, which is also one of the social objectives of the Treaty.'

With the regulation, the Assembly showed that it wanted to ‘create a Community, a genuine Community, a common market providing for the free movement of goods, services, capital and also the human factor that is vital to the economic and productive cycle of our countries’. This confirmed that ‘man is always the focus of our attention and our concern, and even when we look at the economy we do so with reference to man.’

The regulation changed the rules on migrant workers, giving them special protection during their stay and allowing them to move from one undertaking to another. Workers could be accompanied by family members. Preference was given, however, to job creation rather than to moving labour from regions with high unemployment to regions with a shortage of workers: ‘It is better for capital and initiative to go in search of labour than for labour to move elsewhere in search of initiative and capital.’

Another regulation on the free movement of workers was drawn up in 1963. It abolished the principle of giving priority to the national market and put migrant workers on an equal footing with national workers, in regard not only to the right to vote but also the right to be elected as a representative of all the workers employed in an undertaking.

In 1966, the Commission presented directives on a European social policy, supplemented in 1968 by four ‘priority guidelines’. They included promoting vocational training, improving living and working conditions, correlating social policy with the Community’s other policies and monitoring the social statistics of the Six at European level.

From 1 July 1968, workers in the six Member States were not only protected against any discrimination based on nationality but also had the right to move freely, offer their services, and to apply for and be offered jobs with any employer. They could also settle with their family in any Community country.

**More resolute moves towards a social Europe in the 1970s**

In the mid-1970s, social policy began to occupy an increasingly important position. As Hans-August Lücker pointed out, nearly all decisions have social implications: ‘A democracy does not consist only of
institutions but must rather, in the interests of an open society, eliminate all material and social barriers separating the citizen from a full participation in the life of the nation. The European Christian Democrats are proud to be passionate innovators in this field.  

The Paris Summit of 19-21 October 1972 underlined the governments’ political resolve to do their utmost to achieve a coordinated policy in the field of employment and vocational training and to improve workers’ living and working conditions. The Summit officially recognised the fundamental role social policy must play in an enlarged Europe. It marked a turning point in the development of the Community. According to Alfred Bertrand, ‘the time has now come for the Community institutions to draw up a serious social policy for the nine Member States.’  

The social action programme to which the European Parliament’s Christian-Democratic Group agreed in principle in the report drafted by one of its members, the Italian Luigi Girardin, was merely a first step on the road to a common social policy and, therefore, towards giving the Community a more human aspect:  

‘In the Final Declaration issued at the Paris Summit the Member States stated that they regarded economic growth not as an end in itself but as a means of securing an improvement in the living standards of their peoples [...] This statement must be taken very seriously because at least we have arrived at a stage where the direct political resolve exists to progress towards an open social policy. We should seize the opportunity because unless we adjust European economic integration to social requirements we shall obviously only be lending support to the view that man is the servant of the economy instead of the other way round. That is why we must make this effort and do everything we can at both the national and the Community level. We should see this as a new and greater challenge to the trade unions and social partners in the Community.’  

The figure of seven million unemployed in the EEC dampened the social enthusiasm inspired by the strong growth of earlier years. Jacques Santer, the Luxembourg MEP who was to enjoy a great future as Prime Minister of his country and President of the Commission, issued a warning: ‘If we do not succeed in gaining over to the European cause the broad masses of the working population who are worried about their future, no institutional development towards a European Union will ever have the popular support which is essential for the construction of a Europe of individuals and peoples.’  

The Group then proposed holding a major debate with the ministers responsible for social, economic and financial policy. In the course of 1978, Parliament began to think about a sectoral structural policy.
a subject that the Group considered in detail during its Study Days in Regensburg, in October that year. In the light of the reports by Ernst Müller-Hermann, Harry Notenboom, Ferruccio Pisoni, Guillaume Schyns and Hermann Schwörer, it emphasised the need for a sectoral structural policy conducted at Community level. In a common market, the basic economic conditions must be created at the level of the market as a whole. The means used must be consistent with the principle of a social market economy; in the sectors affected by the crisis, such as the iron and steel and the textile industries, that implied creating a social consensus.

The Christian-Democratic Group’s social dialogue with undertakings and trade unions

Because a number of members of the Group came from trade unions or employers’ associations with links to Christian Democracy, it was genuinely important to hold meetings and discussions with Christian trade union organisations.

The Group held its first meeting with Christian Democrat trade union members of the Consultative Committee of the Community on 9 May 1955. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the EEC’s economic and social problems. The Christian Democrats suggested to the workers’ organisations that consultations should be organised at international level. They wanted joint committees to be set up to settle disputes between the national employers’ and workers’ organisations. The committees would act in an advisory capacity and should show leadership. The Group also proposed creating a central body responsible for looking into wages and working conditions in other Member State industries.

Alfred Bertrand expressed concern about the future: ‘We must be careful, when we set up a common market, not to repeat the mistakes we made in establishing the ECSC. The Treaty on the common market does not contain any clauses on workers [...] There is an urgent need to include clauses on the conditions of competition, the policy on investment funds and the management of readaptation funds. The best way to achieve this would be by creating a social and economic committee.’

The concern which Bertrand voiced as early as 1956 was widely echoed in the 1960s and 1970s when the various social (European Social Fund) and regional (European Regional Development Fund) solidarity funds financed by the European budget were created.

One of the Commission’s tasks under the Treaty of Rome was to promote close cooperation between Member States in matters relating to
The Community’s social policy

the right of association and collective bargaining between employers and workers. A large number of advisory committees were set up in the 1960s to advise the Commission on formulating specific policies. These committees, such as the Committee for the Social Security of Migrant Workers, the Committee of the ESF and the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Men and Women, were made up of representatives of national employers’ and trade union organisations and of the governments.

The Assembly encouraged social dialogue and made a practical contribution by often inviting the social partners to make their positions known at Community level to the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs before it drew up any reports on proposals concerning them.

The Catholic Employers’ Organisation and the European Federation of Christian Trade Unions asked the Group to organise a conference, which was held in February 1961. It was preceded by a preparatory meeting held in Strasbourg on 27 June 1960 in which the Group’s bureau, two employers and two trade unionists took part. Following the ECSC’s report on social policy (1952-1962), the Belgian MEP René Pêtre stressed the importance of involving the social partners even more closely.

The trade unions and employers’ associations adjusted to the scale of the EEC. Every group of social partners set up a European secretariat. Liaison offices were also set up, demonstrating a shared determination to cooperate. ‘All this activity is not just useful but vital to ensure that European workers see the European Community as a genuine instrument of Community solidarity and social justice.’

From 1970 on, the Standing Committee on Employment became the major tripartite European body concerned with employment. The Council of Ministers, the Commission and the social partners held constant consultations to promote cooperation on employment policy.

Worker consultation and participation lay at the heart of the European debate from the moment the first social action programme was adopted in 1974. The directives on employment dealt with the right of workers to be informed and consulted on a wide range of important issues affecting the health of their undertaking and their own interests, but they contained no provisions giving workers the right to participate in the decision-making process.
Chapter X
THE CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRATIC GROUP’S SOLIDARITY WITH THE NATIONS OPPRESSED BY THE SOVIET UNION

‘This Europe is not directed against anyone; it has no designs of aggression, no egotistical or imperialist nature, either internally or with regard to other countries. It will remain accessible to those wishing to join. Its raison d’être is solidarity and international cooperation, a rational organisation of the world of which it must form an essential part.’

Robert Schuman

The Treaties of Rome did not contain any provisions on foreign policy. They provided neither for consultation nor even for any kind of cooperation in this field among the six States. Nevertheless, the European Communities had a key role to play in the sphere of foreign policy. The dynamism generated by the Common Market considerably strengthened Europe’s position in the world and enabled the Community to introduce a new factor into international relations.

From 1953 to 1979, the Christian-Democratic Group in the European Parliament manifested its political will on all the major issues relating to cooperation in the field of foreign policy.

At the beginning of the 1950s, the history of international relations entered a new era. Before the Supreme Soviet, Georgy Malenkov solemnly revealed that ‘the United States no longer has a monopoly on the production of the hydrogen bomb’. In response to this growing threat, in 1951 the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales announced that they wanted to ‘defend Christian and Western civilisation against the peril of totalitarian oppression that threatens us in the East of Europe’. The United States, which had made a decisive contribution, through the Marshall Plan, to putting the European economy back on its feet after the Second World War, regularly underwrote and, in more general terms, encouraged the efforts to unify Europe, the ‘second pillar’ of the North Atlantic Alliance.

In his inaugural address as President of the ECSC Common Assembly in 1956, Hans Furler emphasised that ‘Only in collaboration with the
United States of America shall we Europeans be able to confront the dangers inherent in world politics’.\textsuperscript{138}

In the view of the Christian Democrats, a peaceful Europe would be based first and foremost on European values and solidarity. They firmly believed that such a Europe would one day be the key to the liberation of the countries of Eastern Europe from Communist control. Margaret Klompé, a Dutch Member of the ECSC Common Assembly, had stated back in 1954 that ‘The Common Assembly regards the European Coal and Steel Community as one of the first concrete examples of a political union, from which a wider union may one day emerge. The future of the peoples of the West, as of those behind the Iron Curtain, depends on the efforts made by the Common Assembly to achieve European union, not only in military terms but more especially in the social and economic spheres.’\textsuperscript{139}

In their desire to create a broader union some day which included the ‘peoples behind the Iron Curtain’, the Christian Democrats distinguished between the oppressed peoples – the victims of the regime – and their oppressors: ‘There are no satellite nations, only satellite governments’\textsuperscript{140} Moreover, it was imperative to ‘oppose any bargaining with the oppressor for the purpose of political trade-offs involving the fate of the peoples who are victims of Communist aggression.’\textsuperscript{141}

**Berlin: the ‘Wall of Shame’ (1961)**

In the 1950s, the relative gravity of each crisis was reflected in the situation faced by the people of Berlin. The city remained divided into a western part, containing the American, British and French sectors, and an eastern part, the Soviet sector. On 16 and 17 June 1953, strikes broke out in East Berlin and rapidly spread throughout East Germany. All the demonstrations were broken up by the Soviet army. Many lives were lost, and thousands of East Germans fled at that time to the Federal Republic of Germany. The flags outside the Maison de l’Europe in Strasbourg were lowered to half-mast as an expression of sympathy on the part of free Europe.\textsuperscript{142}

The Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament met in Berlin on 25 and 26 October 1960 to demonstrate the solidarity of Parliament with the Berlin population. The Chairman of the Christian-Democratic Group asked all the Christian Democrat members of that committee to attend the meeting.\textsuperscript{143}

In less than ten years, more than two million people moved from East to West Germany. To halt this continuous mass exodus, the German Democratic Republic finally decided to prevent the westward
The Christian-Democratic Group’s solidarity with the nations oppressed

The Christian-Democratic Group’s solidarity with the nations oppressed population drain by building the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961, making the Soviet zone of occupation the largest prison camp that Europe had ever known and opening a new chapter in the history of totalitarian Communism.

Repression in Hungary (October 1956) and Czechoslovakia (August 1968)

In October 1956, Hungarian opponents of the country’s political regime gave vent to their discontent by staging a peaceful procession through the streets of Budapest, which was destined to lead to the organisation of armed resistance. Nikita Khrushchev ordered the Red Army to put down the Hungarian uprising by force. Soviet troops attacked en masse and removed the new National Government. The Soviet Union had chosen a very favourable moment to intervene, because the Western camp, deeply divided and weakened by the Suez crisis which was brewing at the same time, was in no state to take appropriate action and stood by helplessly as the Soviet forces intervened.

These events in Hungary deeply shocked the Christian-Democratic Group in Parliament. As Hans Furler said, ‘The world political situation is filling us with dismay. We have been horrified to see the brutality with which freedom is being denied to ancient European nations in the east of our continent. I am thinking primarily of the Hungarians, a proud and courageous people to whom our hearts go out’.144 Through this aggressive intervention in contempt of democracy, the prestige of the USSR in the countries of Western Europe sank lower than at any time since the end of the Second World War. These events would long remain etched in the minds of Europeans.145

Less than twelve years later, in Czechoslovakia, the USSR was equally brutal in crushing the ‘Prague Spring’. Following the events of 21 August 1968, a debate took place in the European Parliament on the basis of a report drafted by Mario Scelba on the political consequences of the events in Czechoslovakia.146 The rapporteur, echoing the views of his Christian-Democratic Group, expressed solidarity with the people of Czechoslovakia. Faced with this hardening of the Communist bloc, he said, free Europe should play a role on the global political stage that befitted its status. Scelba noted that these events had occurred at a moment when Europe was disunited, hiding behind the protective shield of the United States. Europe’s position was consolidating the Soviet Union’s domination of its satellite countries and was advancing the division of the world into spheres of influence of the big two pow-
ers. European aspirations to unity were the guarantor of independence, freedom and peace. The House voted in favour of the resolution condemning the occupation of Czechoslovakia by foreign troops. The European Congress of Christian Democratic Parties, meeting in Venice from 12 to 15 September 1968, also manifested its solidarity with the people of Czechoslovakia. The invasion created an urgent need for initiatives designed to rekindle the integration process, to strengthen the Communities and to enlarge them.

**The Helsinki Summit of 1975 – was East-West détente a reality or an illusion?**

The détente of the 1970s was a parallel development to an intensification of East-West exchanges. During that period, subscribing to the ideas propounded in *Pacem in Terris*, the Christian Democrats supported every initiative dedicated to the aims of détente and disarmament.

They were under no illusions, however, about the risks of manipulation by Moscow, which blew hot and cold and sought to weaken Euro-American solidarity. Without the North Atlantic Alliance, Europe would have been unable to pursue détente between East and West in its foreign policy. It needed to engage with the United States to seek the foundations of an equal partnership of the kind proposed by John F. Kennedy in his famous Philadelphia speech in July 1962, which served to launch a vast range of negotiations on customs tariffs and helped to liberalise world trade. In the political sphere, relations were still hampered by the imbalance between the United States and the European Communities that resulted from the latter’s chronic inability to speak with one voice.

Nevertheless, political cooperation among the Nine enabled them to adopt common positions during the preparatory discussions and at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was the most momentous event in the development of East-West relations in the post-Stalinist era.

On 1 August 1975, following two years of negotiation, the CSCE was concluded with a founding instrument, the Final Act of the Helsinki Summit. The CSCE was to be a permanent negotiating forum in which

---

a In the Final Act, the 35 participating States, which belonged to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Warsaw Pact or were regarded as neutral, officially recognised the borders created in Europe at the end of the Second World War. A regime of military confidence-building measures was created, whereby one or more States which intended to conduct certain types of military exercise had to undertake beforehand to keep
states that had hitherto been locked in confrontation agreed to cooperate and transcend their divisions. The CSCE took place in the European context of the Cold War and was based on a transatlantic approach, participation being open to all the countries whose territory was wholly or partly in Europe as well as to the United States and Canada. Albania was the only eligible country that opted to stay away from the negotiations.

On the whole, the period of the CSCE negotiations was marked by a strengthening of Community cohesion. The Nine managed to speak with one voice in defence of their interests and common objectives, and that cohesion was the pivotal point around which the negotiations revolved. At the drafting of the Final Act, Egon Klepsch emphasised that balanced negotiations should produce a multilateral outcome without hindering Europe’s pursuit of unification. The Christian-Democratic Group were particularly staunch advocates of the ‘third basket’ of measures, which focused on free movement of people and ideas and confidence-building through mutual reduction of forces and armaments. ‘We want cooperation on an equal footing between states,’ said Klepsch, ‘and we reject any hegemonies in Europe’.

Given the subjects discussed in Helsinki, the USSR and its satellite States might have been expected to show great reluctance to take part in the negotiations, but they agreed to discuss mutual recognition and economic cooperation. On the other hand, Article 7 of the Helsinki Final Act, which commits participating States to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, was not put into practice in the Soviet bloc, and dissidents who campaigned to ensure that their countries’ obligations were honoured lived under constant threat of repression, deportation and imprisonment. Alexander Solzhenitsyn in the Soviet Union and Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia are the best-known victims, but numerous others would remain anonymous. Sadly, the Helsinki Summit often raised hopes which were never fulfilled.

Parliament drew its first conclusions from the Conference in a debate held on 24 September 1975: ‘The Final Act opens the way to a Europe of peace, security and justice and the steady development of friendly rela-
The Christian-Democratic Group entrusted Egon Klepsch and Giovanni Bersani with the task of evaluating the consequences of the Helsinki Conference. Their conclusion was as follows: ‘What remains as the authentic reality of the Conference is the solemn undertaking made by the parties before world public opinion.’ By 1977, even though the implementation of the declaration of intent made in the Final Act was negligible in terms of tangible results, the long-term effects of the conference would be very considerable. As Jan Edgar Jahn observed, ‘The CSCE Final Act gives the West a sound basis in law not only for calling for fulfilment by the Communist governments of the concrete declarations of intent decided in Helsinki, but also for making the whole gamut of human rights and basic freedoms the subject of international relations and discussions. With the CSCE Final Act, the safeguarding of human rights has been acknowledged as an essential factor in international relations. This comes from the realisation that the respect of personal freedom within the state and freedom between states are indissolubly conjoined.’

An audacious initiative by the Group: European arms cooperation (1978)

The Christian-Democratic Group was at the origin of concrete proposals to make progress towards European integration in the area of defence. Unlike the Socialist Group and, even more so, the Communist Group, which took at face value the promises made by the Soviet Union in its attempts to neutralise the Europeans’ resolve to defend themselves, the Christian Democrats continued to advocate European political integration. The Blumenfeld report, for example, which was presented on behalf of the European Parliament’s Committee on Political Affairs, suggested half-yearly meetings of the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of the nine Member States. The Group’s spirit of initiative, however, was most clearly marked in a report presented by Egon Klepsch, also on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee, who observed that, in the face of the excessive build-up of the Soviet Union’s forces, especially its conventional forces, and rising costs in the arms industry, the countries of Europe were dissipating their efforts. Europe’s defences would benefit if a common industrial policy were pursued in the domain of armaments. ‘We could have recourse to these instruments,’ said Klepsch, ‘which neither NATO nor WEU nor the Euro group has at its
The Christian-Democratic Group’s solidarity with the nations oppressed disposal, to rationalise arms production. There is a need to reduce arms expenditure by means of standardisation and more rational use of the existing industries and to achieve a greater degree of autonomy in the field of armaments’.

The Commission approved Parliament’s request for the presentation of a European action programme on the development and production of conventional weapons. The resolution was adopted on the strength of the Christian Democrat, Liberal and Conservative votes, while most of the Socialists and Communists voted against and the Gaullists abstained.
Chapter XI
AID TO AFRICA – A HISTORICAL AND MORAL LEGACY

Some of the parties in the Christian Democrat family, such as those in France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, belong to countries that played an active role in 19th-century colonisation and in the wave of decolonisation that took place in the decades following the end of the Second World War.

The text of the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 contains the following sentence, which set the future Community an additional task: ‘With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely the development of the African continent’.

In the view of the Christian Democrats, there could be no doubt that ‘[…] the fight against famine, poverty and under-development represents a duty for all humanity, starting with the prosperous countries’.160

The establishment of the EEC coincided with decolonisation. Before the Treaty of Rome was concluded, the French Government proposed that France’s overseas territories be included in the area of application of the Treaty. Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands supported this proposal. The part of the Treaty entitled ‘Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories’ defined the principles of association. When the EEC was born, these objectives would form the basis of a Community policy on Africa.

According to Pierre Wigny, ‘Association between Europe and Africa is an opportunity presented by the Treaty of Rome. It is essential to find forms of collaboration for the overseas peoples, with their consent and in their best interests, that will guarantee them faster economic and political development and let them share the responsibilities of power’.161 The authors of the Treaty of Rome sought to establish joint relations between the Member States of the EEC and the overseas countries and territories.162

The purpose of association was to promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close
economic relations between them and the Community as a whole. To that end, trade was to be freed from all restrictions, and imports from the countries and territories into the Community were to be exempted from customs duties. The Member States provided for a European Investment Fund, which was to operate for a period of five years (1957-1962) for the purpose of financing investments of general interest in Africa.

From 3 to 5 May 1961, a meeting was held in Bonn of the joint committee comprising 16 representatives of African States and Madagascar, and 16 delegates from the European Parliament. The purpose of the meeting was to ensure the success of the forthcoming Afro-European Conference. After the meeting, the European Parliament, at its plenary part-session in May 1961, held a debate and adopted a resolution on the political, economic and social aspects of association with the countries of Africa. The House expressed the hope that a wider framework could be found for economic cooperation between Africa and Europe. The representative of the Christian Democrats, Mario Pedini, stressed that the new Euro-African relationship should reflect the most recent changes in Africa. Europeans, he said, had to take account of the freedom, independence and commercial and cultural liberalisation of the African countries, so that ‘the Euro-African community does not become the meeting place of equivocal and dubious interests but represents a permanent element, a guarantor of that balance of civilisation which the world of today so badly needs’. It was a matter of the industrialised nations showing solidarity with the developing countries.

The contribution of the Christian Democrats to the Yaoundé I (July 1963) and Yaoundé II (July 1969) Agreements

The Association Agreement between the EEC and 18 African States, including Madagascar, was signed in Yaoundé on 20 July 1963. It entered into force in 1964 and became a key instrument of interregional economic, commercial, financial, technical and cultural cooperation.

The Yaoundé Agreement was based on free trade between the EEC and each of the Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM), and created joint institutions to administer the association arrangements. Besides the investments made by the European Investment Bank, the agreement increased the allocation to the European Development Fund. Nevertheless, the volume of financial aid remained below the levels of the bilateral aid provided by the former colonial
powers. The Christian-Democratic Group in the European Parliament maintained that it was necessary to ‘promote relations with States that meet the criterion of political and economic independence’. Incidentally, it was Hans Furler, President of the European Parliament from 1960 to 1962, who took the credit for creating the Euro-African Parliamentary Assembly. The Group approved the conclusion of the Association Agreement, and its representatives set great store by the possibility of accession by other African States and by cooperation in the fields of culture and education.

The main provisions of the Yaoundé Agreement were renewed by the second Association Agreement of 29 July 1969 between the EEC and 18 African States, including Madagascar. The second Yaoundé Agreement served to improve and render more tangible the association mechanisms of technical, financial, agricultural, industrial and commercial cooperation, managed and supervised by joint institutions and parliamentary bodies. Meanwhile, the Dutch territories of Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles had been added to the list of overseas countries and territories associated with the EEC.

In 1968, the Arusha Agreement was concluded with three Commonwealth countries – Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It established association with those countries, consisting in a partial free-trade area and joint institutions, but made no provision for financial or even technical cooperation. The second Yaoundé Agreement was designed to remedy the erosion of tariff preferences and the problem of fluctuations in export income that occurred when dips in the prices of commodities exported by those countries resulted in severe losses of revenue. Financial-stabilisation funds were created for such eventualities.

The Lomé Conference: a turning point towards relations based on mutual solidarity (February 1975)

‘The progress achieved with the Lomé Convention represents for Christian Democrats the confirmation of many of their expectations and of their ideological and political aims. The CD Group sees Lomé as important because it marks a trend towards new democratic models of cooperation and participation in the solution of international problems.’ Giovanni Bersani

The Lomé Convention was signed in the capital of Togo on 28 February 1975 and linked the nine Member States of the EEC to 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in a common framework of commercial, industrial, financial and technical cooperation which replaced the Yaoundé Agreements. It provided for the establishment
of an ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly, comprising equal numbers of delegates from the European Parliament and from the parliaments of the ACP countries. The ACP-EEC Joint Committee was responsible for preparing the ground for the Assembly’s deliberations. During the debate on the Lomé Convention in the European Parliament, Belgian MEP Pierre Deschamps emphasised how important it was for the ACP countries to reinforce their unity and for Europe to have an open Community.

This Convention, which officially entered into force in April 1976, removed the last vestiges of colonialism by emphasising the joint nature of the new cooperative framework. Europe thus established a form of cooperation between equals which was democratically institutionalised and mutually beneficial. The agreement represented a step towards a new international economic order based on solidarity and justice.

As Giovanni Bersani emphasised, ‘This agreement is an important milestone in the EEC’s development cooperation policy, a valuable boost to the process of unification of the African continent and a turning point in the relations of mutual solidarity between a large number of the countries of Africa, many of the Caribbean countries and some areas of the Pacific.’

The Lomé Convention was based on the Christian Democratic values of solidarity, respect for the dignity of all human beings and equality. As Giovanni Bersani explained, ‘In contrast to the North-South Conference which, according to a certain number of ACP representatives, gave an impression of disillusionment, the meeting of the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly was characterised by an atmosphere of confidence and friendship’. This form of cooperation gradually overcame scepticism and prejudices and ultimately led to the accession of other states, such as the countries of the East African Community (Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda), Mauritius (1972) and 27 other African, Caribbean and Asian countries.

The Lomé Convention was innovative in terms of its scope. At that time the aggregate population of the 46 ACP countries came to 268 million; if the populations of the European countries were added, the number of people involved exceeded 500 million. It was, in short, a Convention of truly global dimensions. The trade regime and commercial cooperation were governed by the principle of reciprocity.

A meeting of the EEC-AASM Association Council was held in Dublin from 21 to 23 May 1975. Pierre Deschamps described it as a global ‘first’ in relations between industrialised and developing countries. The main aim of the meeting was to enact provisions establishing a Consultative Assembly and its institutions. As Deschamps said, ‘one of the
basic features of the Lomé Convention, to my way of thinking, is that it has committed Europe and its partners to a determined drive towards unity’. This was true of Europe, as François-Xavier Ortoli, President of the Commission, confirmed: ‘Europe has today a development policy vis-à-vis the Third and Fourth Worlds, a policy that is clear in its objectives, ambitious and varied in its means, a policy the implementation of which will provide us with our finest hour in the eyes of the world.’

The Christian-Democratic Group and the uphill struggle for human rights in Africa: a tale of contrasts

The Christian Democrats supported the extension of the most fundamental human rights to all of the Community’s partner countries in order to ensure that these rights featured in all international treaties and conventions. They supported all the efforts that were made to insert an explicit reference to human rights into the Lomé Convention, and they affirmed the EEC’s obligation to enable its ACP partners to respect human rights. The Christian Democrats regarded respect for human dignity as the basis of the system of pluralist democracy for which they stood and as crucial for the maintenance of peace and international cooperation.

Pierre Deschamps made a vigorous speech on the subject of human rights and Lomé II. The Christian Democratic Members, he said, considered it essential to approach human rights ‘with great care and a high sense of responsibility; there must be no complacency or prejudice’. Human rights should not be used as ‘a veiled pretext for interfering in the internal affairs of the Member States of the Convention’. Christian Democrats believed that fundamental freedoms had priority over national sovereignty. They condemned apartheid because it denied the basic equality of human beings.

The Group devoted its Study Days at Mandelieu-La Napoule in France in July 1978 to the North-South dialogue. The resolution which the Group adopted there stated that ‘The economic and social development of the Third World and international cooperation will be the main issues of the final 25 years of this century; peace and stability in the world will depend on the response to these issues’. A number of initiatives were subsequently developed, beginning with an oral question which Luigi Noé asked in 1978 on the subject of aid to developing countries in the field of energy policy.

The second Lomé Convention, which was signed on 31 October 1979, was given a human and social dimension alongside the economic and
financial dimension that had characterised the previous agreements. The issue of human rights was included in the discussions on the Convention, as were cultural cooperation, the involvement of the representative bodies of business and labour and protection of the rights of nationals of ACP countries who were working or studying in Europe. The Heads of State or Government had previously declared at their Copenhagen summit back in 1973 that the Nine intended ‘to contribute, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, to ensuring that international relations have a more just basis [...] and that the security of each country is more effectively guaranteed’. 

The record of this policy for the development of Africa in those first post-colonial decades is a chequered one. The colonial heritage had left its mark on the attitudes of the new leaders. Fledgling democracies found it difficult to resist the temptation of tribal fragmentation. The most disadvantaged countries soon lagged far behind in terms of economic and social development. Coups and civil wars, in some cases massacres and outbreaks of famine, mounted up as European partners could only look on helplessly. The Group tried to contribute to the success of the new joint institutions established by the Lomé Conventions, but the African contingent was not as representative as it might have been, and the dialogue often became bogged down in diplomatic formality. Nevertheless, the trade provisions and the financial protocols did bear some fruit in the form of more stable commodity markets, income guarantees for certain agricultural exports and assistance for infrastructure projects. Some members of the Group took a more personal interest in the development of special relationships with the movements based on Christian principles that existed in some African countries. After 1979, the EPP Group would create an Africa Foundation, which was led by Giovanni Bersani and the French MEP Michel Debatisse. Other initiatives were launched for Southern Africa and would promote the gradual and relatively peaceful elimination of apartheid in South Africa.
The members of the Christian-Democratic Group were delegated by the national parliaments of the six original Member States. Their numbers within the national delegations could vary as a result of national parliamentary elections in their respective countries. This relative instability in the composition of the European Parliament explains why most mandates were renewed every two years or more frequently, according to circumstances. From the outset, the Italian and German delegations accounted for the largest numbers of representatives in the Christian-Democratic Group, both in the Common Assembly of the ECSC from 1952 to 1958 and in the single parliamentary assembly for the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom from 1958 onwards. It should also be mentioned that the number of Members rose sharply with changes in the nature of the European Parliament. In 1952 it had 78 Members, then from March 1958 it had 142 Members, and from June 1979, when the first direct elections took place, it had 410 Members.

**A German-Italian condominium within the Christian-Democratic Group?**

The CDU/CSU representatives from the German delegation continuously occupied and consolidated its position as the leading national contingent in the Group, with 8 members (21 %) in 1952, 19 (28 %) in 1958 and 16 (31 %) in 1975. The numerical weight of the CDU/CSU was due to the dominance of those parties in post-war Germany.

The German delegation within the Group pursued a steady strategy of gradually assuming greater responsibility. Considering it inappropriate, only seven years after the end of the war, to seek top political posts such as the presidency of the European Parliament or the chairmanship of the Group, the German Christian Democrats were prepared to wait until 1956 before one of their own, Hans Furler, became Presi-
dent of the Assembly and until 1966 before nominating Joseph Illerhaus for the position of Group Chairman.

Thereafter, with Joseph Illerhaus, Hans-August Lücke, Egon Klepsch and, most recently, Hans-Gert Pöttering occupying the chair, the German delegation demonstrated its affinity with the chairmanship of the Group, which it has held for a grand total of 30 years in the period from 1953 to 2009. This predominance is self-explanatory, given the fact that the CDU/CSU contingent has always been the leading national delegation ever since the birth of the Group.a

The reason why this preponderance of the German delegation lasted for many years was a balanced division of responsibilities with the other delegation that roughly equalled it in size, namely the Italian delegation.

The twelve Members representing the Italian Christian Democrats in 1952 represented 32% of the Group’s total membership. They numbered 25, equivalent to 38%, in 1958 and 16, or 31%, in 1975. The strong Italian representation was naturally connected with the dominant position of Democrazia cristiana in post-war Italy, but it also stemmed from the decision taken by the two chambers of the Italian Parliament – the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate – not to elect their Communist Members as delegates in view of the Communists’ avowed hostility to the European integration process throughout the period of the Cold War. A Communist Group was not formed in the European Parliament until 1974, because it took until 1969 and 1970 respectively before the Italian and French Parliaments began to delegate Communist Deputies. Of the 36 Italian MEPs in 1962, for example, 26 represented the DCI and were members of the Christian-Democratic Group.

The other delegations therefore accepted that the allocation of the posts of Chairman and secretary-general was left for the Germans and Italians to determine jointly. Egon Klepsch believed that the Italian del-

---

a Egon Klepsch was Chairman of the Group twice, from 1977 to 1982, then from 1984 to 1992. Hans-Gert Pöttering chaired the Group from July 1999 to January 2007. Over the whole period, members of the French delegation have been in the chair for a total of ten years (Alain Poher from 1958 to 1966 and Joseph Daul from 2007 to 2009). Four Belgian chairmen – Pierre Wigny, Alfred Bertrand, Leo Tindemans and Wilfried Martens – clocked up a total of ten years. One Dutch Chairman, Emmanuel Sassen, held the post for five years, and one Italian, Paolo Barbi, chaired the Group for two and a half years. As far as the exercise of political influence through the post of secretary-general is concerned, the German delegation has held the post for a cumulative period of 25 years (Hans-Joachim Opitz, Carl Otto Lenz, Gerhard Guckenberger, Klaus Welle and Martin Kamp), while the Italian delegation has held it for 24 years (Arnaldo Ferragni and Alfredo De Poi, Giampaolo Bettamio, Sergio Guccione). There was a Portuguese secretary-general for two years (Mário David), and the list is completed by Niels Pedersen from Denmark, who held the post for four years. See Parts II and III of the present work.
egation always considered itself to be what he called ‘eine Privilegiata’, enjoying a special relationship with the German delegation.\textsuperscript{a}

The Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg delegations were, by common consent, regarded as a single Benelux delegation, the third of the ‘big guns’ in the Group. Its members numbered 13 (34%) in 1958, 17 (25%) in 1962 and 13 (26%) in 1975.

The distribution of important posts, namely those of the President and Vice-Presidents of the European Parliament, the Chairman and vice-chairmen of the Group and the chairmen of parliamentary committees, was based on the relative size of these three blocs.

The Group’s French delegation was smaller in number, comprising five members in 1952, six in 1958 and three in 1975, but was enhanced by the personality of some of those members, foremost among whom were Robert Schuman, Alain Poher and Pierre-Henri Teitgen. The German members considered it essential to maintain a special political relationship with their French counterparts at a time when a symbolic exemplary value attached to such personal links.

\textbf{The first chairmen}

The Group’s first Chairman, Emmanuel Sassen, was born in 1911. He became a Member of the Dutch Parliament soon after the end of the war then served as a minister before returning to the back benches. He resigned the chairmanship of the Christian-Democratic Group in 1958 to become a member of the new Euratom Commission, and continued his European career in the Commission of the European Communities until 1971. His successor, Pierre Wigny from the Belgian Social Christian Party, had also been a government minister, serving from 1947 until 1950, and held the Foreign Affairs portfolio from 1958 to 1962 after having chaired the Group for a short time.

On the proposal of Hermann Kopf, head of the German delegation, Alain Poher, who had been a member of the Group since its creation, was elected Chairman of the Christian-Democratic Group on 6 October 1958. This marked the start of a new chapter in his long and steadfast European career. Poher, who had been personal secretary to Robert Schuman and served as Senator for the \textit{département} of Val de Marne from 1952 to 1995, chaired the Group from 1959 to 1966 before becoming President of the European Parliament, a post he held from 1966 to 1969. His parallel role as President of the French Senate from 1968 to 1992 saw him assume the position of President of the Republic

\textsuperscript{a} Interview with Egon Klepsch in Koblenz on 15 March 2004.
ad interim following the resignation of General Charles de Gaulle in 1969 and after the death of Georges Pompidou in 1974.

Joseph Illerhaus, a former textile merchant who was born in 1903 and had been a Member of the Bundestag since first being elected in 1953, succeeded Alain Poher in 1966 and chaired the Group until 1969.

The Group was then chaired by Hans-August Lücker from 1969 to 1975. Lücker, who began his career after the war in the Bavarian Chamber of Agriculture, was a Member of the Bundestag from 1953 to 1980. He was a profoundly convinced European, marked by his personal experience and his faith. Prevented from attending university by the Nazis because he would not join any of the student associations controlled by Adolf Hitler’s party, he enlisted as an ordinary soldier and was caught up in the agony of the Battle of Stalingrad. It took him several weeks to return to Germany on foot and rejoin his unit. He witnessed the collapse of the Third Reich at first hand. A great admirer of Robert Schuman, he dedicated the last years of his life, until his death in 2008, to the cause of beatification of the Father of Europe. He was one of the few Members of the unelected European Parliament to win a seat after the introduction of direct elections in 1979.

**A Europeans’ Club**

Hans-Joachim Opitz, the first Secretary-General of the Group, recalls how Group members interacted extremely openly and attentively. They all tried to make themselves understood in their native tongue, although most were persuaded to speak French, the lingua franca for the members of the Italian, Belgian and Luxembourg delegations, who conversed easily in French, and the German and Dutch members, many of whom made great efforts to learn it. English was never used as an official language until the arrival of the Irish delegation from Fine Gael in 1973. It need hardly be said that this situation has changed gradually but spectacularly as English has become established alongside French following the accession of two Scandinavian countries in the 1990s and of the Central and Eastern European countries in the first decade of the new century. Of course, the general services of the European Parliament provided simultaneous interpretation into the four official languages of the Group (German, French, Dutch and Italian) at all its formal meetings.

Is it possible to speak of a ‘club’ culture within the Christian-Democratic Group in those days? If that description refers to a sense of belonging to a group of individuals sharing a common view of the foundations of their political action, which were essentially Christian
Democrat and European federalist values, and to a tacit agreement to abide by the same rules of conduct in order to ensure the cohesion and harmony of the Group, then the Christian-Democratic Group was indeed a club from 1952 to 1979. Some members were far more often present and far more active in the club than others, and the strategic objectives were ultimately set by a limited number of MEPs, namely those who were not preoccupied with their national political activity and could devote a sufficient amount of their time to their European mandate. The latter, however, did not impose an excessively heavy schedule. Parliament held six one-week part-sessions each year, in January, March, May, June, September and November. The parliamentary committees, which were fewer in number in those days, did not start meeting in Brussels until 1958, when the city became the provisional headquarters of the EEC Commission under Walter Hallstein. The only venue for meetings of the Group was Strasbourg, where they took place two or three times a week during the part-sessions, normally one hour before the start of a plenary sitting. Not until that preparatory hour did the Group adopt the line it would take on the reports submitted to the House and decide on the distribution of the Group’s allocation of speaking time. At the request of the Luxembourg delegation, some meetings of the Bureau were held in Luxembourg, and the practice of holding one annual meeting of the Group in the third workplace of the European Parliament was rigorously maintained from 1979 to 1997.

Not until Egon Klepsch became Chairman in May 1977 was a certain distribution of tasks introduced within the Group during the week spent in Brussels preparing for the next plenary part-session in Strasbourg. Klepsch set up working groups A, B, C and D, each covering the portfolios of particular committees. He also proposed, on the basis of the Bundestag model, the designation of coordinators to organise, with the aid of a technical adviser, the work of the Group’s members within each of the parliamentary committees. Another innovation was that of the shadow rapporteur, who was appointed by the Group to monitor a report entrusted to another political group. This method of internal collaboration served to rationalise the workload that confronted the new Members who were elected in 1979. The system was cemented in the course of subsequent parliamentary terms.

**Travelling and discovering Europe**

Another initiative was taken in 1961 that greatly helped to promote the club spirit, which later came to merit the description ‘family spirit’, between Group members, namely the Study Days that were held away
from the usual places of work twice yearly in the capital or a region of one of the member countries. These study sessions, which lasted for two or three days, provided the opportunity to work in a more informal atmosphere, generally in a large hotel or the seat of a local authority, to meet local or national figures there from a party affiliated with the Group in order to find out about the national and European political situation, and to hold in-depth discussions on one or two matters directly connected with European affairs, such as regional policy, institutional strategy, agricultural reform or development aid. Guest speakers – national or regional political leaders, members of the Commission or senior professional or academic figures – presented a report jointly with Group members designated on the basis of their responsibility for the subject under discussion. The receptions and official invitations associated with these Study Days also gave the MEPs, who were sometimes accompanied by their spouses, a chance to get to know each other better. They were even advised to ensure, when they sat down at mealtimes, that there was a mixture of nationalities and languages at each table.


These meetings, which became increasingly numerous, included some smaller-scale meetings of the Group’s Bureau, comprising the Chairman and vice-chairmen, the heads of the national delegations and the members who chair parliamentary committees, when there was a need, as was the case in Madrid in 1977 and at the Oporto meeting in 1978, for the Group to signal its support for an internal political development that was conducive to democracy and to the formation of political forces with Christian Democratic leanings.

This tradition, which helps members to discover Europe, was maintained in the elected Parliament after 1979. The Bureau of Parliament allocates funds from the parliamentary budget for these external meetings, which all political groups are entitled to organise.
The birth of a supranational secretariat

As soon as the Christian-Democratic Group was formed, the German delegation, represented by its leader, Heinrich von Brentano, a strong and influential personality in Bonn and Strasbourg, proposed that a secretariat, independent of the administration of the European Parliament, be placed at the service of Group members. This secretariat was to operate along supranational lines. He proposed that the task of creating the secretariat be entrusted to Hans-Joachim Opitz, a young German official. Opitz was thus appointed and took up his duties as secretary-general in January 1954. Since 1945, Hans-Joachim Opitz had been one of the leaders of the CDU Catholic youth associations, and his organisational talents had come to the notice of Heinrich von Brentano.

The German delegation’s candidate received especially strong support from Alain Poher, who himself recommended the recruitment of Micheline Valentin in January 1954. She was then appointed deputy secretary-general of the Group, which she left in 1979. Hortense Geimer, a secretary/typist from Luxembourg, was also recruited at that time.

Hans-Joachim Opitz had to create the Group secretariat out of nothing. The minimal budget that the European Parliament allocated to the Group in 1954 enabled it to spend only a limited amount on administration, including the salaries of the three members of the secretariat and the rent for offices in Strasbourg. Everything had to be done, such as purchasing office equipment and establishing links with the Luxembourg customs and tax authorities. Above all, the secretariat had to organise its support services for Group members – informing them about the activities of the High Authority and preparing committee reports and Group members’ plenary speeches. In the words of Opitz, ‘We had to respond to the needs of Members. We very quickly realised that some documentation had to be produced, because there were large numbers of plenary sittings every year, over and above the committee meetings. The aim was to disseminate information by means of a bulletin of 15 to 20 pages in length, which would be published monthly and contain a report of what was being said within the High Authority and what was happening in the Common Assembly. That worked very well […] We soon had the idea of holding interviews with Members before committee meetings. If the meetings started at 10 a.m., we would arrange to meet at nine to exchange points of view and information. I looked after economic affairs, and Miss Micheline Valentin dealt with social and political affairs. We would discuss the agenda, item by item, in order to find interesting features. Some Members found the idea very useful.'
For instance, Mrs Margaretha Klompé, from the Netherlands, appreciated that it was an opportunity for members of the Group to coordinate their positions.a

The task was made all the more demanding by the fact that the nascent administration of the European Parliament had to organise its own work and could lend only limited assistance to the Group’s staff. The latter were unable, for example, to attend parliamentary meetings and even the High Authority’s press conferences.

‘I spent a long time, moreover,’ Opitz continued, ‘trying to attend Jean Monnet’s meetings and particularly his press conferences, but they would never countenance it, even if I promised not to say a word throughout the meeting. That made it very complicated to gather the information we needed for the monthly report. However, a young Italian journalist by the name of Emmanuel Gazzo helped us a great deal. He used to write a regular bulletin called “Europe”. I had an excellent relationship with him. What is more, he always knew what was going on. Nevertheless, it was very difficult to obtain information’.b

The secretariat’s first annual activity report was presented orally by the secretary-general, on the basis of a written note,c at a dinner in

---

a Interview with Hans-Joachim Opitz in Luxembourg on 10 March 2008.
b Interview with Hans-Joachim Opitz in Luxembourg on 10 March 2008.
c Extracts from this six-page report, written in excellent French, testify to the working conditions of the first members of the secretariat, as of 28 November 1954: ‘The establishment of a secretariat composed of permanent staff necessitated, first of all, the creation of a proper organisation. Its creation inevitably took up a great deal of time which could otherwise have been used for work that was directly and immediately beneficial to the members of the Group. It was, in fact, a matter of turning an empty room into an office; we had to begin by gathering all the information required to perform that task in the best and most rational way. We then needed to start keeping books for accounts and correspondence and at the same time to establish a filing system for the latter, to find a way of cooperating with the Community bodies and other equally important institutions, to conclude leases and take out insurance policies and to deal, in short, with numerous practical tasks such as having headed paper printed for the Group, obtaining maps for the map library and doing all the things that are needed to run an office. […] We believe we can say that setting up our secretariat did not involve any unnecessary expenditure, and in any case our treasurer, Nicolas Margue, keeps a watchful eye on these things. […] The second task was to establish contacts with people who could provide information that might interest the members of the Group. We came to believe that it was necessary, as far as possible and without prejudice to the performance of our main task, to include the national parties in the list of addressees to which we sent our information. […] All the members of the Group need only read “Informations”, our news bulletin, to be aware of the work of the secretariat. Since bulletin No 11, “Informations” has appeared about once a month and is designed to inform you of all the important things that happen in the Community. […] We feel it is a personal success that we were able to provide you with our first information bulletin barely two months after the creation of the secretariat, whereas the Liberal Group, for example, which was set up barely a month after us in Luxembourg, despite having had magnificent headed paper printed for its information bulletins, has not yet addressed a single bulletin to its members. […] We have already noted
Strasbourg on Sunday, 28 November 1954, which was attended by almost all the members of the Group.

It took the intervention of the Chairman, Alain Poher, in March 1966 before the staff of the secretariat were finally allowed to assist Group members in committee. The employment status of the secretariat staff was also precarious. Their assimilation to temporary staff under the General Staff Regulations for European civil servants dated from 1962 and was enacted at the insistence of the President of the European Parliament, Hans Furler. The secretariat of the Group began its pioneering work with limited human resources but motivated by its awareness of being part of an experiment that was unprecedented in the realm of human relations and the pursuit of the European ideal. In 1959, Hans-Joachim Opitz was appointed head of the General Services Directorate of the European Parliament. The German delegation nominated another young law graduate, Carl Otto Lenz, who took up his duties officially on 1 January 1960 and recruited a second secretary, Felicitas Roesch.

This was Carl Otto Lenz’s first professional experience and his first European experience. Born in 1930, too young to have fought in the war, he had been introduced into the circle of German Europeanists through his father, a Member of the Bundestag and rapporteur on the Treaty of Rome. His work for the Group gave him the opportunity to meet Robert Schuman, whom he greatly admired. At Schuman’s funeral in Scy-Chazelles, he was chosen to be one of the six pall-bearers. It was

\[\text{that there is almost a week between our receipt of the latest news items to be inserted in “Informations” and your receipt of the bulletin. The technical work that is required after we receive all the documentation – examining the issues that need to be featured, the summarising and editing work, the translation, the typing of stencils, the duplication, the stapling of pages, the preparation of consignments and their delivery by the postal service – takes about a week, as experience has shown. It should not be forgotten that the secretariat comprised only two people until very recently and now comprises just three. The Documentation Service of the Common Assembly, with which we can compare ourselves to some extent and which sends you the fortnightly bulletin “Informations bimensuelles”, containing articles with a slightly broader scope than our own, comprises 16 people, including the library staff. Its translations are done by the Language Service, and a typing pool types its stencils, while the internal mail service dispatches the finished bulletins. Although we realise, after examining the situation, that the news in our “Informations” is rarely more up-to-date than the Common Assembly’s “Informations bimensuelles”, since we regard the latter, at least the items based on articles from periodicals, as a mere supplement to our own bulletin, this does not worry us unduly.}\]

a The regulation of 28 September 1972 confirmed the mandate of the Chairman of the Group designated by Parliament as an appointing authority. In practice, the staff of the secretariat are recruited in accordance with a distribution formula based on the relative sizes of the political groups. The Chairman of the Group signs the employment contract of Group staff after a selection process which has been brought into line over the years with the competitive examination procedures followed by the European institutions.
he who was granted a personal audience with Konrad Adenauer at the Federal Chancellery to ask him to write the foreword to Robert Schuman’s book *Pour l’Europe*. Lenz went on to pursue a career in politics, being elected six times to the Bundestag, where he spent 18 years representing the Hessian constituency left vacant by the death of Heinrich von Brentano. Having served as Chairman of the Bundestag Committee on Legal Affairs, he later became an Advocate General at the Court of Justice of the European Communities, an office he held from 1984 to 1997. It enabled him to return to Luxembourg, where he had lived when working for the Group. His memory of that period is one of life-defining commitment: ‘In the secretariat of the Group, we had the feeling that we were taking part in something very important, something even more important than our countries of origin. There was no such thing as overtime payments. Working overtime was normal – no one counted the hours. It was a privilege to work there, to advance the process of European integration and to build a lasting peace.’

Arnaldo Ferragni, a young federalist activist from the Italian Christian-Democratic movement who came to the attention of Alain Poher during a demonstration staged by the *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales* in Paris, came to Luxembourg in 1960 and then succeeded Carl Otto Lenz as secretary-general on 1 February 1966.

On Alain Poher’s initiative, the successive Secretaries General also headed the secretariat of the Christian-Democratic Group in the Assembly of the Council of Europe, which met in Strasbourg, and the Western European Union (WEU) Assembly, which met in Paris. This arrangement lasted until the direct elections in 1979. These additional tasks did not require them to spend excessive amounts of time in these other forums, but it did facilitate the establishment of a unified political approach by Christian Democrats in the three assemblies. The members of national parliaments who were delegated to the European Parliament were not the same ones who had seats in both the Council of Europe and WEU.

‘Veritable monks, serving the institutions from morn till night’

The relationship of mutual trust that existed between each Chairman and his secretary-general was essential to the proper functioning of the Group. Alain Poher had confidence in his staff, and a few words with Carl Otto Lenz or Arnaldo Ferragni were enough to trigger a search for

---

a Interview with Carl Otto Lenz in Bernsheim on 15 November 2007.
the basis of a political compromise between two delegations within the Group, to find a practical arrangement that satisfied the demands of a particular MEP or to launch negotiations with the competent parliamentary services for facilities that the Group required for its work. Even more crucial was the personal commitment of each, whose efforts were not curtailed by the limits of the working day. As Arnaldo Ferragni recalled, with a hint of nostalgia for those pioneering days, ‘We behaved like veritable monks, serving the institutions from morn till night. We felt we were building something solid, because we had experienced the war’. The Group secretariat had to expand gradually to deal with the new burdens placed on the European Parliament by the financial treaties of 1970 and 1975. This progressive development of the powers of Parliament was reflected in a high volume of activity on the part of the political groups.

The secretariat was established in Luxembourg, initially in modest city-centre premises at 19 rue Beaumont, which it shared with the Socialist and Liberal Groups, and later in the new European Parliament building constructed on the Kirchberg Plateau. A branch in Brussels for the offices of Group staff assigned to parliamentary duties was opened on the Boulevard de l’Empereur in the heart of the city until the direct elections of 1979, when the European Parliament had a new building constructed on the rue Belliard in the European quarter.

In the course of those earliest years, the head of the secretariat had to get to grips with new tasks. He had to organise relations with the press, publish brochures portraying the work of the Group and records of the Study Days and draw up summaries of the Group’s voting positions on the main reports submitted to the plenary sittings of Parliament. This is how Arnaldo Ferragni described one aspect of his work: ‘What did our work as Group officials involve when we attended meetings of the parliamentary committees? First of all, we accompanied and assisted the Members. We first had to study all the matters on the agenda and advise Members, if they sought our advice, to adopt particular positions or make particular points at the meeting. In the end, we would draw up a record, no more than two pages in length, of the decisions taken by the parliamentary committee and any problems that might have emerged during the meeting or when the vote was taken. […] Who received copies of this record? The Chairman of the Group and the members of the Group Bureau, comprising the Chairman, the two vice-chairmen and so on – six nationalities altogether. We officials would establish contact with the Chairman of the Group and with the spokesmen of each of the other groups in the parlia-
mentary committee. And on several occasions we helped the Member from our Group with certain aspects of the preparation of his report.a

Arnaldo Ferragni having been appointed head of the European Parliament’s information bureau in Rome, he was succeeded as secretary-general by Alfredo De Poi on 1 December 1972.

Born in Perugia in 1945, Alfredo De Poi was an active member of the Italian Christian Democratic youth movement during his legal studies and was elected its President, which enabled him to become President of the European Union of Young Christian Democrats (UEJDC). This European Union work led to his being selected to fill the post of secretary-general of the Christian-Democratic Group in the European Parliament.

De Poi believed that one of the reasons for his election as President of the UEJDC and his subsequent appointment as secretary-general of the Christian-Democratic Group in the European Parliament was the ‘success of the mediation efforts in helping to heal the rift between the Junge Union in Germany and the other youth movements. Consensus, however, was also built on a commitment to going where none had gone before, by which I mean the explicit desire to press for the formation of a “large European Democratic Party that is able to transcend and unify the various Christian-Democratic parties on a popular and progressive basis”. In the same year, 1972, I was called to take over as head of the Secretariat-General of the Christian-Democratic Group in the European Parliament – helped, no doubt, by that strategic desire which exactly matched the strategy of the Group itself’.b

De Poi refers to the primarily political role he played within the Group in the creation of the EPP and then describes his entry into Italian politics: ‘The post of secretary-general also involved the provision of technical support to the parliamentary groups in the WEU and Council of Europe assemblies with some of the secretariat staff. The task at that time was, first and foremost, to support the initiation of the process of forming a political force within the joint institutions, which – thanks in particular to the impetus injected by Hans-August Lücker and Alfred Bertrand, who chaired the Group during my time as secretary-general, and by political leaders such as Amintore Fanfani, Helmut Kohl, Leo Tindemans and Alain Poher, to name but a few – resulted in the creation of the EPP in April 1976. To this end, the secretariat of the parliamentary Group performed the function of a provisional secretariat of the Party until its constituent congress in Brussels. From that same month of April 1976 until the month of June, I waged a dif-

---

a Interview with Arnaldo Ferragni in Strasbourg on 14 November 2007.
b Biography of Alfredo De Poi, sent to the author on 1 October 2007.
ficult electoral campaign that culminated in my election to the Italian Chamber of Deputies, along with other young renewers of Christian Democracy, in a climate marked by a critical economic situation, rising terrorism and political institutions in crisis. Since my continuing commitment to the Group in the European Parliament and also, in part, to the EPP, would have been incompatible in practice with my new duties, I resigned from the secretariat in September 1976.a

Alfredo De Poi remained true to his European convictions through his work in the European institutions: ‘I nevertheless continued my activities in the European institutions as a Member of the Assembly of the Council of Europe and then, from 1979 to 1984, as head of the Italian parliamentary delegation to the Assembly. I also served as Vice-Chairman of the General Affairs Committee of the WEU Assembly, of which I was elected President, an office I held from 1983 to 1984. My main tasks in the WEU framework were to monitor, as rapporteur, the development of relations with the European Parliament and, in particular, to follow the institutionalisation of the common security policy under the unifying direction of the Council of Europe’.b

His political career, however, gave way to involvement in the world of industry. De Poi expressed his disappointment at the way his own party had developed in Italy: ‘It seemed to me, in fact, particularly through my own personal experience in failing to win re-election to the Chamber, that the hopes of development and renewal of Christian Democracy had been dashed, lost in a process of self-perpetuation of old habits and in a fragmentation that would ultimately lead to collapse in the early 1990s. My analysis of the situation led me not to renew my party membership, convinced as I was of the incurable nature of the crisis it was undergoing and aware of the shift in various elements of the balance on which its historical legitimacy had been founded’.c

The task of occupying the strategic post of secretary-general of the Group fell to Giampaolo Bettamio, who took up his duties on 1 October 1976 and held the office in the run-up to the direct elections of June 1979 and well beyond, serving until 1986, when Egon Klepsch was Chairman. It was in the period between 1977 and 1979 that the secretariat of the Group underwent its first structuring, a result of the increase in the number of temporary posts allocated to the political groups. More than ten grade A administrators were recruited for the secretariat, along with a similar number of grade B and grade C staff. A

---

b Ibid.
c Ibid.
system of specialisation operated within the secretariat whereby grade
A staff were given advisory responsibilities in particular fields.\textsuperscript{a}

\textsuperscript{a} In this way the secretariat gradually expanded in Luxembourg, with only a small
contingent being maintained in the Brussels office. On the eve of the June 1979 elections,
Giampaolo Bettamio had Friedrich Fugmann as his deputy. The senior staff worked with
the Group members to assist them in their parliamentary activities: Jan Westenbroek was
the budget specialist, Giovanni Perissinotto dealt with matters covered by the Committee
on Legal Affairs, Gerhard Guckenberger was responsible for the portfolio of the Commit-
tee on Agriculture, Alain de Brouwer looked after development aid, Aloyse Scholtes dealt
with the tasks of the Committee on Social Affairs, and Wolf Yorck von Wartenburg oversaw
transport matters. Of the other staff who were engaged before the 1979 elections, five were
still working in the Group secretariat in 2009. Those five – Gabriele De Bondt, Maria Flana-
gan, Marianne Hecké, Gabriella Tassinari and Paulette Vertriest – have each amassed more
than 30 years’ service. Maria Flanagan, from Ireland, who took up her duties on 1 Octo-
ber 1973 when the Irish delegation arrived, may be regarded in 2009 as the \textit{doyenne} of the
secretariat.
Birth of the European People’s Party

The Christian-Democratic Group underwent a major change on 14 March 1978, when it was given the new name of ‘Christian-Democratic Group (Group of the European People’s Party)’. The decision taken on 20 September 1976 by the Council of the European Communities in the form of an Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage had formally enshrined the political agreement reached by the summit of Heads of State or Government in December 1974. This decision opened up new vistas for mobilising Europe’s political forces, and the Christian Democrats took the most powerful initiative by creating a genuine European political party. What was the goal? To harness the dynamism that would inevitably be generated by the introduction of universal suffrage into the European integration process by forming a federation of all the existing Christian Democratic parties in the member countries of the European Communities. This initiative advanced and fleshed out a vision that had long existed in the minds of some Christian Democrat leaders.

Arnaldo Ferragni recalls having had a conversation on the same subject with Hans-August Lücker back in September 1966 on the occasion of a meeting of Parliament’s Committee on Political Affairs in Gardone in Italy:

‘After attending these institutional meetings, Mr Lücker and I went out onto the lakeside terrace, where we spoke very frankly about our impressions of the current situation and what needed to be done for the future.

It was at that moment that the idea of the party germinated. I put forward the name that had come to me: People’s Party. Why People’s Party? Because Christian Democrats were traditionally representatives of the people.

It was not only the upper middle classes, I said – the business leaders, bankers or the most powerful forces – that were represented, even if they
were present in every political party. No, it was the voices of the people. One way or another, there was a historical link with the Italian People’s Party that had been led by Don Sturzo. “Who is this Don Sturzo?” he asked. I told him who he was and what he had done, and I also outlined to him the historical links that existed between the political experience of Don Sturzo and the political history of Germany, particularly that of the German Centre Party in the 1920s.

He listened to me, then at one point he said, “You are right, because in fact my father, who was one of the leaders of the Centre Party, told me about this Don Sturzo, who was actually a priest”.

He asked me not to divulge the content of our conversation, because he believed it was too soon to launch that idea. He said that we must nevertheless start to work together to prepare the ground for its implementation.

He returned to Germany, then we met again a fortnight later, when he said to me, “I found some colleagues who also know the story of Don Sturzo, and it seems like a good idea to me, but we must keep it under our hats for the time being”.

Together we devised a strategy for achieving our objective. When talking to national party leaders, however, we noted that there were still numerous reservations about the creation of a large European party.

Members of the European Parliament tended to be receptive to the idea, because they knew that their scope for action in Parliament would be limited without the support of a real European party.

They could not act, however, because their national parties back home did not yet appreciate the importance of the role that Europe could play in resolving particular problems.

Mr Lücker then decided to visit the various capitals (I sometimes accompanied him, but otherwise he went on his own) to share his concerns but also his vision of the future.

Thanks to this venture, Mr Lücker managed to make national leaders aware of the issue.\(^a\)

In April 1972, the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD) had set up a ‘Political Committee of the Christian Democratic Parties of Member States of the European Communities’. The designation and unifying purpose of the committee therefore encompassed only the EUCD member parties in individual countries belonging to the European Communities. The aim of the committee was ‘to establish a permanent relationship between parties and parliamentary groups at both the national and European levels and to reach a basic political consensus on the intensification and future development of European integration’.

\(^a\) Interview with Arnaldo Ferragni in Strasbourg on 14 November 2007.
Six joint working parties of the Christian-Democratic Group and the EUCD were created, their respective areas of responsibility being international politics, economic affairs, the European programme, thought and action, regional policy and social policy. This collaboration between the Christian-Democratic Group and the member parties of the EUCD helped to raise the level of European awareness among political leaders in the national parties. In this way, the idea of a European party was gradually able to advance.

Advantage needed to be taken of the hopes of rekindling the European integration process that had been raised by the summits of 1969 and 1972, which had outlined the prospect of a future European Union. Group Chairman Hans-August Lücker wanted to act quickly. He involved Wilfried Martens, the young Chairman of the Belgian Christian People’s Party (CVP) who would later become the emblematic figure of the European People's Party and serve as Chairman of the Group from 1994 to 1999, in the activities of a working group on a European party. Several meetings were held between November 1975 and January 1976 to draft the statutes and the political programme of the future party. The French Social Democratic Centre Party (CDS) wanted to avoid the reference to Christianity in the name of the new party to take account of the tradition of secularism in France. A consensus was ultimately secured on the two key terms ‘People’s’ and ‘European’.

The CDU and CSU tried to associate the British Conservative Party very closely with the new European People’s Party with a view to creating an alliance of the main people’s parties representing the centre-right throughout the Community. In the face of vehement opposition from the Italian Christian Democrats and the member parties in the Benelux countries, however, the German parties had to backtrack. They nevertheless pursued their strategy by creating the European Democratic Union (EDU) in 1978 with the support of the ÖVP, the Austrian People’s Party. The EDU was designed to forge durable links and establish structured cooperation between the Christian Democrats and the Conservatives. The EDU, which was based in Vienna, was joined by numerous centre-right parties, including the French Rally for the Republic (RPR). Relations between the EPP and the EDU were to follow an erratic course until the EDU lost its raison d'être in 1999 when the EPP Group transformed itself into the EPP-ED Group.

On 29 April 1976, the Political Committee decided in favour of founding a European People’s Party, a federation of the Christian Democratic parties in the countries of the European Communities. The formal decision to create the party was taken by the Assembly of the EUCD in Luxembourg on 8 July 1976. Leo Tindemans was elected Chairman of
the new party. It was he who would lead the party into the European elections in 1979. It was not difficult to reach a unanimous decision on the choice of the Belgian Prime Minister, who, in December 1975, had just presented his report on European union\(^a\) requested by the Heads of State or Government at their summit in December 1974.

Three vice-chairmen were also appointed – Dario Antoniozzi, who was to be a long-serving member of the EPP Group, André Colin, a leading figure in French Christian Democracy, and Norbert Schmelzer, a respected parliamentarian with influence in the field of foreign affairs from the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), the new party uniting the three strands of Christian Democracy in the Netherlands.

**The Christian-Democratic Group steals a march on the Socialist Group**

The creation of the EPP was the culmination of a long and arduous pioneering task for the Christian-Democratic Group in the European Parliament. For as long as there was no European party, the Group, in addition to its parliamentary activities, tried to coordinate the European activities of the Christian-Democratic parties that existed in the various countries of the EEC.

‘Today we must emphasise with pride that we have been the first to establish a coherent political party at European level. Once again, it is the Christian Democrats who, as during the nineteen fifties, have shown the way to Socialists and again we will force them to follow us, in spite of their hesitation, along the political road to European unification. To their slogan, “Europe will be socialist or will not exist”, we reply: “We will make Europe and it will not be socialist”’. These words from *CD-Europe Bulletin* No 6, published by the Group in June 1976, resonate like a dispatch from a victorious campaign.

---

\(^a\) In his report, which was made public in 29 December 1975 and presented on 2 April 1976 to the European Council in Luxembourg, Leo Tindemans proposed that the existing institutions be strengthened in order to make them more effective, that the powers of the Commission be widened, that Parliament be given legislative powers and that majority voting in the Council be extended. He proposed that the Council agree to delegate to the Commission the executive powers that would enable it to fulfil its mission again. Tindemans also suggested that more power be given to the European Parliament, which he hoped would be elected by universal suffrage from 1978, by granting it a right of initiative, which had hitherto been the sole prerogative of the Commission. In spite of its pragmatism and deliberate restraint, the Tindemans report did not arouse enthusiasm among the governments of the Member States. The Christian-Democratic Group, through Alfred Bertrand, lent its support and made the report one of the components of its blueprint for the revival of the European integration process.
Towards the first European elections

The Party and the Group would therefore join forces in the period from 1976 to 1979 in order to rendezvous in June 1979 for their common goal, namely the first European elections. The European federalist flag was hoisted on high, as the political programme adopted by the congress of 8 March 1978 proclaims: ‘We, the European People’s Party, a federation of Christian-Democratic parties from the Member States of the European Communities, desire the unity of Europe. We therefore intend to continue the political work of the Christian-Democratic statesmen Robert Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi and Konrad Adenauer, who laid the foundations for what has been achieved so far. Following in their footsteps, we are firmly resolved to continue and bring to fruition this historic work through the creation of a European union, which will take the political form of a European Federation, as proposed by Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950.’ Wilfried Martens, kingpin of the new party, describes with the utmost clarity the choice made by the EPP: ‘In our view, European unification must culminate in a European federation, because the federal structure is the only one that can achieve and guarantee unity in diversity and diversity in unity. The federal structure is, in our eyes, the most appropriate way to give substance to the principle of subsidiarity, whereby only that which we cannot do at a lower level should be referred up to a higher authority. The federal structure interpreted in this way best matches our pluralist vision that abhors monopolies. In short, federalism is the political expression of our personalism’.

Direct election by universal suffrage: the ‘great hope’ of Christian Democrats

The dates of 7 and 10 June 1979 were awaited by the Christian-Democratic Group like the start of a new era, and rightly so, for direct elections would truly transform the entire process of European integration and would add to the invention of the Community method in 1950 a second revolution in the system of international relations. The idea was expressed in embryonic form in the ECSC Treaty, which laid down the principle in Article 21. The Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC confirmed the significance of the principle by entrusting the Assembly with the task of drawing up ‘proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States’.

The visionary enthusiast Pierre-Henri Teitgen from the French Popular Republican Movement (MRP), who had been in the Resistance and was a professor of European law, which he taught to several genera-
tions of students in Paris, had made the crucial point very clearly at a plenary sitting of the ECSC Common Assembly as early as 2 December 1954. Article 21 of the ECSC Treaty would have to be implemented one day, he had said, and so it would be ‘easier to justify the election by universal suffrage of an assembly such as ours if it were no longer confined in future to dealing exclusively with the problem of coal and steel’.

Meanwhile, the crisis over the proposed European Defence Community was followed by the relaunch of the integration process at Messina and the adoption of the Treaties of Rome. Very quickly, other Christian Democrats stepped into the breach. Article 138 of the EEC Treaty was invoked by the European Parliament to entrust its Committee on Political Affairs with the task of drawing up a proposal. That proposal was adopted by the Assembly on 17 May 1960 in the form of a ‘draft convention introducing elections to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage’. The draft recommended the establishment of an entirely uniform electoral system, an increase in the number of Members to 426 and a single election date for all Member States. Emilio Battista, a Christian Democrat, had the honour of being one of the co-signatories of the historic draft along with the Belgian Socialist Fernand Dehousse and, for the Liberals, Maurice Faure, a French Member who had taken part in the negotiations on the Treaty of Rome.

There followed a long journey through the wilderness, starting with a point-blank veto by France in the Council, the only institution with the authority to give the parliamentary proposal the force of law. The crux of the matter, as Pierre-Henri Teitgen had accurately foreseen, was the question of powers. In the view of the French Gaullist Government, there could be no question of vesting the Assembly with new powers, and so elections were pointless. The Christian Democrats took the opposite view, that the European integration process had to become broader and more democratic. Direct elections would legitimise new advances. That was the leitmotif of the sixties and seventies. France and its partners finally gave their consent in December 1974. It had taken fifteen years of patience and perseverance to break down national resistance. On 14 January 1975, when Parliament adopted its new report on direct elections, Alfred Bertrand, who had given so much of himself to the cause, made an emotional appraisal of the journey that had been undertaken: ‘This decision is of such historic significance that we Christian Democrats cannot help recalling our unceasing demands, throughout the process of European integration and development, that Europe must be a human entity, which has not been the case so far. That will now be possible, thanks to direct elections to the European Parliament by uni-
Towards the first European elections

Universal suffrage, which will enable our citizens to shape the future of Europe themselves.

The future election was a great beacon of hope for the family of Christian-Democratic parties. The European integration process was in danger of being paralysed by squabbles over secondary national interests if it were left in the hands of national administrations, some of which devoted most of their energy to blocking the Commission’s proposals. The Commission needed a strong political ally. Parliament could become that ally if it were endowed with new legitimacy of its own to strengthen it in relation to the Council and the Member States.

Democratisation of the European Communities became the primary objective of the Christian-Democratic Group, because it was the prerequisite for the fresh start that the Group wanted to give the integration process.

Egon Klepsch, the CDU Member for Koblenz, who had entered the European Parliament in 1973, was to become the Group’s key figure for the next two decades. He appreciated how central the eminently political issue of direct elections and the powers of Parliament would be to the debate. He also spoke at that same sitting on 14 January 1975, where he said, ‘One of the aims of this Draft Convention is in fact to ensure that the legitimacy of the European Community is enhanced, so as to make the path towards European Union smoother. […] For us Christian Democrats, the essential thing is to develop the democratic structure of Europe and to ensure that European political union does not remain a remote aim, but becomes tangible and attainable, and that we have a means of achieving this in a Parliament which is in direct contact with the peoples of Europe’.

The debate continued. Parliament maintained its pressure on the Council. An intergovernmental agreement was needed to lay down detailed arrangements for the elections.

A date needed to be fixed as early as possible. The Act was finally adopted on 20 September 1976. It laid down that the duration of each legislative term of the European Parliament would be five years, that concurrent national and European mandates were permissible, that there would be 410 Members and that electoral procedures for the first election would be governed by the Member States’ national laws.

In this way, the Council left the issue of uniform electoral procedure unresolved, and it would subsequently become one of the many hobbies of elected Members in the years to come. Lastly, the Council decided that the election date would be in May or June 1978.
10 June 1979: ‘D-Day’ for the Christian-Democratic Group and the EPP

The elections, alas, were not held in 1978.

The United Kingdom asked that they be postponed for a year so that it could organise its geographical constituencies, because the government intended to adhere to the tradition of a constituency vote for each seat. So the elections were deferred until 7 and 10 June 1979, and the new timescale was used by the Christian Democrats to improve their campaigning resources.

Egon Klepsch’s political hour had come. The former refugee from the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia still had many members of his family behind the Iron Curtain. He drew his European ideal from the legacy of Konrad Adenauer and had adopted Heinrich von Brentano as his political role model. Klepsch had been a member of the CDU since 1951 and had cut his political teeth in the Junge Union, which he chaired from 1963 to 1969. He was elected to the Bundestag in 1965. He joined the Christian-Democratic Group in the European Parliament in 1973 and was the youngest member of the German delegation. On 5 May 1977, he was elected Chairman of the Christian-Democratic Group on the proposal of Alfred Bertrand. With the support of a large majority of the German delegation, he built up a strategy of alliance with the Group’s Italian delegation.

A few weeks before his election as Chairman of the Group, Klepsch had had to meet a major political challenge. He was aware that the Socialists, Liberals and Gaullists had, for some years, been implementing a tacit agreement to rotate the presidency of the European Parliament amongst themselves. Under this arrangement, a Socialist presidency would be followed by a Liberal presidency, then the Socialists would provide another President, who would be succeeded by a Gaullist, and so on. That deal had been done in March 1971. The Conservative and Christian-Democratic Groups failed to secure the election of their nominee Willem J. Schuijt, a Vice-President of the European Parliament and a member of the Dutch delegation in the Christian-Democratic Group, in February 1973. The deal had cut out the Christian Democrats, and Klepsch sought to foil it by promoting an agreement with the group of British Conservatives. He had to act quickly. The presidency of German Socialist Walter Behrendt from 1971 to 1973 had been followed by that of Dutch Liberal Cornelis Berkhouwer from 1973 to 1975, then Georges Spénale, a French Socialist, from 1975 to 1977. Now it was the Gaullists’ turn to nominate a candidate, and they put forward Irish Member Michael B. Yeats. Klepsch, with the aid of the
Group’s Secretary-General, Giampaolo Bettamio, and the support of Group Chairman Alfred Bertrand, reached agreement with the Italian delegation to nominate a candidate of substance on behalf of the Christian-Democratic Group with Conservative and Liberal backing. That candidate was Emilio Colombo.\textsuperscript{a}

In exchange, the EPP Group would undertake to support a candidate from the Liberal Group after the direct elections of June 1979.

The plenary vote took place on 8 March 1977. In the first round, Emilio Colombo obtained 81 votes, Georges Spénale 74 and Michael B. Yeats 19. The second round of voting produced a similar result. After the sitting had been suspended, the Socialist Group announced the withdrawal of Spénale in favour of Yeats. The third round proved the effectiveness of the Christian Democrats’ strategy as Emilio Colombo was elected with 85 votes, Michael B. Yeats having polled 77.\textsuperscript{185}

Emilio Colombo was thus proclaimed President of the European Parliament. It was another tactical triumph for the Group and its future Chairman, Egon Klepsch.

Emilio Colombo was one of the grandees of Italian Christian Democracy. Born in 1920, he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies when the Italian Republic was founded in 1948, having become a member of the Constituent Assembly in 1946. He had held several ministerial posts, including the foreign affairs portfolio. He became President of the Italian Council of Ministers in 1970, serving as premier until 1972. From the time of his arrival in the European Parliament in 1976, his commitment as a staunch European and his remarkable diplomatic skills endowed him with the authority to become its President. He was re-elected in 1978 and again in 1979 for a third term, which broke with the tradition hitherto observed by the political groups of limiting the term of each presidency to two years.

To Colombo, as President of the institution, fell the task of ensuring the smoothest possible political and administrative transition from an appointed to an elected Parliament. His term of office ended with the election of Simone Veil, the Liberal Group candidate, in July 1979.

The EPP had thus honoured its commitment to the other groups of the centre and right. Under the agreement, incidentally, the Liberals were to vote in turn for an EPP candidate in 1982. Emilio Colombo would return to the European Parliament as an elected Member in 1989, remaining there until 1992. The Group awarded him the Schuman Medal in 1986. Later, at the age of 88, having been appointed

\textsuperscript{a} Interview with Egon Klepsch in Koblenz on 15 March 2004.
a Life Senator of the Italian Republic, Colombo would experience the profound satisfaction, as a champion of the European ideal, of attending the ceremony marking the 50th anniversary of the European Parliament which was held in Strasbourg on 12 March 2008 on the initiative of Hans-Gert Pöttering.

With Egon Klepsch chairing the Group, Emilio Colombo presiding over the European Parliament and Leo Tindemans in charge of the European People’s Party, the Christian Democrats prepared themselves to make 10 June 1979 a day to remember.

The Group, which now had financial resources allocated to it from the European Parliament budget proportionate to its numerical strength, was able to aid the fledgling European People’s Party. A total of 40 million Belgian francs, equivalent to one million euros, was paid to the Party for the publication of electioneering material, particularly for literature propagating the electoral platform adopted by the Congress on 22 and 23 February 1979.

Such a prospect was unprecedented in the history of the continent: the electorate of nine democratic countries were to be called to the polls at the same time to elect the Members of one and the same Parliament.

With the benefit of hindsight, we can see how generously history was bestowing significant events, all of which tended in the same direction. The year 1979, for example, was not only marked by the elections. On 5 February, accession negotiations were opened with Spain and Portugal. They were lengthy, and it would take until 1986 before the two countries became full members of the European Communities. Greece, for its part, signed its Accession Treaty on 28 May, which paved the way for it to become the tenth Member State on 1 January 1981. Enlargement in the Mediterranean region was thus under way following the democratisation of southern Europe, and the centre of gravity moved southwards after the northerly enlargement of 1973.

Two other dates must be underlined. The first is 13 March 1979, which marked the creation of the European Monetary System, without which the future single currency, the euro, could not have been introduced 20 years later, on 1 January 1999. The second date is 3 May 1979, only a few weeks after the creation of the EMS, when Margaret Thatcher was appointed Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. She was to prove a difficult partner for the Christian Democrats in the quest for European integration, for she did not believe in federation as its ultimate political purpose. She let that be known, sometimes none too tactfully, throughout the 1980s. She also demonstrated great firmness in her
dealings with Moscow and was a loyal ally of Ronald Reagan in the trial of strength between NATO and the Soviet Union on the issue of Euromissile deployment.

Lastly, the destinies of two huge personalities were to become intertwined without their ever having met. Cardinal Karol Józef Wojtyła was elected Pope on 16 October 1978 and took the name John Paul II, while on 16 March 1979 Jean Monnet passed away at the age of 91 at his home in Houjarray, some 30 miles from Paris. It was in that same house that Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman had discussed and developed the proposal set out in the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950. On behalf of the European Parliament, Emilio Colombo immediately proposed a gesture heavily laden with symbolism; in accordance with his proposal, the house was purchased by the European Parliament, since when it has been a museum commemorating one of the Fathers of Europe.

In Rome, John Paul II inaugurated his pontificate, the message of which, backed by action, would help to change the destiny of the continent when, ten years later, the discredited and powerless Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe would crumble away. At the time, however, these developments were scarcely imaginable. The minds of the Group and the EPP were fixed on one thing: the electoral results that would be collected in the nine countries of the Community and announced late in the evening of Sunday, 10 June 1979.
Part two
THE BUILDERS (1979-1994)
Chapter XIV

ANATOMY OF THE NEW ELECTED GROUP (JULY 1979)

It was a resounding victory, but at the same time frustrating. Why? The CD-EPP Group won 32.8 million votes, 29.6 % of the total votes in the Community. However, it was only in second place in the new Parliament, with 108 Members, whereas the Socialist Group, for which fewer people voted (29.5 million, 26.9 % of the votes), could boast of having 112 members. The reason was simple: the British MEPs were elected on the basis of a majority vote in each constituency in a single ballot, which drastically exaggerated voting trends. Whoever came first in their constituency won the seat. Since the Conservatives were slightly ahead of Labour in most constituencies, they won 64 seats out of 81. However, the Conservatives would not be part of the EPP Group and the Socialist Group, which the 17 Labour Members joined, was thus in first place.

All the same, the CD-EPP Group was well satisfied with the results. Two of its leaders won exceptionally large numbers of votes in their countries. The 983 600 preference votes for Leo Tindemans in Belgium and the 860 000 votes for Emilio Colombo in Italy were real plebiscites for the Christian Democrat leaders.

The CDU-CSU won 49.2 % of the votes in Germany, the DCI 36.5 % in Italy, the CDA 35.6 % in the Netherlands, the CSV 36 % in Luxembourg, and Fine Gael 33 % in Ireland. The position in France was more complicated. Simone Veil’s ‘Union pour la France en Europe’ list, on which the CDS Christian Democrats and the UDF Liberals were represented, had an excellent result, 27.5 %, far ahead of the other majority group, the Jacques Chirac list for ‘La défense des intérêts de la France en Europe’. It was a crushing defeat for the Eurosceptic stance of the RPR of the time, which had only 15 MEPs. The Group of European Progressive Democrats now represented only 5 % of MEPs, compared with 8 % in the unelected Parliament. The Members on the Simone Veil list were divided between the CD-EPP Group (9) and the Liberal Group (17).
The German results came as a complete surprise to the SPD-FDP government coalition headed by Helmut Schmidt, which had not expected the Christian Democrats to do so well (42 CDU-CSU Members, compared with 35 SPD and 4 FDP). Germany took an important decision that would partly account for the consistent influence of its representatives in Parliament in successive parliamentary terms: it prohibited dual national and European Parliament mandates from 1980, with the exception of Willy Brandt for the SPD and Hans Katzer for the CDU.

Turnout was remarkably high (70% in the Six, although much less convincing in the United Kingdom at only 30%), reflecting the public enthusiasm for European integration and this new form of democracy allowing direct elections. Leo Tindemans remarked on this positive signal from the electorate when he was Chairman of the EPP: ‘We have the heavy responsibility of making this Parliament a reality, giving it credibility and fulfilling the hopes of those who elected us. You cannot, with impunity, bring out 180 million voters only for them to find they have a Parliament that is powerless or incapable of increasing its powers, a Parliament that does not try to follow the path laid down for it by the electorate’.

The Group’s first meeting, held in Luxembourg at 4.30 p.m. on the afternoon of Monday, 29 July, was impressive. It was chaired by the oldest member, Guido Gonella, a founder of the Italian DC and colleague of Alcide De Gasperi. During the war he set up ‘Il Popolo’, which was to become the reference newspaper for the Christian Democrats. He served several terms as a minister and was a candidate for the Italian presidency in 1978.

The Chairman emphasised the historic importance of this first meeting of the elected Group. He announced that the outgoing Chairman, Egon Klepsch, was standing for re-election. This was put to the vote, and Egon Klepsch was elected virtually unanimously, with 96 votes out of 99 and 3 blank votes. Two outgoing Vice-Chairmen were also re-elected: Willem Vergeer, put forward by the Dutch delegation, and Maria Luisa Cassanmagnago Cerretti, put forward by the Italian delegation, won 85 out of 91 votes, with 4 blank votes. The Group opted for continuity and for experienced older Members when it launched this new phase of its development. At the same time it took a decision that was symbolic of this new phase: on 17 July it changed its name. The Christian-Democratic Group (Group of the European People’s Party) became the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian-Democratic Group), a further step towards secularisation of the centre-right grouping.
From the very first meetings, everyone got to know their neighbours. Members sat in alphabetical order in the Group room, with the different nationalities mixed together.

**Impressive German delegation**

The 42-strong German delegation was the most impressive and included some famous names in European history. Otto von Habsburg, elected from the CSU list in Bavaria, was the son of Charles, Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, Bohemia and Croatia, and of Zita Bourbon-Parma. Von Habsburg was himself named Crown Prince of Austria-Hungary in 1916. After the fall of the Empire he was exiled to Switzerland in 1918, then to Madeira, Spain and Belgium until 1939. He was not allowed to return to Austria until 1966. Some Members, like the French MEP Olivier d’Ormesson, himself from an illustrious aristocratic family, addressed him as ‘Monseigneur’, but Otto von Habsburg was above all a European and a campaigner for democracy and a Greater Europe. He spoke excellent Italian, Spanish, English, Portuguese and French, as well as his two mother tongues, German and Hungarian. One of the Members tells the story of how, when von Habsburg was asked one evening who he thought would win an Austria-Hungary football match, he retorted, ‘Who are they playing?’ Gifted with a strong sense of humour in several languages, a fierce defender of human rights, an implacable opponent of Communism, President of the Pan-European Movement and, in that capacity, very knowledgeable about political developments in Central Europe, von Habsburg was one of the Group’s most distinguished figures. He sat for 20 years, until 1999, and was named an Honorary Member, the only one so far. As coordinator of the Political Affairs Committee, he had an authority that extended beyond the EPP Group to the whole of the centre-right majority in Parliament. When he came to visit the Group in Strasbourg on his 95th birthday on 13 November 2007, he was acclaimed unanimously by all the Members there.

The German delegation had other notable characters too. One of them was Kai-Uwe von Hassel, former President of the Land of Schleswig-Holstein, Minister for Defence and President of the Bundestag. As President of the UEDC, von Hassel helped support Christian Democrat parties in southern Europe. For that reason he was expelled from Malta by the prickly and undemocratic Dom Mintoff, who was Socialist Prime Minister at the time. He made several trips to Turkey to help restore parliamentary democracy.

Philipp von Bismarck, nephew of the ‘Iron Chancellor’, was a member of Parliament’s Committee on Economic Affairs for 10 years and
represented German Chambers of Commerce and Industry. He had the air of a Prussian aristocrat, but treated everyone with great courtesy.

The main concern for the German delegation, however, was to show itself competent and hardworking. Although it had a large number of Members, this was not enough to guarantee political influence, but daily attendance in the Group and in committee made it possible for its Members to specialise, and MEPs elected and re-elected for several terms of office were able to build steady careers in the Group. Four of this new generation of German MEPs who came to Parliament in 1979, Hans-Gert Pöttering, Karl von Wogau, Ingo Friedrich and Elmar Brok (who became a Member in 1980), were to sit continuously for 30 years, until 2009. Two others, Ursula Schleicher and Hans-August Lücker, would sit for 25 years. Five Members, Siegbert Alber, Otto von Habsburg, Marlene Lenz, Kurt Malangré and Günter Rinsche, would sit for 20 years. It was because of this long service and personal dedication that some of the new Members played leading roles in Parliament. Egon Klepsch was Chairman of the Group for 12 years and then President of Parliament. Hans-Gert Pöttering was also exemplary in his steady rise. Starting as a member of the Committee on Regional Policy, in subsequent parliamentary terms he was Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, Vice-Chairman and then Chairman of the Group, and finally President of the European Parliament. Ingo Friedrich became a Vice-President of Parliament, as did Siegbert Alber and Ursula Schleicher. Karl von Wogau started as a very active member of the Committee on Economic Affairs, becoming its Chairman before moving on to defence as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence. Elmar Brok had various responsibilities, later becoming Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and representing Parliament in most of the places where new Treaties were negotiated (Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice), and then on the Constitutional Convention. Marlene Lenz belonged to the Group for 20 years and was a highly active member of the Committee on Women, which she chaired. Like her brother Carl Otto Lenz, former Secretary General of the Christian Democratic Group in the European Parliament and a long-term Member of the Bundestag, she inherited her political and European ideals from her father, a former Secretary of State in Konrad Adenauer’s government.

Kurt Malangré, mayor of Aachen, also held his seat for four parliamentary terms, as did Günter Rinsche, who was for a long time head of the German delegation. A former Member of the Bundestag and Director of the Adenauer Foundation, he was close to Chancellor Helmut Kohl and, like the Chancellor, strongly committed to Europe. His moral
authority and level-headedness meant that he was listened to and respected by the other delegations. Finally, four other German Members elected in 1979 were also key figures in the next few years. Horst Langes was undoubtedly the budget expert of the Group, playing a leading role in its working groups and the Committee on Budgets, for which he became spokesman in 1979. Langes was one of those MEPs who thrive on hard work. He loved long Budget Committee meetings, even night sittings, sifting through each amendment as the mechanics of each financial year followed their relentless course. In that position Langes acquired real power. Members of other committees knew that and often approached him to seek EPP support for their amendments in the budget vote. However, Langes had to share this authority with another budget strategist, the Bavarian Heinrich Aigner, an MEP since 1961 and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Budgetary Control in the unelected Assembly. Heinrich Aigner managed to have the subcommittee constituted a full committee, the Committee on Budgetary Control, and chaired it from 1979 until his death in March 1988. Konrad Schön, the coordinator, took over from him until the end of the parliamentary term.

At least three other names should be included in this portrait gallery of German delegation members who were important figures in the life of the Group in the first three parliamentary terms. Rudolf Luster, a jovial Berlin lawyer who always had a smile on his face, represented Berlin in Parliament from 1978 to 1994. He chaired the German delegation before Günter Rinsche and was a man of strong federalist convictions, tabling a draft federal constitution on behalf of the Group with the bureau of Parliament’s Committee on Institutional Affairs. On his initiative, the Group made several visits to Berlin to express its solidarity with victims of the wall. The Bavarian Reinhold Bocklet was a member of the Group from 1979 to 1993, specialising mainly in agriculture and uniform electoral law. Because of his expertise, he left the Group in 1993 to become a minister in the Bavarian Government. Lastly, Bernhard Sälzer was an influential figure in the German delegation who started as a member of the Committee on Energy and Research. On behalf of Egon Klepsch, he led sensitive missions to parties associated with Christian Democracy in southern Europe. He became Vice-Chairman of the Group in 1992 when it was chaired by Leo Tindemans. After his premature death in a car accident in December 1993, Horst Langes took over until the end of the parliamentary term.
The other 'big' delegation, the Italians

The other big delegation in the EPP Group was the Italian delegation, with 30 Members, including the outgoing President of Parliament Emilio Colombo, who was elected Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee in July 1979. A few months after his election, Colombo was once again called upon to play a central role in Italian and European politics when he was appointed Foreign Minister in March 1980. With his German counterpart Hans-Dietrich Genscher, he put forward an initiative in November 1981 that would lead to the Single European Act, the first significant boost to European integration since the Treaties of Rome. Colombo returned to the European Parliament in 1989.

Another prominent figure in Italian and international Christian Democracy joined the Group. Mariano Rumor was a Member of the Italian Constituent Assembly in 1946, five times President of the Council in Italy and President of the Christian Democratic World Union. As benign, diplomatic and voluble as an Italian cardinal, Rumor took over from Emilio Colombo as Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee. He was a past master at negotiation and compromise, which the Italian Christian Democrats considered the noblest of pursuits in a Parliament, especially the European Parliament, which was made up of politicians from different countries and of all kinds of political persuasions.

Several outgoing MEPs held on to their seats in the new elected Parliament. Dario Antoniozzi, a Member of Parliament from 1972 to 1976 and several times Minister, was a Member of the Group until 1989. A fluent speaker who was a leading light in the European People’s Party, of which he was Vice-President, Antoniozzi was an active member of the Italian delegation and its spokesman. His son, Alfredo Antoniozzi, took up the torch as a member of the EPP Group in 2004, when he was elected from the Forza Italia list. In 1979 Mario Pedini, another former minister, who had established himself as an expert in science and cultural affairs in the previous Parliament, was elected Chairman of the Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Training and Sport. He left the European Parliament in 1984, after 15 years in office. Giosuè Ligios had been an agriculture specialist in the Christian-Democratic Group since 1972, and in 1979 he became Chairman of his favourite committee. Two other Italian members of that committee, Alfredo Diana and Roberto Costanzo, represented the interests of rural voters and the food processing industry. Both were listened to and respected by the other members of their delegation. Joachim Dalsass, a German-speaking member, represented the province of South Tyrol until 1994.
Giovanni Bersani was one of the best-known and most faithful Members of the Group, which he belonged to for 29 years, from 1960 to 1989. At first he focused on social affairs, a subject in which, as a former head of the Association of Italian Christian Workers, he had a special interest. But he undoubtedly concentrated most of his efforts on fostering relations between Europe and Africa. He was Co-Chairman of the Joint Assembly of the Lomé Convention from 1977 to 1979 and Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Development. He visited Africa many times and established lasting personal relationships with Africans who were working to promote democracy in their countries, often at risk to their lives and without a great deal of success. With the Dutch Co-Chairman Willem Vergeer, he was the instigator of the Africa Foundation set up by the Group in September 1981 to identify and help young leaders who might promote the development of Christian Democracy in certain African countries.

Maria Luisa Cassanmagnago Cerretti, who had been elected Member for Milan in 1976, was re-appointed Vice-Chairman of the Group. A lively and animated Milanese, she had strong links with the working class. She was to be a hardworking member of the Group until 1994, becoming a Vice-President of Parliament and then Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee.

Pietro Adonnino, an elegant and eloquent lawyer, only served for one term, from 1979 to 1984. He was a full member of the Committee on Budgets and came to prominence when the European Council at Fontainebleau on 26 June 1984 appointed him to chair the Committee on a People’s Europe, which was to propose concrete measures to make citizens of the Community more aware of the benefits of European integration and the need to promote it. The Adonnino report was presented with two other documents which enabled an Intergovernmental Conference to be opened at the Milan European Council on 28 and 29 June 1985.

Finally, Paolo Barbi, a Neapolitan born in 1919, was strongly committed to Europe. A brilliant speaker with a passionate interest in classical culture, he was part of the federalist and progressive Christian Democratic tradition. He was the only Italian to chair the Group, when Egon Klepsch resigned in January 1982 to become President of Parliament. The Group meetings chaired by Paolo Barbi were memorable. Some of the meetings in Strasbourg late in the day gave rise to fiery discussions. The strong voice of the Chairman rang out in the room – he did not even seem to need a microphone to make himself heard. Other Members of the Italian delegation expressed their views just as forcefully. Some left the room, gesticulating. When everyone met up again the
next morning they were the best of friends... Barbi was a strong sup-
porter of the federal Europe project. He left Parliament in 1984 but
remained very active in the EPP’s Italian delegation. He was sad to note
the decline in his own party that began in 1992 and regretted what he
called ‘the tactical complexity’ of the EPP in the years that followed,
the loss of its Christian-Democratic and Europeanist identity and the
extension of the EPP to the Conservatives.\(^a\)

**Strong personalities in the Belgian, French, Dutch, Irish
and Luxembourg delegations**

The other 37 Members of the Group were divided between five dele-
gations. Three were more or less the same size; the Netherlands and
Belgium had 10 Members each and France 9. Ireland had 4 and Luxem-
bourg 3.

The Belgian and Dutch MEPs had a very enthusiastic approach that
was not just due to the fact that their countries were close to Parlia-
ment’s places of work. The Benelux Christian Democrat parties were
traditionally pro-European right from the start of the European inte-
gration process. They saw that commitment as a safeguard against the
return of the wars in which their people and countries had suffered so
terribly. They also believed a supranational Europe to be an antidote
to the hegemonist tendencies of the larger countries.

*Primus inter pares*, Leo Tindemans, with the large number of prefer-
ence votes he received, was instrumental in the success of the list of his
Flemish CVP party. He left the Group in December 1981 with his fellow
Belgian Paul De Keersmaeker to join the Belgian Government as For-

eign Minister, a role for which he was well qualified. He returned to the

Two other Belgian members, each with his own individual style,
made an indelible mark on the Group. Fernand Herman, former Minis-
ter for the Economy and a Brussels parliamentarian, was a man of
determination, a brilliant and impassioned speaker and a true Euro-
pean. Throughout his twenty years in the Group, from 1979 to 1999, he
consistently stood up for two complementary ideas: an economic and
monetary Europe and political union. Whenever there was a serious
debate in the Group about strategic choices, Herman staunchly sup-
ported the Community approach, based on an independent Commis-
sion, a democratic Parliament and a majority-voting Council. As
rapporteur on the Constitution for the Committee on Institutional

\(^a\) Interview with Paolo Barbi in Brussels on 4 February 2004.
Affairs, Herman was ready to confront the Eurosceptics, sometimes without sparing their feelings, but he always had an ability to explain his views clearly and was keen that people should share them.

Lambert Croux, his fellow Belgian from Limburg in Flanders, was a very different character, a serious and methodical Chairman of Working Group A, which coordinated the Group’s political and institutional work. He was also Vice-Chairman of the Group from 1987 to 1989, ending his second and final term of office in Parliament in that position. He was the Group rapporteur on the negotiation of the Single European Act and established himself as a level-headed advocate of the gradual method as a means for the European Parliament to acquire power.

The Dutch were also hardworking and able Hanja Maij-Weggen served for four terms, from 1979 to 1989, then, after a period as a Minister in Ruud Lubbers’ CDA Government, from 1994 to 2004. A trained nurse, she was elected in 1979 at the age of 35. As a member of the Committee on the Environment, she soon became very popular in the Netherlands when she faced up to powerful interest groups of baby seal hunters in the Canadian Arctic. After stimulating a strong debate in Europe, Maij-Weggen had a resolution on the Community trade in products derived from seals adopted by the European Parliament in March 1982, which led to a European decision to restrict fur imports. Returning to the Group in 1994, she was Group Vice-Chairman and head of the Dutch delegation and she extended her field of interest to social and institutional affairs.

Two other Dutch MEPs were elected for three parliamentary terms from 1979 to 1994. Bouke Beumer started off in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. His serious attitude to his work and his reserved nature won him the respect of his colleagues. He was Chairman of the Committee on Youth and Culture from 1982 to 1984, then head of the Group’s Dutch delegation. Jean Penders had a keen interest in international politics and European security. As a member of the Political Affairs Committee, he was rapporteur on the Middle East and other areas of political cooperation. Penders was very active and well-informed and he and Otto von Habsburg complemented each other temperamentally and politically, operating as an effective team in the Political Affairs Committee. Finally, two Members of the unelected Parliament won their seats again. Harry Notenboom had stood out in the Committee on Budgets since 1971 as he progressively mastered the powers and procedures of the European Parliament, and Willem Vergeer, Vice-Chairman with responsibility for international relations, went on numerous missions to Africa and other continents on behalf of the Group.
Nicolas Estgen was elected and re-elected for Luxembourg in the same period, 1979 to 1994. He looked after the interests of his country, particularly on the issue of the seat of Parliament. He was a Vice-President of the European Parliament from 1982 to 1984.

The French delegation had nine members, who came from the Christian Democrat section of the UDF. Jean Lecanuet, a brilliant speaker and a man of culture who had studied philosophy, was President of both the UDF and the CDS and the embodiment of European centrism in France since the 1960s. He would later be one of the first to recognise Valéry Giscard d’Estaing as the modern mouthpiece for this political grouping. It was difficult for him to play a full part in Parliament and in the Group because he was also a senator and mayor of Rouen.

Jean Seitlinger, MP for the Moselle since 1956, a former associate of Robert Schuman and Secretary-General of the EPP, was a staunch supporter of Christian Democracy, as were André Diligent, senator for the North and General Secretary of the CDS, and Maurice-René Simonnet, a former MRP minister, who became Treasurer and Vice-Chairman of the Group.

Louise Moreau, one of the few women in the EPP Group, was a former member of the resistance who was parachuted into occupied France, and deputy mayor of Mandelieu-la-Napoule where the Group held its Study Days. A particularly notable member of the French team was Pierre Pflimlin, a historic figure and mayor of Strasbourg since 1959. Born in 1907, he was Alsatian to the core. He devoted all his energies and his huge talent to the European cause and to Franco-German reconciliation. He was a brilliant speaker in both German and French. By the time he was elected to the European Parliament he had already had an extremely distinguished and successful career. After a period as President of the Council and a minister under the Fourth Republic and in the government of General de Gaulle, he sacrificed his career in national politics in 1962 to stand up for his European beliefs. Previously a member of the unelected European Parliament and President of the Council of Europe, he was a Vice-President of the European Parliament from 1979 to 1984.

Pflimlin was so highly respected by the whole Group that the German delegation nominated him to be President of the European Parliament in July 1984. His election opened up a new chapter in the

---

a The EPP Group had eight women members in this first parliamentary term: Hanna Walz, Marlene Lenz, Renate-Charlotte Rabbetghe and Ursula Schleicher in the German delegation, Maria Luisa Cassanmagnago Cerretti and Paola Gaiotti De Biase in the Italian delegation, Louise Moreau in the French delegation and Hanja Maij-Weggen in the Dutch delegation.
career of this man from the border between two countries, and he performed his role with authority and enthusiasm until January 1987.

Finally, to conclude these necessarily brief portraits of the men and women who belonged to the EPP Group, mention must be made of the Irish member John Joseph McCartin, who, from 1979 to 2004, worked conscientiously in the Committee on Agriculture and took initiatives to promote the peace and development of Northern Ireland. As outgoing Vice-Chairman of the Group, he was presented with the Robert Schuman medal by the Chairman, Hans-Gert Pöttering, in a ceremony in Budapest on 7 July 2004.
Egon Klepsch orchestrated the transition from the old unelected Group to the 1979 Group. Only 27 of the 107 MEPs had been in the Assembly previously. Innovative arrangements and working methods had to be devised to take account of Parliament’s new responsibilities and work pattern. First of all, it was necessary to ensure that each MEP had a full and a substitute seat on each of the fifteen parliamentary committees. Four of them were chaired by EPP members: the Political Affairs Committee by Mariano Rumor, the Committee on Energy by Hanna Walz, the Committee on Social Affairs by the Dutch member Frans van der Gun and the Committee on Budgetary Control by Heinrich Aigner. The Group also had Vice-Chairmen in all the other committees and Chairmen in many of the interparliamentary delegations for relations with third-countries.

Egon Klepsch retained the structure of the working groups, A (political affairs), B (economic affairs) and C (budgetary affairs), made up of members of various committees and responsible for preparing for the plenary debates on each report, tabling amendments and drawing up the list of speakers. Working Group A was chaired by Maria Luisa Casanmagnago Cerretti, Working Group B by Egon Klepsch himself and Working Group C by Willem Vergeer. Each of them was assisted by a coordinator, Giosuè Ligios for A, Siegbert Alber for B and Sjouke Jonker for C.

Giampaolo Bettamio put in charge of building up the Secretariat and maintaining its supranational character

The most urgent requirement was to build up the Secretariat. Parliament’s budget provided for a sizeable increase in political group staff in the 1980 and 1981 financial years, to allow for the fact that the
number of MEPs had doubled since the election. It was therefore decided in December 1979 and then in February 1980 to draw up staff regulations and lay down rules for the operation of the Secretariat. The Secretariat was organised into a number of departments: the central secretariat, parliamentary work, press, and documentation.

Giampaolo Bettamio was put in charge of this reorganisation. Egon Klepsch kept a close eye on personnel matters, but he relied on his 40-year-old Secretary-General to implement the decisions of the Chairman. Bettamio had joined the Group in 1973 after studying at the university in his native city of Bologna. He had come to Brussels to represent the specialist press of the Italian chambers of commerce and industry. He had close links with the DCI and was co-opted by Alfred Bertrand and Hans-August Lücker to handle the Group’s initial public relations. Taking over from Alfredo De Poi in 1976, he had time to establish with Klepsch the working relationship necessary for cooperation between a methodical and forthright German Chairman and an imaginative and diplomatic Italian Secretary-General. They communicated in English, understanding each other well enough to be able to work together, apparently without any problems, from 1977 to 1982 and from 1984 to 1986. Bettamio continued in the role under the chairmanship of Paolo Barbi from 1982 to 1984.

In September 1980, the Secretary-General presented the 1981 organisogram to the Group’s Bureau. Over twenty administrators and the same number of secretaries were to be taken on in the space of a few months. They would be covered by the Community regulations and would work on a supranational basis. Some delegations tried unsuccessfully to put forward the idea of a ‘staff affairs’ committee made up of Members from each national delegation, whose responsibilities would include recruitment. The Chairman and Secretary-General were opposed to that idea. Instead they proposed a joint committee of three members of staff and three MEPs to act as a supervisory authority. However, the Group Chairman still had sole authority to make proposals to the administrative Bureau for the employment of officials, after a selection competition which would be brought gradually into line with Parla-

---

a Giampaolo Bettamio was appointed Director at the European Parliament in February 1986 and joined Egon Klepsch’s cabinet in 1992 when Klepsch became President of the European Parliament. After Silvio Berlusconi’s success in the European elections in June 1994, the Forza Italia Members asked for his help in setting up a new political group and organising its Secretariat. So the former Secretary-General of the CD-EPP Group became Secretary-General of the Forza Europa Group, which merged with the EPP Group in June 1998. Giampaolo Bettamio was elected Senator for Forza Italia and re-elected to the Italian Senate in 2008.
ment’s internal procedures. Fernand Herman was asked to draw up the Staff Regulations and they were adopted shortly afterwards.

The EPP Group was also to achieve a result that would in future benefit staff of most of the political groups. As Giampaolo Bettamio pointed out with a certain amount of pride: ‘The Staff Regulations came about because it was necessary to put the agreements reached between staff and MEPs on paper. It was the Christian Democrats who passed that idea on to the socialists. It would have been more logical if it were the other way round. It would have been more logical if the socialist party, the party of the workers, had taken that initiative, but no, we were the ones who took it.’

So those first few months saw the emergence at the Luxembourg and Brussels offices of a new generation of staff carried along in the wake of direct elections and the dynamic that followed. By the end of 1980, staff posted to Brussels had offices in the new building in rue Belliard, in the heart of the European district. The first organigram for the Group Secretariat, published in September 1981, showed 34 female and 22 male members of staff of seven different nationalities, on average much younger than the MEPs. Some of them would have long careers in the Group, others would branch off into the Parliament administration after a competition. Some would leave Parliament for good and go elsewhere. Others, like Karl Colling, the Director of Finance, and Stefan Pfitzner, Head of External Relations, would continue their careers in the Parliament administration.

A stable Secretariat helps to ensure the Group’s continuity

---

b Of the 56 members of staff listed in 1981, 18 are still in post in 2009: Paolo Licandro, Deputy Secretary-General; Pascal Fontaine, Special Adviser; Robert Fitzhenry, Head of the Press Office, proud of his Irish roots, always well-informed and easy-going; Béatrice Scarascia Mugnozza, Head of Relations with National Parliaments, who has been working with the Committee on Constitutional Affairs since it was set up (her father, Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, was a leading figure in the Italian Christian Democratic movement in the post-war years and a Commissioner); Werner Krögel, Head of Working Group C, who spent many years monitoring the Committee on Agriculture Affairs, where his Bavarian roots stood him in good stead; Arthur Hildebrandt, Head of International Relations, an indefatigable globetrotter for the Group who has visited over 60 countries in Africa, Central America and Asia, including Papua and Samoa, on his missions with MEPs. In addition to the five female members of staff referred to on page 148, Michèle Melia has been assistant to the French press officer since 1981. Guy Korthoudt was seconded to the EPP for a long time and was its Deputy Secretary-General. Angela Kaladjis, Marilena Deriu, Fiona Kearns and Monique Pocket, who were recruited in this 1979–1981 period, are still working for the Group in 2009, and so is Pascaline Raffegeau, who started in the cabinet of the Chairman, Pierre Pflimlin, and has been working for the Group since 1985.
The status of temporary employees appointed for an indefinite period does not legally guarantee them establishment and the status of officials. In practice, it has been extremely rare for the Group to terminate the contract of any of its staff unilaterally after giving them notice, unless there are serious grounds. Officials working for the Group are recruited on the basis of various criteria: university qualifications, professional skills, knowledge of languages and the ‘Group culture’. Over the years, renewal has taken account of new delegations joining the Group. A national scale is used, whilst allowing for the specific functional requirements of the Secretariat: technical skills (IT, accounting), geographical diversity and political representativeness. It is also accepted that changes in the number of Group Members and their division between national delegations, which occur whenever Parliament is re-elected, should not drastically affect the job security of staff and the running of the Secretariat. So some delegations are under-represented for a while when there are too many staff of a different nationality whose Members have been severely defeated in the elections. It is the responsibility of the Secretary-General to negotiate arrangements with his opposite numbers in the other groups in order to ‘even out’ the groups’ staff complements, taking account of both the needs of the service and personal circumstances. It is in the interests of the Group to ensure that officials working for the Group are relatively secure. The feeling of belonging that encourages dedication and commitment makes every member of the Secretariat staff work better. If the Secretariat were not highly motivated and stable, the supranational spirit of the Group created by the trust between MEPs and their staff would be less developed and less effective.

**Progressive benefits of the new technologies**

The working conditions of MEPs and officials have been improved by the technological advances from the 1980s onwards. At the plenary sittings in Strasbourg, Members who had only just been elected had to deal with exhausting attempts at filibustering by the Italian radical Marco Pannella. In order to block the vote on the new European Parliament Rules of Procedure put forward by Rudolf Luster on behalf of the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, Pannella had tabled several thousand amendments that had to be rejected one by one by a show of hands. Parliament’s technical services installed the electronic voting system, which came into operation and speeded up the voting procedure in the vote on the budget on 6 November 1979.

The Group acquired its first fax machine on 3 October 1979. It was another three years before the first few word processors arrived, in
October 1982. You might remember the hours staff spent typing each change of wording, each amendment made in the course of discussions, which meant that the whole text had to be retyped. But the real IT revolution happened ten years later, after Paolo Licandro had presented an equipment plan in December 1990, which allowed the Group to have an up-to-the-minute IT department. The practical aspects of the work of MEPs and officials in the Group were very specific. Allowance had to be made for the distances between the three workplaces and MEPs’ constituencies. Motorways were often congested, flights delayed by bad weather or strikes. Trunks were taken from one city to another in advance and could get lost, temporarily depriving someone of a file they urgently needed. Telematics and laptop computers gradually reduced the dependence of the European Parliament ‘nomads’ on their main working tool, the paper on which words are written.

In the first few years of the elected Parliament, MEPs from Italy and Ireland and later from Greece, Spain and Portugal frequently complained that there were too few flights between Strasbourg and the European capitals. Long journeys by various means (air, road, rail) were stressful and threatened the status quo between the Member States on the question of Parliament’s seat. Objectors to Strasbourg and supporters of a single seat in Brussels were to be found in all the political groups, including the EPP Group. The German, French and Luxembourg delegations understood the symbolic significance of the Alsatian capital and were a consistent and notable exception. Reports to the Political Affairs Committee on the issue of the seat were an opportunity for the two sides to confront each other and it was not until the Court of Justice judgments and ultimately the decision by the Heads of State at the European Council in Edinburgh on 12 December 1992 that the matter was considered to have been permanently resolved. The improved air links have also helped calm the situation between the pro- and anti-Strasbourg camps, although institutional arguments for a single seat are still the subject of debate.

The EPP Group persuades Greek Members to join (December 1981)

The accession treaty with the tenth Member State, Greece, was signed a few weeks before the June 1979 direct elections. After the treaty

---

a The department is efficiently managed by Walter Petrucci, who was recruited in
entered into force on 1 January 1981, one of the first major political
decisions by the Group was to bring in the Greek MEPs. Although there
was no problem for the Socialist Group, to which PASOK was affiliated,
the EPP was still uncertain as to what would be decided by the Nea
Demokratia party in power in Athens, under the leadership of Konstant-
tinos Karamanlís. Since Nea Demokratia did not belong to the EPP
Party, its Members could equally well sit in the Liberal Group, the Con-
servative Group or even the Gaullist Group, as well as, of course, the
EPP Group. The Greek MEPs, delegated by the Greek Parliament, did
not come to any decision and sat with the non-attached Members for
several months. Direct elections were planned for 18 October 1981.
Egon Klepsch wanted to make a point for his Group: through Giulio
Andreotti, who had good contacts with his Greek counterpart in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he led a delegation to Greece immediately
after the elections. Klepsch thought of a way to persuade his prospec-
tive partners. He coloured in a plan of the Chamber for them, showing
the EPP firmly and solidly in the centre of Parliament, while the centre-
right groups were to its right, more or less on the margins. This, com-
bined with the promise of two senior posts for the EPP Group, including
a position as Vice-Chairman of the Group, convinced the Nea Demokra-
tia leaders. So eight newly elected Greek Members joined the EPP Group
on 23 December 1981, bringing its membership up to 117.a

Egon Klepsch fails to be elected President of the European
Parliament and Paolo Barbi is elected Chairman (1982)

This was a real tactical achievement for Klepsch and it opened the
way for the gradual enlargement of the Group to include parties
that had the same values as the EPP but had not traditionally been
Christian-Democratic parties. However, Klepsch’s success did not
mean that he achieved his ambition to be elected President of the Euro-
pean Parliament in January 1982. He had already raised the question
of the succession to Simone Veil, who was elected in July 1979, with
the Group Chairmen and Bureau on 13 May 1981. He pointed out
that the agreement made with the Liberal Group to alternate with the
EPP after Simone Veil’s two-and-a-half-year term of office did not for-
mally commit the Conservatives, who belonged to the centre-right
majority. It would be politically inappropriate for them to endorse
the election of a socialist. So Klepsch proposed that the EPP Group
should nominate one of its Members for the Presidency. He and Leo

---
Tindemans were both candidates. The first vote took place in Brussels on 9 October 1981, Klepsch having managed to establish that, on the basis of the rules for the CDU Group in the Bundestag, correspondence votes would be allowed under the supervision of the Secretary-General. When the vote was held, neither of the two candidates won an absolute majority in the first ballot. Finally, on 5 October, Egon Klepsch was nominated by the Group after intensive political activity, with feelings sometimes running high in the national delegations. But the game was far from over. The Liberals announced that they were honouring their agreement and not putting forward a candidate. The Conservatives, however, nominated their Group Chairman, Sir James Scott Hopkins. Some believed that, as the Rules of Procedure provided, they would keep their candidate for the first three rounds, for which an absolute majority was needed, and withdraw after negotiation in the fourth round, making way for the best-placed centre-right candidate, Egon Klepsch.

Things did not go according to plan. The Conservatives kept their candidate until the Dutch socialist Pieter Dankert was elected in the fourth round. The ill-feeling between Klepsch and the British Conservatives lasted a long time and he thought that some of the Liberals had failed to honour their commitments. The procedure required that the vote should be secret. In a secret ballot, anything is possible...

Even so, Klepsch’s defeat opened the door to the Bureau of Parliament for him, since he was elected Vice-President. He was later elected to the top position in 1992.

A few days after the election of the President, the EPP Group reorganised its own members for the next half parliamentary term. Paolo Barbi was elected Group Chairman. Willem Vergeer remained in post as Vice-Chairman. Siegbert Alber became Vice-Chairman for the German delegation and for the Greek delegation Konstantinos Kallias was named third Vice-Chairman, as agreed before Nea Demokratia joined. A new elective post added, de facto, a fourth Vice-Chairman, the treasurer. Maurice-René Simonnet was appointed to that post. In addition, the EPP Group had five Vice-Presidents of Parliament elected. Two other organisational decisions were taken. The Bureau and the old Administrative Bureau were merged and a fourth standing working group was set up. The working groups were headed by Lambert Croux (Group A), Philipp von Bismarck (Group B), Horst Langes (Group C), and Maria Luisa Cassanmagnago Cerretti (Group D).

---

a The Group’s Rules of Procedure no longer allow proxy voting.
b Interview with Egon Klepsch, Koblenz, 15 March 2004.
Under Paolo Barbi’s chairmanship, the Chairman of the Group led a mission to the Middle East from 21 May to 3 June 1983. The visit to Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinian refugee camps at Sabra and Chatila, accompanied by Italian troops from the UN intervention force, was an intensive political mission for the Chairman and other members.

Barbi also committed himself to establishing a closer working relationship with the EPP Party, in particular its President, Leo Tindemans, and its Secretary-General, Thomas Jansen. The Group encouraged its members to attend the Party’s Fourth Congress in Paris in December 1982. Barbi had a different style from Egon Klepsch. He was less well versed than his predecessor in political tactics and pragmatic arrangements, concentrating his energy on the big debates and campaigning vigorously for a federal Europe. This Naples parliamentarian, an academic who was not really at home in political games, was not reappointed by his party to a post qualifying him for the European elections in June 1984. As Group Chairman he was popular with his colleagues and staff. Tribute was paid to him in the editorial of the September 1984 issue of the Group’s monthly newsletter, published under the supervision of Secretary-General Giampaolo Bettamio and Werner de Crombrugghe, Head of the Press Office: ‘Thank you, Paolo Barbi. You have lost your seat in the European Parliament, but not your place in Christian Democracy, because you are leaving those who know you an inheritance that is just as important as your work as Chairman of the EPP Group: a particular concept of politics. Your career shows that you chose service in preference to political glory. You do not compromise with duty or honour’.  

The comments by Thomas Jansen, who was Secretary-General of the European People’s Party from 1983 to 1994, are particularly enlightening, both on the cooperation between the Group and the Party and on the ‘management styles’ of the two Group Chairmen he knew well: ‘The exceptional commitment of the Italian Paolo Barbi was marked by close cooperation with the EPP. Indeed, Barbi did not differentiate between the two. For him, both the party and the Group were there to serve the end of one Christian-Democratic and European federalist project. As far as he was concerned, it was reasonable to use all available means to bring it about. Barbi was not rewarded for his stand in support of the EPP. After his successful work in Brussels and Strasbourg, it emerged that Democrazia Cristiana (or the powerful DC figure De Mita) had neglected to ensure he had the necessary support for re-election to the European Parliament’.  

182
Politics and structure of the Group in the first parliamentary term

On Egon Klepsch, who was again elected Chairman of the Group in July 1984, Jansen wrote that ‘his repeated election as leader over such a long period reflected the prevailing feeling in the group that he was irreplaceable. Although his way of running the Group was not uncontroversial, he never had to face a rival candidate. His strengths were the incredible degree to which he was always there, both in Parliament and in the group. He also had a detailed knowledge, down to the technical details, of every procedure or combination of procedures, and the political problems connected with all of them. He relied on the two strongest national groups in the Group, the Germans and the Italians. The majority of the German delegation was loyal to him, not just out of national camaraderie, but on the basis of friendly relations – relations he was careful to cultivate. In the 1960s he had systematically done much the same to win the support and endorsement of the Italians during his time as federal Chairman of the CDU’s youth wing, the Junge Union, and as President of the European Union of Christian Democrats.

Klepsch’s style of leadership in turn dominated the Group’s style. He always tried to head off potential controversies which might harm Group unity. He was generally able to avoid conflict by bringing the relevant individuals and groups together, and reaching agreement by establishing a balance of interests. It was how he held tactical control. At the same time, he pursued the aims of the vast majority of the Group – and he was consistent and clear-eyed about his strategy. Those aims were the federal organisation of the European Community, the reinforcement of its democratic and parliamentary components, and finally the consolidation of the EPP Group’s central position. The goal was to ensure that all decision-making in the European Parliament depended on the EPP Group’s agreement or participation.’190
Chapter XVI

THE ‘VAN AERSSEN INITIATIVE’
STARTS THE INSTITUTIONAL DEBATE
WITHIN THE EPP GROUP (1979-1984)

Dual strategy: ‘small steps’ and a new treaty

Almost as soon as it was set up, the new directly-elected EPP Group took the initiative in raising the key question of the future of European integration. How could the ambitions of the 1972 and 1974 Summits be realised, how could the European Union described in the Bertrand report in 1975 and the Tindemans report in 1976 be achieved, how could widening be reconciled with deepening and a basis be established for a Community of fundamental rights creating European citizenship?

On 27 September 1979, a motion for a resolution on extending the legal bases of the European Community was tabled in the European Parliament. It was signed by Jochen van Aerssen, Egon Klepsch, Emilio Colombo, Leo Tindemans and all the other heads of delegation in the Group. In addition to a brief explanatory memorandum, it contained a list of specific objectives to be achieved with a new treaty.

Once the debate had started, it did not stop. A consensus was quickly reached within the Group on the principle of a dual strategy:
– the ‘constitutive and federalist’ approach, which required an extension of the Community’s powers and amendment of the treaties. Parliament therefore needed to set up a special committee to make proposals to that effect;
– the ‘pragmatic and progressive approach’, which entailed setting up an institutional subcommittee under the Political Affairs Committee, whose aim would be to improve relations between the EEC bodies by making maximum use of the possibilities available under the existing treaties.

For some months there was still a certain amount of misunderstanding in Parliament as to the compatibility of these two approaches. Those who strongly and exclusively supported the first option, the ‘constitutives’ led by Altiero Spinelli, a longstanding Italian federalist, former Member of the Commission, elected from the Italian
Communist Party list, and founder of the ‘Crocodile Group’, a questioned whether the efforts by the Political Affairs Committee and its Subcommittee on Institutional Affairs to take Europe forward ‘in small steps’ were the right approach.

The EPP Group did not support the Crocodile initiative, taking the view that, on the question of federalist orthodoxy, it was more experienced and consistent in its ideas than any of the other political groups.

At the July 1981 part-session the EPP approach proved to be doubly successful. The main reports that the Committee on Institutional Affairs chaired by André Diligent had been drawing up for nearly a year were adopted by large majorities in plenary, confirming that the ‘small steps’ approach was the right one. At the same time, on the basis of an amendment tabled by EPP members including Sjouke Jonker, Jochen van Aerssen, Egon Klepsch and Erik Blumenfeld, which replaced almost the whole of the Crocodile Club resolution, Parliament decided, by 161 votes in favour, 24 against and 12 abstentions, to:
- take full initiative in giving a new impetus to the European Union,
- set up a standing Committee on Institutional Affairs in the second half of the parliamentary term, which would draw up an amendment to the existing treaties,
- ask the Subcommittee on Institutional Affairs to put forward proposals for a precise definition of competences.

Thus institutional matters would be dealt with by a new standing committee with responsibility for making proposals to the Member States for significant progress in Community integration. The limit set by the treaties should no longer be considered an insurmountable obstacle. Their revision must be seen as necessary progress, without which the prospect of further direct elections to the European Parliament in 1984 would lose much of its point.

In the immediate future, the reports presented by the Political Affairs Committee after the Subcommittee on Institutional Affairs had done its work could bring about an improvement in relations between the Community bodies. Five of them were adopted in July 1981: the Hänsch reportb, the van Miert reportc, the Diligent reportd, the Baduel Glorioso reporte and the report by Lady Elles.f

---

a From the name of one of the best restaurants in Strasbourg, where the members of this small group had decided to meet.
b Relations between the European Parliament and the Council.
c Right of initiative and role of the European Parliament in the legislative power of the Community.
d Relations between the European Parliament and the national Parliaments.
e Relations between the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee.
f European political cooperation and the role of the European Parliament.
EPP Group Members made a significant contribution to these reports. The report by André Diligent was adopted by 127 votes to 20. It called for regular and organic relations to be established between the European Parliament and the national Parliaments. New information channels could be put in place and reciprocal exchanges organised. MEPs should be able to take part in the work of national parliamentary committees, without having the right to vote. The Subcommittee on Institutional Affairs discussed two other reports by EPP members, the report by Erik Blumenfeld on the role of the European Parliament in the negotiation of accession and other treaties and agreements signed between the European Community and non-member countries, and the report by Dario Antoniozzi on relations between the European Parliament and the European Council.


The new Committee on Constitutional Affairs was finally set up on 9 July 1981, under the chairmanship of Altiero Spinelli. Eleven EPP Group members were full members. They began their work in a Europe of repeated budget crises, with the governments in some disarray as the public took an increasingly sceptical view of European integration. Action was needed.

There was a growing determination to end the political impasse by reforming the institutions. On 6 January 1981, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the Liberal German Foreign Minister, made his ‘Epiphany Appeal’ in Stuttgart, to which his Italian opposite number Emilio Colombo replied in his speech in Florence on 28 January 1981 at the Eighth Congress of the European Association of Local Authorities.

On 6 November, the German and Italian Governments submitted a plan to their partners in the form of a Draft European Act. The role of the European Council was institutionalised and strengthened and the powers of the Council of Ministers more clearly defined. The German-Italian plan did not call the Luxembourg compromise into question; however, it did take the view that abstention within the Council of Ministers should prevail if it could avert use of the veto. In particular, the European Parliament was assigned ‘central importance’, which must be reflected in its ‘direct involvement in the decision-making process and by its review function’. This latter innovation was significant, since it gave Parliament advisory powers for ‘all matters relating to the
European Community', supervisory powers over the Council of Ministers (the Council to report to MEPs every six months, oral questions), the right to scrutinise confirmation of the Commission, respect for the rights of Parliament in the consultation procedure, Parliament to be heard and kept informed on the negotiation of international treaties, legitimation of parliamentary resolutions on human rights and the development of relations between the European Parliament and national Parliaments.

The Genscher-Colombo Plan was debated in the European Parliament at the plenary sitting on 19 November 1981. The two Ministers explicitly sought Parliament’s backing, believing that Parliament should ‘play a central role in the creation of the Union.’

Emilio Colombo, speaking on behalf of the Council, took pleasure in reminding the House that he had been a member of the EPP Group and Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee until April 1980. He opened his speech, briefly and symbolically: ‘Madam President, esteemed colleagues.’ He went on to say: ‘The European Parliament’s part in this whole scheme stems from its importance as a body directly elected by the people. It is our firm belief that Parliament has not only the title but also the authority to play a central role in spurring on the creation of the Union. When drafting our proposal, ideas from the Parliament were foremost in our minds, as can be seen from the number of proposed measures in the draft European Act in our joint task of creating the Union.’

Leo Tindemans spoke on behalf of the Group shortly afterwards. His response to the promises by the two Ministers was: ‘Yes but – i.e. ‘yes’ to your proposals, but on condition that this Europe is strengthened and unified in real terms.’

Leo Tindemans began by criticising the right of veto in the Council of Ministers, which remained in place under the plan, although it was considered to have ‘negative consequences’ and ‘in reality leads to rigidity’.

Furthermore, the European Act in no way guaranteed that Parliament’s powers would be increased, since it was not a judicial instrument: ‘We must, sooner or later, revise the Treaties’. As the plan stood at that point, that was not likely to happen before the 1984 elections: ‘At the 1984 elections, we must be able to make it quite clear to the voters that this Parliament has done all in its power to protect the interests of the people of Europe as effectively as possible and with an eye to the future. When you say that it will not be possible to revise the Act for another five years, we can no longer simply go along with you.’

When presenting his interim report on the Draft European Act a year after the November 1981 debate, Lambert Croux said that
Parliament supported the Genscher-Colombo initiative, but ‘we shall also keep a wary eye on the follow-up from the Council and the governments in their turn to this urgent work …’.\textsuperscript{199}

Despite the European Parliament’s support for the German-Italian plan, there was no major follow-up at the Stuttgart Council from 17 to 19 June 1983. The European Council adopted the European Act in the form of a Solemn Declaration on European Union which was not legally binding. Its implementing arrangements were far from ambitious and the Luxembourg compromise, although restricted by the unanimity requirement, was not called into question.

In the meantime, on 6 July 1982 Parliament adopted a resolution on the guidelines for institutional reform and authorised the Committee on Institutional Problems to draw up a report that would culminate in the Spinelli Plan. The EPP Group would be the only parliamentary group to vote for this en bloc.\textsuperscript{200}

The preliminary draft by the European Parliament satisfied the Group, in that it met its Europeanist expectations.\textsuperscript{a} It was also a way for the Group to win acceptance for its ideas on the organisation of society and values. As the EPP co-rapporteur Gero Pfennig said in the debate on 13 September 1983:\textsuperscript{b} ‘a vision of the State as a parliamentary democracy guaranteeing liberties and rights which evolved during the Age of Enlightenment. This is Europe’s and the United States’ common heritage. This ideal was and is still founded on the conviction that every individual possesses certain inviolable and inalienable rights’.\textsuperscript{201}

\textsuperscript{a} In addition to the rapporteur-coordinator, Altiero Spinelli, the Committee on Institutional Affairs had six co-rapporteurs: Karel de Gucht (Belgian - Liberal), Jacques Moreau (French - Socialist), Gero Pfennig (German – European People’s Party), Derek Prag (British - European Democrat), Hans-Joachim Seeler (German - Socialist) and Ortensio Zecchino (Italian - European People’s Party).

\textsuperscript{b} On the same day two of the Group’s most fervent constitutionalists, Rudolf Luster and Gero Pfennig, helped in their work by the Deputy Secretary-General, the lawyer Friedrich Fugmann, decided to submit to the bureau of the Committee on Institutional Problems the text of a ‘constitution for a federal State’. This very proactive draft document was not intended to oppose Parliament’s own initiative, but to contribute to the discussion on the reform of the treaties. It clearly spells out the purpose of a federal State, drawing on federal constitutions like Canada’s and rejecting the existing Community institutional structure. The areas of responsibility which the federal State covers range from external defence to fighting crime, and also include development aid, monetary policy and environmental and consumer protection. The President of the Union is chosen from the Member State heads of state in alphabetical order. The President of the Council of the Union is elected by Parliament and proposes ministerial appointments to the President of the Union. Parliament has the power to pass a constructive vote of no confidence in the President of the Council of the Union. The seat of the institutions, which is decided by Parliament, becomes federal territory. The Union is financially independent and is responsible for defence.
Paolo Barbi announced enthusiastically that the Group ‘will vote for the proposal of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, and will do so unanimously after a long and careful examination.’

When the resolution on the Treaty establishing the European Union came up for debate in the European Parliament on 14 February 1984, it was fully supported by the EPP Group. The Christian Democrat MEPs saw themselves as heirs to the earlier great projects and were ready to support the project outside the Chamber, as Flaminio Piccoli declared: ‘In 1975, Bertrand saw the European Union by 1980, in 1977 Scelba called for the strengthening of the rights of European citizens, so as to create a uniform fabric of European society that was essential for the consolidation of the Community. The late Gonella made the same point during his first period of office of the European Parliament elected by direct universal suffrage; and the Genscher-Colombo proposals – which were blocked – again put forward, forcibly, the same proposals. These initiatives show the commitment of Christian Democrats to the unification of Europe. For this reason, we express our firm agreement with the draft of the new Treaty … We shall take the initiative, as European Christian Democrats, and we shall urge national parliaments and governments – each according to its own responsibilities – to work for the ratification of the draft treaty, in the awareness that only the expressive institutions of the peoples of Europe can take those single-minded decisions that long drawn-out negotiations achieve between the bureaucracies of individual nations.’

Nonetheless the European Parliament resolution on the preliminary draft Treaty establishing the European Union did not receive the hoped-for response from the national Parliaments, apart from the Italian Parliament, of which Altiero Spinelli was a Member. The Spinelli Plan was not the main issue in the second direct European Parliament elections.

On 24 May 1984, the President-in-Office of the European Council, French President François Mitterrand, nonetheless supported the draft Treaty establishing the European Union and proposed to the European Parliament that talks should be started on the subject.
Chapter XVII
FULL RECOGNITION
OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AS JOINT BUDGET AUTHORITY
(1979-1984)

The role of the European Parliament in the budget procedure, which had been established in practice since 1975, was strengthened when it was elected by direct universal suffrage. Having gained more democratic legitimacy in relation to the Council and the Commission, MEPs intended to make full use of their powers to assert themselves with the Council. The budget dispute that had allowed Parliament to win greater respect for its prerogatives in the 1970s would become fiercer and would not end until the late 1980s. Heinrich Aigner, Harry Notenboom, Horst Langes, Konrad Schön, Pietro Adonnino and Paolo Barbi were to become budget specialists and they consistently and successfully demonstrated the Committee on Budgets’ fighting spirit.

For the EPP Group, the budget became a means to build Europe.


In the early 1980s there were fierce exchanges between the two branches of the budget authority, especially in view of the economic situation in Europe since the two oil crises. Faced with rising unemployment, strong inflation and recessions in the key sectors of industry in the national economies, some Member States did not necessarily receive the benefits they might hope for from the pooling of resources and economic policies. The United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Germany considered that they were contributing more than they were getting out of the Community and demanded compensation. This idea of a ‘fair return’ was a serious threat to the future of European integration.

Faced with this anti-Community attitude, Parliament took a stance as the defender of Europe’s interests. The terms it set for the debate were not without relevance: could Community policies be financed
when the 1 % VAT levied in each Member State was not actually being paid into the Community and, more generally, own resources were no longer sufficient? How could new policies be developed to improve the economic performance of the Community when compulsory expenditure – i.e. expenditure derived from the Treaty obligations – and expenditure on the Common Agricultural Policy in particular accounted for more than half the Community budget? How could de facto solidarity be created between the Member States when some States saw the Community budget as an extension of their national budget or, even worse, demanded compensation in the light of their actual or assumed economic situation?

Rejection of the 1980 budget: ‘the first moment of truth’ for the elected Parliament

The debate that started in July 1979 on the preliminary draft budget for 1980 presented by the Commission was largely what Members of the EPP Group were hoping for. In order to alter the balance of the Community budget in favour of structural policies, the Commission was prepared to reduce agricultural expenditure.

The tone altered dramatically in the debate on 27 and 28 September, immediately after the first reading by the Council. Numerous items of expenditure had been axed from the draft budget presented to MEPs, relating mainly to structural policies. This non-compulsory expenditure, on which, under the budget procedure, Parliament had the last word, had been transferred to the Common Agricultural Policy, whose chronic financing problems over the previous few years were in danger of overburdening the Community budget.

The EPP Group Members identified several aspects which appeared to be unsatisfactory: energy policy, strongly defended by Hanna Walz, Chairman of the Energy Committee, who asked Parliament to adopt the amendments tabled by its committee, and social policy by John Joseph McCartin, who was critical of the fact that the appropriations for social policy represented only 6 % of budget.

Since there could clearly be no consensus on the budget, the Group Members (apart from six French Members) voted unanimously to reject it. The Group Chairman, Egon Klepsch, explained that the EPP’s position was due to the Council’s intransigence in the negotiations. However, he considered this to be not an institutional crisis, but the exercise of a right provided for in the Treaties. If Parliament were to approve
that budget, it would be countenancing the stagnation of the Community.

On 11 December 1979, after a second reading by the Council that was equally unconvincing, the spokesmen for the parliamentary political groups, all agreeing that the draft budget should be rejected, explained their positions. Egon Klepsch remarked that ‘the arguments we advanced to convince 180 million Europeans that they should go to the polls was undoubtedly that this directly elected European Parliament could be expected to provide a more accurate definition of the public interest in Europe, even if, as is the case in many quarters, there is considerable opposition to an extension of the powers of this House. When we vote on the budget, not only the EP but also the other institutions – whether they have forgotten it or not – will be experiencing the first real test since the citizens of Europe took their decision ….’ Recapping on all the points that appeared to be lacking in the draft budget, Klepsch said that his Group would be voting for rejection. On 13 December 1979, the whole European Parliament rejected the 1980 budget by 288 votes to 64, with 1 abstention.

The Luxembourg Council on 27 and 28 April 1980 was a failure. The British demanded that their contribution be reduced, since they had very limited involvement in the CAP.

However, things started to move again fairly quickly when, on 30 May 1980, the Council of Ministers came to an agreement on the British contribution and the setting of agricultural prices. The Council and Parliament began consultations, in which Heinrich Aigner and Harry Notenboom were involved. These lasted until 20 June, when the Council put forward a new draft budget. The debates and vote on the 1980 budget could at last be held on 26 and 27 June. Paolo Barbi finally offered the support of the Group and went on the offensive for the future: ‘I think there are two lessons to be drawn from this long, bitter, and for those who are members of the Committee on Budgets, tiring struggle over the 1980 budget: the first is the need to move towards major institutional changes, which, by bringing Europe nearer to political unity, would make it possible to overcome the serious problems created by the dual nature of the budgetary authority. It is clear that […] the powers of Parliament should be strengthened, that it should be given greater opportunities to have the final say and to take final decisions on the budget so as to underpin financially political trends and choices which would otherwise remain a dead letter. The second lesson […] is the need to increase the Community’s financial resources rapidly.’ The 1980 budget was eventually adopted by the President of the European Parliament on 9 July, after the Council had agreed to MEPs’ amendments.
The ‘Adonnino doctrine’ (1981): the budget as a political lever, not just an accounting document

By 10 July 1980, the Commission was already presenting its preliminary draft budget for 1981 to Parliament. However, the Groups were cautious and did not express their views until after the Council had presented the budget at the plenary sitting on 14 October 1980.

Once again, the draft budget was not unanimously approved by MEPs. Pietro Adonnino, who was appointed rapporteur, was critical of the idea of the budget as more of an accounting than a political document. An examination of the draft budget raised questions regarding its juridical and political role. In his view, the Council ‘regarded [the budget] as a mere administrative record of decisions made elsewhere and only included in the document for technical purposes of authorisation and implementation.

The Group spokesman, Konrad Schön, also expressed his disappointment. Firstly, non-compulsory expenditure had been drastically cut, although it represented a significant resource for Parliament. Furthermore, the EPP Group found no evidence in the draft budget of three political priorities to which it attached importance: energy policy, industrial policy combined with social policy and measures to combat world hunger. Lastly, the agricultural policy expenditure was considered inadequate.

Pietro Adonnino presented his final report on 3 November 1980. He concluded by outlining a budget concept in which the role of the budget in European integration might be seen as of the highest possible importance: ‘It is for Parliament, essentially this directly elected Parliament, to establish in this context a precise definition that enables us to move on from this view of a Europe of nations, a Europe of constant compromises between different interests, a balance of power, indeed a reign of power: We have to replace that idea with a Europe in which Community policies and action – I stress the word Community, as the Treaty of Rome requires – lessen the differences, consolidate and enhance what we have in common, overcome short-term difficulties and, above all, promote progressive and balanced development and ultimately create the fundamental conditions for our Community to speak with one voice on the major international issues of our time, an objective that the political cooperation policies are seeking to achieve, and thus to play a key role amongst all those who are embarking on this historic phase. And all that, ladies and gentlemen, can also be done through the budget.’

No fewer than 610 amendments were put to the vote on 6 November, in order to bring the budget into line with Parliament’s wishes. Over
Full recognition of the European Parliament as joint budget authority

ECU 332 million\(^{a}\) in payment appropriations and over ECU 554 million in commitment appropriations were added to satisfy the MEPs. When it came before the Council for a second reading, the Council reduced the ambitious draft budget for 1981 presented by Parliament, whilst increasing the supplementary budget for 1980 that was then under consideration.

On 18 December, Parliament voted on the 1981 budget and the supplementary budget for 1980, with amendments that substantially increased their appropriations. The Council, when informed of that decision, told the President of Parliament on 23 December that it had not yet been able to agree on an opinion on the amendments to the supplementary budget for 1980. On the basis of the budget procedure, the President of Parliament could reasonably consider that the Council had not given its opinion within the required period and it therefore adopted both budgets.

This accidental but legal adoption of the 1981 budget had the support of the EPP Group. The Group Chairman, Egon Klepsch, said at the time: ‘This was a correct decision, and the EPP Group supported it […] The budgetary decisions by the European Parliament constitute a step forward. They demonstrate Parliament’s ability to act, showing wisdom and moderation […] The EPP Group is convinced that by making this political gesture, Parliament has acted correctly and has given proof of European solidarity […] As in the past, the European Community will only make progress as a result of political decisions. Our electors, the people of Europe, must know that we oppose any attempts to restrain such progress by reverting to narrow national or legal positions.’\(^{210}\)

Resolution of the budget crises (1981-1984)

On 15 September 1981, the Council presented the draft budget for 1982. The EPP Group spokesman, Harry Notenboom, drew attention to the weakness of the proposals and was quick to point out that ‘… this budget can only be regarded as a step backwards.’\(^{211}\)

The perennial subject of dispute between the three institutions, namely the division between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure, was once again raised. Parliament took the view that expenditure that it itself classed as non-compulsory indisputably fell into that category.\(^{212}\) Despite the doubts expressed by the Council about Parliament’s margin for manoeuvre, no opinion was given and the President of Parliament adopted the budget as it stood.

---

\(^{a}\) European unit of account.
The three years of budget crises did not leave the protagonists unscathed. The EPP Group called for greater cooperation between the three institutions: ‘I hope we shall succeed in adopting the [1982] budget in December, with the cooperation of the Commission and especially the Council. We are not going to do so at any cost, simply in order to have a budget. We want a budget because we know about the problems with provisional twelfths.’

In the first half of 1982, it fell to the Belgian Presidency of the Council to work out the terms of an agreement that would encourage dialogue between the three branches of the budget authority. Leo Tindemans, who, as well as being Belgian Foreign Minister and thus President of the Council, was also President of the European People’s Party, used all his intelligence and skills as a diplomat to bring about the signature of a joint declaration on 30 June 1982. The aim was mainly to prevent discussions between the institutions during the procedure from delaying the adoption of the budget, and to prevent situations of open conflict between the Council and Parliament. The declaration also settled the issue of the current and future division between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure, defined Parliament’s margin for manoeuvre, introduced a compromise on the issue of ceilings in existing regulations, established a legal basis for any appropriation commitment asked for by Parliament and, finally, strengthened the procedure for interinstitutional collaboration.

MEPs were still far from satisfied with the 1983 draft budget considered at first reading at the plenary sitting on 26 October 1982. Once again the EPP Group disagreed with the Council’s view that the Community budget should be treated in the same way as national budgets. Konrad Schön gave a reminder of that view when he said that the budget was not merely an end, to make savings in a period of austerity, it was primarily a political means of resolving some of Europe’s economic problems. In his opinion, the Community budget was still too ‘modest. I always tell my German visitors that it is no larger than the budget of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia.’

In the second reading, on 14 December 1982, MEPs discussed Parliament’s margin for manoeuvre. Emphasising the importance of the budget for the achievement of an ever closer Community, the EPP Group, represented by Pietro Adonnino, confirmed its support for increases of ECU 137.5 million in payment appropriations and ECU 176 million in commitment appropriations. In adopting the 1983 budget, Parliament exercised the margin for manoeuvre which it considered its right.

At the same time as it voted on the 1983 budget at second reading, Parliament also had to debate the supplementary and amending budget
(SAB) for 1982. However, far from resolving the issue of the British contribution, the SAB made it worse by perpetuating the financial mechanisms that until then had been used temporarily and creating a contribution refund surplus of ECU 1 thousand million in favour of the United Kingdom.

Since the Budget Council did not make sufficient concessions to the conditions set by Parliament, Parliament had no hesitation in causing another serious budget crisis by deciding to reject the 1982 SAB. The dénouement came two months later, when Parliament decided to vote\textsuperscript{220} for the 1983 SAB, to which the contents of the 1982 SAB had been transferred.\textsuperscript{221} In the meantime the Council had agreed to several of Parliament’s conditions, undertaking in particular not to continue this \textit{a posteriori} compensation system.

The objections to the draft 1984 budget were exactly the same as the previous ones. MEPs were starting to feel powerless, increasingly so when the December 1983 Intergovernmental Conference in Athens proved a failure.

The EPP Group, however, unlike the Socialists, the European Democrats and some British Labour Members, who wanted the 1984 budget to be rejected,\textsuperscript{222} was not willing to go to those lengths.\textsuperscript{223} So, despite strong British opposition, Parliament by a large majority adopted the 1984 budget as revised at first reading. The resolution adopted after the debate on 15 December 1983 blocked the compensation for the British and Germans, whilst allowing the Council a further three months to resolve the crisis. In particular Parliament wanted reform of the CAP and account to be taken of its decisions on the future financing of the EEC. On 21 December 1983, the President of Parliament adopted the amended budget at second reading, forcing the Commission and the Council at last to find solutions.

**Refusal of a discharge\textsuperscript{a} for the 1982 budget: a warning to the Commission**

When, after its replacement in the June 1984 elections, the European Parliament considered the discharge it was to give the Commission for the 1982 financial year, it found that there were several objections. First of all, MEPs resented the behaviour of the Commission. In 1984 it had refused to provide certain documents urgently requested by the Committee on Budgetary Control, maintaining that they were confidential.

\textsuperscript{a} Budget discharge: European Parliament approval for the Commission to implement the previous year’s budget.
The Commission had itself disowned its budget controller, the European Court of Auditors, which had refused to approve implementation of the 1982 budget. Moreover, the Commission had not taken account of Parliament’s requests not to refund the British and German contributions. Lastly, the Commission had not acted on the amendments to the 1982 budget adopted by Parliament.224

The Committee on Budgetary Control therefore felt compelled to ask MEPs in the debate on 14 November 1984 to refuse the Commission a discharge, the first time this had happened in ten years. The Chairman of the Committee, Heinrich Aigner, defended Parliament’s point of view, which was aimed at the Commission: ‘I would assure President Thorn that the Committee on Budget Control’s criticisms are directed not at him personally or at individual Commissioners, but against the Commission’s function as an institution. I think that members of this House from all the groups have repeatedly said in recent years that the Commission has no longer been able to sustain its true roles as the Community’s driving force, the initiator of its future development.’225

The debate, ostensibly a technical one, soon turned out to be a political one in which Parliament could not remain neutral. The Group spokesman, Konrad Schön, explained the reasons for this: ‘Parliamentary control, whatever the form in which it is exercised, is political control, and political control must perforce lead to political judgments [...] the Committee on Budgetary Control is more than just an audit committee which, on completion of a budget, verifies figures, perhaps corrects them, states its conclusions and then files its report [...] Unlike you [the Commission] we are eager to make policy and thank goodness, we do not have to share this power!’226

By refusing to give a discharge, Parliament was totally repudiating the policy of the Commission, but, as far as the EPP Group was concerned, that should not signify a sanction on the Commission.227 On the contrary, it was a way of reaffirming the roles of the Commission and Parliament. It was with that in mind that Heinrich Aigner defended the report by the Committee on Budgetary Control, ‘which will, I hope, not set the Community back by its criticisms, but rather will impart new impulses to it.’ He added that ‘The aim of our report, even if it is presented in a negative form, is not to weaken but to strengthen the Commission.’228
The Common Agricultural Policy presented the EPP Group with a real dilemma. All the Christian Democrat parties had solid links with the countryside and commitments to the agricultural sector. Electorally, the EPP could not disappoint farmers, whether they farmed on a large or small scale, in the south or the north. In the 1980s, that electorate still had the power to influence the views of the Group. However, the Group had to admit that agricultural expenditure took an overwhelming share of the Community budget, nearly 75%, most of which went on market support expenditure. Paradoxically, that expenditure was classed as compulsory expenditure, which Parliament could not amend. As we saw, the Group’s budget strategy was to identify political priorities that were part of a real Community dynamic. These included developing future policies and solidarity policies covered by non-compulsory expenditure (NCE). The EPP Group was anxious to avoid having to choose between persuading the Council to cut agricultural expenditure, which would cause discontent amongst the rural electorate, and sacrificing new policies. So the CAP had to be reformed and made less costly, without challenging its fundamental principles.

One of the Group’s aims in the 1979-1984 parliamentary term was therefore to limit expenditure. It wanted to ‘dispel the idea that the CAP is a drain on the Community’s resources which is holding up the development of other policies.’

The scandal of surpluses

The CAP, a victim of its own success in certain areas, caused one of the biggest controversies in the history of the Community. Whereas after the Second World War the aim of the CAP was to secure food supplies, the Community had developed a system of aid to producers to encourage a rapid increase in production. That aim was largely achieved, but
presented a new challenge for agriculture: if yield in a particular period was sufficient to supply the agricultural markets, the slightest upward fluctuation in supply resulted in undesirable surpluses.

Agricultural surpluses caused serious tensions between the Member States and outraged the public. In the Group Study Days in The Hague in 1975, the group spokesman, Isidor Früh, was already expressing concern that ‘compromises in the agricultural sector are becoming more and more equivalent to the addition of requirements reflecting national interests.’\(^{231}\) The Council and Commission tried to remedy the negative effects of those decisions, but without much success, since the policies introduced all too often had short-term objectives. The rapporteur therefore concluded that the ‘wide range of measures adopted [by the Community to restore the balance of agricultural markets] at frequent intervals, some of which have precisely the opposite effect, does not inspire hopes of a successful plan in the medium term. Short-term measures are not the way to level out production cycles; instead they inflate production surpluses.’\(^{232}\)

The butter mountains and milk lakes were the subject of frequent comment. The EPP Group was concerned: ‘Since the inception of the Common Agricultural Policy, the objectives defined in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome have not been realised to the same extent; productivity has increased to the point where the rate of self-sufficiency has exceeded 100 % in certain sectors, but the surpluses and the resulting additional expenditure or intervention measures lay the Common Agricultural Policy open to more and more criticism.’\(^{233}\)

The Group’s objective was therefore one of ‘a reasonable reduction of surpluses with a view to a sufficient level of supply of foodstuffs and to a reasonable level of food aid. The disposal of agricultural surpluses is a burden on the budget and creates tensions in the international market in the Community’s relations with its trading partners. The EPP Group favours the temporary involvement of producers in disposal arrangements by means of a progressive co-responsibility levy on production. In the long term, surpluses will have to be eliminated through sectoral measures.’\(^{234}\)

**Improving agricultural policy sector by sector**

One of the first steps taken by the EPP Group was to establish a stronger presence in Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture. In the first term of the directly elected Parliament, changes in the composition of the Committee enabled the Group to increase the number of members it had on the Committee considerably. Whereas in the first half of the parliamentary term it had 10 ordinary and 10 substitute members, in the second term the Christian Democrat representation on the Com-
The common agricultural policy (CaP) Committee was increased, with the addition of three ordinary members and one substitute member, out of a total of 45 members. The Christian Democrat Vice-Chairmen of the Committee were confirmed. The Group welcomed the re-election of Isidor Früh and the Italian Arnaldo Colleselli, even though a member of the Group of European Democrats considered not to be in favour of the CAP was again elected Chairman of the Committee on a knife-edge!235

Since the Christian Democrats were so strongly represented, the Group was able to play a full part in the preparation of reports dealing with specific aspects of the CAP: Arnaldo Colleselli reported on the market in rice236 and the common organisation of the market in wine237; Joachim Dalsass on the market in seeds238; Giosuè Ligios on the common organisation of the markets in fruit and vegetables239; Alfredo Diana on olive producer organisations240; Efstratios Papaefstratiou on producer groups and associations in the cotton sector241; Reinhold Bocklet on zootechnical standards applicable to breeding animals of the porcine species242, aid for hops producers243 and the common organisation of the markets in sugar.244

Modernising agriculture

The second aspect that the Group worked on, which became increasingly important in the 1979-1984 parliamentary term, was Community action on agricultural structures.

‘Members of the CD Group were quick to point to the need to look at changes in agricultural structures within the wider context of the creation of jobs in the countryside. Only in this way can structural change take place in agriculture on a voluntary basis without creating hardship.’245 Several Members of the Group drew up reports on the subject, which dealt particularly with the regions and highlighted the diversity of European agriculture, its problems and the action that needed to be taken on these.

The issue of less-favoured regions was discussed in the report on the acceleration of agricultural development in certain regions of Greece.246 Geographically targeted structural action was designed to reduce the gap between the various agricultural regions of Europe, particularly the Mediterranean and northern Europe. The Group spokesman, Efstratios Papaefstratiou, pointed out during the debate on the Kaloyannis report, that: ‘this unbalanced development makes it urgently necessary for the European Community to intervene in search of ways to meet the special needs of the disadvantaged agricultural areas in Greece.’247
The need for a structural policy was also considered at European level, as the report by another member of the Group, Joachim Dalsass from South Tyrol, showed. The report pointed out that the ambitious aims of the CAP when it was introduced only took account of supplies and prices. Although those two aims were still important, ‘it is not enough to agree on a fine package of prices. It has always been necessary to think of the places of production, the agricultural holdings and their quantitative and qualitative improvement.’

At the end of the 1979-1984 parliamentary term, the outlines of the structural policy emerged more clearly in the aims of the EPP Group: ‘Structural policy must be considered another important element of the EPP Group’s policy on agriculture [...] On the initiative of the EPP Group, special programmes have been drawn up for certain less-favoured Community regions in the last few years, such as the special programme for Ireland, the programme to improve the infrastructure of certain less-favoured areas in the Federal Republic of Germany or the programme to accelerate agricultural development in Greece [...] The EPP has exerted a decisive influence on new versions of structural directives.’

The EPP Group supports the Commission reforms

In the mid-1980s, the new Commission appointed Franz Andriessen Commissioner for agriculture and fisheries. The European Parliament Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and Food was chaired by the Dutch MEP Teun Tolman. With these two Christian Democrats in strategic European agriculture posts, new prospects were opened up for EPP members in relations between Parliament and the Commission.

In 1985, the Commission started a wide-ranging debate on European agriculture on the basis of its Green Paper, ‘Perspectives for the Common Agricultural Policy’. The sector was already facing a serious crisis. Some steps were taken to reorientate production in sectors with surpluses, resolve the problem of income for small family farms and make farmers more aware of environmental issues. The market had to be taken into account by aligning guaranteed prices with world prices and imposing a limit on the quantities that received support. Quotas were introduced for a five-year period, especially for dairy products. The new system to curb production affected one third of all agricultural production.

Shortly afterwards the EPP Group put forward its views on the CAP through its ‘Agriculture’ Working Group, chaired by Joachim Dalsass. The EPP guidelines for a progressive Common Agricultural Policy were
The common agricultural policy (CaP) was the outcome of detailed discussions within the Group and with agricultural organisations between July and December 1985. The Christian Democrats gave priority to the people working in the agricultural sector. They spoke up for family farms, whose diversity was the most appropriate solution to the structural conditions of the Community. The priority aim of reducing surpluses must be achieved in a socially acceptable way, and with the cooperation of farmers.

Group members used the guidelines as their basis in the debate on the Commission Green Paper and the Tolman report on the future of the CAP in January 1986.

Reinhold Bocklet summed up the position of the EPP Group in three points: the methods used to reduce surpluses must be socially acceptable; agricultural income must be supplemented by payments for the contributions made ‘by small and medium-scale farming, such as maintaining cultivated land and the structural stability of rural areas’; and the CAP must focus on preserving the environment.

At the same time, the Group advocated an active and reasonable market and price policy.

However, the management of stocks became a burning question in 1986, since it accounted for more and more of the CAP budget. A commission of inquiry was set up in the European Parliament. Its rapporteur, Michel Debatisse, presented his findings in November 1987.
Chapter XIX
CONTINUING TO FACE UP TO THE SOVIET THREAT

Disillusionment with détente

The 1970s began in a spirit of hope, but ended in disillusionment. The rapprochement with the East, which Westerners had wanted to believe in when signing the Helsinki Agreements, had failed to materialise. What was worse, the Soviets seemed to be doing their utmost to destabilise peace in Europe. On the eve of the European elections, the EPP Group continued to support détente, but on the other side of the Iron Curtain nothing had changed. The Final Act of the Helsinki Conference began to have real repercussions within the population of the USSR, giving fresh courage to the champions of human rights. However, it very soon became apparent to the EPP Group that when those people wanted to make their voices heard, by referring to the documents signed by their countries, they came up against the same repressive measures to which they had previously been subjected. The cases of Andrei Sakharov, Natan Sharansky and Yuri Orlov, and other cases examined by the European Parliament, were symptomatic of the ideological inflexibility of the Soviet system.

The Helsinki process itself became bogged down. The Belgrade Conference, and then the Madrid Conference, which were supposed to implement the agreements, became lost in the clash between the two concepts of détente. The Soviets were apparently not prepared to make any concessions.

Then, at the end of 1979, came the coup in Kabul. Following the leonine treaty of friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation which the USSR succeeded in getting signed in Afghanistan, the Red Army entered Kabul in support of a coup d'état. The West immediately condemned this move, and the EPP Group, in the person of Erik Blumfeld, gave its support to the Afghan cause. ‘This is not an unfortunate accident which has occurred somewhere in the world, nor a matter of unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of a country: it is the military invasion, by a world power, of a sovereign and independent state, at
a time when the world is experiencing an extremely dramatic global situation.’262

On 15 February 1980, the European Parliament organised a debate on Afghanistan. Since the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the USSR had hardened its policy on dissidents. Andrei Sakharov had been arrested. Three motions for resolutions were tabled before Parliament. The first of these expressed the indignation of the EPP Group, the Socialists, the Conservatives, the Liberals and the Group of Progressive European Democrats, and condemned Sakharov’s arrest.263 The second resolution, tabled by the same Groups, was concerned with the advisability of holding the Olympic Games in a venue other than Moscow.264 The third, tabled by the Members of the EPP Group and the Conservatives, called on the Commission to reconsider all its relations with the Soviet Union.265 These three resolutions were adopted by Parliament, the third one in spite of opposition from those on the Left of the European Parliament.266

The human cost of the war was tragic, as Hans-Gert Pöttering noted, a few years later, in his report on the situation in Afghanistan: ‘with the aim of transforming this country [into a dependent satellite state], […] it is estimated that 1.5 million people have been killed, 1.2 million have been injured, and more than 4 million turned into refugees or victims of persecution […]. This war, which is being fought in defiance of international law, in occupied zones, has caused the destruction of civil targets – the bombing of villages, the destruction of properly signed hospitals, obstacles placed in the way of medical care provision, the destruction of crops and livestock, the use of chemical weapons causing skin, lung and nerve injuries, as well as imprisonment, torture, murders – constitutes the most serious violation of human and ethnic rights and the rights of peoples to have occurred during the present decade […]’267

In the summer of 1980 it was Europe’s turn to hold its breath. The Polish crisis, triggered by workers’ strikes in response to the government’s decisions to increase the prices of basic foodstuffs, gave rise to fears of Soviet intervention identical to the intervention experienced by the Warsaw Pact countries. The events of July of that year led to negotiations between the strikers and the authorities, who had been given a mandate by the Politburo, and resulted in the Gdansk Agreement signed on 31 August 1980 by Lech Wałęsa, the Chairman of the Strike Committee, and a government delegation. It seemed that the worst had been avoided.

The European Parliament immediately expressed its support for the Polish people, and welcomed the fact that they had managed to resolve the crisis by peaceful means. In actual fact, as Leo Tindemans,
emphasised, any prolongation of the conflict would inevitably have led
to intervention by Moscow, which would have ‘...made a laughing-stock
of the idea of defending human rights. The spirit of Helsinki, the Final Act
of 1975 which was signed by our countries and also by Poland, and the
forthcoming conference in Madrid would [...] have become pointless. If
force had been used, the quest for peace and détente would have lost all
credibility’. The Penders report on the human rights situation in
Poland was published in the wake of the crisis. The report empha-
sised the need to continue, in the context of the Madrid Conference,
with the long-term task of putting pressure on the USSR to persuade it
finally to acknowledge the human rights-issue.

The Group’s fears were confirmed when the military coup d'état of
December 1981 put an end to the opening up of relations triggered by
the Gdansk agreements. Members of the Group continued to express
their solidarity with the Polish people, the trade union Solidarność –
now a banned organisation – and the Church.

On 29 April 1982, a delegation from the EPP Group, including its
German Vice-Chairman Siegbert Alber, Belgian Members Marcel
Albert Vandewiele, Pierre Deschamps and Victor Michel, was welcomed
by representatives of the Polish Social Catholic Union. A catastrophic
picture of the situation in Poland emerged. European food aid for the
Polish people was required as a matter of urgency. The EPP was
entrusted with the task of drawing up a report on the situation in
Poland. On 25 February 1982, Pierre Deschamps set out the main
points of his report in an in-depth exposé of the historical and political
conditions in which the Polish drama was being played out, and
emphasised the fact that the declaration of martial law in Poland
on 13 December 1981 had had the effect not only of destroying the
process of democratic renewal in that country but also of threatening
the stability of Europe. The role played by the Soviet Union in imple-
menting the repressive measures adopted by the Polish authorities
constituted a serious violation of human rights and of the spirit of
the Helsinki agreement. At the time, the majority of the Political Affairs
Committee wanted to see a fundamental re-examination of economic
policy towards the USSR, without halting the supply of humanitar-
ian and food aid to the Polish people. The Committee recommended
to the Council of Ministers that all forms of private aid which could
be of direct benefit to the Polish people should be supported. The com-
munist and socialist MEPs voted against the Deschamps report. They
called for the preservation of pockets of détente with the USSR,
and were against falling in with the American policy of restricting trading relations with the countries of the Soviet bloc. In spite of this the
report was adopted, by a large majority, by the Political Affairs Committee.

‘Neither red nor dead’: the Euromissile crisis (1979-1984)

Since 1977, Europe had been living under the sword of Damocles in the shape of the SS-20 Soviet nuclear missiles scattered throughout the satellite States. The USSR was exploiting the gaps in the SALT arms limitation agreements signed with the United States during the détente years. As soon as Ronald Reagan was elected as US President, the alarm bells started to ring. Soviet superiority seemed to be overwhelming, and the risk of nuclear threats to the continent of Europe became a real possibility. In December 1979 NATO formally approved the installation of Pershing II missiles and Cruise missiles with American land-based launchers in Western Europe. At the same time European equipment was modernised. This arsenal, intended to counterbalance the Soviet SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers, considerably strengthened the range of weapons capable of reaching Soviet territory. The decision was in line with the EPP Group’s strategy of balanced forces. Of course, every effort should be made to promote peace and encourage détente between East and West, but that effort had to be accompanied by an unambiguous collective deterrent capability based on Western solidarity and cooperation. Egon Klepsch, speaking in the European Parliament, summed up the NATO decision: ‘Why was the NATO dual decision taken? In order to give the Soviet Union an opportunity to remove this threat against us, in order to ensure by negotiations with it that we need not build up our armaments in order to maintain the balance of forces’.

Pacifist movements were developing throughout the whole of Western Europe, made up of genuine pacifists as well as openly pro-Soviet agitators. Cleverly manipulated by Soviet propaganda, pacifists in Germany and elsewhere, demonstrating against the siting of American Euromissiles, chanted ‘Lieber rot als tot’ (Better red than dead). They called for a unilateral ‘nuclear freeze’, which in reality would have amounted to allowing the Soviet Union to retain its nuclear superiority, thereby giving Moscow a permanent opportunity to blackmail the West.

Pierre Pflimlin, the first Vice-President of the European Parliament, gave them the following warning: ‘Many people believe that within the Kremlin there is no desire for aggression, so that there is not really any risk of war. Actually it is likely that the people currently running the Soviet Union do not want a war in Europe, but if the current imbalance in
powers continues, they would have a good chance, without having to win
a war, of obtaining by threats the capitulation of a Western Europe para-
lysed by fear and ready to accept servitude.²²³

At its fourth Congress in 1982, the European People’s Party sup-
ported²²⁴ the ‘zero option’ proposal made by President Reagan to the
Soviet Union: no American rockets would be installed in Europe if the
Soviet Union dismantled its SS-20s. If that proved to be unsuccessful,
Members of the Group would reaffirm their support for the NATO strat-
egy. The Atlantic Alliance remained the most credible basis for the
defence of our freedom.²²⁵

The USSR’s categorical opposition to the zero option meant that dis-
armament was out of the question. Moscow continued with the sys-
tematic installation of its SS-20s. Faced with such duplicity, Paolo Barbi
pointed out the danger: ‘… the Soviets have been able to take advantage
of this long period not indeed to negotiate but to increase their number of
warheads from 135 in 1979 to 1 050 this year [in 1983], so demonstrating
clearly their wish to ensure their monopoly of short-range missiles in order
to blackmail Europe through the nuclear threat and divide it from its
American partners’.²²⁶

In November 1983, the European Parliament considered the pro-
posal tabled by the Socialist Government of Greece, which held the
Council Presidency at the time, for a moratorium on the deployment of
American missiles. The Socialist Group supported this proposal,²²⁷
whereas the EPP Group rejected it.²²⁸ There was a lively debate, which
showed clearly that there was a split within Parliament between the
Left and the Right.²²⁹ Belgian MEP Paul Vankerkhoven explained
the EPP Group’s position and described the negative consequences of
the pacifist demonstrations: ‘Wanting peace […] is not the same as shout-
ing the slogans that someone else has put in our mouths, and is not the
same as following advice without knowing where it has come from or
whose interests it is serving. Wanting peace requires – in fact demands –
a minimum level of clear-sightedness and courage.’²³⁰ He thought that
perspicacity was needed in order to recognise that ‘unilateral pacifism
is not an adequate response to the installation of SS20 missiles, which the
USSR has continued relentlessly to do, even during the Geneva negotia-
tions.’²³¹ While it took courage to recognise that the ideology which
believed that fighting for peace was the same as fighting for Commu-
nism was not acceptable, the people of Europe, if they wanted to retain
their independence, could not allow the USSR to have the right of veto
over their security. In any negotiations with the Soviets, we would have
to defend both peace and liberty ‘if in future we want to remain, not red
rather than dead, but neither red nor dead.’²³²
In June 1984, the first battalion of Pershing II missiles was deployed in Europe, which provoked, from the Soviet Union, a proposal to resume negotiations. When the American missiles became operational, in December 1984, the European Parliament debated a motion for a resolution tabled by Hans-Gert Pöttering, Otto von Habsburg, Erik Blumenfeld, Reinhold Bocklet, Philipp von Bismarck, Egon Klepsch, Jacques Mallet, Pierre Bernard-Reymond, Jean Penders, Lambert Croux, Gustavo Selva and Ioannis Tzounis, on behalf of the EPP Group, on the dialogue on disarmament. That resolution called on the Foreign Ministers ‘to impress on the Governments of the United States of America and the Soviet Union the need to take initiatives without unilateral preconditions so that arms control negotiations begin forthwith between the two superpowers based on the principles of equality, reciprocity and equal rights to security on all present and proposed weapons systems […].’

Towards a common defence

The Euromissile crisis revived the plan for a common European defence system. The EPP Group was the first to emphasise the need for an initiative intended to implement such a policy between the Member States of the Community. ‘For free, democratic States, security policy is synonymous with peace policy. The essence of a security policy lies in dissuading any potential aggressor from starting a military conflict. Without peace there can be neither security nor freedom.’ That was the conclusion of Members of the Group meeting in Florence in 1982 for their Study Days. The European Community had to speak with a single voice at international level. However, since the failure of the Common European Defence (CED), the subject had seemed to be taboo within the European institutions. Parliament had only limited powers when it came to external relations. Members of the EPP Group did not resign themselves to this powerlessness, and considered that ‘by virtue of its election by universal suffrage, the European Parliament is perfectly entitled to discuss such questions, especially their political aspects, which affect the safety and freedom of Europeans.’ They therefore proposed that Parliament should consider the idea of a common European policy which could strengthen the Atlantic Alliance through the creation of a ‘European pillar’. Such cooperation would make it possible to define a coherent strategy towards the USSR and its allies.

Specific measures were taken in this area. For example, at the initiative of Wolfgang Schall, a retired brigadier general and CDU MEP, a ‘Security Intergroup’ was formed, which met informally during each of
Continuing to face up to the soviet threat

the Strasbourg part-sessions, and which consisted of representatives of the EPP Group, the European Democrats and the Liberals. The purpose of this cooperation was to exchange information on each Group's initiatives on security issues, to discuss the relations to be established with the Assembly of the Western European Union, and to monitor the drafting of the general reports submitted to the Political Affairs Committee. At the request of Kai-Uwe von Hassel, and following discussions within the Intergroup, cooperation was established between Members of the European Parliament and Members of the WEU Assembly. An EP/WEU ‘Joint Committee’ was planned.\textsuperscript{288} At the beginning of 1982, the EPP Group called for improvements in European security policy in the following areas\textsuperscript{289}: the harmonisation of the foreign and economic policies of the Community and the United States; participation by the armed forces of the European partners in areas important from the security angle; an increase in the agreed contingents of the European partners in the context of NATO; and support for the disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Since European defence matters could not be openly discussed in the European Parliament – the Community treaties had not yet given it the requisite powers – the Group tackled the question of European defence via the issue of protecting maritime supply lines. By the end of the 1970s, it had become necessary to draw two conclusions. The first of these concerned the increasing ‘decontinentalisation’ of the USSR, thanks to its military intervention powers, which made it capable of taking action in any part of the world, and particularly in the most vulnerable countries of the Third World. The second conclusion was that, after the shock of the first oil crisis in 1973, almost all the oil consumed in the Community was imported by sea.

From the beginning of January 1980 onwards, the French Members of the Groupe, Louise Moreau, Olivier d’Ormesson and André Diligent, kept up the debate within the European Parliament. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the situation in the Middle East, the problem was becoming a matter of urgency. Throughout the first half of 1980, Members of the Group asked oral questions and tabled draft resolutions on the subject.\textsuperscript{290} Once again the split between Left and Right became apparent. The Left did all it could to thwart this initiative, even going so far as to walk out of a plenary sitting so that there would not be the quorum for a vote.\textsuperscript{291} The EPP Group, overcoming new objections on grounds of inadmissibility submitted by the Socialist Group, managed to get André Diligent chosen as rapporteur, and his report was drafted and adopted by the Political Affairs Committee in November 1980.\textsuperscript{292} The report was intended to alert governments to the dangers
that threatened them, to ask them to consult and take joint decisions which would give them the necessary maritime means to safeguard, to the best of their ability, the security of their supplies. It emphasised the impressive increase in power of the Soviet navy over all the oceans of the world, and Moscow’s policy of occupying strategic bases in Africa and the Indian Ocean. Parliament’s resolution invited those Member States which had fleets to coordinate their surveillance operations outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. The motion was unsuccessful, but the debate on European security had finally secured a place in the proceedings of the European Parliament.

In 1984 the European Parliament created a Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament, which allowed it to include these two items on its agenda officially. The EPP did not lose any time in making use of this new forum to relaunch its defence projects. This was particularly true at the plenary sitting of May 1986, when the young German Chairman of the Subcommittee, Hans-Gert Pöttering, put an oral question on European security and defence strategy to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs who were meeting to discuss European political cooperation. Following the debate, Parliament adopted a resolution on a European strategic defence project. It was also thanks to the Subcommittee that the Single European Act included a section on the political and economic aspects of security. The Subcommittee increasingly became the forum that was needed to bridge the gap that made it so difficult for the various groups within the European Parliament to talk to each other about European security policy.
Chapter XX
THE NEW WAVE OF EPP MEMBERS
AFTER THE ELECTIONS
OF JUNE 1984

Failure or success in the elections of 14 and 17 June 1984?

Turnout for the second direct ballot tumbled, but in spite of everything it was still over 50%. The total number of votes for the EPP parties was over 31 million, as opposed to 30 million for the Socialists. The EPP remained the leading political force in Europe, but the lack of representatives from parties close to the EPP in the UK and the absence of a uniform electoral system in the Member States continued to handicap the numerical strength of the Group, which amounted to 110 MEPs (seven seats fewer). By comparison, the Socialist Group had 130 MEPs, thanks to a surge by Labour, which gained 15 new seats. The European Democratic Group, to which the British Conservatives belonged, lost 13 seats, falling from 63 to 50 MEPs. The Liberal Group was reduced from 38 to 31 Members. The Group of the European Democratic Alliance, which included the Gaullists and the Irish Fine Gael party, gained 7 seats, rising from 22 to 29 MEPs. The breakthrough by Jean-Marie Le Pen in France boosted the Technical Group of the European Right (16 MEPs, an increase of 4). Lastly, a new formation appeared on the Left, the Rainbow, which had 20 seats and represented the Green and Ecology movement.

Within the Group, the CDU-CSU remained the largest formation, with 41 seats, followed by the Italian Christian Democrats (DCI) and the Tyrolean Party (26 + 1 seats), slightly down (– 3 seats). The decline in support for the Belgian and Dutch parties (– 4 and – 2) also contributed to the Group’s slight fall in numbers.

Egon Klepsch regains long-term control of the Group

On 18 July, Egon Klepsch again took over as Chairman of the Group, a role which he was not to relinquish until January 1992, when he finally became President of the European Parliament. He was surrounded by five Vice-Chairmen, also elected by secret ballot: the outgoing
Vice-Chairman Willem Vergeer, the Italian Giovanni Giavazzi, Michel Debartiss of France, Panayotis Lambrias of Greece, and Nicolas Estgen of Luxembourg. The Group took over the chairmanship of four parliamentary committees: Heinrich Aigner of Germany continued as Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Control, while Georgios Anastassopoulos of Greece became Chairman of the Committee on Transport, Roberto Formigoni of Italy became Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee, Marlene Lenz of Germany became Chairwoman of the Committee on Women’s Rights, and Teun Tolman of the Netherlands took over as Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development.

**Famous faces join the Group**

Who were the new faces who joined the Group in 1984? The German delegation remained the same, its 25 MEPs having been re-elected. The economist Otmar Franz, who had been elected in 1981, would devote himself, until 1989, to promoting the idea of economic and monetary union. The CSU’s Members included Franz Joseph von Stauffenberg, a lawyer, and the son of the famous military officer who was executed for organising the plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler.

Of the Italian MEPs, Giovanni Giavazzi, a Member since 1979, became Vice-Chairman of the Group, a role in which he demonstrated his interest in economic and institutional affairs. His application and moderation earned him the respect of his colleagues. The same can be said of Ferruccio Pisoni who, having been a non-elected Member from 1972 to 1979, regained his seat in 1984 and kept it until 1994. Pisoni, a specialist in agricultural matters, would go on to succeed his fellow Italian Giovanni Giavazzi as Vice-Chairman of the Group. Three other leading Italian figures made their entrance: Carlo Casini, a magistrate representing Florence, was very involved in the Catholic movements within his party, and was the organiser of the ‘Respect for Life’ movement, becoming a key adviser to some members of the Group during debates on bio-ethical issues, a subject on which he would later be appointed rapporteur on behalf of the Legal Affairs Committee. He would serve as an MEP from 1984 to 1989, and again for the 2004-2009 legislative period. Roberto Formigoni, who was elected in 1984 at the age of 37, was the co-founder, in 1976, of the Popular Movement, a campaigning organisation close to the Vatican, which was influential in Italian Catholic circles. Formigoni served as an MEP until 1993, and was elected President of the Region of Lombardy in 1995. Members of the Group quickly became aware of his senior position within the Italian delegation when he obtained one of the most prestigious positions,
the Chairmanship of the Political Affairs Committee. Finally we must mention Luigi Ciriaco De Mita, who was Director of the DCI from 1982 to 1989. He was a Member of the Group from 1984 to 1988, when he became President of the Italian Council, and then from 1999 to 2004. The role which he had to play in Italy during the years when the weakening of the DCI profoundly changed the political set-up in his country explained why he was more often to be found in Rome than in Strasbourg and Brussels.

The Greek delegation consisted of nine Members, including four former ministers: Ioannis Boutos; Dimitrios Evrigenis, who had for a long time been a judge at the European Court of Human Rights and on that basis was given the job of rapporteur for the Temporary Committee on Racism and Antisemitism which Parliament set up in 1980; Panayotis Lambrias, a journalist and close associate of Konstantinos Karamanlis, who was to remain in the Group until 1999, and became a Vice-President; Georgios Anastassopoulos, also a journalist by profession and a member of the Group for 15 years, who was a very active MEP and, like most of his compatriots, was in love with politics and appeared to understand its most unfathomable mysteries; Efthimios Christodoulou who served as an MEP from 1984 to 1990 and was an active member of the Committee on Budgets. He was appointed to the Greek Government, serving at the Ministry for National Economy from 1990 to 1994, and returned to the Group as head of delegation from 1994 to 1999. He could express himself elegantly in many languages, was one of the Presidents of the Central Bank, and enjoyed a reputation which went far beyond the borders of his own country. Finally, there was Ioannis Tzounis, a former Greek Ambassador to Washington, and Marietta Giannakou who on several occasions served as a minister in Athens, and was Head of the Greek Delegation.

On the Benelux side there were few changes. Petrus Cornelissen returned to the Dutch Delegation and devoted his attention to the transport sector during the three legislative periods in which he served as an MEP, ending in 1999. Belgian Members Raphael Chanterie, representing the Flemish-speaking population, and Gérard Deprez, representing the Francophone population, were both active figures from the time they were elected. Chanterie, who had already been an MEP since 1981, when he replaced Leo Tindemans, remained in the Group until 1999. He was a patient negotiator, and as a Vice-Chairman of the Group he played an active role, under Egon Klepsch, in the many contacts which the Group had with Christian Democrat Commissioners and Members of the European Council, particularly in the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty. Deprez, Chairman of Belgium’s Christian Social
Party, represented francophone Belgium together with Fernand Herman. His talents as an orator in support of his traditional concept of federalist Christian Democracy gave him regular opportunities to speak for the Group during the most crucial debates. He did not follow the majority line adopted by the Group in 2004, which allowed the Party of European Democrats to defend constitutional positions which differed from that of the EPP, and so he left the Group after 20 years of service, and joined the Liberal Group. The Luxembourg Delegation, which again consisted of three MEPs, half of the country’s quota, allowing its Members quite rightly to claim the credit for one of the best success rates in the Group, again included Nicolas Estgen, as well as Marcelle Lentz-Cornette, who would remain until 1989, as would Ernest Mühlen.

The French Delegation remained the same, with nine UDF-CDS Members elected from the UDF-RPR joint list led once again by Simone Veil, which would later be dispersed between the EPP, Liberal and EDA Groups. Dominique Baudis, aged 37 and Mayor of Toulouse, succeeded his father Pierre Baudis, also an MEP and Mayor of the ‘rose city’ during the first legislative period. On several occasions the Group would be given a warm welcome in Toulouse, one of the regional capitals of the south-west and the main headquarters of Airbus. Nicole Fontaine was elected for the first time and would remain a Member until 2002, when she joined the French Government, returning to her place in the Group from 2004 to 2009. Fontaine had distinguished herself in the defence of Catholic education in France before being called to enter politics. In the Group, her strict, hard-working approach gradually earned her the respect of her colleagues. Initially coordinator for the Committee on Youth and Culture, and very active on legal matters, she became a Vice-President of Parliament in 1989 and first Vice-President in June 1994. Her excellent knowledge of conciliation procedures and her uninterrupted progress through Parliament’s Bureau resulted in the German Delegation’s nominating her for election to the Presidency of the European Parliament, a position she would occupy from July 1999 to January 2002 (see Part 3). Michel Debatisse, a farmer from the Auvergne, had been trained by the organisation Jeunesse Agricole Catholique. He became the head of one of the most powerful French farming unions, the FNSEA, then Secretary of State in the Government of Raymond Barre. He also served as Group Treasurer. Enthusiastic and persevering, he was particularly interested in the development of Catholic and democratic dynamics in Africa.
The new wave of EPP members after the elections of June 1984

The European coronation of Pierre Pflimlin as President of the European Parliament on 24 July 1984

Pierre Pflimlin, whose popularity had grown when he served as first Vice-President of Parliament during the previous legislative period, saw his career as a European activist crowned by his election as President on 24 July 1984 in the second ballot, where he gained 221 votes compared with 133 votes for the outgoing President, the Dutch Socialist Pieter Dankert, and 49 votes for Altiero Spinelli, the candidate put forward by the Communist Group. The first words of the new President, who had regained for the EPP Group a position which it had not occupied since the time of Emilio Colombo, were dedicated to his predecessor and spiritual mentor Robert Schuman. While it became clear that Jacques Delors would be a candidate for the next President of the Commission, Pflimlin’s election would ensure that Parliament had authoritative representation when it came to defending its budgetary powers and increasing its legislative responsibilities during the negotiations on the Single European Act.

Pierre Pflimlin was President of the European Parliament until January 1987. He would remain a Member of the Group until the end of his mandate in July 1989, after which he would continue to be active in promoting Europe. The power of his conviction and his skill as an orator were equally effective whether his audience consisted of French or German speakers, and in 1991 he published his ‘Mémoires d’un Européen’ (Memoirs of a European).

Pierre Pflimlin died on 27 June 2000 at the age of 93 in his home city of Strasbourg. A few days later, on 4 July 2000, Hans-Gert Pöttering, who was a close friend of Pflimlin, paid tribute to him in the speech he gave in reply to the French Presidency’s programme: ‘I am grateful to you, [President Chirac], for bringing Pierre Pflimlin and Robert Schuman to mind. […] Last Friday, we paid our last respects to Pierre Pflimlin in the cathedral here in Strasbourg. […] All those present […] were deeply moved. The European flag stood next to Pierre Pflimlin’s coffin, and at the end of the service, which was not a mournful service but one of hope and confidence, the European anthem was played and sung by a choir. If this had been possible a hundred years ago, […] what suffering and misery our European continent would have been spared! […] That is why European unification policy is, in essence, a policy of peace’.

---

a Seven years later, on 9 July 2007, in his role as EP President, Hans-Gert Pöttering inaugurated the Pierre Pflimlin building, which is now an integral part of the European Parliament in Strasbourg.
The speaking time war: ‘prima donnas’ versus ‘backbenchers’

When the new Group was forced to admit that Members’ speaking time during plenary debates was more difficult to apportion than in the non-elected Parliament, mainly because of the massive increase in the number of MEPs, questions started to be asked among the Group’s leadership. Should preference be given to Members who had regularly taken part in the work of the Group, by giving them priority, or should they yield to last-minute requests by ‘prima donnas’, in other words important figures within their own party and country, not often in attendance in Brussels but anxious to appear in their national media? It was difficult not to give in to a request from a national leader or a head of delegation when the debate concerned the President-in-Office, a European Council or an event of international importance. At the same time, however, that was bound to disappoint the ‘backbenchers’, those ordinary Members who had no other qualification than the fact that they had worked hard, often in difficult circumstances, to draft a compromise document with other delegations or other Groups. This dilemma remained unresolved from one legislative period to the next. Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen responsible for parliamentary work attempted to find principled solutions which would not discourage keen parliamentarians. They also had to take into account different national traditions, often linked to the electoral system or the culture of the party in question. For example, Members elected on the basis of national proportional lists, as was the case in France until 2004, or by a preferential voting system like the Italian one, claimed that their presence was required in their own country if they were to have any chance of being re-elected. Others, like the German or British Members, elected on a regional or local basis, were answerable to their voters for the work they did in Brussels and Strasbourg. However, the rule did not apply to everyone. In almost all delegations there were ‘ghost’ MEPs whose colleagues would have had difficulty identifying them at the end of the legislative period. Others, by contrast, who had attended regularly and had invested time and hard work in the Group, enjoyed an influence and a reputation within Parliament which was practically non-existent back home in their own country.

Mid-term adjustments (January 1986 and January 1987)

The composition of Parliament was changed in January 1986 when Spain and Portugal became members of the European Community. The
contacts made by the Group during the process of democratising the two countries had ensured that the Group would be joined by two Spanish regional Christian Democrat parties, the Basque PNV and a fraction of Conversion y Union de Catalunya, as well as the Union of the Democratic Centre. At that time, the head of delegation representing the seven Members of the Spanish Delegation was the Catalan MEP Josep Antoni Duran I Lleida, while the two Portuguese MEPs were represented by Francisco António Lucas Pires, who remained in the Group until 1998. This professor of law at the University of Coimbra, the former Chairman of his party and a respected constitutionalist, was initially a Vice-President of the European Parliament and later devoted himself to institutional work, giving his fellow Group members the benefit of his sharply lucid legal and political analyses. His human warmth, his unflappable humour and his highly cultivated mind made him a very popular figure during the twelve years he was a Member of the Group, a period which was cruelly cut short when he died while still serving as an MEP.

A new Secretary-General: Sergio Guccione (February 1986)

Meanwhile, Giampaolo Bettamio left his post as Secretary-General after having been appointed a Director of the European Parliament in February 1986. He was replaced by Sergio Guccione.

Guccione was born in Sicily, where he spent his childhood years while Italy was experiencing the hardships of World War II. He studied law at the University of Palermo, and in Cologne, where he learned German and specialised in budgetary policies. In 1962 he started working for the European Parliament in Luxembourg, where he integrated the running of the parliamentary committees and came to the notice of the EPP Members of the Budgetary Committee. As Director in the Committee on Budgets, he gained an extensive knowledge of Parliament as an institution. ‘Budgetary power was our first real power. In effect, it was Parliament’s responsibility to draw up the budget. The amendments were fundamental. An amendment which expresses an opinion is something which has always been highly valuable, but an amendment which determines the figures, the sums, and which sets priorities and allocates those sums accordingly, carries enormous weight.’

Egon Klepsch knew him well and liked him. He arranged for him to be seconded to the Group, and the Chairman and his new Secretary-

---

a In January 2009, Parliament’s Bureau decided to pay tribute to Francisco Lucas Pires by naming the Parliament’s Library (Reading Room) in Brussels after him.

b Interview on 19 May 2008 in Luxembourg.

c Sergio Guccione was deeply impressed by his collaboration with the former Group
General, who also enjoyed the confidence of the Italian Delegation, worked together for six years. In January 1991 Guccione rejoined the administration as Director-General for Information.

The structure of the Group’s Secretariat also had to be adapted to fit the new distribution of tasks between MEPs. The section dealing with parliamentary work was placed under the control of Gerhard Guckenberger, who was promoted to Deputy Secretary-General, and working groups A, B, C and D (Hans Reh, Stefan Pfitzner, Jan Westenbroek and Riccardo Ribera d’Alcala) each had ten or so Members who mainly served on the committees. Committees with different north-south sensitivities, such as the Committee on Agriculture, were now entrusted to two advisers, in that particular case the Italian Franco Sestito and the German Werner Krögel. The Press Service now consisted of one adviser per national delegation.

Chairman. ‘Egon Klepsch possessed intuition in politics. In that area he really taught me everything I know (...) He was one of a kind in every field. He always managed to be there, which would not have been technically possible, for example, for someone who came, as I did, from the far South. He had to be there, at every meeting. He really was a great worker.’ Interview on 19 May 2008 in Luxembourg.

a Riccardo Ribera d’Alcala, originally from Naples like Paolo Barbi, entered the Group’s Secretariat in 1982 and continued his career in the cabinets of EP Presidents Egon Klepsch, Nicole Fontaine and Pat Cox. In the meantime he had rejoined the Group from 1994 to 1999 and was appointed Deputy Secretary-General from 1998 to 1999. In December 2008, Ribera d’Alcala was confirmed as Director-General of the Internal Policy DG, a post previously occupied by Klaus Welle.
Chapter XXI

‘In order to achieve this great internal market we have to start from one fundamental given: there is essentially nothing that separates us, nothing that prevents us from uniting in an area where the free movement of goods, people, services and capital is guaranteed.’

Leo Tindemans

A favourable political context (June-July 1984)

A few days after the election of the new European Parliament, the European Council met in Fontainebleau on 25 and 26 June 1984. It agreed to some of Parliament’s initiative, but refused the principle of a new treaty. It was decided to set up two working parties. The first of these, known as the ‘Spaak Committee II’ or ‘Spaak 2’, whose name was an explicit reference to the role of the former Belgian Prime Minister in drafting the Treaties of Rome, would have the task of making proposals to improve the operation of European cooperation in the Community field and in the field of political cooperation. The second committee, ‘The People’s Europe’, would be responsible for identifying a whole series of specific and precise measures enabling the citizens of the Community to gain a better understanding of the needs of such an evolution.

The Spaak Committee II consisted of personal representatives of the Heads of State or Government. It was formed during the second half of 1984 during the Irish Presidency, which appointed as its head the Irish Senator James Dooge, a former Minister for Foreign Affairs and special representative of the Prime Minister, Garret Fitzgerald.

Although he was not authorised to take part in the work, Pierre Pflimlin, who had just been elected as President of the European Parliament, put constant pressure on the Dooge Committee and on the Council. This continuous monitoring, which the EPP Group supported, was formally reflected in a number of resolutions adopted during the course
of the 1984-1985 Parliamentary year, which gave rise to regular debates in the House. President Pflimlin spoke several times to the Council to request it to follow some of the Committee’s recommendations, while Parliament’s Enlarged Bureau was to meet in Milan\(^\text{300}\) when the Council examined the results of the Committee’s work.

Parliament’s requests were in line with the EPP Group’s concerns, namely that an intergovernmental conference should be convened as soon as possible in order to implement the desired institutional reforms and strengthen Parliament’s role in the Community decision-making process in accordance with the spirit of the Spinelli draft treaty.

On 17 April 1985, Parliament adopted the Croux report on the European Parliament’s position on the deliberations of the European Council on European Union\(^\text{301}\), in which it once again asked the Milan European Council to convene an intergovernmental conference. MEPs insisted that such a conference should draw on the spirit and the method of the draft Union Treaty prepared by Parliament, the report by the Dooge Committee and the acquis communautaire.\(^\text{302}\) ‘The conference should examine this document and propose modifications where it considers them necessary, involving Parliament in this process, as indeed the Dooge Committee proposes.’\(^\text{303}\)

Christian Democrat leaders meeting in Rome on 19-20 June 1985 thought that the Milan meeting of the European Council should take ‘irreversible decisions leading to European union, and should convene the intergovernmental conference, which would have a precise mandate to implement those decisions.’\(^\text{304}\) That conference, in which the President of the European Parliament should participate, should complete its work during the course of that same year in order to enable integration to continue.

**The ‘Kangaroo Group’ gives momentum to the Internal Market**

The Treaty of Rome provided for the creation, by 1 January 1970, of a common market featuring the introduction of the ‘four freedoms’ (freedom of movement of persons, goods, capital and services), of a customs union between Member States, and of a single competition policy.

Yet anti-competitive and protectionist practices continued to exist, mainly in the goods and services sectors, fragmenting the common market by physical, technical, fiscal and administrative barriers.

At the beginning of the 1980s, a number of economic and political factors led to renewed interest in the plan for a common market from both Member States and Community institutions.
Towards the single act and the great internal market – the ‘1992 objective’

Firstly, the internal market was becoming a necessity because of intense international competition, which was the result of both globalisation and the economic crisis affecting Europe since the two oil crises of 1973 and 1979. In a more competitive international environment, with the emergence of the developing countries, the single market was essential, as a realistic and reliable solution to make European products and services more competitive, to relaunch the economies of Member States and to put an end to the crisis. As the French MEP and former Prime Minister Raymond Barre emphasised in 1987: ‘An open society rejects isolation and protectionism. It uses all its resources, and above all its resources of intelligence, innovation and spirit of enterprise, to ensure that it is fully involved in international trade in manpower, goods, services and capital, and derives from this factors of economic and human progress. Ultimately, openness to Europe, which is actually openness to the world, will be what drives our development in decades to come.’

Later, the internal market became a response to the modernisation of the European economy, which was moving towards the services sector, and to new concerns such as environmental protection or consumer welfare.

At the same time, an informal group was created at the instigation of the British MEP Basil De Ferranti and his German counterpart Karl von Wogau, member of the EPP Group. The aim of this group was to increase Europe’s economic potential and develop intra-Community trade through the completion of the internal market. The group was known as the ‘Kangaroo Group’ owing to the kangaroo’s ability to jump and therefore, symbolically, to leap over national boundaries. Von Wogau, De Ferranti and the German Socialist Dieter Rogalla were the leaders of this group, which met on the fringe of Parliament’s sittings, regularly welcomed senior political figures as its guests and exercised political and technical pressure, calling for the abolition of border controls and the completion of the internal market.

The EPP Group also called for the abolition of intra-Community borders, in its Declaration of Aix-la-Chapelle on 6 May 1982. It deplored the fact that a European passport had been created, yet checks on people at borders had still not been abolished.

Within the European Parliament, the EPP Group vigorously supported the relaunching of the internal market project. Fernand Herman, a member of the Temporary Parliamentary Committee on the European economic relaunch, argued in favour of ‘more Europe, more investment and more research’. During the debate, Karl von Wogau submitted to the Committee, on behalf of the Group, an oral question
on the proposals made by Fernand Herman. He pointed out the demand for the creation of the internal market and, in that context, the abolition of border controls by 1989. The EPP Group’s proposals placed particular emphasis on measures relating to a Europe of citizens, the abolition of bureaucratic barriers, and the creation of jobs.

On 9 April 1984, the European Parliament adopted the report by von Wogau on the need to create the internal market. Giving estimates of the costs created by maintaining customs barriers within the common market was an excellent way of making people aware of the need for the internal market. Thus the report emphasised the fact that European businesses could save ECU 12 billion if the internal market became effective. The most striking example was the long queues of lorries waiting at borders because of having to go through customs inspections, which were costing the European economy about ECU 500 million a year.

The report put the following question quite plainly: Would Europe be in a position to meet the great challenge of globalisation and to cope with stagnation and unemployment? The rapporteurs noted that an integrated internal market was an essential framework for facilitating innovation, creativity and initiative, and that the formation of a vast internal market was not an objective in itself, but rather a means at our disposal, providing our political will with a framework for taking action to meet the challenges we know we face. They said that this was a suitable framework for the industrial strategies developed by the European institutions, but there still needed to be a common willingness to take action.

The report supported specific measures such as the creation of a uniform document for export, transit and import within the Community, which would replace the existing documents. It also argued in favour of the creation of a common customs code and wanted VAT rates to be approximated rather than harmonised. Finally, it recommended the development of European standards and the creation of a European patent.

The report was in line with the Group’s views on the internal market, i.e. that we should seek a realistic and pragmatic approach which did not handicap producers and industrialists, and that it was desirable to make practical and tangible progress which the public could actually see. This approach was taken up by Danish MEP Poul Møller, who explained, during the debate on the report, that, ‘it is the Europe of the citizens which we should continue to work on’.

On 24 July 1984, the European Parliament adopted the resolution tabled by Karl von Wogau on behalf of the EPP Group on the Fontainebleau European Council’s decisions. It invited the Council to complete
the internal market and to develop the ecu into a parallel European monetary unit.

**The Commission’s white paper – the document that founded the internal market**

On 14 January 1985, Jacques Delors, the new President of the Commission, gave a speech to the European Parliament on the new Commission guidelines. He spoke of his desire to complete the internal market and proposed 1992 as the target date, which was warmly welcomed by Parliament.

In March 1985 the European Council, meeting in Brussels, formally adopted the Commission’s proposal. In May of that year it decided on the definitive application of the principle of the mutual recognition of national standards. The Council gave the Commission the task of drawing up a programme and a timetable for bringing the internal market into operation. Thus, in a few months, the European Council gave the green light to a whole series of proposals which formed the basis for the internal market programme. This political willingness allowed the Commission to begin the technical work of implementing that programme.

The Group’s Study Days in Luxembourg, from 28 to 31 May 1985, were largely devoted to the economic relaunch and the internal market. During the discussions, Emilio Colombo reaffirmed that, ‘Overcoming the current economic difficulties should provide Europe with the chance to revitalise its cohesion and boost its political identity’.

Karl von Wogau devoted his speech to the decision-making process within the internal market and said that he was very much in favour of switching to qualified majority voting in the Council, the aim being to prevent delays and bureaucratic texts.

The European Commission published its ‘White Paper on completing the internal market’ on 14 June 1985. Drafted by Lord Cockfield, the Commission Vice-President responsible for the internal market, and with the support of the German Christian Democrat Commissioner Karl-Heinz Narjes, who was responsible for industrial policy, research and innovation, the White Paper consisted of a detailed legislative programme for 1992, and made provision for 300 measures to create the ‘internal market, a space without borders’. This document also laid down a definitive and binding timetable ending in 1992.

Three categories of obstacles to freedom of movement were identified: physical barriers, technical barriers and, finally, fiscal barriers. Precise and practical measures were proposed with a view to abolishing them.
On 12 June 1985 a debate took place in the European Parliament on the report on the internal market. The report, prepared by British MEP Ben Patterson, was in favour of abolishing borders, developing common technical and legal standards for industry and trade and, finally, drawing up common policies on transport and external trade.313

Karl von Wogau listed the conditions for the creation of a great internal market. ‘Our aim is to create an open common market by the year 1992; [...] In my view it is particularly important for us to create a common market for advanced technologies, with common standards, mutual recognition of certificates, the continued development of the European patent, the development of a European trade mark law and a Europe-wide procurement, because that is a prerequisite if small and medium undertakings, which are particularly innovative and do create more jobs than anyone else, are to be able to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the wider market from the beginning.’314

The Frenchman Jean-Pierre Abelin, spokesman for the EPP Group, then emphasised that the question of the internal market should be dealt with in the context of the Community in the wider sense, taking into account a strengthened regional policy, consolidated monetary stability and a more clearly stated convergence between economic policies: ‘[…] there are no internal markets without external frontiers and without a real commercial policy vis-à-vis the outside world, otherwise the advances we wish to see might result in greater penetration from without and a weakening of this Community, which would thus rapidly become a soulless free-trade area’.315

The members of the EPP Group were emphatic that all the measures to be taken required a timetable, a method and a viable decision-making procedure. A precise timetable ought to make it possible to avoid certain decisions being put off indefinitely. The method of adopting measures in ‘packages’ would allow proposals to be grouped together, so that agreements could be reached more easily on the basis of reciprocal concessions. As for the decision-making process, qualified-majority voting ought to become the rule.

The European Council in Milan: a victory for Europeans (June 1985)

When the Heads of State and Government met in Milan on 28 and 29 June 1985, they found on the negotiating table, besides the final report of the Dooge Committee,316 the draft Treaty on European Union submitted by Parliament and the report by the Adonnino Committee. In addition to these three documents there was also the White Paper
on completing the internal market and the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration.

Lord Cockfield’s White Paper was adopted. The Heads of State and Government gave their formal agreement to the timetable drawn up and the priorities proposed. The Council of Ministers was then invited to study the institutional conditions which would guarantee the success of the internal market, the aim being to overcome existing obstacles in the Community decision-making process. The institutional discussions would of course be based on the proposals contained in the Dooge Report.

The general wording of the Dooge Report was ambitious, close to the most federalist aspirations of the time, and proposed a number of innovations, both in the institutional domain and in the powers of the future Union. However, the reservations expressed by several members of the Committee on specific points were actually slightly retrograde steps.

The European Council decided to convene an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), despite opposition from the United Kingdom, Greece and Denmark. For the first time, thanks to the insistence of Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, the European Council took a decision by a majority vote. The aim of the mandate given to the IGC was to draw up a treaty on a common foreign and security policy, and to examine the amendments to the EEC Treaty which would be necessary in order to make the institutional changes concerning the Council’s decision-making processes, the executive powers of the Commission, the powers of the European Parliament and the expansion to include new areas of activity.

In the resolution adopted on 9 July 1985 by its Committee on Institutional Affairs on the convening of the conference, Parliament welcomed the organisation of the conference, which would have the task of studying institutional reform. However, it deplored the lack of consistency in the procedure for amending the Treaties, the absence of any draft of a new treaty on political cooperation, and the absence of the reforms necessary to complete the internal market and create a Europe of technology.317

Egon Klepsch summed up the results of the Milan Summit: ‘We consider that Milan signals a new phase of Community politics. There is no doubt that we would have wished for a clearer mandate for the intergovernmental conference than we in fact got. But on the other hand we concede that Milan revealed a determination to take decisions, and what this Community urgently needs is decisions. We may not agree with all of them, but without them the Community is likely to wither and die’.318
In spite of everything, the way ahead to the Single Act was now clear.

**The EPP Group decides to make the best of the Single European Act (February 1986)**

The Intergovernmental Conference to revise the Community treaties opened in Luxembourg on 9 September 1985. The debate on institutional reform was bound to be difficult, owing to the disagreement expressed by Member States. However, the Commission found a solution, a way of avoiding quarrels, by proposing a precise objective, the completion of the internal market (the White Paper drafted by Lord Cockfield). The issue of institutional reform was tackled in relation to this economic objective. The prospect of a single market was of great interest to the UK and Denmark, so those two Member States could hardly oppose the reforms necessary for achieving it.

Those who took part in the Conference agreed on the principle of modifying the institutions of the Community so as to improve its operation and expand its areas of responsibility. Plans were made to extend majority voting so as to achieve a great European single market by the end of 1992, to increase the scope of Community competence, to increase the powers of the European Parliament and to give legal form to cooperation on foreign policy.

The European Parliament resolution of 12 December 1985 represented the final attempt to influence the course of the negotiations. Parliament considered that the outcome was inadequate compared with the Spinelli draft treaty. It recommended a series of amendments to the Council of Ministers, and reserved its final opinion.319

At the plenary sitting, Egon Klepsch emphasised that it was important to establish ‘that work has begun on more intensive reforms in the matter of extending the powers of the European Community and that an effort is being made to tighten up the decision-making process. But we are also agreed that political imperatives and objective necessity demand considerably more than what has been decided now’. On the subject of Parliament’s powers, he found that insufficient progress had been achieved, and said ‘… we are convinced that we have to win the battle against the bureaucracy of the Council in order to introduce democratic controls for the sake of our citizens’.320

When Parliament adopted its resolution on the results of the Luxembourg Summit, on 16 January 1986, it made its reservations clear: ‘... the Single Act can produce only modest progress in certain spheres of Community activity, and [...] it is very far from constituting the genuine reform
Towards the single act and the great internal market – the ‘1992 objective’

of the Community [...]’. The EPP Group fully supported this resolution.

Taking the floor on behalf of the EPP Group, Jean Penders concluded, with regard to the results of the IGC, ‘It was certainly not the “quantum jump” which one member of the Netherlands government [...] chose to call it [...]’. There is a perfect phrase in English: “We take note”. We are not over the moon, but we will try and make the best of it’.322

Entirely in line with the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart and the European Parliament’s Draft Treaty on European Union, the Single European Act clearly expressed the its signatories’ desire to progress towards European union, which is referred to in its preamble and in Article 1.

The Single Act, signed on 17 February 1986 in Luxembourg, was the first intergovernmental text to recognise Europe’s parliamentary institution under the name ‘the European Parliament’, although it had been known by that name since 1962. Now that Parliament finally had a legitimate form, it also started to become more legitimate, albeit to a modest degree, in its primary function as a parliament, i.e. its legislative function.

The new procedure, known as ‘co-operation’, enabled Parliament to participate in the process of forming European law. In the wording of the text, the co-operation procedure includes the consultation procedure, involving the submission of a Commission proposal to the Council, the latter taking its decision after obtaining Parliament’s opinion. However, all the Council does is to ‘adopt a common position’ which it communicates to the European Parliament. That is the beginning of Parliament’s second reading process. At the time of the transfer, the emphasis is placed on informing Parliament as to the reasons for the joint position adopted by the Council and any amendments which the Commission may have made to its proposal during the first reading. Parliament’s second reading is subject to a time limit of three months, during which time MEPs may approve the common position or not give an opinion on it. In both cases, the Council ‘definitely adopts the act in question’. Parliament may also reject the common position, in which case the Council has one month in which to take a unanimous second-reading decision. Finally, as an intermediate solution, Parliament may propose amendments to the Commission’s proposal, in which case the latter has to re-examine its amended proposal within one month, at the end of which time it resubmits its proposal to the Council, together with the amendments which it has decided not to include. If the Council still wants to adopt those amendments, or to amend the re-examined proposal further, it has to take a unanimous
decision to that effect. The re-examined proposal is adopted by a qualified majority.

The EPP Group’s increasing commitment to the ‘1992 Objective’

The Single Act came into force in July 1987. It was the first major change to the Treaty of Rome. In addition to its institutional provisions, it mainly incorporated the idea of a single market and the programme that was designed to achieve it by 1992. The Single Act identified the internal market as one of the objectives pursued by ‘European construction’ and defined it as ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’. It set out major guiding principles, such as competition, cooperation and solidarity. The target date of 31 December 1992 for the completion of the single market became official, and demonstrated the Community’s political willingness and commitment to achieving the successful completion of the project.

The European Parliament immediately became involved in work on the completion of the internal market. A Temporary Committee on the success of the Single Act was given the task of drawing up an opinion on the Commission Communication ‘Making a success of the Single Act: a new frontier for Europe’. Karl von Wogau was appointed rapporteur, and he and the Spanish MEP Enrique Barón Crespo presented it to other Members on 13 May 1987.

In March 1988 the European Commission published a study by a group of independent experts entitled ‘Europe 1992 - The Overall Challenge’. The purpose of this study, generally known as the Cecchini” Report, was to evaluate ‘the cost of non-Europe’ and the advantages of the single market. It evaluated the benefits of the internal market at five points of additional growth and the creation of five million new jobs within the Community. It also took into account various political considerations which could result from the completion of the single market. The management of a vast economic area without borders required a new decision-making capacity at Community level which could lead to the Commission becoming an embryonic government. This opinion was shared by Parliament and the Commission.

The European Parliament and the EPP Group in particular supported increased powers for the Commission, but also for Parliament itself. MEPs also examined the institutional implications of the cost of non-Europe and the consequences of completing the internal market, on 15 June 1988.
The report established that the implementation of the Single Act would make it possible to achieve considerable savings (ECU 170 billion a year). It encouraged MEPs to ensure that the process did not become bogged down in red tape, and considered that this would require a tendency towards greater transparency in the decision-making process.

During the debate, Lambert Croux submitted an oral question on behalf of the EPP Group, and emphasised that, ‘... when we complete the internal market, the qualitative change in our Community will cover practically all fields of policy, political, social, economic and even, partly, cultural. Even political-cum-institutional changes will push to the forefront and we shall have to set up a European government [...] I think too [...] that the time has come when the Commission should be presided over by a person who has been able to appoint his own commissioners, in consultation with the governments and the parliaments, with the assent of this Parliament’.

On 27 June 1988, at the European Council meeting in Hanover, the Heads of State and Government made the completion of the internal market one of the Community’s priorities. In their conclusions they emphasised that the creation of the internal market should go hand in hand with the protection of the environment, the creation of a Europe of citizens and a social Europe, and the creation of monetary union. The Europe of citizens would involve removing all obstacles to the free movement of persons, while at the same time guaranteeing internal security. As for the social Europe, that would aim to ensure that everyone benefited from the advantages of the internal market.

In addition, the Council expressed its satisfaction with the progress made towards the creation of the internal market. It welcomed the decisions taken in strategic areas such as the complete liberalisation of capital movements, the reciprocal recognition of qualifications, the opening up of public procurement, insurance and air and road transport. This progress had been possible thanks to ‘the full use of the voting procedures laid down in the Single Act’.

Following the Council meeting, the EPP Group welcomed the outcome, and felt that the new decision-making structures had enabled rapid progress to be made towards the implementation of the White Paper. As far as the Group was concerned, this was another example of ‘the dynamism of interdependence based on real fellowship, so dear to Jean Monnet’.

---

a The rapporteur gives a very specific example: a family of four would benefit to the tune of between ECU 2 000 and 3 000 per year.
The internal market: by and large a success story

Thanks to the Single Act, Parliament now had more scope to put pressure on the Commission and the Council and influence the decision-making process. The annual reports of the Economic, Monetary and Industrial Committee on the completion of the internal market enabled Parliament to monitor the implementation of the White Paper and to support the measures which it regarded as a matter of priority.

One example was the report by Karl von Wogau, adopted on 16 May 1991, which deplored the lack of progress on the social Europe and internal security following the opening up of the Community’s internal borders. However, the report highlighted Parliament’s influence, pointing out with satisfaction that over 50 % of the amendments proposed by the European Parliament had been adopted, directly or indirectly, by the Council.333

The last report on the completion of the internal market, prepared by Ben Patterson, was adopted on 18 December 1992, a few days before the end of the time limit. It emphasised that the work was far from being finished, particularly as regards the harmonisation of VAT rates, company taxation, air cabotage, and the Community trademark and patent systems. The second problem which Patterson identified was the rate at which legislation was transposed into Member States’ national law. The report invited the Commission to use all the means at its disposal to compel Member States to remedy this situation. The European Parliament even went so far as to threaten the Commission with the prospect of an action for failure to meet its obligations unless it dealt more firmly with Member States.334

While all this was going on, the EPP Group and Parliament’s Economic, Monetary and Industrial Committee were behind a number of resolutions demanding that the time limit be adhered to and recommending the adoption of measures concerning freedom of movement of persons, European citizenship and the fiscal harmonisation required in order to abolish physical borders.335

The other institution whose decision-making process was greatly changed by the Single Act was the Council itself. Many of the decisions taken in order to implement the common market were now taken by a qualified majority: the Common Customs Tariff, freedom to provide services, the free movement of capital and the approximation of national laws.

On the other hand, unanimous voting was retained for tax matters and matters concerning freedom of movement for persons and employees’ interests and rights. Member States wanted to keep their sovereignty
over these sensitive subjects. This was a cause for regret as far as the EPP Group was concerned, since it had supported switching to qualified-majority voting for all the measures set out in the White Paper.

However, about two thirds of the measures set out in the White Paper were able to be adopted by a qualified majority, which considerably facilitated and speeded up the ‘1992 Programme’.

The Single European Act, by expanding the areas in which the Community could intervene, created a new dynamic. Regional policy, social policy, environmental policy and transport policy all received special attention in the context of the completion of the internal market. The removal of obstacles to freedom of movement, planned for 1993, ought to make it possible to improve living conditions throughout the Community. It was vital that the opening up of borders should be backed up by a series of measures to reduce disparities in development at social and regional level. The solidarity policies were thus intended to support the completion of the internal market and to correct any imbalances by means of structural measures.

The Commission, which was seeking to reform the Community’s structural intervention, proposed that the amount of budgetary resources devoted to achieving the Structural Fund objectives should be doubled by 1992.

The Structural Funds were the instruments intended to enable the implementation of cohesion policy. According to Panayotis Lambrias, they should help to improve social and economic structures within the Community and should be used to achieve the objectives which the Community had set itself as part of its overall development policy. Thus it was that the Community’s structural policy underwent a fundamental reform in 1988.

Thanks to that reform, over ECU 60 billion were set aside to strengthen economic and social solidarity. At the EPP Group’s Study Days in Galway, Egon Klepsch welcomed this decision, saying that ‘the Community has succeeded in making the decisive breakthrough towards a Community of solidarity’.

The second reform of the Structural Funds started in 1992. The European Council, meeting in Edinburgh on 11-12 December 1992, decided to increase the financial resources devoted to regional policy.
Chapter XXII
A EUROPE OF SYMBOLS
AND CITIZENS – FROM
THE ADONNINO COMMITTEE (1984)
TO THE MAASTRICHT TREATY (1992)

The twelve stars of Alexander and Beethoven’s Ninth

On 29 May 1986, in front of the European Commission building in Brussels, twelve golden stars on a blue background rose slowly into the air. After thirty years of existence, Europe had finally adopted a single symbol, whatever the institution. Among the officials who had come to listen to Beethoven’s ‘Ode to Joy’ were of course Jacques Delors, the new President of the Commission, and Pierre Pflimlin, the President of the European Parliament. It was mainly thanks to him that we now had this flag ‘of noble simplicity’. According to Mr Pflimlin, the European ideal had sometimes been hidden by each European institution’s tendency to emphasise its ‘difference’ from the other institutions by opposing them. The European Community, in particular, had suffered all too often as a result of disputes between its three main components, the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the European Parliament. Such disputes, he said, were hardly of interest to public opinion, and yet they damaged Europe’s image. It was important, said Mr Pflimlin, to have a single flag for all the European institutions. The oldest European institution, the Council of Europe, had chosen as its flag twelve gold stars on a blue background. Each of the other institutions had inserted a specific symbol into that flag. The European Parliament, for example, had used the letters ‘EP-PE’ surrounded by oak leaves. and it was only with great difficulty that Mr Pflimlin, following a resolution adopted by Parliament, had managed to persuade the Bureau to give up this symbol.337

‘The People’s Europe’, an important idea since the 1970s and the report on European union by Leo Tindemans, gradually became a political objective during the 1980s, as the signing of the Maastricht Treaty came nearer. The Fontainebleau Council in June 1984 created a Committee consisting of the personal representatives of the Heads of State and Government, which was given the task of drafting a set of
proposals on this subject by the end of the first half of 1985. In what was the first specific Community action in this field, the Committee prepared and coordinated initiatives designed to strengthen the identity and image of the Community in the minds of its citizens and of the world in general. It studied the measures which would be needed to ensure the free movement of goods and to facilitate formalities for the free movement of persons and the mutual recognition of qualifications. It was also given the task of examining symbolic instruments: a flag and a European anthem, the harmonisation of border posts, and the minting of a European currency, the ecu. Its Chairman, Pietro Adonnino, a former member of the EPP Group, submitted the final report to the Milan Council twelve months later. The report studied how to simplify the rules hampering the free movement of Community citizens and the extension of their rights. It contained proposals on special citizens’ rights, culture and communication, information, youth, education, exchanges and sport, health, social security, twinning schemes, and the strengthening of the Community’s image and identity.

Let Europe become a tangible reality

To a large extent this report reflected the demands of the EPP Group. It put forward numerous proposals which sought to improve citizens’ participation in Community life, including the free movement of citizens, the abolition or simplification of passport controls, the introduction of a European passport and, looking further ahead, what would eventually become the Delors proposals on the creation of a ‘Europe without frontiers’ in 1992. The proposals also covered taxation applicable to cross-border workers, the mutual recognition of diplomas and professional qualifications, and the creation of a general right of residence. The report recognised that measures concerning the free movement of persons would give rise to fewer reservations if they were the result of the implementation of the internal market.

However, although the Group was satisfied with the report of the Adonnino Committee, its Chairman Egon Klepsch pointed out that the European Parliament must not be left out of things. ‘To try to bring progress to the Community through intergovernmental committees, ad hoc working parties or suchlike in which only the national bureaucrats call the tune again, is to build Europe on sandy ground.’ He hoped ‘that the people’s Europe will receive more than the excellent written basis provided by the Adonnino report, and that concrete measures will also be taken’. The EPP Group made sure that this declaration of intent did not go unheeded, and it fell to Elmar Brok to express Parliament’s
opinion on the recommendations of the Adonnino Committee. During the plenary sitting in November 1985, Parliament adopted the ‘People’s Europe’ reports, i.e. the Brok report on a people’s Europe and the first report by Nicole Fontaine on the proposed directive on recognition of higher education diplomas.342

Parliament also dealt with the question of voting rights and eligibility to stand in municipal and European elections, for citizens of a Member State other than the one in which they are resident. The Brok report supported the measures proposed by the Adonnino Committee and accused the Council of not having implemented them quickly enough. In order for Europe to become a tangible reality, the report included a large number of detailed proposals on special rights for citizens, culture, communications and information, youth, education, exchanges and sport, freedom of movement for citizens, the free movement of goods and capital, the environment, health, drugs and social security.343

Werner Münch, the Group’s coordinator in the Committee on Youth and Culture, emphasised the need for European identity and awareness. ‘The people do not want obstacles, barriers, forms, taxes, controls and conflicts. The people certainly do not want stagnation and resignation. The people of Europe want encouragement for an idea. They want to be helped to acquire a stronger sense of Europe, they want more opportunities to accept and identify with Europe and they want the way paved for visions and real Utopias. Aside from all the individual political issues, what is decisive in the end is the people’s participation in the political decision-making in the Community, for at the basis of a democratic constitutional Europe lies the implementation of the principle of the division of powers [...]’.344

The abolition of border controls

Just one month after the submission of the Adonnino Committee’s report, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights submitted its report on the Commission’s proposal on simplifying the controls and formalities applicable to citizens of Member States when crossing intra-Community borders. The report emphasised that the aim of Community action at internal borders should be the abolition, rather than simplification, of passport controls.345 The most important proposals were concerned with indirect taxation, plant health and statistical inspections, and the abolition of the single administrative document required by customs.346

Liberalisation within the Community required adequate surveillance at its external borders. It would be the Schengen Agreement which
would lead to the abolition of all controls at the borders of signatory Member States with effect from 1 January 1993. These controls were transferred to the external borders of the Schengen area, and plans were made for a common policy on visas and asylum rights.

For the EPP Group, freedom of movement of persons had always been linked to the question of internal security. The Malangrè report of 10 September 1992 on the free movement of persons and security within the European Community emphasised the need not to delay, on any pretext, the opening up of the borders on 1 January 1993, to study in detail the creation of a Community police force to combat international organised crime, and to respect human rights and international obligations in all proposals concerning asylum rights.347

Exchange visits for young people

The frontier-free area provided new opportunities for young Europeans. Through its special programmes, the Community provided professional training, either initial or continuing, mobility for students and teachers throughout Europe, the academic recognition of studies carried out in another Member State, transnational cooperation between higher education and businesses, and language learning. The number of Community programmes and the budgets allocated to them increased year by year.

The excellent mutual understanding brought about by young people’s exchanges was something that EPP Group MEPs had been calling for since the early 1980s when, thanks to the initiative by Reinhold Bocklet, money from the Community budget was for the first time earmarked for exchange visits between young people.348 EPP Group MEPs all supported the exchange programmes and called for them to have adequate funding. Nicole Fontaine was the rapporteur for the ‘YES TO EUROPE’ programme (an action programme seeking to promote exchange visits for young people),349 Mary Elizabeth Banotti acted as rapporteur for the PETRA programme350 and Arie Oostlander for the TEMPUS programme.351 Anna Hermans was appointed rapporteur for the European dimension at university level.352 Werner Münch was a supporter of teacher mobility.353 By a unanimous vote of the EPP Group, it was proposed to extend the framework of the ERASMUS programme

---

a The main programmes were: PETRA (young people in initial training and training managers), FORCE (continuing training), COMETT (cooperation between higher education and enterprises), ERASMUS (mobility of students in higher education), YOUTH FOR EUROPE (exchange visits for young people aged 15 to 25), LINGUA (language training), TEMPUS (university cooperation with Central Europe).
to include primary and secondary education – the Herman report on education and training policy for the 1993 horizon.\textsuperscript{354}

**European citizenship**

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 confirmed European governments’ commitment to give increasing importance to the idea of a people’s Europe. The greatest innovation in the Treaty would be the introduction of citizenship, to be granted to all persons having the nationality of a Member State. European citizenship conferred special rights derived from membership of the Community, which would be in addition to the rights and obligations linked to the status of a national of a Member State. European citizens would have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of Member States, the right to vote and to be eligible to stand in municipal and European Parliament elections in a Member State in which they were resident but of which they were not nationals, and the right to protection from the diplomatic and consular authorities of all Member States in the territory of a third country. In order to defend the rights which they would derive from the new Treaty, a citizen of the Union would have the right to submit petitions to the European Parliament, and could make complaints to the newly created European Ombudsman concerning cases of maladministration in the activities of the Community institutions or bodies.

However, the right of petition was not really anything new. Since 1953, it had been possible for any European citizen to submit petitions to Parliament under certain provisions of its Rules of Procedure. So the introduction of the right of petition by the Maastricht Treaty merely formally sanctioned a right which Parliament had guaranteed since 1987.\textsuperscript{355}

Citizenship can only exist in the context of rights and fundamental freedoms for everyone, both as individuals, but also as members of social groups. Citizenship is not, therefore, set up as a privilege, but rather as an element of belonging to a community which forms part of a guarantee given to everyone that the rights and dignity of human beings will be protected. This idea, which originates from Christian thinking, was referred to in the first Bindi Report on Union citizenship. ‘Citizenship is a decisive factor for the determination of the nature of the Union that we are building. […] The citizens, along with Member States, must play an important part, including the law-making side, in the building of the Community. A treaty between sovereign states is no longer sufficient. Instead, it is essential for the Union to be founded also on the decisive presence of the citizens: the Union cannot be an essentially
bureaucratic structure, it must develop an essential democratic element.  

Parliament’s Committee on Institutional Affairs drafted the final Bindi Report on Union citizenship, and it was approved on 21 November 1991. The report set out proposals regarding the articles to be inserted in the Treaty on European Union on the subject of citizenship. The definition of citizenship constituted an essential and unifying element of the European Union, because the Union must be based not only on the relationship between Member States but also on the relationship between citizens. There had been requests for the definition of a real citizens’ statute, which would make it easier for them to fulfil their obligations, and which would above all guarantee and strengthen their rights. The aim was to present citizenship as the basis of the Community’s political power. The very legitimacy of the Community emanates from its citizens, and their exercising of power determines the Community’s fundamental choices. Citizenship must be able to exercise its powers in a system where social and economic rights are guaranteed to everyone, including non-resident citizens.

The European Ombudsman

Citizens of the Union can appeal to the Ombudsman against any acts involving the Community public administration. The Ombudsman has the power to investigate, either following a complaint by a person or association, or on his or her own initiative. The institution was created as a tool to safeguard rights and interests and to guarantee greater transparency in the Community.

After Maastricht, Parliament’s Committee on Institutional Affairs drafted a report containing a draft statute for the European Ombudsman and for the exercising of his powers (the Bindi Report on the European Ombudsman, which was adopted on 17 December 1992). This was the first legislative act originating on the initiative of Parliament under the Maastricht Treaty. In terms of its content, this decision was of fundamental importance in encouraging contact between citizens and the Community institutions. ‘So we are really dealing with a question directly linked to the establishment of European citizenship.’

The Ombudsman is exclusively dependent upon the European Parliament: he is appointed by Parliament, he reports to Parliament on any finding of maladministration, and he submits to Parliament an annual report. The draft of this report is discussed at two seminars attended by academics and national experts and ombudsmen from all Member States. The question of the European Ombudsman arose
during the debate on 17 November 1993 on negotiations with the Commission and the Council with a view to drawing up an interinstitutional declaration on the decision concerning the statute for the Ombudsman. Rosaria Bindi requested that the Ombudsman should have access to all the information held by the institutions and that he should be autonomous in his activities. In line with the interinstitutional agreement of 25 October 1993 on the European Ombudsman, the Council approved Parliament’s draft decision on the subject on 7 February 1994.

Voting rights and eligibility for municipal and European Parliament elections

The principle here originated in the Treaty of Rome and the debate had already started back in 1974 when the European Council gave the Council and a working group the task of drawing up a draft on voting rights. Following a certain amount of inertia on the part of the Commission, and a number of motions for resolutions tabled by MEPs, Parliament took up this question during its debate on the People’s Europe, and asked the Commission to take action.

The oral question of 13 November 1985 on the voting rights and eligibility to stand for elections to local councils and the European Parliament of citizens of a Member State other than the one in which they are resident was drafted by representatives of the political Groups and local councillors. During the debate, a Member of the EPP Group, Michelangelo Ciancaglini, emphasised that the two levels of representation, i.e. the local vote and the European vote, ‘constitute an irrefutable minimum for that People’s Europe that would otherwise be devoid of the most elementary content’.

The report on the voting rights of nationals of Member States in local elections in their Member State of residence was submitted on 15 March 1989, following a proposal by the Commission which was intended to regulate the situation of four million European citizens deprived of their municipal voting rights. Since the creation of a People’s Europe was supposed to eliminate any discrimination still experienced by nationals of one Member State who lived in another State, it was more logical and justified for a person to take part in a ballot organised by the local authority where he lived, rather than a ballot in a local authority area where he no longer lived but whose nationality he had. The proposed directive laid down the conditions for those voting rights.

Unlike entitlement to vote in local elections, the Treaty on European Union, by creating citizenship of the Union, guaranteed its citizens the
right to take part in European elections in the Member State in which they resided, without needing to have the nationality of that State. The timetable laid down by the Treaty stipulated that, if the detailed implementing rules for the voting were adopted before 31 December 1993, they would be applicable with effect from the fourth direct elections to the European Parliament, in June 1994.

On 17 November 1993 Parliament adopted the Froment-Meurice report on voting rights and eligibility to stand for election to the European Parliament for Union citizens residing in a Member State other than their Member State of nationality. Parliament decided against any attempt to introduce a derogation from the principle of non-discrimination between citizens of the Union on the basis of nationality. The report asked Member States to transpose the directive into national legislation as soon as possible, so that the citizens of the Union could take part in the European elections of June 1994, as laid down by the Treaty on European Union.\textsuperscript{367}

\footnote{Article 8b(2) of the Treaty lays down that every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he resides.}
Establishment of the Sakharov Prize

‘The fight for freedom in all its dimensions – this is the prime reason for our existence. It is this which makes Christian democracy the indomitable adversary of totalitarianism in all its forms, of all dictatorships whether they be of the right or the left.’

Jean Lecanuet

In 1977 the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission signed a Joint Declaration on fundamental rights. For Christian Democrats this first text on human rights was an act of signal importance since the process of European integration, their great ambition, could not be achieved without it. The European Parliament, in its first term, did a great deal of work on this subject, and the Group sought to give a political lead on human rights both inside the Community and outside it.

In 1983 MEPs noted that notwithstanding the Universal Declaration and the European Declaration of the Council of Europe, breaches of human rights were commonplace. For this reason the Christian Democrats suggested that in addition to the Universal Declaration, binding on all members of the UN, there should also be regional declarations which would be more precise and would put in place the necessary machinery for judging infringements, and a right of appeal to the institutions of the Universal Declaration.

During the Cold War era, the Christian Democrats were no longer alone in opposing dictatorships and the abuses which deprived people of the right to freedom of thought and action and its corollary of respecting the freedom of others. When the USSR invaded Afghanistan there was unanimous condemnation, instigated by the Christian Democrats, and only the French communist MEPs failed to support it. The outcry did not persuade the USSR to pull out, but it was certainly a factor in the granting of relative trade union freedoms to the people of Poland.
After all, it is not always easy fighting for freedoms, especially in countries where democratic traditions do not exist or are new and precarious; as is the case in Africa and Latin America. But wherever it can, the EPP Group is vigilant in supporting the forces of freedom and pushing back totalitarianism. In 1983 Marlene Lenz presented a report on human rights in the world: ‘The European Parliament notes that there has been a gap between moral intent and everyday political practice which cannot be bridged quickly until such time as there is a true awareness of human rights in all countries, but also until we know exactly what we mean by peace and freedom.’

In May 1985 the Political Affairs Committee, chaired by Roberto Formigoni, considered the report on establishing the Sakharov Prize. The vote was taken in October. In December 1985 the Committee put a proposal to the House for the establishment of a European Parliament Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought, to be awarded annually to a specific study or work nominated by a two-thirds majority of the Political Affairs Committee. Named after the famous Soviet dissident, the prize would honour those who had dedicated themselves to fighting oppression and injustice.

Establishment of the Prize was accompanied by a plenary debate. Otto von Habsburg, spokesman for the EPP Group, spoke in favour, remarking: ‘We must not forget that nowadays Sakharov has become a symbol of integrity and courage for the world […] Sakharov stands for many others. He is a symbol because he has dared to resist tyranny, to stand up for his principles and to accept the consequences of his actions.’

The Prize was awarded for the first time on 13 February 1989 to Nelson Mandela, the figurehead of resistance to apartheid who was imprisoned for twenty years, and, posthumously, to Anatoli Marchenko, the Soviet dissident who died in a Soviet prison in 1987 after a hunger strike.

The Committee on Women’s Rights

The European Parliament also played an innovative role in women’s rights. Following the first direct elections, the presidency of Parliament was entrusted to a woman, and a woman of no mean stature

---

On 17 December 2008 Hans-Gert Pöttering, the President of the European Parliament, officiated at a ceremony to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Sakharov Prize. In the presence of Yelena Bonner, Andrei Sakharov’s widow, and of numerous former winners of the prize, he presented the Prize to members of the family of Chinese dissident Hu Jia, who remains in prison in Beijing for his advocacy of human rights.
– Simone Veil. The House had 67 female members who were behind the original moves to set up an *ad hoc* committee tasked with analysing the situation of women in the European Community.

This *ad hoc* committee worked with the Commission on ‘measures to be taken under the Treaty to solve the problems inherent in the status of women.’ Hanja Maij-Weggen was one of the Christian Democrats who, in March 1980, urged the Council to ensure that the Member States of the Community signed and ratified the United Nations Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. On the basis of a resolution on the situation of women in the European Community tabled by Hanja Maij-Weggen, Maria Luisa Cassanmagnago Cerretti, Renate-Charlotte Rabbethge, Marlene Lenz, Paola Gaiotti De Biase, Elise C.A.M. Boot, Gisele M.H. Moreau, Ursula Schleicher and Hanna Walz, plus four members from other groups, the Social Affairs Committee drew up an interim report on the status of women.

This committee spent fourteen months preparing a report on the situation of women in the European Community which was presented by Hanja Maij-Weggen and approved by Parliament on 11 February 1981. In the report the *ad hoc* committee gave an exhaustive list of the specific issues and forms of discrimination which women faced. Marlene Lenz, the spokeswoman for the EPP Group, said in support of this report that: ‘Women should and must be given an opportunity in the present-day working world, but women, like men, must be left more time to shape their family lives’. In her view the report had to do more than simply list the many actions needed in politics and employment: it should also list a raft of measures to make it easier for women to reconcile the demands of family life and work. In June 1981 the European Parliament set up a committee of inquiry to monitor the attainment of the objectives set in the resolution and track developments in the situation of women in all countries of the Community, a necessary process without which the resolution’s demands might very well be sidelined and forgotten.

Not until 1984 was there a debate on women’s rights, this time not by the *ad hoc* committee or the committee of inquiry, but by a full committee chaired by Marlene Lenz. After two and a half years’ work the committee of inquiry put forward a report and a motion for a resolution which was adopted on 17 January 1984. Parliament proposed that a standing committee should be formed after the 1984 elections, to safeguard the *acquis communautaire* and further develop equality of opportunities between women and men. This 116-article resolution constituted a *vade mecum* for policy on women’s issues. It was
implemented in July 1984 by the newly elected Parliament, which decided to set up a Committee on Women’s Rights. The committee’s remit was to monitor compliance with the directives currently in force on equal opportunities, but also to address matters such as education, employment, vocational training, new technologies and migrant women.

Equal treatment for men and women was the guiding principle in the work of the Committee on Women’s Rights and the work of Parliament generally. The priority themes of this work were trends in the jobs market and the importance of education with a view to new employment opportunities for young women, the combating of violence against women, the implementation and development of Community instruments, and family policy. Members of the EPP Group sought to ensure that the principle of equal opportunities and rights for both sexes was applied in employment-related matters and in efforts to reconcile the demands of paid work for women and their responsibilities within the family.

Marlene Lenz, as Chairwoman of the standing committee, pressed for the Commission to include strategies to ensure equal rights for men and women in all its programmes. On the matter of unemployment, she deplored the fact that the Commission paid little attention to women, one of the biggest groups of the unemployed. The topic of female unemployment was dealt with in greater detail in the report by Hanja Maij-Weggen. All this produced swift results. The Commission put in place a new Community action programme on the promotion of equal opportunities for women, because discrimination persisted despite the Treaty article on equal pay. The Commission also initiated a number of directives on equal pay, equal treatment in employment, and equality with regard to social security.

In May 1992 a meeting was held in Brussels of representatives of 16 Christian Democratic women’s groups from 13 countries. The theme of the conference was ‘A social dimension for Europe – the role of women’, and for the first time this brought together, under a common umbrella, all the women’s groups within the EPP and the EUCD. Those invited included EPP President and Minister of State Wilfried Martens, Miet Smet, the Belgian Minister for equal opportunities policy, Rita Süßmuth, the Speaker of the Bundestag and Erna Hennicot-Schoepges, the Speaker of the Luxembourg Parliament, together with Fanny Palli-Pètralia, the former Greek Minister for Culture and Sport. Maria Bello de Guzmán, the President of the World Union of Christian Democratic Women (UMFDC) and the International Committee of the UMFDC also attended.
In political terms gender equality came to be, if not a permanent consideration, at least a recurring theme in politicians’ pronouncements. Marlene Lenz, Hanja Maij-Weggen, Rika de Backer-van Ocken, Ursula Braun-Moser, Ria Oomen-Ruijten, Marietta Giannakou and Nicole Fontaine made a major contribution to raising the profile of these issues in the European political arena.

**Combating fascism and racism**
The rise of fascism and racism in Europe was a cause of particular concern to Parliament. In September 1984 Parliament’s Bureau instituted a committee of inquiry, whose 15 members included, for the EPP, Otto von Habsburg, Nicole Fontaine, Gustavo Selva and Dimitrios Evrigenis, who would be named as rapporteur for the committee. He saw a need for constant strengthening of people’s democratic awareness in order to protect them from political extremism, finding in his report that xenophobia was on the increase.

In June 1986, on the basis of the Evrigenis and Veil resolutions, the European Parliament called on the Council, the representatives of the Member States meeting within the Council, and the Commission to issue a declaration against racism and xenophobia. The European Parliament was thus the instigator of the European Community’s formal commitment to opposing racism. The declaration would be known as the ‘Evrigenis Declaration’. Another report on the same subject was subsequently drafted in 1991. Thanks to these contributions, there has been more forceful condemnation of various racist acts perpetrated on European soil.

**Combating the death penalty**
The Group could see that moves towards democracy were progressing in some countries, especially in Eastern Europe, during the 1980s and early 1990s, but the situation regarding fundamental rights worldwide was serious, with daily evidence of the continued use of torture and of prisoners dying whilst in detention.

The EPP Group put forward numerous resolutions on capital punishment in the world. In 1990, for example, the Group put before the House a resolution on death sentences and executions in Indonesia, deploring the execution of prisoners who had been held for 24 years and calling on the Commission to demonstrate appropriate restraint in granting development aid under the cooperation agreement with Indonesia. Capital punishment in the USA did not escape Parliament’s attention either. During that same year, thanks to the work of Maria Luisa Cassanmagnago Cerretti, Parliament adopted another
compromise resolution, on the death penalty in the USA, urging the authorities in various countries in the world which still had capital punishment to revise their laws with a view to abolishing it.

In 1994 the Group revisited its earlier resolution of 18 June 1981 on abolition of the death penalty in the Community. Members of the Group found that little progress had in fact been made and that the death penalty was still in force in most of the world’s countries.a

Refugees from the crisis in Yugoslavia
The last world war displaced entire populations totalling an estimated 25 million people in Europe, plus 18-20 million refugees. When attention focused on the latter-day events unfolding in Bosnia Herzegovina, on the thousands being killed there and the hundreds of thousands of refugees, MEPs from the EPP Group, Arie Oostlander, Otto von Habsburg and Ria Oomen-Ruijten, tabled a resolution and called for an urgent debate on humanitarian aid to the war-torn areas of former Yugoslavia.390

In June 1992 Arie Oostlander addressed this question in his report on the Community’s relations with the republics of former Yugoslavia. On the matter of refugees, the report suggested that the Commission should draw up an economic aid programme to help overcome the problems facing, in particular, the populations of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina.391 In July 1993 the European Parliament called on the Community Member States to extend the programme of humanitarian action.392 To guarantee the protection of convoys carrying humanitarian aid to populations displaced by and suffering as a result of the war, as well as protection for the civilian population in the security areas, the European Community cooperated with the United Nations and the USA on a joint action in which UNPROFOR troops were deployed.393

The crisis in Yugoslavia raised issues of minorities’ rights and how to protect them. Taking its inspiration from the work done by the Council of Europe in this field, the EPP Group suggested that the European Parliament should look in greater depth at the economic and social rights of the individual and at the rights of minorities. The Group’s members took the view that protection for minorities should be a sine qua non of recognising new states formed after the fall of the Berlin Wall and establishing cooperative relations with them.

---

a In 1994, 132 countries in the world still retained the death penalty.
Human rights in the countries of the Soviet bloc

‘One realises, when an event of this kind occurs, that freedom is a true value [...] it is a huge victory for the values we believe in. These people have liberated themselves for economic reasons, but even more so for reasons that are political and spiritual’.394 Pierre Pflimlin

The issue of human rights in the Eastern bloc and Latin American countries influenced by the Soviet Union was addressed by the Subcommittee on Human Rights.

Wolfgang Schall, the Group’s spokesman on human rights in the Soviet Union, said: ‘Not only does the Soviet Union not respect human rights – it is intensifying its pressure on other states, organising and exerting this by means of a huge state apparatus. It elevates this apparatus to the first rank of an unofficial state diktat, of an unspoken state truth. Its solemn commitment to the UN and CSCE treaties, its democratic constitution, must not blind the Summit to the careless and cold contempt it shows for the human person, for subjects who have no rights, but also for the rest of humanity’.395

In an attempt to step up the fight for human rights the EPP, just a few weeks before the second follow-up conference to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was due to open in Madrid, called on all the participating countries to use this as an opportunity to demand that the terms of the Helsinki Final Act be applied in those countries which had so far shirked the obligations that they had themselves entered into.396

The EPP was alarmed at the situation in which many well-known figures found themselves. There was talk at the time of Sakharov’s ‘internal exile’, but the term was not just a euphemism but a downright untruth. The Christian Democrats noted that anyone visiting him was promptly interrogated by the authorities. The EPP Group pointed out that the support of the European Parliament was important to dissidents, because their circumstances were awkward: their telephones were tapped and their contacts with each other were made difficult. Through the resolution on the case of Andrei Sakharov, initiated by the Group in the Political Affairs Committee, the Members of the European Parliament supported the courageous stance taken by Sakharov and dissidents in other countries who resisted the regime imposed on them by the Soviet Union.

The future of Poland offered cause for concern. The European Council of December 1980 in Luxembourg stated the position of the Nine, and this was echoed in Parliament’s debates. On 24 June 1982 Parliament approved the report on the situation in Poland by Pierre Deschamps,
who described the great hope emerging there: ‘The hope that, through genuinely representative and spontaneously elected bodies, the whole of Polish society could take part in public life, could exercise a genuine influence on the running of the country, and could keep a check on the activities of those in power. All that, of course, was expected to take place within the legal framework of the wider civil rights and liberties that were recognised after the month of August 1980.’

He traced the development of the ‘freedom movement’ up to the coup of 13 December 1981, when ‘the hope engendered in the Polish people gave way to bitterness’. The Government had chosen confrontation rather than dialogue. On human rights and social and political rights, the outcome was even more disappointing. The report called on Parliament to condemn the risks to international security and détente and the dangers of failure to uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms. The EPP Group demanded ‘the lifting of the state of siege, the immediate liberation of detainees’, notably Lech Wałęsa, and ‘a return to dialogue between the Government, the Church and the Solidarity trade union’ and to free trade unionism.

**Human rights violations in Turkey**

Christian Democrats were also very concerned by the human rights situation in Turkey. Admittedly, since the 1974 invasion of Cyprus and the freezing of relations which had been ongoing since the agreement of 1964, relations between Turkey and the European Community had improved. The Christian Democrat Group proposed that talks should be opened between the conflicting parties on the island of Cyprus. But following the military coup of September 1980 the European Parliament decided to suspend the EC-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee.

The question of whether or not to revive the work of this Committee was looked at five years later in the context of the report on the human rights situation in Turkey. This found that despite some progress towards the restoration of human rights, acts of violence and breaches of fundamental rights meant that there was not yet any justification for a reversal of the suspension. The report was rejected by a large majority of the EPP Group ‘because of its one-sidedness and suspect on-the-spot research.’ The Group and, through it, the Political Affairs Committee, favoured reviving the Committee and suggested an alternative scenario: ‘Our security depended on the unity and efficiency of the North Atlantic Alliance, the most endangered region of which was southeast Europe, of which Turkey was the cornerstone.’ Rapporteur Kai-Uwe von Hassel laid before the House a motion for a resolution on the political situation in Turkey reflecting the European Community’s solidarity at
Upholding human rights and combating poverty

an extremely critical time in the country’s history. The resolution made a fundamental demand for human rights to be upheld and guaranteed and called for free general elections to the Turkish National Assembly.

Central and Latin America between two forms of totalitarianism

In the early 1980s the south of Latin America constituted a ‘bloc’ of totalitarian countries (Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile), clustered around Brazil. Their governments combined political authority (concentration of powers, an ideology of ‘national security’, suppression of opposition) with economic liberalism.

At the European Parliament’s March 1982 part-session, the EPP Group tabled a motion for a resolution on the situation of political parties in Uruguay. The Group was very alarmed by the military regime’s new draft law aimed at dissolving certain political parties. On that occasion Maria Luisa Cassanmagnago Cerretti said: ‘How can one talk of democracy respecting fundamental rights and freedoms when the forces associated with the major political currents such as Christian Democracy (operating for 60 years in that country) and Socialism (70 years) have been banished from political life because of their international relations and solidarity?’

Developments in El Salvador were a source of concern too. Only the participation of Christian Democrats in the government had prevented the outbreak of civil war. This issue was debated in Parliament. At the suggestion of Egon Klepsch, the EPP Group proposed the adoption of a resolution on the situation in the country. Backed by the proposal put forward by Horst Langes, the Group suggested organising a programme of emergency aid to ‘Caritas’ in the dioceses of El Salvador.

The Christian Democrats welcomed the fall of the regime of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, hoping that the regime that succeeded him would be able to guarantee political pluralism. The motion for a resolution on emergency aid to Nicaragua in September 1979 was favourably received by the EPP Group. Maria Luisa Cassanmagnago Cerretti commented that because of the seriousness of the situation in Nicaragua, where 300 tonnes of food a day were needed to avoid a disastrous famine, it was imperative to act straightaway. In April 1980, during the debate on his report on the situation in Nicaragua, Dario Antoniozzi told the European Parliament: ‘The Political Affairs Committee does not believe that aid should be linked to political criteria. All the same, a failure of the international community to come to the aid of Nicaragua in the
enormous task of reconstruction could perhaps considerably hold up the establishment of the new regime and of democracy.'

The EPP Group’s Lisbon Study Days of 2-6 June 1986 were devoted to the subject of solidarity within and beyond the Community and to relations with Latin America. Group members found that democracy in South America was beginning to bear fruit and that disputes between neighbouring countries were being resolved and were lessening in intensity. Egon Klepsch commented that ‘Chile, Paraguay and Surinam are worrying anachronisms in a generally more democratic and – with exceptions – more peaceful environment.’ Chile had traditionally been very important to the EPP. Here a long-standing democratic trend, determined to a large extent by early Christian Democrats in Latin America, had been abruptly cut short. ‘Eduardo Frei’s social concept of a “revolution in freedom” ended in ideological polarisation immediately after his time, and Pinochet’s military dictatorship then immediately turned to ironing out the established political and social pluralism.’

The EPP Group found that human rights violations and the sidelining and expulsion of political opponents had become typical of General Pinochet’s regime. The EPP Group had, from the start, supported the liberal forces in Chile in their non-violent struggle to restore democracy through free elections, and to secure respect for fundamental rights.

In this region, and especially in Chile and Nicaragua, the EPP Group supported democratic parties, free trade unions and the churches in their struggle against dictatorship and repression, to secure peace, democracy, social justice and the protection of human rights.

It spoke out in favour of stepping up European Community aid to countries committed to the path of democracy. The Christian Democrats started from the principle that European Community cooperation with industrialised countries increased the efficiency of those fighting for democracy. Group members wanted the Community to have a presence everywhere in the world through ‘a coordinated approach to all common questions of safeguarding peace, democracy, human rights and social justice.’

‘…The hungry are never free’

The picture in the early 1980s was depressing: apart from islands of prosperity such as Europe, the USA and Japan, ‘hunger and destitution’ were ‘the lot of almost 1 000 million people in the Third World.’ The European Community could not stand idly by in the face of this human tragedy which was becoming extremely acute and difficult to control.
Africa was affected, of course, particularly the Horn of Africa where Somalia and Ethiopia were tearing each other to pieces. But there was also Cambodia, newly emerged from fratricidal genocide and now experiencing a tragic period of Vietnamese occupation.

These issues provided plenty of work for the Group’s members sitting in the Committee on Development and Cooperation: Giovanni Bersani (Vice-Chairman of the Committee and Co-President of the ACP-EEC Joint Committee), Jean Lecanuet, Hans-August Lücker, Victor Michel, Angelo Narducci, Renate-Charlotte Rabbethge, Willem Vergeer and Kurt Wawrzik worked hard for several months to prepare a debate on world hunger.

The Group as a whole drafted reports and resolutions on this topic. The Group’s Vice-Chairman, Maria Luisa Cassanmagnago Cerretti, and its Chairman Egon Klepsch, tabled two resolutions as early as 1979.

During the debate in the European Parliament Leo Tindemans expressed alarm: ‘*We here should be deeply concerned by the problem of starvation and malnutrition. We should take every opportunity to encourage the UN, the FAO* and World Bank to pursue the right policy on a large scale. We, for our part, must not make the old mistake of delivering impressive speeches, adopting resolutions blaming anyone and everyone, using fine words and holding press conferences and think we can then go home satisfied with what we have done.*’

In 1980 statistics showed that 40,000 children were dying of starvation every day. Renate-Charlotte Rabbethge pointed to the errors of earlier development aid policy and asked for better measures to ensure that optimum use was made of the loans given. In her view, a swift improvement in funding to fight hunger was only possible in countries that had the political will to create a better market economy; this, by guaranteeing democracy and more efficient spending, could help to resolve the problem. At the initiative of Victor Michel, the ACP-EEC Joint Committee decided to form a joint working party tasked with evaluating the results of the European Parliament’s debate and looking at how the recommended changes in development cooperation policy and international economic relations might be made. As Otto von Habsburg put it, ‘*in our development aid we should remember that a true friend is not someone who gives his neighbour a fish, but the person who teaches him to fish.*’

The principles underlying the EPP Group’s work in Parliament were thus very clear-cut.

---

a (UN) Food and Agriculture Organisation.
One: it was the farmers themselves who could ensure adequate agricultural/food production.

Two: to achieve this, there was a need for ‘respect of the social and cultural environment, appropriate education and information, and above all, efforts [had] to be concentrated on the poorest and the hardest-hit.’

Three: the Group suggested using young people’s experience of voluntary service to get young people to take a greater interest in a ‘new spirit’ of combating under-development. During the debate on the budget, the Group’s political intentions were translated into the earmarking of increased funds for development and cooperation policy.

Emergency aid to Asia

In November 1979 the Community signed a cooperation agreement with the members of ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations). This agreement – for the first time in any agreement concluded by the Community and non-associated developing countries – included an article on development, in which the Community ‘undertook to cooperate with ASEAN to foster the independence, the economic self-sufficiency and the social wellbeing of this region.’

The disastrous situation in the region, caused by the conflicts in Indochina, focused the Community’s attention on it. At the end of 1979 the EPP Group tabled a resolution on the question of emergency aid to Vietnam and Cambodia, drafted by Horst Langes, and it urged the other political parties in Parliament to support Community action in this region. There were resolutions on refugees in Indochina, southern China and Cambodia. The Group considered Kurt Wawrzik’s report of 11 February 1980 on humanitarian aid to Cambodia and refugees in South-East Asia.

Resuming North-South dialogue:
the second Lomé Convention

Twenty years after the first Lomé Convention, Europe and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries renewed their ‘open agreement’. The Lomé Conventions were original in four respects: cooperation terms were secure with a long-term basis in law, relationships were forged within a Community framework which precluded any economic or

---

a ASEAN was established in Bangkok on 8 August 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development of the region, to promote regional peace and stability, and to promote active cooperation and mutual assistance on matters of common interest.
ideological manipulation or discrimination amongst the African states, there were common institutions (Joint Consultative Assembly, Council of Ministers advised by a Committee of Ambassadors), and the range of issues covered by cooperation was very broad. The success of Lomé can be attributed, to some degree, to the specificity of the various cooperation policies envisaged by the Convention (financial, economic, trade, technical, industrial and other links), and to the introduction of innovative systems which, over the medium term, stabilised export earnings from a number of sensitive, agricultural or mining products (Stabex, Sysmin).

From early 1979 the Group appointed an African adviser, a former head of the Africa section of the CDWU, to conduct fact-finding missions to a series of African countries and to prepare the colloquium to be held in Kigali, Rwanda, in October 1980. This meeting brought together a delegation from the Group, which included Giovanni Bersani, Willem Vergeer, Kurt Wawrzik and Victor Michel, and fifty or so participants from 15 countries of Africa. The purpose of the meeting, with the theme of education and training for Community development in Africa, was to draw up an inventory of cultural, social and human development in Africa, examine the position of education and review the question of how much Community aid was needed.

Victor Michel was given the task of assessing the social dimension of cooperation. Presenting his report to the Fifth meeting of the ACP-EEC Joint Consultative Assembly, he noted that 'by establishing measures to assist migrant workers, the Lomé II agreements introduced a completely new social dimension into the system of economic cooperation between the ACP states and the Community.' He suggested that the initiative of social protection for migrant workers and students coming to Europe should be backed up by appropriate measures. In addition to social protection measures, political and cultural measures should also be taken. In adopting the Michel report, the Assembly thus expressed its wish to see the EEC and its Member States undertake a policy of coordinating and harmonising national policies on the rights of migrant workers from ACP countries.

The Group's engagement with Africa was strengthened in 1982 by the Study Days held in Limerick (Ireland), which focused in part on the issues facing Africa. During this meeting Emilio Colombo commented 'Today, however, we are convinced that a solution to the problems of trade is only a part – though a very important part – of the solution to the problem of underdevelopment. We must therefore give priority to cooperation in the widest sense, with the main aim of enabling the African countries to achieve self-sufficiency in food.' The former President of
the European Parliament also emphasised the particular importance which the European People’s Party attached to training supervisory staff. This, he said, was a stimulus to the human and cultural development of the populations concerned.\(^\text{427}\)

Six African countries became members of the Christian Democrat International (CDI), the former CDWU. The CDI’s first official meeting was held in October 1984 in Kampala (Uganda), where the Group was represented by its Chairman Egon Klepsch, and by Willem Vergeer and Giovanni Bersani. It highlighted ‘the deep interrelationship between human rights, peace and development in Africa’. In Kampala, the Christian Democrats launched an appeal on behalf of Africans who ‘are, in their millions, deprived of their fundamental rights and live in abject poverty’. They stressed that ‘respect for human rights is an essential prerequisite for democracy, development and peace’, and urged ‘the Ugandan authorities, and those of other African states, to sign and ratify the international covenants on civil and political rights and on economic, social and cultural rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1966.’\(^\text{428}\)

**Lomé III – ‘a strange performance’**

The last meeting of the Consultative Assembly prior to the signing of the new ACP-EEC cooperation agreement was held in September 1984. ACP-EEC parliamentarians held their meetings in Luxembourg. Meetings of the Joint Committee were chaired in turn by Jean Ganga Zandzou, Speaker of the National Assembly of the Congo, and by Giovanni Bersani, as co-chairmen, and those of the Consultative Assembly were chaired by J.T. Kolane, Speaker of the National Assembly of Lesotho, and Pierre Pflimlin, as co-presidents. Opening the proceedings in Luxembourg, Giovanni Bersani said that ‘the overall situation in the southern hemisphere, already serious, not to say tragic in many respects, has continued to deteriorate. […] Despite Lomé, the situation of the ACP countries, some of which are amongst the world’s poorest, is also a cause for grave concern.’\(^\text{429}\)

On 8 December 1984, in the Togo capital Lomé, the Community signed a third Convention with 60 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries – Lomé III. Present as a privileged observer, Pierre Pflimlin, at the time President of Parliament, gave a striking account of the ceremony a few years later in his memoirs: ‘A strange performance, held at the headquarters of Togo’s only political party. The room was completely filled by party activists dressed in bright colours which varied from one row of seats to the next. The arrival of Eyadéma, President of the Republic and head of the party, was greeted with rapturous applause. The
Community was represented by Gaston Thorn, President of the Commission, and by Peter Barry, President-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, who took their seats on the podium and signed the Convention [...] The event proceeded with great solemnity. The names of the signatory countries (the Community’s 10 and the 66 ACP countries) were read out one after the other, in alphabetical order. Each time, the country’s flag was carried to the middle of the room and then placed along the side walls. This whole performance, which had no hint of African spontaneity, had been orchestrated, as I was told later, by North Korean advisers brought in by the single party [...] In the evening, during the banquet, there was dancing and singing in honour of President Eyadéma. The abbreviations EEC and ACP were interwoven into the songs in a strange and contrived manner [...]430

The conclusion of the negotiations marked a milestone along the route of forging links between the industrialised world and the developing countries. Promotion of a new type of relations was central to Lomé III. Rather than encouraging industry, which made poorly competitive products for which there were limited markets, the Convention sought to stimulate agricultural production which was now given priority. The aim was to favour food crops, to ensure self-sufficiency in food and, more broadly, help develop the rural economy, while at the same time preserving the environment through measures to combat erosion and desertification.

The preamble to the Convention affirmed the signatories’ adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and their faith in fundamental rights. The new Convention included provisions on the situation of women, cultural cooperation and the importance of the natural environment. Many of these new inclusions were the result of parliamentary initiatives by the Group. For example, there were proposals on the role of women in the development process, put forward by a working party of the ACP-EEC Joint Committee chaired by Renate-Charlotte Rabbethge.431

On the subject of financial aid the Group found it unfortunate that, though more aid was being given, the total amount had not risen enough. Group members found that some of the stumbling blocks that had hampered the talks on Lomé III still existed. In its view these were principally the inadequate volume of financial resources and consequent fragmentation of the subsidies granted, Third World debt, apartheid, the inadequacy of the Stabex financing instruments, and food aid which prevented the proper conduct of an appropriate agricultural policy.432 It was with these challenges in mind that the negotiators of Lomé IV came together.
Main objective of Lomé IV: to promote democracy in Africa

In 1989 Leo Tindemans became Co-President of the ACP-EEC Joint Parliamentary Assembly. On 15 December the fourth Convention was signed in Lomé between the ‘Twelve’ and the ‘Sixty eight’ for a new period of 10 years and with an obligation to review it after five years. It came into force from September 1990. Lomé IV was the first 10-year Convention, even though its accompanying protocol was adopted for five years only. This 1990-1995 financial protocol made available the sum of ECU 12 1000 million, of which ECU 10 800 million came from the 7th EDF and the rest from the European Investment Bank.

The EPP Group supported the idea of giving micro-financing to the private sector, more especially to micro-businesses and SMEs, to stimulate the economy, encourage the creation of jobs and provide financial services for persons wishing to set up a business but unable to obtain funding from the big banks.433

When Maria Luisa Cassanmagnago Cerretti replaced Leo Tindemans as Co-President of the Joint Assembly the EPP Group began to study the social dimension of cooperation. The aim was to strengthen human capital and social policies, by making the poor no longer reactive to their development but proactive in shaping it, by combating discrimination, particularly with regard to women, and by putting employment, productivity, health and education at the centre of development policies.434

A mid-term review of the Convention was scheduled for 1995, and under the agreement signed on Mauritius on 4 November 1995 the second financial protocol, running from 1995 to 2000, provided for funding of ECU 14 625 million. The Convention placed the emphasis on promoting democracy and good governance, strengthening the place of women in society, protecting the environment, decentralising cooperation, diversifying the economies of the ACP countries, promoting the private sector and strengthening regional, industrial and trade cooperation, and developing businesses and services. The Group was convinced that in most ACP countries, substantially improving the position of women was what brought progress in the alleviation of poverty. The Group’s work would concentrate on initiatives in the fields of training, information, education and support. Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law were essential features of the Convention’s second period. Under the 1995 agreement those ACP countries which did not meet these criteria were likely to have their funding withdrawn.4 On the basis of this acquis, and given that in

---

4 Amended fourth Lomé Convention, Article 5.
the year the agreement was signed, 13 of the 30 armed conflicts taking place in the world were in ACP countries, the EPP Group emphasised the need to operate a policy that served the interests of peace and conflict prevention, and one which combined these objectives together with the objective of good governance of public affairs in all the various aspects of partnership.
Chapter XXIV
THE THIRD TERM OF THE DIRECTLY ELECTED PARLIAMENT:

The elections of 15 and 18 June 1989 were not the EPP Group’s finest hour. The Left made gains thanks to the success of the British Labour Party which returned 46 Members (+14). The Socialist Group’s margin over the EPP Group widened (180 seats compared with 121). The European Democratic Group lost ground (34 Members, 32 of them British). The most striking loss was that of the German delegation (32 Members, down from 41), due to the slump in popularity of the ruling CDU/CSU. The Italian delegation retained a respectable number of Members (27), the European election not yet reflecting the future effects of the demise of Democrazia Cristiana. France did badly as a result of the strategy of the CDS within the UDF. The CDS had refused to be part of the list headed by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and stood under its own colours, led by Simone Veil who subsequently sat as a member of the Liberal Group along with another Member elected from her list, Jean-Louis Borloo.

The German and Italian delegations together accounted for over 50 % of the membership of the Group’s 12 delegations. The Greek and Dutch delegations, with 10 Members each, scored well for their country. The situation in Belgium was rather disappointing (7 Members), though Leo Tindemans was re-elected. The Group had one UK Member representing Northern Ireland and one Dane from the Christian Democratic Party.

In addition to Egon Klepsch and Hanja Maij-Weggen who kept their positions as Group Chairman and Vice-Chairman, three new members were elected to the Group presidency: Marcelino Oreja Aguirre (Spain), Raphael Chanterie (Belgium) and Antonio Iodice (Italy).

**Bringing Spain’s Partido Popular into the fold**

But for the support of the 15 new Members from the Partido Popular, Spain’s representation would have been limited to just one MEP from
the Catalan party Convergencia i Unió, Concepció Ferrer i Casals, and the EPP Group would have been weakened still further. The support of Spain’s Partido Popular members had already been planned and orchestrated during the preceding parliamentary term. When Spain joined the Community in January 1986 the Alianza Popular, headed nationally by Manuel Fraga Iribarne, opted to ally its MEPs with the European Democratic Group, in other words the British Conservatives. Egon Klepsch tells how, as Chairman of the Group and with an eye to the 1989 elections, he got in touch with the former Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, who was both a Christian Democrat and a committed European. Klepsch was invited by Oreja Aguirre for talks with Manuel Fraga Iribarne one evening in Strasbourg. Both Spaniards spoke German, which made communication with Egon Klepsch easier. Oreja Aguirre advocated a large People’s Party in Spain which leaned more towards the centre, could appeal to a wider electorate and so overturn the supremacy of Felipe González’s PSOE. To re-fashion the Party’s image, which still carried too many echoes of the Franco-ist past, a young and modernist leader was needed. He emerged soon after in the person of José María Aznar.

In the meantime efforts got under way to rebuild the Party. These proved very successful. The Alianza Popular congress of 21 January 1989 changed the Party’s name to ‘Partido Popular’. It was decided that the Partido Popular list would be headed by Marcelino Oreja Aguirre himself and would include Christian Democrats and Centrists, with a number of trusty supporters of Manuel Fraga Iribarne also in the mix. Fraga Iribarne would distance himself from Spanish national politics and concentrate on running his home region of Galicia. This scenario was endorsed by the Partido Popular and by the European People’s Party, with the active backing of its President Jacques Santer. It was also necessary to persuade Javier Rupérez, the leader of Spain’s Christian Democratic Party, to ally himself with the new Partido Popular. On 24 May Egon Klepsch read out a letter from Javier Rupérez to the Group’s Bureau. Rupérez was asking that future MEPs elected from Marcelino Oreja Aguirre’s list should sit with the EPP Group. The ideological programme of the new Partido Popular made reference to the thinking of Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi. The Group’s Bureau approved this request in principle. On 3 June 1989 the EPP Summit endorsed the principle that future members elected from the list of the Partido Popular would join the Group as allied members (Rules of Procedure, Article 5b).

a Interview with Egon Klepsch, op. cit.
A year later, following a meeting between Wilfried Martens, José María Aznar and Javier Rupérez, the principle that the Partido Popular should sit with the EPP was agreed and confirmed on 18 October 1991. José María Aznar's triumph in the 1994 European elections, doubling the number of his Members, plus the fact that the leader of the Partido Popular became Prime Minister in 1996 and was re-elected in 2000, proved the wisdom of this political shift towards the centre.

The British Conservatives’ application is ‘frozen’…
(July 1989)

Enlargement of the Group to include a political family far removed, historically, from the roots of Christian Democracy, marked the beginning of the big change which the EPP and the Party would undergo from 1992. Admission of Spain’s Partido Popular and Greece’s Nea Demokratia was conditional on a stringent demand which the moral and political authorities of the EPP would ensure was met – clear espousal of humanist values and commitment to European integration. The Group’s Spanish and Greek members did not fail us here and their inclusion strengthened the geographical base of the EPP’s political family. Even before the election of June 1989 the Spanish had warned their UK partners that they would not be continuing their alliance with the European Democratic Group.

In fact the Conservatives, in the wake of their poor showing in the elections, feared becoming marginalised in the new Parliament, and they drew inspiration from the Spanish MEPs’ move to the EPP. On 6 July 1989, three weeks after the elections, Egon Klepsch brought to the attention of the Group’s Bureau, meeting in Brussels, a letter of 28 June which he had received from the Chairman of the European Democratic Group, Sir Christopher Prout: ‘I have the honour to inform you that the MEPs newly elected from the UK Conservative Party decided last night, at a meeting in London, to instruct me to put forward our application to join the Group of the European People’s Party under the terms of your Rules of Procedure, Article 5(b). This decision was taken because the European Democratic Group and the Group of the European People’s Party have enjoyed a good and fruitful period of cooperation during the life of the second directly-elected European Parliament. I would emphasise that our wish to join the EPP Group is an expression of our sincere desire to play a truly constructive part in strengthening Parliament and in building Europe. In the five years ahead, Parliament will face monumental challenges. Firstly, the creation of a European single market, with all its related aspects, is an essential item on our agenda. And economic and monetary union has just received a strong boost from
the decisions taken at the Madrid Summit. Measures are also urgently needed to safeguard or improve our environment. We are convinced that by working together we have a better chance of attaining our objectives. Membership of the EPP Group will strengthen the efficacy of our joint endeavours towards an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe.’

This letter of 28 June 1989 marked neither the first nor the last chapter in the long and turbulent history of relations between the EPP and the British Conservatives. In his memoirs, Wilfried Martens admitted quite candidly that during his period as EPP President, relations with the British Conservatives were a cross he found hard to bear. Martens, then Prime Minister of Belgium, would succeed Jacques Santer as EPP President on 10 May 1990. He recalled that the first contacts between the British and the Christian Democrats went back to January 1966 when Edward Heath announced at a press conference in Rome that his party wished to join the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD). In the face of outright opposition from the Italians, Dutch and Belgians, this proposal was permanently shelved. Martens added that the history of the British Conservatives and the EPP, and quite possibly of the United Kingdom and the European Community, might have been different if the British had been admitted into the Christian Democratic family then. It was, he thought, a huge mistake.

More than two decades after this first attempt it fell to Egon Klepsch, and then to Leo Tindemans, as Group Chairman, to deal with the matter in liaison with Wilfried Martens.

How did the Group react to this application? The minutes of 10 July 1989 for the meeting of the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen held during the Study Days in Funchal, capital of Madeira, record laconically: ‘the Chairman thought that in view of the opposition expressed by a number of Christian Democratic parties the Conservative Party’s application to join should be frozen, and he suggested that an arrangement be made for cooperating with this group’. Egon Klepsch was not really keen to speed matters up. But the British Conservative MEPs elected in June 1989 were not Eurosceptics. Quite the opposite: a majority of them represented a new trend within the Conservative Party and were tired of the current isolation thrust upon them when Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister since 1979 and defending her country’s corner in Europe, issued her peremptory demand ‘I want my money back!’ Her replacement as Prime Minister by John Major on 27 November 1990 confirmed this change in the Tory tone on European integration.a

---

a Tony Blair’s defeat of John Major in the March 1997 election again reversed the majority trend within the Conservative party apparatus and revived earlier Euroscepticism.
The thaw in relations between the two groups was the result of an initiative by the Party. Helmut Kohl was keen to move things forward. By tradition, the CDU sought close relations with the moderate majority parties in Europe's bigger countries. Kohl's contacts with John Major were, if not cordial, sufficiently open to allow dialogue. Wilfried Martens was of the same mind. Recently elected as EPP President, on 18 June 1990 he invited the Chairman of the European Democratic Group, Sir Christopher Prout, together with Chris Patten, the pro-European and Catholic Conservative Party Chairman, and Harald Rømer, Secretary-General of the ED Group, to a working lunch at his Prime Ministerial residence.

Several months elapsed. On 13 April 1991 Wilfried Martens chaired the EPP Summit in Val Duchesse. On the agenda were the letters from Sir Christopher Prout and Chris Patten dated 5 and 11 April, explicitly endorsing the EPP programme and confirming their request to join the Group. The divisions within the EPP resurfaced: Helmut Kohl, José María Aznar, Konstantinos Mitsotakis and Jacques Santer were in favour, but the Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, the Belgians, Italians and Irish remained hostile. However, it was decided that a consultation committee linking the Bureau of the EPP Group and the Bureau of the ED Group would be set up to coordinate the work of eight groups of experts common to both Groups. That work was to check, by 1 April 1992, that the groups’ positions were compatible. Arnaldo Forlani expressed formal disapproval on behalf of the DCI.

The uncooperative attitude of John Major, who secured substantial opt-outs at the Maastricht European Council on 10 December 1991, cooled the ardour of those who were unconditionally in favour of the Tories joining the EPP Group. But it grew more likely that Conservatives would be able to join the Group as individual allied members.

... and ultimately accepted (April 1992)

Meanwhile, Leo Tindemans took over from Egon Klepsch as Chairman of the Group on 14 January 1992 after Klepsch was elected President of Parliament. Tindemans and Wilfried Martens, two Belgian Christian Democrats who were committed Europeans, thus bore the institutional responsibility of managing the British application. At the EPP Summit of 14 March 1992 it was clear that Ruud Lubbers’ position had softened, opening the way for the Group to adopt a pragmatic formula.

---

a Chris Patten would later be a member of the Prodi Commission from 1999 to 2004, after serving as the last Governor of Hong Kong.
The Italian Christian Democrats, weakened at home, lost their influence. On 7 April 1992 Tindemans asked the Group to vote by secret ballot on whether a fixed party list of British Members should be admitted. 72 members voted for the British to have allied membership, 36 voted against and there were 3 spoilt votes. The 32 British Conservative Members and 2 Danish Conservatives joined officially on 1 May 1992. Article 1 of the Statute was amended. The Group would henceforth be known as the ‘Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and Allied Members’. Sir Christopher Prout became Vice-Chairman of the Group. A fifth permanent working party was set up for the Conservatives. John Biesmans was appointed Deputy Secretary-General of the Group, which absorbed all the staff of the European Democrats’ Secretariat. The European Democratic Group was now defunct.

**An increasingly female and younger EPP Group**

The arrival of women in the political arena proceeded slowly in the 1980s, and differently from one country to another. The CD Group in the old Parliament of 1952 to 1979 had just four female members: Margaretha Klompé (Netherlands), Maria Probst and Hanna Walz (Germany) and Erisia Tonetti (Italy). Eight women were elected in 1979, 14 in 1984 and 19 in 1989. Of the 19 women elected in 1989, 7 were from the German delegation, 2 from Italy, 2 from the Netherlands, 2 from Spain, 2 from Luxembourg and 1 each from France, Belgium, Greece and Ireland.

---

*a* John Biesmans rose progressively to the role of number two in the Secretariat with the title of Deputy Secretary-General, Head of Cabinet to the Secretary-General, Klaus Welle from 1999. He also acted as Head of the Press Service following the departure of Werner de Crombrugghe and until the appointment of Robert Fitzhenry. In 2008 he was also in charge of the Internal Organisation Service which included IT, Personnel and Finance Units. He routinely assisted the Chairman and Secretary-General in public. His British *sang froid*, accentuated by his soldierly bearing reminiscent of an Army Sergeant Major, together with his organisational skills, made him a key member of the Secretariat. Another member of the European Democratic Group Secretariat who joined the EPP Group in 1992 was the former ED Group Secretary-General Harald Rømer who was briefly a Special Adviser to the Group before joining the administration of the European Parliament as a Director-General, then Deputy Secretary-General and finally Secretary-General. His compatriot Niels Pedersen, who, along with his wife Merete Pedersen, had entered Parliament in 1974, sat on the Rules of Procedure Committee and was in charge of parliamentary work and later Secretary-General of the Group in 2005 following the departure of Klaus Welle. Anthony Teasdale, long-time adviser in the Group’s London office, joined the cabinet of President Hans-Gert Pöttering in 2007. Fellow Britons who have since left the service include Alan Reid, adviser to the Civil Liberties Committee, Timothy Brainbridge who joined the Documentation Service, David Steel, adviser to the Budgetary Control Committee, and Stephen Biller, whose main remit was relations with the churches and dialogue with the Orthodox Church and whose bearing, reminiscent of a diplomat or priest, opened doors for him into the Vatican.
In 1989 the increasing youth of the Group was apparent in the arrival of members born after World War II, some of whom would go on to enjoy lengthy careers in the Group.

Reimer Böge, born in Schleswig Holstein in 1951, an agricultural engineer and farmer by profession, would plough his furrow in Parliament on the basis of his agricultural and budgetary know-how. He would act as rapporteur for the Commission of Inquiry into BSE (bovine spongiform encephalitis), on the financing of the Union for the period 2007-2013, and would be Chairman of the Committee on Budgets from 2004. Karl-Heinz Florenz, born in 1947, spent his first years in the Environment Committee, acting as coordinator for the EPP and chairing the Committee from 2004 to 2007. Georg Jarzembowski, MP for Hamburg and an MEP since 1991, was born in 1947. He too adopted the method of specialised know-how which was transferable from one parliament to another and qualified him for responsibilities within the Group. Jarzembowski (who also insisted on meticulous punctuality at meetings of the Group!) was the undisputed champion coordinator for the Transport Committee. Godelieve Quisthoudt-Rowohl, born in Belgium in 1947, trained as a biochemist in Germany. She represented Lower Saxony from 1989 and was a Quaestor in Parliament from 1999 after doing much work on the EU’s research framework programmes.

When the British Conservatives joined the Group in April 1992 there was a new influx of members born after the war. Three of them would leave their indelible stamp on the EPP Group and were still members in 2009: Caroline Jackson, born in 1946, MEP for the South West of England, is a history graduate of Nuffield College, Oxford. Working first as an administrator for the European Democratic Group from 1974 to 1984, she has during her successive terms of office focused her efforts on the environment and food safety. Edward McMillan-Scott, born in 1949 and an MP for Yorkshire, has headed the UK delegation. A self-declared expert on the European tourism industry, he was elected Vice-President of the European Parliament in 2004. James Elles, born in 1949, has sat since 1984 for the South-East of England, and his constituency includes the renowned University of Oxford. The son of Lady Elles, who sat in the first directly elected Parliament in 1979, James Elles began as an official at the European Commission where he acquired his expertise in administrative and budgetary matters, something he would make great use of in his parliamentary service. As a respected and sometimes feared member of the Budgets Committee and the Budgetary Control Committee, he is relentless in his scrutiny of his former institution’s administration. Vice-Chairman of the Group up to 2007 and founder of the European Ideas Network think-tank (see
Part 3), James Elles has been one of the EPP-ED Group’s most energetic members and keenest defenders of the UK delegation’s interests.

This young generation of MEPs elected in 1989 also includes the Dutchwoman Ria Oomen-Ruijten, born in 1950, and the Luxembourger Viviane Reding, born in 1951.

Ria Oomen-Ruijten came to politics early; she was a member of the Dutch parliament at the age of 31 and served from 1981 to 1989. This energetic and extrovert lady, from the Limburg town of Maastricht, typifies the Catholic south of the country which is customarily distinguished from the (Calvinist, austere) north. An active member of the Social Affairs Committee and Environment Committee, Oomen-Ruijten was Vice-Chairman of the Group from the second part of the parliamentary term, which started in January 1992. She has been Chairman of the European Parliament delegation to the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee since 2007.

Viviane Reding is a journalist by profession. She has already served as a member of the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies. Vice-Chairman of the Christian Social People’s Party, she is, like most Luxembourgers, perfectly at home in three languages, switching easily between German and French and only using her mother tongue with her compatriots. Reding represented her delegation in the Group’s Bureau and focused her work on the Civil Liberties Committee. Because of her eminent position in Luxembourg and in European circles, and the commitment she showed to her chosen special interests, she was nominated by her country as a member of the Prodi Commission in 1999 after two consecutive terms in the EPP Group.

**Strong characters join the EPP ranks**

Doris Pack became one of the most assiduous and influential members of the German delegation. Representing the Saarland, a French-speaker and sympathetic to Franco-German entente, Pack had represented her home state in the Bundestag before joining the European Parliament. Starting as a member of the Culture and Education Committee, she became its coordinator in 1994 and still holds that office in 2009, testimony to the authority and ability she has shown there. Simultaneously with her work on the Culture Committee, Pack is very interested in the process of stabilisation and reconciliation in the Western Balkans. As Chairman of the European Parliament’s delegation for relations with South-East Europe since 1989, she has travelled thousands of miles through this difficult region, forging lasting ties with most of the players who decide between war and peace, reconciliation or confrontation.
Impassioned and often indignant, Doris Pack is the EPP Group’s ultimate authority on the countries of former Yugoslavia.

In a very different sector, budgetary control, Diemut Theato also proved authoritative. Elected as a member for the Rhine Neckar district in southern Germany, which she represented in the Group from 1987 to 2004, she succeeded Heinrich Aigner as Chairman of the Budgetary Control Committee, which became a relentless censor of the Commission during the 1990s, unsettling the executive with constant criticism of its management. Refusal to sign off the budget and justified criticism of its financial management finally triggered the collective resignation of the Santer Commission in March 1999 (see Part 3).

The Spanish MEPs elected in 1989 who joined the Group after the political agreement reached with the new Partido Popular included two men whose temperament and political backgrounds were very different but who both represented the centre right in Spanish politics. Carlos Robles Piquer, born in Madrid in 1925, was originally a diplomat, representing his country on several continents. He was a state secretary and minister in the last governments of the Franco era and went on to chair a number of organisations and cultural foundations. Typical of the traditionalist right in the Spanish delegation, he was Vice-Chairman of the Group between 1994 and 1999. It was he, at a Bureau meeting in Malta in June 1996, who came up with the idea of the first exchanges which the Group organised on the theme of tolerance and intercultural dialogue.

José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado, born in 1935, unquestionably came from the Spanish Christian Democratic family. His father was a leading member of it and did not shrink from standing up for the values he believed in against the Franco-ist regime. When he entered the European Parliament in 1989, José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado, used his lawyer’s skills and his ability to express himself clearly and in several languages in support of a fervent belief in Europe. He was a member and subsequently Chairman of the Institutional Affairs Committee from 1992 to 1994. He was then a Vice-President of Parliament and was nominated by the EPP Group for the office of President and elected in January 1997. In his last speech on 5 May 1999 he said he had been ‘moved by the passion of Europe, which has allowed the utopia of fifty years ago to become, for the most part, a reality’.437

Astrid Lulling was also elected to the Group in 1989. This straight-talking Luxembourger, born in 1929, holds a number of records: she is the longest-serving member of the House, having sat in the unelected Parliament from 1965 to 1974 as a national MEP; she is also the longest-serving member of the Group and is still a member in 2009. A member
of the Economic Affairs Committee where she upholds a liberal line, Astrid Lulling is unfailingly present at Group Bureau meetings anywhere in the Union. She is a powerful personality, popular with colleagues of various nationalities and groups for her leadership of a study group on wine and her championship of honey production. Thanks to her popularity she was elected as a Quaestor of Parliament in 2004, by secret ballot.

Two other powerful figures joined the ranks of the EPP in 1989.

Sir Henry Plumb was part of the first wave of Conservative MEPs in 1979. A former President of Britain’s powerful National Farmers Union, Sir Henry chaired Parliament’s Agriculture Committee from 1979 to 1982. He was then Chairman of his Group, the European Democrats, from 1982 to 1987, after Sir James Scott Hopkins and before Sir Christopher Prout, and he was then elected President of Parliament with the backing of the EPP Group, serving from 1987 to 1989. Re-elected in 1989, he backed the Conservatives’ request to join the EPP Group en bloc, though this did not come about until May 1992. Sir Henry, later Lord Plumb, was above all a gentleman farmer, combining all the features of Britishness with a fervent commitment to Europe which won him friends in the European Parliament. The famous claim that he was ‘born British but would die a European’ sums up the career of this pragmatic Conservative who judged European integration on its successes and its achievements.

Jean-Louis Bourlanges, a former left-leaning Gaullist, elected on the list of Simone Veil and the Christian Democrats of the CDS, was a pure product of the French intelligentsia. Brilliant and cultured, he loved using paradox and humour both in his speeches before the House and the Group and in his writings as a frequent contributor to the French press. His taste for polemics did not always win him friends, but those he did win over to his European beliefs remained loyal to him. A member of the Budgets Committee, he became Chairman of the Budgetary Control Committee in 1993. He was keenest on institutional debates, where he distinguished himself by his passion and feel for argument. Re-elected to the EPP Group for the period 1989 to 2004, he chose at that juncture to join the Liberal Group, to the deep regret of his fellow-members of the Institutional Affairs Committee.

**A surprise: the arrival of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (December 1991)**

Members of the EPP Group were surprised, in December 1991 during the final days of Egon Klepsch’s chairmanship, to see Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing applying for allied membership along with three other French MPs who were trusty supporters of his and, like him, members of the Liberal Group: Alain Lamassoure, Jeannou Lacaze and Robert Hersant. Not only had the former French President been elected to the European Parliament in June 1989 as head of the UDF party list and, along with his fellow-candidates on the list, joined the Liberal Group; he had barely arrived when he was put forward for the chairmanship of that Group. So when he moved to the EPP Group more than two years later, with the support of the French delegation, this was seen as proof of the increasing strength of the EPP. Observing in his work as Group leader that Parliament’s major policy lines were set by the two big groups, the EPP and PES, Giscard d’Estaing thought he could be more effective working within the EPP than as head of the Liberals, whose policy fluctuated between left and right. Whilst not all Liberals followed his lead at that time, he started the move which led the Portuguese Social Democrats of the PSD to join the EPP in November 1996, an early sign of the clear ascendancy which the EPP would have over the Socialists from 1999.

Changes in the Group’s leadership: the chairmanship of Leo Tindemans and new members of the Secretariat (January 1991-July 1994)

The Chairman’s team supporting Egon Klepsch experienced a number of changes in January 1991. Hanja Maij-Weggen had been brought into Ruud Lubbers’ government as Minister of Transport. Ria Oomen-Ruijten took over from her, doing the key job of Vice-Chairman in charge of parliamentary work, which included drawing up the list of speakers for the Group and their allotted speaking time. Oomen-Ruijten would continue to hold this office under the chairmanship of Leo Tindemans and then Wilfried Martens up to 1999. Ferruccio Pisoni took over from Antonio Iodice and José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado from Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, who had been appointed Chairman of the Institutional Affairs Committee.

The leadership of the Secretariat changed also, when Sergio Guc-cione moved to his post as Parliament’s Director-General for Information in Luxembourg on 31 January 1991.

Egon Klepsch wanted to replace him with Gerhard Guckenberger, who had previously been in charge of parliamentary work. Guckenberger was very familiar with the Group and was well thought of both by MEPs and his colleagues in the Secretariat. Joining Parliament
before the elections of 1979, this courteous and reserved Bavarian, a
former assistant to Hans-August Lücker, initially looked after the
Agriculture Committee, an area of key importance to the Christian
Democrats at the time. Chosen by Egon Klepsch, the new Secretary-
General would assist Leo Tindemans from 1992 to 1994 and then

On 12 February 1991 Gerhard Guckenberger put his new proposals
for the Secretariat to the Group’s Bureau. A management team com-
prising the heads of department was formed. This team became the
Secretariat’s first restricted, operational structure, meeting regularly
once a week under the direction of the Secretary-General to gain an
overall view of the Group’s activities and ensure that management bod-
ies, Presidency and Group were all functioning properly.

The management team would be perpetuated by Guckenberger’s
successors (see Part 3). At this time the Secretariat had a staff of 99, 85
of them based in Brussels.a

On 14 January 1992, half-way through the parliamentary term, the
change in Group leadership was more marked. Egon Klepsch had finally
succeeded in his long-held ambition to be President of Parliament, and
the vacancy of Group Chairman was filled by Leo Tindemans after a
fairly open contest against several other candidates, including his com-
patriot Raphael Chanterie and the Italian Calogero Lo Giudice. The

a Of all the administrators who joined the Secretariat in the 1980s-1990s we should
mention the following: Delia Carro (1986), who headed the Human Resources Unit after
working in the Documentation Service; Miguel Seabra-Ferreira (1986), who was responsi-
ble for relations with the Portuguese press and later the internet unit; Andreas Hartmann
(1987), who was first an assistant to Egon Klepsch when he was Chairman, and subse-
quently adviser for the Foreign Affairs Committee; Anne Vahl (1986), adviser for the French-
language press and the Committee on Women’s Rights; Martin Kamp (1989), adviser for
the Environment Committee and head of a working group, Deputy Secretary-General in
charge of parliamentary work, later becoming Secretary-General of the Group in Septem-
ber 2007. Elias Kavalierakis joined the Group in 1984 for the Legal Affairs Committee,
shortly after his compatriot Spyros Efstathopoulos (1981) for the Regional Affairs Commit-
tee and Committee of the Regions; Klaus Kellersmann advised the Social Affairs Commit-
tee and was regularly elected to the Group’s Staff Committee; Romain Strasser (1986), a
Luxembourger working with the Transport Committee; Christine Detourbet (1991) who
looked after the French members of the Liberal Group, worked for a long time in the Docu-
mentation Service and became head of the Political Strategy Unit in 2008; Véronique Donck
(1991), was formerly an assistant to Gérard Deprez and adviser to the EPP members of the
Culture Committee; Mariangella Fontanini (1991) of the Italian press service; Carlo Palas-
sof (1991) served the Development Committee and ACP Assembly; Kathrin Ruhrmann
(1991) looked after the German press and was then spokesperson for Hans-Gert Pöttering
as Group Chairman and President of Parliament; Antonio Preto (1992), a lawyer by training,
who worked in the Legal Affairs Committee before joining Hans-Gert Pöttering’s cabinet;
Jorge Soutullo Sánchez (1993) of the Agriculture Committee, Harald Kandolf (1994), an Aus-
trian who worked with the Regional Policy Committee; and Johan Ryngaert (1989) who was
greatly valued by the Group’s Secretaries-General and worked for the Central Secretariat.
outcome of the vote, in which 122 members took part, was as follows: Leo Tindemans 65 votes, Raphael Chanterie 25, Calogero Lo Giudice 25, 6 blank votes and 1 spoilt vote. Ria Oomen-Ruijten was confirmed in her post of Vice-Chairman and the other vice-chairmen elected were Menelaos Hadjigeorgiou (Greece), Manuel García Amigo (Spain), Bernhard Sälzer (Germany) and John Joseph McCartin (Ireland). Ria Oomen-Ruijten’s portfolio included the job of ‘chief Whip’, a new function designed to ensure more assiduous attendance in the House and better voting discipline amongst members. Each national delegation had to appoint a whip. This network of whips had to monitor members’ attendance, reporting on it to the federal whip, and to collect information, passing this on to the Presidency and the heads of delegation.
Chapter XXV
THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL
(NOVEMBER 1989), GERMAN
REUNIFICATION AND THE END
OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE (1991)

An unexpected revolution

History often has surprises in store and those elected to serve during Parliament’s third term were soon witness to this. Indeed, the politicians who stood for election by the people of Europe in June 1989 throughout the Europe of Twelve could hardly have imagined that they would be elected to deal with an unexpected revolution: the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November, the ousting of Ceauşescu on 22 December and his rapid execution, the elections in Hungary in March 1990 and in Czechoslovakia in June 1990, the reunification of Germany on 3 October, the election of Lech Wałęsa as President of Poland on 9 December, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on 25 February 1991, the proclamation of independence by Croatia and Slovenia on 25 June 1991, the applications by Sweden and Finland to join the Community on 1 July 1991 and 18 March 1992 respectively, the recognition of the Baltic States by the Twelve on 27 August 1991, the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 8 December 1991, the beginning of the bloody clashes in a dismembered Yugoslavia while Czechoslovakia underwent ‘a velvet divorce’, and so on. In a matter of months the world seemed to have run amok. Europe was the birthplace of a movement that rearranged all the geopolitical maps. The end of East-West antagonism and Communism seemed to turn back the clocks. Europe rediscovered liberty, fear dissipated, aspirations for democracy and greater material well-being became a priority, while Communism, one of the most pernicious and dangerous ideologies ever dreamt up by man, was discredited and condemned. At the same time, however, the phantoms of the past reappeared: territorial claims, identity crises, religious confrontations and ‘ethnic cleansing’.

The EPP Group could not have imagined in July 1989 that its agenda for the months and years ahead would be so profoundly disrupted. The preceding years, primarily the 1980s, had been largely occupied with
prosaic financial issues such as the British contribution to the budget and the cost of the agricultural policy. A major project, the internal market, had sapped the positive energy of the governments and Community institutions. Europeans were above all concerned about the internal effects of the economic crisis on employment and inflation. However, the awakening of the populations of Central and Eastern Europe, their desire to be free and to make up for the decades they had lost were to take centre stage. The Europe of Twelve in 1989 would eventually become the Europe of Twenty-Seven but it did not yet know this; it had not yet realised the full extent of the change taking place before its eyes.

First signs of change in the Soviet Union

In March 1985 the Soviet Union saw a young man elected General Secretary of the Communist Party: Mikhail Gorbachev. He faced an appalling situation. Outside the Soviet Union, the Red Army was embroiled in an Afghanistan that was becoming ‘its Vietnam’. At home, society was being worn down by shortages. The economy and demography were at their lowest points. A far-reaching reform of the system was needed as soon as possible: perestroika. At the same time, Gorbachev wanted it to be transparent and thus introduced glasnost.

The West, for its part, had learned, often at its own expense during the détente, not to trust the changes announced in the USSR. It was therefore wary about the turn of events: ‘Are the changes in the USSR significant, profound, sustainable? Are the changes likely to encourage east-west rapprochement? Or will they instead provide the USSR with additional means to help it achieve global dominance? Should the countries of Europe under Soviet control not fear that Moscow will tighten the reins?’438 The EPP Group remained cautious about Gorbachev’s declared sincerity and the Kremlin’s new political direction. Its members were keen ‘not to lose the initiative and to continue along the path of political unification of a free Europe, which will enable them to provide a strong response to all eventualities’439

Its doubts were fuelled by the persistent human rights violations in the Soviet Union, which the European Parliament highlighted in numerous resolutions.

At the same time, the debate on disarmament was still going on.

The US President and the Soviet General Secretary met regularly: in October 1986 in Reykjavik to discuss disarmament and security, and in July 1987 to sign the agreement on the ‘double-zero option’, which provided for the decommissioning and destruction of all intermediate-range nuclear missiles (over 500 km) based in Europe.
The foundations were laid for a third zero option: by allowing Europe to keep only short-range nuclear missiles (less than 500 km), the agreement ‘singled out’ the Federal Republic of Germany, which became the only member of NATO to be vulnerable to a nuclear attack.

The members of the EPP Group noted that the USSR held the diplomatic advantage. The Soviets put the European governments in a difficult situation with regard to their people. In West Germany in particular, they could no longer understand why NATO was refusing to enter into negotiations. Pierre Pflimlin noted, however, that ‘the total or partial elimination of American nuclear weapons stationed on European soil, understandably deemed desirable by a sizeable portion of public opinion, poses the problem in totally new terms. In order to guarantee our future security, it is essential […] that the enormous imbalance in conventional arms should end and that chemical and bacteriological weapons […] should be eliminated altogether’.

EPP Group Presidency in Moscow (March 1987)

As far as the EPP was concerned, good intentions alone were not enough to guarantee peace. The agreements had to be complied with and their application monitored on the ground through strict and effective procedures. From 16 to 21 March 1987, at the invitation of Lev Tolkunov, Chairman of the Soviet of the Union and the Parliamentary Group of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the EPP Group Presidency undertook a fact-finding visit to the USSR.

In Moscow the Group Presidency, comprising Egon Klepsch, Panayotis Lambrias, Giovanni Giavazzi, Michel Debatisse, Lambert Croux and Hanja Maij-Weggen, hoped to uncover the answers to a number of questions: Was the USSR changing? Did Mikhail Gorbachev want to establish open relations with the Community? Was an agreement on the ‘Euromissiles’ possible? Would the zero option not result in weaker security for Europe? The Group Presidency wanted to clarify the Soviets’ intentions with regard to the elimination of all nuclear and chemical weapons, the application of the third Helsinki ‘basket’ (respect for human rights, free trade throughout the continent of Europe) and the resolution of regional conflicts (Afghanistan, East Africa and West Africa, Central America, South-East Asia). The visit revealed that the Soviets were serious about strengthening relations between both parts of Europe, which had entered a decisive phase on 22 September 1986 with the opening of talks between the Community and Comecon experts.

On 13 November 1987 in Brussels the Group organised a conference on perestroika. It emphasised that the USSR had to tackle numerous
internal problems: the collapse of its economic system (poorly functioning kolkhozes and planning); the explosion of the black market; a certain ideological crisis and corruption in the Communist Party itself; and active opposition in some occupied countries (Poland, Afghanistan). After the fall of Nikita Khrushchev, the USSR had 'steered a course between a return to Stalinism and a national Bolshevist drift'\textsuperscript{443}. Mikhail Gorbachev now had the difficult task of tackling corruption in the Party, controlling the local mafia and fighting alcoholism. In East-West relations, the Kremlin was trying to exploit existing antagonism or contradictions in the West. Moscow wanted to eliminate all intermediate-range nuclear missiles but did not want to go any further than that (chemical or conventional weapons). In the light of the new military challenges presented by the United States over the next five years (notably the SDI), 'Moscow is being forced to choose not between guns and butter but between today's guns and tomorrow's guns'\textsuperscript{444}.

Cracks in the Wall of Shame (early 1989)

At the beginning of 1989 a new wind swept through the region, but still nobody in the West seemed to understand that it would sweep away everything in its path. It came first of all from Poland, where General Jaruzelski legalised Solidarity (Solidarność) and allowed virtually free elections to be held. A government led by a Catholic from the Solidarity movement, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was established. It also came from Afghanistan, from which the exhausted Red Army was withdrawing. It swept through Hungary, where the regime at last recognised the martyr Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister who had led the 1956 Bucharest revolution against Moscow.

In Czechoslovakia Václav Havel was arrested during a ceremony commemorating Jan Palach, the student who had burnt himself to death in January 1969 in protest against the Soviet invasion. In East Germany the Communist movement was regaining strength and winning the support of the army and secret police. Any reunification of Germany still seemed highly unlikely. The East German Government was counting on the support of the USSR and the Soviet troops stationed in its territory. However, Mikhail Gorbachev did not want to jeopardise his policy of rapprochement with the West and refused to authorise any military intervention, confirming this to Helmut Kohl during his visit to Bonn on 13 June 1989. Hungary had just opened up its border with Austria to East German nationals and an entire population started to flee to the West. On 9 October 1989 more than 70 000 people defied the regime, chanting ‘we are the people’. Violent clashes were
expected, but none occurred. On 16 October, 120,000 people marched in protest. On 18 October Erich Honecker, who had tried to save the regime right up until the very end, resigned. The demonstrations spread to all parts of East Germany, and the authorities were forced to pull back bit by bit before giving up altogether. A new leadership was put in place, promising free elections, and on 9 November it announced that it, too, would open its border with West Germany, including West Berlin. The Wall of Shame had fallen.

**Group’s reaction to the fall of the Berlin Wall (November 1989)**

The Group Presidency, re-elected on 17 July 1989, was once again led by Egon Klepsch. Originally from the Sudeten region, he had a personal interest in the German question and the future of central Europe. By chance, on the same day as the Group’s new leadership was elected in Strasbourg, the Council received an application from Austria to join the Community. The fall of the Berlin Wall came as a complete surprise and was witnessed live on television by millions of Western Europeans on the evening of 9 November. The EPP Group, however, had already established contacts with the democratic forces that were emerging in some of the Comecon countries. The repression in Poland and Hungary was becoming less brutal, and so on 29 October the Group Presidency began a visit to Hungary. The report of that visit by Egon Klepsch himself is particularly interesting: ‘It was the delegation from the Hungarian Democratic Forum, led by its Chairman, József Antall, who undoubtedly has the makings of a great statesman, that seemed to us to be by far the most convincing and the most capable of leading. If the HDF, which was formed two years ago, initially attracted leading figures from right across the political spectrum, thereby presenting a somewhat confused image, it has since evolved (Mr Antall’s election as Chairman being one of the key elements here) into an alliance of people with Christian Democrat beliefs whose fundamental political positions are in line with those of the CDPP and the Smallholders’ Party. However, unlike these two parties, the HDF seems to have a broader and more effective party apparatus; it seems to have clear ideas of Hungary’s future, in terms of both foreign and domestic policy; and it also seems to be significantly more popular among voters than the other parties’.

This political analysis was borne out by events. József Antall was soon to become the country’s Prime Minister. It was under his leadership that his party became a major government party and Hungary embarked on the reforms needed for it to join the European Union.
The European Parliament’s sitting in November 1989 on the situation in Central and Eastern Europe was an enthusiastic affair. Helmut Kohl was invited to address the Members after President François Mitterrand. Historic events were taking place, both for Germany, which could now think about reunification, and for all the people of Eastern Europe. Konrad Adenauer’s prediction of ‘a free and united Germany in a free and united Europe’ was to be fulfilled.

The European revolution in the East was just the first stage. It was now vital to ensure that things kept moving forward, as Pierre Bernard-Reymond emphasised the day after the speech by the German Chancellor. It was important first of all to be careful to ‘avoid any action that would make Mr Gorbachev’s task more difficult given that the positive development of the current situation in Central Europe is dependent on its success. […] [We must be careful] since we know that some of the governments leading totalitarian regimes have not yet given in to the pressure from their people. [We must be careful] since although the military situation is set against a backdrop of disarmament, resolving it will be dangerous since one of the camps, which still has massive stockpiles of weapons, is politically unstable’. However, a determined effort was also needed to provide immediate assistance to Poland and Hungary ‘which have courageously highlighted the path to democracy’, and the countries that would follow them down that path.

After the fall of the Wall, the Group’s initiatives increased. Egon Klesch organised a meeting of the Group’s enlarged Bureau in Strasbourg on 8 and 9 December to examine a single topic: the changes in Eastern Europe. Representatives of civil society and the new democratic parties in Hungary, Poland and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were invited to attend. They had the opportunity to speak to the members of the Bureau, the four Christian Democratic Commissioners who had come along, as well as Giulio Andreotti, the Italian Prime Minister, and Paul De Keersmaeker, a former member of the Group and Belgian Minister, who were in Strasbourg for the European Council meeting being held at the same time.

The EPP Bureau expected the European Council, meeting to discuss the consequences of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, to provide ‘decisions to match the significance of the historic events sweeping our continent […] which will shape the destiny of millions of Europeans’. In the West, the European Community was now well established, while in the East the last vestiges of totalitarianism had just disappeared: ‘The two parts of Europe are thus able to draw closer together and there is every
reason to hope that tomorrow the continent as a whole will recover its unity in a free and democratic society. According to the Group, it was essential to respond to the quickening pace of history by quickening the pace of European integration.

The European Council was indeed determined to react to the magnitude of the events, and the Twelve agreed in principle to hold a new Intergovernmental Conference on monetary union.

Shortly afterwards, from 8 to 12 January 1990, the Group held a meeting at the Reichstag in Berlin, where everyone could see and touch the Wall under demolition. The most fortunate were able to buy a chunk of painted cement, soon to become a relic of a different era, for DM 2. The Group visited East Berlin and met members of the newly-formed CDU-East and representatives of the Churches and Demokratischer Aufbruch. A few days later, during the Strasbourg sitting of 16 January, four Estonian guests addressed the Group, including one of the leaders of the Independence Party, Tunne Kelam, who would himself eventually become an elected member of the Group in 2004. On 17 January, at a meeting of the Group Bureau, Horst Langes, President of the Foundation for the Cooperation of Christian Democrats in Europe recently set up by the Group, submitted urgent requests for funds for photocopiers, fax machines and even megaphones. This equipment was to be used to help the democratic forces being established to participate in the first democratic elections to be held in the countries of Central Europe. The Party’s Secretary-General, Thomas Jansen, was to supply a list of the parties that were connected to the EPP. On 14 February the EPP Group appointed its six representatives to the ad hoc committee which the European Parliament had just set up on the consequences of German reunification: Fritz Pirkl, Elmar Brok, Leo Tindemans, Gerardo Fernández-Albor, Adrien Zeller and Roberto Formigoni.

**EPP Group advocates rapid reunification of Germany within the European Union**

On 18 March the first democratic elections were held in the eastern part of Germany. The leader of the newly-formed CDU-East, Lothar de Maizière, bolstered by the dramatic initiatives taken by Chancellor Helmut Kohl to achieve reunification, became Prime Minister. One week later, on 25 March, József Antall was victorious in Hungary. The European Union, notably France and Germany, reacted: on 19 April Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand proposed that an Intergovernmental Conference on political union be held alongside the conference on EMU. On 17 May Lothar de Maizière visited Strasbourg to address the
Group. The elections in Czechoslovakia were held on 8 June. On 4 July in Luxembourg Egon Klepsch organised, alongside the Group meeting, a conference on the future of Europe, which was attended by Jacques Delors and numerous EPP party leaders. On 6 July the Group adopted a Declaration prepared by a working group led by Raphael Chanterie, ‘Europe 2000’, which called for the reunification of the continent and the continuation of the project for a federal Europe. On 10 May Wilfried Martens was elected President of the EPP, replacing Jacques Santer.

The Group’s political strategy now focused on the new situation that was developing month by month, week by week and day by day, like a film on fast-forward. New geographical horizons, new geopolitical concepts and new dimensions of the European ideal were taking shape.

On 3 September 1990 the Group’s Study Days in Vienna began. Its sister party, the ÖVP, was in power. Its leaders, government members Joseph Riegler and Alois Mock, together with Friedrich König, a Group observer, put forward arguments in favour of their country’s future accession. Austria’s neutrality would no longer be an obstacle. All of Central Europe was shifting, including the Baltic countries, and there were new signals coming from Yugoslavia, some full of hope; but others laden with calls for war and suppression.

On 3 October, in the Group’s meeting room, room 62 in the rue Béliard in Brussels, Egon Klepsch took the initiative of organising a ceremony to which he invited all MEPs, except for the extremist groups, to celebrate German reunification, which became official on that day. Wilfried Martens, Pierre Pflimlin, Emilio Colombo and Jürgen Schröder, leading Christian Democratic members of the former Volkskammer, addressed those present. The participants felt that they were witnessing a key date in Europe’s history.

Klepsch said: ‘3 October is a great day not just for Germany but for all of Europe’. He also stressed that the Christian Democrat leaders in Germany had always known that ‘in order to overcome the division of Germany, they needed a united Europe’. The next speaker after the Group Chairman was Wilfried Martens, President of the European People’s Party, who thanked Chancellor Kohl for having brought this project to fruition: ‘Thank you, Chancellor Kohl, for leaving no room for uncertainty or apprehension. Indeed, events themselves have already disproved the accusation sometimes made of the FRG that it was shifting towards the east, or at least towards a more neutral position in order to achieve unification. No, the GDR chose of its own accord to move towards West Germany and, consequently, towards the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. We are delighted’, he went on, ‘that the USSR has eventually had no choice but to allow the unified Germany to be part of
NATO. Today only the security framework offered by the Atlantic Alliance can guarantee the future stability of Europe, as the European Community and even the Western European Union (WEU) are still far from being able to guarantee Europe’s collective defence and security. Some of Germany’s partners in Western Europe, Martens concluded, ‘had feared that the fast pace of German unification would mean that it was out of touch with the process of European integration. I, personally, hope that one will foster the other, with German unity acting as a powerful catalyst for European union’.

According to Emilio Colombo, President of the European Union of Christian Democrats, German unification ‘is putting an end to one of the worst consequences of Yalta’. ‘We cannot ignore the fact that there are some fears about unification’, continued the former President of the European Parliament. ‘They stem from the fact that people see a united Germany at the heart of Europe through the dark glasses of the past rather than the experience of recent years […] We must not give any credence to these fears. We must have confidence in the united Germany’.

He highlighted ‘the need in Europe for a major cultural offensive to support a major humanist trend’. He hoped that the Intergovernmental Conferences planned for the end of the year would lead to a genuine European Union, rather than merely making non-essential amendments to the existing Treaties.

In the view of the EPP Group, it was not a matter of slowing down the pace of European integration, but of strengthening Community action despite the complexity of the reunification process. After the upheavals in the East, the European Community was needed more than ever. Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, some people were talking about a return to ‘the Europe of nations’ and a rise in nationalism. In response to such statements, the members of the EPP Group highlighted a number of truths: ‘Though the USSR and the Warsaw Pact may have been weakened, Russia remains the largest power in Europe; it would therefore be better for our countries to be able to speak with one voice. The same is true in relation to our American partners […] The people will once again feel that Europe is their home and will rediscover their sense of identity and their roots. Is there any other project capable of offering people an ideal that is more concrete, one that offers such peace and fraternity, one that is truer than the ideal of solidarity, which is the springboard for broader solidarity in an unbalanced, shifting and increasingly interdependent world?’ According to Adrien Zeller, ‘asking these questions is the same as answering them’.

During the Group’s Study Days in Crete, from 30 April to 4 May 1990, Jean Penders stated the following: ‘The revolutions in the autumn of
1989 made it abundantly clear that the Marxist system of state and government, in which freedom, opportunities for individual development and active participation by the public in the economy and politics are stifled, has been a total failure. The only real alternative is a democratic society in which human rights, political pluralism and free elections are generally accepted.

The Western Economic Summit, held in Paris from 14 to 16 July 1989 and known as the ‘Summit of the Arch’, asked the Commission to coordinate measures to assist economic restructuring in Poland and Hungary. The PHARE programme, which benefited both countries and which the Council subsequently intended to extend to other countries that were striving to achieve democracy, gave concrete expression to the key role played by the Community within the ‘G-24’ in the development of eastern Europe.

Parliament and the EPP Group kept a close eye on developments in the East. Otto von Habsburg concentrated on Hungary through the EP Delegation for relations with that country, while Jean-Louis Bourlanges defended Poland’s cause in the European Parliament. The Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee, Maria Luisa Cassanmagnago Cerretti, along with Parliament’s Enlarged Bureau, met Presidents Václav Havel and Lech Wałęsa during their visits on 20 March and 4 April 1991 respectively. In addition to the Crete Study Days in 1990 on the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, the Group devoted part of its Study Days in Schwerin (Germany) to the situation in the new Länder and the Baltic region. The Group also observed the first free elections.

**Break-up of the USSR (December 1991)**

In the USSR events were also moving quickly. On 16 April 1991 the Chairman of the Russian Parliament, Boris Yeltsin, during an official visit to Strasbourg, met the members of the EPP Group. In his speech Yeltsin described Russia as being part of *the great European family* and added that he hoped that it would be represented in the UN and other international organisations.

In his welcoming speech, Egon Klepsch said *Russia is one of the greatest countries of Europe and the Chairman of the Russian Parliament has the confidence of the vast majority of the Russian population. Many centuries of shared history and the same Christian foundations have established powerful links between Russia and the Member States of the European Community. Russia’s awakening to democracy and search for less rigid political and economic structures must be supported unreservedly by the European Community*. 
Four months after this meeting, in August, the Conservatives tried to put the Communists back in power. The coup was unsuccessful and Boris Yeltsin dismantled the Communist apparatus once and for all. As highlighted in the EPP Group’s report from that time: ‘For the Soviet astronauts returning to earth after a long mission during which they were not kept informed of events, the Soviet Union proved unrecognisable: it had in fact vanished over a period of a few months, and in its place were Russia and other new independent republics, following the failed coup attempt by the military, in August 1991, against Mikhail Gorbachev. The reaction of the forces of democracy, embodied by Boris Yeltsin, had ultimately the effect of accelerating the collapse of the Communist regime and the break-up of the Soviet State, declared dissolved on 17 December 1991. Each of the former republics in turn declared independence and joined the UN’.

In just a few weeks, the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance were to see their traditional strategic adversary disappear. The former Soviet Republics each joined the CSCE, which became the forum where the entire continent discussed issues linked to security, cooperation and the resolution of problems concerning borders and minorities.

The Baltic region regains ‘its place on the maps of Europe and in the minds of the West’

As far back as 1987 the European Parliament had expressed serious concerns about the human rights violations committed by the USSR in the Baltic States. On 23 August 1989 almost 2 million people in the Baltic countries formed a human chain stretching more than 500 kilometres to protest against their countries’ occupation by the Soviet Union. This became known as the ‘Baltic Way’ and marked the beginning of the independence movement of the three republics.

In September 1990 an EPP Group delegation visited Lithuania, the country that was at the forefront of the independence movement in the region. Egon Klepsch, Ria Oomen-Ruijten, Bartho Pronk, Georgios Sardakis and Konstantinos Stavrou met the leaders of Lithuania, the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Union and the Catholic Church and offered them their support. However, after the Baltic Republics declared their independence the Soviet repression became even worse. The Red Army intervened on 13 January 1991, killing and injuring many Lithuanians.

The President of the Constitutional Assembly of the Republic of Lithuania and Head of State, Vytautas Landsbergis, who was to become a member of the EPP Group in 2004, described the events: ‘At that stage
I was in the Supreme Council and I asked the deputies to come together. Many of them came. The volunteers, who had just taken the oath and made their confession where they were, and the few members of the Defence Department and Security Service were ready to defend the buildings, even though they had hardly any weapons – just a few pistols and hunting rifles, some sticks and some cans of petrol.

‘I tried to call Mikhail Gorbachev; I insisted that his assistant or secretary inform the President of the Soviet Union that men and women were being murdered in Vilnius, that he alone had the power to stop the massacre and that, if he did not stop it, he would be held accountable for it. I also managed to contact our honorary consul in Oslo, who immediately got in touch with the Foreign Minister there and the Icelandic Foreign Minister. Both Ministers reacted with resolve. Boris Yeltsin took the critical and courageous decision to go to Tallinn that very day – 13 January – in spite of warnings from those close to him and the real danger to which he was exposing himself. It was from the Estonian capital that the four countries – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia – launched the declaration of protest, in which they recognised each other’s national sovereignty and agreed that their relations would be governed by the principles of international law. They also appealed to the UN Secretary-General.

In the meantime, the night of 13 January was one of horror and the dawn broke to sorrow.

‘People dead, people injured. Hospitals overflowing. Kaunas took over television broadcasts from the station in Vilnius, which had been occupied. The new Prime Minister had disappeared. We were waiting for the Supreme Council to be attacked. I asked the women to leave the building but they wouldn’t listen to me. I spoke to the crowd gathered outside the Supreme Council and asked the people to disperse in order to ensure that there were no further victims. They knew what was going to happen but they wouldn’t leave. I heard later that some people had even been hurt that I would suggest such a thing. I wrote and recorded a speech that was to be broadcast in case we did not survive. It contained advice on the attitude to adopt if there were another occupation. Fortunately, it did not come to that, the attack ended and was never repeated in such a violent fashion. It was claimed that a KGB officer, when asked why the Supreme Council had not been attacked, replied: “There was too much flesh around it!” […]

‘That is how Lithuania regained its place on the maps of Europe and in the minds of the West. People no longer asked where Lithuania was; they asked who these men were who were capable of dying for their freedom with a song on their lips, and of overcoming a nuclear empire empty-handed’. 
On 14 January the European Parliament’s Political Affairs Committee held an urgent extraordinary meeting at a time when the international community was preoccupied with the crisis in the Gulf. On 18 January the EPP Group and the Christian Democrat International organised a press conference in the European Parliament, attended by the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Algirdas Saudargas, who was visiting the Group. At the press conference the Lithuanian Minister criticised the Western leaders’ attitude towards the Baltic countries, pointing out that they had still not called for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuania. From his European Parliament platform the Minister called on the MEPs and MPs from the EC states to come to the Parliament in Vilnius, which was under siege from the Red Army troops. ‘Stop talking about democracy’, he said. ‘Come to Vilnius to fight for democracy. Come and sleep in the Lithuanian Parliament. It is a matter of life or death for the deputies’.

These words struck a chord with the European People’s Party and its Group in the European Parliament. On the same day as the press conference, Wilfried Martens welcomed the leaders of the Christian Democrat International (CDI) and members of the Group to the Party’s headquarters in Brussels. He expressed the solidarity of the Group and the EPP with the people and forces that were fighting for the democratic institutions of the Baltic states and demanding their independence. ‘We must remind President Mikhail Gorbachev of his solemn commitment in the Paris Declaration last November to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. I call on the Soviet leaders to respect the will of the Baltic peoples.’

In a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev dated 24 January 1991, Wilfried Martens and Egon Klepsch said that the EPP was very concerned about the situation in the Baltic Republics and the changes in their relations with the central Soviet authorities: ‘The intervention of Soviet troops in Lithuania and in Latvia, from which you have distanced yourself, has caused great concern in the European Community. The Christian Democrats in those countries, who are members of the EPP, have strongly condemned the actions of the Soviet soldiers and deeply regret the fact that their deployment, which was neither provoked nor justifiable, resulted in deaths and injuries’. During the January 1991 part-session, the Political Affairs Committee issued a declaration condemning the Soviet aggression.

The three Baltic States eventually declared their independence from the Soviet Union: Lithuania on 11 March, Latvia on 4 May and Estonia on 20 August 1991. At the ministerial meeting of 27 August, held within the framework of European political cooperation, the Community and
its Member States confirmed their decision to recognise officially the independence of these three states, to establish diplomatic relations with them as soon as possible and to support their development efforts. The concerns raised by the Soviet Government’s refusal to negotiate with the Baltic countries led to a new European Parliament resolution, adopted on 13 June 1991. On 10 July the EPP Group welcomed Vytautas Landsbergis to Strasbourg for discussions. The Political Affairs Committee, at a meeting held from 15 to 17 July 1991, decided to draw up a report on the situation in the Baltic Republics, and the Spanish MEP Concepció Ferrer i Casals was appointed rapporteur. Adopted in plenary on 23 April 1993, the resolution that followed on from the report expressed Parliament’s unanimous support and desire to encourage Community and international action to help Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to integrate as quickly as possible into the international economic system, in particular by promoting their relations with the Nordic Council and the European Community. The EP hoped that the cooperation agreements would turn into association agreements as soon as possible. The resolution called on Russia to do everything in its power to accelerate the withdrawal of all troops of the former Soviet Union from the Baltic States, thus respecting the sovereign will of the citizens of those countries. While not forgetting the ‘Russification’ to which the Baltics had been subjected, the motion for a resolution called on the Baltic authorities to take whatever measures were necessary to prevent the Russian-speaking minority from being the subject of any discriminatory practices contrary to the principles of international law, to which the Baltic Republics subscribed.
Chapter XXVI
THE YUGOSLAVIAN CONFLICT (1990-1995)
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

A return to war in Europe

The end of the Soviet Empire was, with some singular exceptions, a peaceful revolution. In the late 1980s/early 1990s the bloc sank meekly but resolutely into history. Conversely, the fragmentation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia resulted in a troubled period of civil war. Scarcely 80 years on, in the same region, Europe’s old demons were resurfacing.

The death of General Tito in May 1980 brought with it a new period of unrest caused by three factors: an economic crisis, a crisis in the Communist Party with the emergence of an opposition, and a resurgence in national feeling.

At the head of the government, Branko Mikulić and the League of Communists announced the introduction of economic reforms that were designed gradually to set Yugoslavia on the path to a Western-style market economy. These reforms resulted in numerous bankruptcies and a rise in unemployment. The weakened federal authority was changing, allowing disputes to flourish between the Republics, which, at the same time, had also begun to reform their own economies. Mikulić resigned on 30 December 1988. The serious crisis of legitimacy facing Yugoslavian Communism encouraged the resurgence of nationalism. During this period demonstrations took place in Belgrade, Serbia, and in Pristina, Kosovo. In 1989 Slobodan Milošević became President of Serbia. His goal was to create a ‘Greater Serbia’, encompassing the Serbian minorities in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. The autonomous status of Vojvodina and Kosovo within Serbia was abolished.

In January 1990 the new Yugoslavian Prime Minister, Ante Marković, needed to deal with the re-emerging nationalisms and faced the break-up of the League of Communists. Eager to establish a mixed economy, freedom of speech and association, as well as free elections in all the Republics, the League was nonetheless riven by deep internal
differences, and its proposals were rejected by its Congress. Slovenia and Croatia walked out of the Congress and severed all links with the Federal League. The political change towards democracy was beginning to take shape: in April reformers gained the upper hand in Slovenia and adopted a declaration of sovereignty, which was confirmed by a referendum; a non-Communist government was formed in Croatia following free elections, and in December the Republic adopted a new Constitution that conferred on it the right to secede; in September Kosovo proclaimed itself a Republic. On 20 and 21 February 1991 the Slovenian and Croatian Parliaments proposed the ‘dissociation’ of the Federation into several sovereign states.

The first human rights violations were condemned by the European Parliament in 1991. During the February part-session, Doris Pack spoke about the situation of Kosovo’s Albanian population. She said that the Serbian Government’s action could be labelled an attempt to impose a type of apartheid. During the urgency debate, Mrs Pack referred to human rights violations and the destruction of the Albanian population’s cultural identity. Parliament adopted a resolution in which it asked the Council to make a rigorous protest to the authorities in Belgrade and to suspend the ongoing negotiations on a financial protocol between the Community and Yugoslavia.

In March 1991 the Federal President, Borisav Jović, resigned after the Federal Collective Presidency refused to adopt the urgent measures proposed by the army to secure calm in the country. The Members of the European Parliament feared that the institutional crisis and the political and economic crisis were deteriorating. The Yugoslav Federation risked becoming ungovernable and dissolving. Following a visit by the European Parliament-Yugoslavia Interparliamentary Delegation, Pavlos Sarlis called for the borders in the Balkans to be maintained.

Towards independence for the Western Balkan states

From the start of 1991 the European Community had exerted “friendly pressure” on Belgrade in order to enable a solution to be found within the Yugoslav federal system. In reality, the Twelve did not have a united position and wasted a lot of time on procedures, enabling Slobodan Milošević, Belgrade’s strongman, to create de facto situations that were impossible to control.

In April 1991 events erupted in the Serbian enclaves of Croatia. In May nationalist commandos from Serbia entered the Serbian regions of Croatia; the Yugoslav army, which had been deployed in the region
The yugoslavian conflict (1990-1995) and its consequences
to restore calm, was opposed by some Croatians, who accused it of protecting the Serbs. On 25 June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence, effective as of 26 June 1991. Twenty-four hours later the Yugoslav army was deployed to Slovenia’s border checkpoints. Fighting between the federal army and the Slovenian territorial defence forces was hard-fought and the list of dead and injured grew rapidly. The offensive was only to last 10 days, however. Meanwhile, the federal army deployed some 70 000 troops in Croatia. The Community tried to establish dialogue between the various parties and to resolve the crisis by peaceful means. At the Luxembourg summit in June 1991 it decided to become involved and sent the ‘troika’ to the area in ‘an attempt to maintain the unity of Yugoslavia’, a state that the international community continued to recognise. On 28 June a ceasefire with Slovenia was negotiated and Community observers were sent to oversee it. Slovenia and Croatia agreed to suspend their declaration of independence for three months. Slovenia became independent on 25 June 1991. Alojz Peterle, Prime Minister until May 1992, played a decisive role in this respect as leader of the Slovenian Christian Democrat party since its creation in 1990.

During the EPP Group’s conference on the Community’s security and defence policy, held in Brussels during the first week of July, the Group’s Chairman, Egon Klepsch, made a statement on the events in Yugoslavia. He said that he was in favour of sending European Parliament observers to the region immediately and he criticised the Yugoslav army for being ‘an army against the people, an instrument of usurpers and Stalinist ideologists’. The army generals were harming not just their own people, but peace in Europe, Klepsch said. Consequently, an EPP Group delegation composed of Otto von Habsburg, Doris Pack, Vice-Chairman of the EP-Yugoslavia Interparliamentary Delegation, Arie Oostlander, rapporteur on Yugoslavia, and Pavlos Sarlis, immediately travelled to Slovenia and Croatia to observe the situation before the EP debate on the Yugoslav question.

The debate was held during the part-session of 8 to 12 July 1991. The joint resolution adopted by the MEPs on 10 July condemned the fact that the Yugoslav army had used force in Slovenia, without the authorisation of the federal authorities, and called on all the parties in the region to refrain from any further use of force.

The European Parliament supported all of the efforts to restore peace, particularly those of the European Community and the CSCE. It also supported the Council’s decision to suspend economic and

---
a The agreement was reached in Brioni on 7 July.
financial assistance to Yugoslavia and called on the Commission, the Council, European political cooperation and the Member State governments to make it clear that continued interference by the Yugoslav federal army in the political crisis would result in the suspension of all assistance and cooperation, including diplomatic relations, with the Federation.\footnote{485} This message referred to the article of the Yugoslav Constitution stipulating that the constituent Republics and autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia had the right to determine their future using peaceful and democratic means. According to Parliament, ‘the Republics are duty bound to use only peaceful and democratic means to make constitutional changes, they must fully respect the CSCE obligations as well as human rights, notably the rights of minorities, and they must agree to be bound by the international commitments made by the Yugoslav Federation.’\footnote{486}

As far as Doris Pack was concerned, the proclamation of independence by Slovenia and Croatia had a solid legal foundation as it was based on democratic principles expressed by their respective peoples and parliaments.\footnote{487} Speaking on behalf of the EPP Group, she stressed that the federal army had exceeded its orders, with tragic consequences.\footnote{488} In her view, a moratorium suspending the declaration of independence should be invoked to give the two Republics enough time to conclude agreements with the other Republics: ‘If the army intervenes again, the Community will have to recognise the independence of Croatia and Slovenia.’\footnote{489} Otto von Habsburg felt that this was a failing: ‘Yugoslavia no longer exists in its current form; that type of state is over. The fault lies with the Community, which has proved to be weak and unable to find a resolution at the appropriate time.’\footnote{490} Highlighting the disparity between the Community’s actual power and the means it had to apply it, von Habsburg said that if the MEPs wanted democracy to extend to international law, it was essential to proclaim people’s right to self-determination and insist that all military intervention be banned.\footnote{491} Since the people of both Republics had expressed their wishes, negotiations with the other parties in the conflict should be launched in order to put the case for their independence.

On 29 July 1991 the Twelve demanded that the Federation’s internal frontiers should be inviolable, a demand that was rejected by Slobodan Milošević and the Croatian Serbs, who refused to be part of an independent Croatia. Fighting intensified in Croatia, where Serbs were carrying out fierce bomb attacks on Vukovar. The Twelve organised a peace conference in The Hague, which began on 7 September 1991. However, because of differences amongst the Twelve, they did not manage to force an end to the fighting.
In September the Dutch Presidency of the Community, supported by France and Germany, proposed sending a Western European Union intervention force to the region, but the United Kingdom, backed by Denmark and Portugal, was opposed to any commitment of troops. The Carrington plan, which took into account the desire for independence already expressed by Slovenia and Croatia, and, subsequently, by Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, abandoned the idea of the continued existence of a Yugoslav Federation.

During Parliament’s September 1991 part-session, the Christian Democrat Commissioner Abel Matutes confirmed the Commission’s intention to maintain dialogue with the European Parliament on the issue. The Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee, Maria Luisa Cassanmagnago Cerretti, highlighted the fact that ‘from all parts a wind of democracy is beginning to blow. As such, the free world cannot remain impervious to the bloodbath that is consuming Yugoslavia’. The Political Affairs Committee had in June asked for the CSCE mechanisms to be invoked. The Italian MEP, speaking on behalf of the EPP Group, noted that the various parties in Yugoslavia wanted peace and that new instruments now needed to be found in order to promote democratic values through cooperation. She pointed out that the Political Affairs Committee had asked that the European Parliament be allowed to meet with the representatives of the parliaments of the various Yugoslav Republics. ‘There is no doubt that the people have the right to self-determination. But our task is to encourage the Yugoslav parliaments to discuss and to understand that the special characteristics of each party can be expressed without jeopardising political and economic integration’. The Chairman said that she was in favour of the deployment of a peacekeeping force to prevent the conflict from spreading.

On 16 December 1991 the Twelve decided to recognise every Republic that wanted to be recognised as such, on condition that it respected human rights, minority rights and the use of arbitration. This decision eliminated the precondition for the global agreement between the parties that had been achieved at the peace conference. On 23 December 1991 Germany unilaterally recognised Slovenia and Croatia. It was followed, on 15 January 1992, by its partner countries after the conference’s Arbitration Commission decided that these two Republics satisfied the required conditions.

On 25 January 1992 Parliament decided, despite strong opposition from Bosnian Serbs, that a referendum on the Republic’s independence should be held. The referendum on separation from Yugoslavia was thus held in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 29 February and
1 March. Independence was approved by 64% of the citizens. The Serbs boycotted the referendum, however, and blocked Sarajevo with barricades.

In spite of everything, according to Arie Oostlander, ‘these results must be accepted since two-thirds of the region’s population took part in the referendum, 25% of whom were Serbs, despite the pressure on them. The constitution of a confederation or separation into cantons must be examined closely’.\textsuperscript{499} Otto von Habsburg believed that in Bosnia-Herzegovina, unlike the situation in Croatia or Slovenia, the question of nationalities was a real problem. Von Habsburg expressed his concern that the situation might explode as a result of external Serbian influence.\textsuperscript{500} On 6 May 1992, under the Presidency of Emilio Colombo, in a message addressed to the Heads of State or Government and to foreign ministers belonging to member parties of the ECDU, the Political Bureau of the European Union of Christian Democrats condemned Serbia’s ‘unacceptable’ aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{501} According to the message, the Political Bureau ‘believes that diplomatic relations with Serbia must be suspended immediately to convey democratic Europe’s disapproval of the policy of that Republic’s leaders’.\textsuperscript{502} Furthermore, ‘the embargo on resources that could add to the aggressor’s military apparatus must be strictly enforced’.\textsuperscript{503}

In Belgrade, Bosnian independence did not go down well. After the Slovenian front, which had rapidly been dealt with, and the Croatian front, a third war was taking shape in a drained Yugoslavia: it was the turn of Vukovar, Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, etc.

**War, massacres and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia (1992-1995)**

In June 1992 Arie Oostlander presented to Parliament, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, his report on relations between the European Community and the Republics of the former Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{504} The motion for a resolution contained in the report considered that Yugoslavia had ceased to exist as a federation of six Republics and stated that the new Federation composed of Serbia and Montenegro could not claim to take over all the international rights and duties of the former Yugoslavia.

While the motion for a resolution stated that recognition of the Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and other Republics that complied with the pre-established criteria should be welcomed, it pointed out that ‘recognition would immediately entail more binding obligations for the UN and the EEC in respect of military action against Bosnia and Croatia since such action would officially be deemed to be a violation of
international law’. It also took the view that ‘the continuing oppression of the Albanian population of Kosovo is unacceptable and constitutes an obstacle to normal relations between Serbia and the EC’.

The motion for a resolution also lists the minority rights and human rights that should be protected by the courts. The borders within Yugoslav territory should be respected and new, self-governing entities should be formed within the republics, where the minorities could enjoy their specific rights. According to Arie Oostlander, these borders should only be altered with the agreement of the relevant authorities and populations. In his view, the federal army should refrain from supporting Serb militias and from all forms of oppressive action in respect of the territories of the other republics. Finally, the disappearance of federal Yugoslavia meant that there was no longer any legal basis for the federal army. The rapporteur said that it should be dissolved under UN supervision and that the European Community should provide aid to retrain federal army personnel. The report recommended that the Commission draw up an economic aid programme to help overcome the problems affecting Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular.

Otto von Habsburg called for a rapid armed intervention to neutralise the aggressors since ‘every minute that passes brings more bloodshed, more despair. We no longer have the luxury of time and we must make every effort to put an end to this massacre, this “genocide”’. He firmly believed that once they were rid of the Milošević dictatorship, the Serbs, who were Europeans too, would rejoin the great European family.

The Vance-Owen Plan

The Vance-Owen Plan sought to divide Bosnia fairly between Muslims, Croats and Serbs and was presented to the Security Council. The Serbs rejected it, forcing the Security Council to adopt a programme of five urgent actions: supply of humanitarian aid to the Bosnian population; effective application of all of the economic sanctions against the Serbs agreed as part of the United Nations resolutions; closure of the borders between Serbia and the Serbian parts of Bosnia; creation of a protection zone to enable the civilian population to receive supplies; and establishment of an international tribunal to try war criminals.

Helveg Petersen, the Danish Foreign Minister, speaking on behalf of European political cooperation, defended the Security Council’s programme in the European Parliament during the May 1993 part-session.
Arie Oostlander stated that the EPP Group, like other groups, did not agree with the compromise as it stood.\textsuperscript{512} He found it strange that the EC Member States should hide behind the Russians in order to justify the weakness of their position. It was also strange ‘that solutions should be imposed on a sovereign state that we have recognised, yet that state is not recognised in the decisions adopting our solutions’\textsuperscript{513} In addition, ‘the rebel troops approve our decisions and we should be ashamed of that for we are supporters of a legal order that we must ensure is respected’.\textsuperscript{514} It was vital to protect the civilian populations, and work should be done with the legal government to provide aerial protection for the populations at risk.

During a mission to Sarajevo the European Parliament expressed its support for the legal government.

Doris Pack noted that the Russians, taking advantage of the West’s weakness and opting to side with their Serbian friends, had announced the death of the Vance-Owen Plan: ‘Even if we admit that the plan is a poor solution, it is important to remember that it is a political solution, unlike the new ideas that focus on achieving things by force’.\textsuperscript{515} In her view, the protection zones were ghettos. The new plan would de facto legalise ethnic cleansing and genocide. The Serbs had taken one-third of Croatian territory and two-thirds of Bosnian territory by force. Pack wondered if any government would be prepared to stand up to the Serbs if there were a conflict in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{516}

**EPP Group takes humanitarian and political initiatives**

In January 1993 Henry Chabert, MEP and Deputy Mayor of Lyon, organised, with the support of the Chairman of the EPP Group, Leo Tindemans, a convoy of humanitarian aid destined for Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{517} Ten tonnes of food and medicines were sent to the Bosnian population.

In May 1993 the EPP Group proposed that the Sakharov Prize be awarded to the editors of the newspaper *Oslobodjenje* published in Sarajevo (Bosnia-Herzegovina), where Muslims, Croats and Serbs worked together in a spirit of fraternity and solidarity. The Group submitted its proposal to the EP President and the Chairman of the EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs on 9 September 1993.\textsuperscript{518}

**End of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

In July 1995 the Bosnian Serb army, led by Ratko Mladić, seized Srebrenica, a Bosniak enclave that had been surrounded since the beginning of the conflict and that sheltered thousands of refugees. Up until
The Yugoslav conflict (1990-1995) and its consequences

The Serbian offensive of Srebrenica had been protected by the UN’s Blue Helmets. The Serbian forces committed a massacre, killing all of the men captured (more than 8,000 deaths).

Given the ineffectiveness of the Blue Helmets, the forces of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) intervened directly in 1995 against the Bosnian Serb militias. In August of the same year Croatia reconquered Krajina during the three-day Operation Flash. At the same time, the Bosniak and Croatian forces pushed the Serbs back on the defensive and regained control of important territories.

In November 1995 Doris Pack presented a report on the conclusions of the delegation’s working group that had visited Skopje in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from 31 October to 1 November 1995. The report gave an overall assessment of the situation. It suggested that FYROM be included in the PHARE programme and that negotiations be launched with a view to concluding a cooperation agreement.

The war ended with the signing of the agreements drawn up in Dayton, Ohio between 1 and 26 November 1995. All of the region’s key political representatives took part in the peace talks: Slobodan Milošević, President of Serbia and representative of the interests of Bosnian Serbs, Franjo Tuđman, President of Croatia, and Alija Izetbegović, President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, accompanied by the Bosnian Foreign Minister, Muhammed ‘Mo’ Sacirbey. The peace conference was chaired by the American mediator, Richard Holbrooke, the European Union Special Envoy, Carl Bildt, and the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Igor Ivanov.

The agreement (formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995) officially recognised the inviolability of the borders, which were the same as those that had existed between the Republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and provided for the creation of two entities within the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Croat-Muslim Federation and the Serbian Republic.

Both of the entities created have autonomy in numerous sectors, but they are integrated into a single State framework. The country’s presidency (which is based on the model of the post-Tito former Yugoslavia) is held in turn by a Serb, a Croat and a Muslim for three months at a time.
Chapter XXVII

At the Rome Assises (November 1990) national and European parliamentarians set their sights on a federal Europe

On 27 November 1990, in Rome, 258 MPs and MEPs from the Twelve Member States met in the prestigious Palazzo Montecitorio, seat of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. Under Bernini’s majestic architecture, the representatives of the European Parliament and the 12 national parliaments of the European Community held their Assises. It was a solemn occasion: for the first time national and European representatives of the peoples of the Community were sitting side by side to discuss the future of Europe.

The parliamentarians decided not to sit in national groupings but, as in the Hemicycle in Strasbourg, to sit in their political groups.

Initiative taken by the Group in Madeira in July 1989

If the European Parliament, working closely with the Italian Parliament, was the main organiser of the Assises, the EPP Group had played a key role. Just over a year before the conference, at its Study Days in Funchal, Portugal, the Group had called for greater European integration. For the single market to become a reality, the EC had to go beyond the rigid borders of the institutional framework established by the Single European Act. If it wanted greater economic integration, Europe needed more political powers and, consequently, a more democratic decision-making process. According to the Group, there were only two types of political actors that could fulfil this last requirement: the European Parliament and the national parliaments. ‘It was there in fact that Leo Tindemans, when considering how to improve relations between the European Parliament and the national parliaments, had suggested organising a major debate on the state of the union in which the national leaders would participate. [...] Karl von Wogau was extremely enthusiastic
about the idea and he immediately started looking into the arrangements and coined the term “Assises”.

The EPP Group prepared for this meeting by organising, from 4 to 6 July 1990, in cooperation with the Foundation for the Cooperation of Christian Democrats in Europe, a week of discussions with the members of the national parliaments on the topic: ‘Christian Democrats: leading Europe towards the year 2000’. The manifesto adopted at this conference emphasised the Christian Democrats’ commitment to a federal Europe: ‘The Members of the European Parliament and members of the national parliaments must work together to consider the structures needed for a federal Europe’. An even more powerful symbol was the decision by the Christian Democrats at that time to sit their 62 national and European representatives together in a single group rather than in national delegations.

The Rome Assises confirmed the theory that it was time to transform the relationship between the Twelve into a European Union and to define this relationship organically in a constitution through the constituent power of the European Parliament and the national parliaments. The Christian Democrat parliamentarians were able to influence the final declaration, which reflected their fundamental positions: eventual goal of a federal-style constitution, political and monetary union, greater democratic legitimacy in relations between the Community and the Member States, greater democratic legitimacy within the Community, with the European Parliament acting as co-legislator, need for a social policy and for a common foreign and security policy, principle of subsidiarity and effectiveness.

Rapid response to the realisation that Europe was coming together again as a continent

Some of these ambitious objectives would eventually be achieved through the Treaty of Maastricht, but lengthy political preparations were still necessary. This work had in fact begun the day after the Single European Act was signed in February 1986 (see Chapter 21), which, for the Christian Democrats, had merely been one step on the road to a Union. The challenge once again was to achieve convergence between the progress on economic union and the progress on political union.

The EPP had anticipated this need for a new ‘roadmap’ for the Union. Germany had taken over the Presidency of the Council during the first half of 1988 and Helmut Kohl invited the EPP to hold its summit in Bonn on 30 May 1988. The key question was how to revive Europe through its currency. At the Hanover European Council on 27 June 1988
The role of the EPP Group in the genesis of the Maastricht treaty

the Germany Presidency entrusted a working group led by Commission President Jacques Delors with the task of drawing up a step-by-step plan to establish EMU. In Madrid in June 1989 the Delors report was accepted as a working basis.

Events were moving on, however, and the political climate changed considerably in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the prospect of German reunification. Faced with the miraculous and spectacular break-up of the Soviet bloc, Europeans were also thinking about the future accession of Moscow’s former satellite states that were regaining their independence and opting for a democratic Europe. The Christian Democrats thus had additional arguments to support a federal-style political Europe that could cope with this new greater Europe without compromising the European Community’s precious acquis.

EPP Congress in Dublin (15-16 November 1990)
sets out its demands on the eve of the 1991 Intergovernmental Conferences

A few days before the official meeting of the Rome Assises, the EPP had held its Congress in Dublin. The document adopted by the Party and the Group set the tone: ‘A federal constitution for Europe’. The text was a substantial contribution to the European debate as people were preparing for the start of the two Intergovernmental Conferences that were to amend the Treaties in order to pave the way for political union and monetary union. Both of these conferences were to take place throughout 1991 and they were officially opened in Rome on 14 and 15 December 1990. Meanwhile, the Group also met in Rome on 6 December and submitted the positions of the Group and the Party to Giulio Andreotti, President-in-Office of the Council.

According to the Dublin document, the European Community should pursue balanced, coherent progress on all fronts towards full political union. There should be a new distribution of powers between the Member States and the Union on the basis of the subsidiarity principle, with due regard for local autonomy, and there should be a guaranteed democratic basis for the Community system, with due regard for the principle of the separation of powers.

Political union included an institutional component and the extension of Community competences. The institutional component involved establishing a European executive (Commission) controlled by a twin-chamber parliament (Council of Ministers and European Parliament). The European Parliament would have powers of codecision on legislation.
and budgets and would have the right to elect and invest the President of the Commission. The extension of competences applied to the fields of foreign policy and security and defence policy, and would begin in the Council and be gradually integrated into the other Community institutions. From the outset, however, the Commission would have a right of initiative.

Economic and monetary union implied a single monetary policy managed by an independent central bank with a view to ensuring price stability and, eventually, the introduction of a single currency. It also implied greater convergence of economic policies and a certain degree of budgetary discipline. Emphasis was also placed on the social dimension of this economic and monetary union, which should be based on a social market economy.

‘EPP Group of Six’, a political catalyst during the Maastricht negotiations (1991-1992)

The period in the run-up to the Maastricht Treaty allowed the Christian Democrats once again to take stock of their shared responsibilities with regard to European integration. Six of the 12 governments, i.e. half of the European Council, were led by Christian Democrats: Wilfried Martens in Belgium, Helmut Kohl in Germany, Giulio Andreotti in Italy, Jacques Santer in Luxembourg, Ruud Lubbers in the Netherlands and Konstantinos Mitsotakis in Greece. Jacques Santer was President of the European Council during the first half of 1991 and Ruud Lubbers took the helm in the second half of the year. As such, they each successively presided over the Intergovernmental Conference. Wilfried Martens was both Prime Minister of Belgium, a post which he held until March 1992, and had been President of the European People’s Party since May 1990. Helmut Kohl was the ‘Reunification Chancellor’ and he had assumed considerable authority in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Wilfried Martens realised how this historical situation and this concentration of power in the hands of a few could both move European integration forward and enable the EPP family to grow stronger. He thus organised three Party summits – in Luxembourg on 21 June 1991, in The Hague on 6 December 1991 and in Brussels on 14 February 1992. In addition to the six Heads of Government, the following party leaders participated in the Luxembourg summit: John Bruton for Fine Gael in Ireland, Gérard Deprez for the Christian Social Party in Belgium, Josep Antoni Duran I Lleida for the UDC in Catalonia, Arnaldo Forlani for Democrazia Cristiana in Italy, Jean-Claude Juncker for the CSV in Luxembourg, Pierre Méhaignerie for the CDS in France, Herman Van Rompuy for the CVP in Belgium, Wim van Velzen for the CDA in the Netherlands, Gerold Tandler for the CSU in
1992 – to enable the six Heads of Government, the EPP party leaders and the Chairman of the Group, Egon Klepsch, to hold regular talks with one another during the negotiating process that culminated in the signing of the Treaty on 7 February 1992\(^a\).

The Party and the Group worked closely together during this intense phase that everyone felt was changing the European context. Of course, Helmut Kohl was also counting on his relationship of trust with François Mitterrand and on the durability of the Franco-German driving force. The political decisions that had been taken were a sensitive issue for the Member States, which had long been used to the division of Germany and the inviolability of the East-West borders. The sudden change in the political landscape brought about by the ongoing German reunification required all the EC partners to be imaginative, perceptive and politically bold. Helmut Kohl had the support of the Group, the EPP Party and the Commission. His long-standing relationships with Egon Klepsch and Wilfried Martens and his natural charisma enabled him to impose his authority in the EPP meetings. However, he also had to take into account experienced leaders such as Giulio Andreotti and, outside the EPP circle, François Mitterrand, John Major and Felipe González, other influential members of the European Council.

When he took over as President of the European Council, Ruud Lubbers also took initiatives involving the Group: on 14 October and 5 and 6 December 1991 he organised two meetings in The Hague with the Group Bureau to discuss the document it had adopted entitled ‘Group requirements for Maastricht’.

The preparations for the Maastricht summit prompted intense collaboration between the Group and the Party, bolstered by a shared conviction. The objectives were clear and well-defined: pushing forward political union and Economic and Monetary Union, extending the Community’s competences and qualified majority voting, making the Union more democratic, and agreeing on a single Treaty that offered a promising framework for the future of Europe’s citizens.

Germany and three representatives of associated parties: Eddie Fenech-Adami (Maltese Nationalist Party), Joseph Riegler (ÖVP, Austria) and José María Aznar (Spanish People’s Party). Finally, the following participated as European representatives: Egon Klepsch for the EPP Group, Franz Andriessen, Vice-President of the Commission, Emilio Colombo, President of the ECDU, and Thomas Jansen, Secretary-General of the EPP.

\(^a\) Wilfried Martens also organised a small ‘strategic’ dinner at Stuyvenberg Castle on 26 November 1991, a few days before the Maastricht European Council, which was attended by the six Heads of Government and Egon Klepsch. Discussions focused on a note prepared at a meeting of the European ‘sherpas’ of the six Heads of Government on 16 November. The note outlined the main objectives to be achieved at Maastricht. The conclusions of the Stuyvenberg dinner were forwarded to the ‘sherpas’ immediately by the minute-taker (editor’s note: author of this book).
Contribution of the European Parliament

The European Parliament, which was not officially involved in the negotiations despite its request that it should be, had the opportunity to debate EMU on 23 October 1991. The EPP Group’s spokesperson, Bouke Beumer, said that the Group attached considerable importance to interinstitutional relations, to the Commission’s right of initiative and to the genuine involvement of the European Parliament in progress towards Economic and Monetary Union as a partner in the decision-making process.\(^\text{525}\)

The resolution adopted by Parliament following this debate contained three key points: Parliament should be able to express its opinion on the economic guidelines before they were adopted; it should be able to have its say and express a real opinion; and it should be able to give its consent rather than just being kept informed. At this stage of the negotiations in the conference, Parliament’s role in relation to the monetary aspects was not clearly defined. The Group was strongly opposed to any attempts to allow decisions to be taken outside the existing Community framework. As Fernand Herman pointed out: ‘There can be no question of creating different structures, run on intergovernmental lines, which would hive off monetary affairs from the Community’.\(^\text{526}\) If an exception was made for the United Kingdom for the third stage of EMU, that derogation should not open the door for other Member States not to participate. If it did, the third stage would lose all credibility.

The other sensitive issue in the debate was the creation of the European Central Bank. Fernand Herman wondered whether the European Monetary Institute planned for the second stage of EMU was just going to be ‘the embryo of the future Central Bank, with all the powers and independence needed speedily to negotiate the tricky and dangerous progression from the transitional stage to the final phase’.\(^\text{527}\)

According to John Walls Cushnahan, the IGC on Economic and Monetary Union should not be exclusively preoccupied with economic matters, but should also address economic and social cohesion. ‘Social union is as important as economic union and the new-found economic prosperity must be utilised to improve the quality of life of all the people of Europe, particularly those who are disadvantaged. If real European integration is to happen then future European policy must rise to the challenge of tackling the evil of unemployment and poverty’.\(^\text{528}\)

Agreement on the Treaty on European Union was finally reached on 10 December 1991 in Maastricht, and the Treaty was officially signed in the same city on 7 February 1992. The Union of Europe had just taken a very important step.
A major step forward for European integration

On 7 February 1992 the Maastricht Treaty was signed in the ancient, pretty little city of the same name in Dutch Limburg, near the German and Belgian borders, which became Europe’s new symbolic capital. The negotiations on the two new European Treaties, one on the Community and one on the Union, were concluded in Maastricht during the previous summit of Heads of State or Government, held on 8 and 9 December. This was a victory for Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers. The new powers conferred on the Community, the improvements in the institutions and the affirmation of the principle of subsidiarity, diplomatic action and security, as well as judicial cooperation, all strengthened the political union. At the same time, the Community established Economic and Monetary Union, which was to lead to the introduction of a single currency managed by an independent Central Bank and to active economic convergence within the Union.

Understandably, some of the most enthusiastic pro-European members of the Group saw the glass as being half empty rather than half full: as Fernand Herman wrote just a few days later in his column in *Le Courrier de la Bourse et de la Banque*, ‘How can we go far enough in Europe to keep the majority of the Member States happy, without going too far to ensure ratification by the British Parliament? We have squared the circle by breaking it. On two fundamental points, monetary union and social policy, the United Kingdom has excluded itself from the circle of the Twelve. […] Accepting these contradictions enables François Mitterrand to tell French journalists that France got what it wanted and the British press to run headlines that John Major is returning victorious to his island country’.

Nevertheless, with sufficient hindsight it is possible to see just how much the decisions taken in Maastricht contributed to the progress of European integration. Chancellor Helmut Kohl had established a formal link between monetary union and political union. As far as
Germany was concerned, there could be no monetary union without serious progress towards political union.\textsuperscript{530} The ten successful years of the European Monetary System had provided solid foundations. Monetary union entailed the gradual implementation of a common monetary policy resulting in the creation of a single currency managed by an independent Central Bank. This concept was designed around the model of the Deutsche Mark and the Bundesbank.\textsuperscript{531} Above all, however, the Germans were prepared to sacrifice their sacrosanct Deutsche Mark for Europe by allowing it to be merged into a future single currency.

Thanks to the presence of the six EPP Heads of Government at the negotiating table, the Maastricht Treaty encompassed a number of EPP proposals and ideas on several points, including the establishment of an irreversible timetable for monetary union, codecision for the European Parliament, the independence of the Central Bank and the creation of the Committee of the Regions. Some EPP goals were not achieved, however, such as the unified structure, the right of the European Parliament to give its assent to any revision of the Treaties, and abandoning the requirement for unanimity on foreign policy matters.\textsuperscript{532}

Finally, subsidiarity became a Community principle, after having merely been a reference in previous texts. A subject of European debates since the 1970s, it had been advocated by the European Parliament in its Draft Treaty of 1984.\textsuperscript{533} Subsidiarity was a federal political principle taken from the German 	extit{Grundgesetz} (Basic Law). The Treaty on European Union thus incorporated a new Article 3b: `The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty'.\textsuperscript{534}

However, subsidiarity, beyond its federalist dimension, was above all an integral part of the Christian vision of Europe. It was inspired by the thinking of Saint Thomas Aquinas, before being taken up again in the social doctrine of the Church in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century in the Encyclical 	extit{Rerum Novarum} by Pope Leo XIII.

The Maastricht Treaty had been signed, but its ratification would prove to be one of the first and most intense confrontations between the progress of European integration and the general public’s perception.
The Christian Democrats leave their mark on the Maastricht treaty

of it. Although most countries went down the parliamentary route for
ratification, a number of them put the Treaty to a referendum.

The Danish referendum: a painful rejection by the people
(June 1992)

On the evening of 2 June 1992 the mood was one of consternation.
Despite all the political, religious, social and cultural elite expressing
their unreserved support for the Treaty, it was rejected by a very small
majority of the Danish people: 50.7 %. This rejection could be partly
explained by the gap between the general public and the politicians,
the difficulty in understanding the Treaty, a number of irrational fears
and the need to assert a national identity that some feared was disap-
ppearing. The EPP Group called on the Community institutions to take
the necessary measures to enable the Eleven to continue with the rati-
fication process while giving Denmark the possibility of catching up
with them as soon as possible.535

As far as the EPP Group was concerned, the deadlock had to be bro-
ken as quickly as possible, as its Chairman, Leo Tindemans, pointed
out: ‘The Maastricht agreements must be ratified and implemented as
soon as possible. [...] The setback in Denmark must not be used as a pre-
text for slowing down the process. Moreover, we intend to improve the
Maastricht agreements even further. This path must lead to the creation
of a federation of nations and it is essential that we develop the concept of
subsidiarity and ensure that it eventually becomes part of our institu-
tional structure. Consequently, we are opposed to any renegotiation of the
Maastricht agreements and we instinctively reject any attempts to estab-
lish an à la carte Europe’.536

As far as Wilfried Martens was concerned, the Danish vote typified
the sense of disquiet dividing the larger and the smaller countries in
the Community. In order to remedy this, the Community approach,
which ensured that at no time could any one institution or any one
Member State impose its views, should be confirmed and strength-
ened.537 ‘If Maastricht were to fail, we would have to wait at least a gener-
ation before progress on the path to the Union resumed’, Martens said,
while ‘failing to build Europe by developing a European awareness among
the public and by winning the approval of its peoples would be tanta-
mount to building it on sand’.538

Relief in Ireland and France

The Treaty on European Union was the subject of a referendum in Ire-
land on 18 June 1992 and in France on 20 September 1992. The positive
results in both these countries cleared the way for the approval of the Maastricht texts by the other Member States. Leo Tindemans called on those attending the EPP summit on 25 September 1992 unequivocally to confirm the Maastricht objectives and to state the most appropriate measures for achieving them. Any countries that asked for the implementation of the Treaty to be postponed would be responsible for delaying the possible accession of the candidate countries.539

‘There can be no delay in the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. The idea that non-ratification of the Maastricht Treaty would allow us to return to the previous status quo, leaving the single market as it stands, is legal babbling. Maastricht is not a problem but a solution’,540 warned the British Conservative MEP John Stevens.

On 18 May 1993, when asked to vote on the Maastricht Treaty once again, the Danish people supported it, but with derogations. In its resolution on the Copenhagen European Council the European Parliament thanked the Danish people for ratifying the Maastricht Treaty and allowing European integration to continue, and it expressed its hope that Denmark would not have to invoke the derogations granted to it in Edinburgh.541

Herman report on the European Constitution (February 1994)

The Maastricht Treaty had scarcely been ratified when the European Parliament presented a draft Constitution of the European Union through its adoption on 9 February 1994 of the Herman report. The report was Parliament’s main contribution to preparations for the Treaty revision that the European Council had scheduled for 1996 with a view to tackling the institutional challenges of future enlargements. Parliament wanted to respond to the fears expressed during the debate on the Maastricht Treaty and to the calls for clarity, simplicity, readability and for political and legal principles to be defined that everybody could understand and that would guarantee the interests of the Member States and their citizens. The enlargement of the Community required clear rules, constitutional rules capable of managing this system: ‘Far from simplifying the construction of Europe, the Maastricht Treaty has made it a great deal more complicated, confusing the question of responsibilities more than ever. […] The Maastricht Treaty makes provision for adaptation of the Treaties in 1996. Preparations for that have to start now.’542

Fernand Herman was the third Christian Democrat rapporteur, after Emilio Colombo and Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, on the Constitution of the Union. The Union’s federal aims and the preparation of the text
The Christian Democrats leave their mark on the Maastricht treaty

of a constitution were expressly reaffirmed. The rapporteur explained
the reasons why the Union needed a constitution and why such a model
had been chosen. ‘A treaty is binding on states, but only on them. A con-
stitution concerns citizens, their fundamental rights, and organisation of
the institutions by which they are governed. As the citizens’ direct repre-
sentatives, we must work tirelessly to obtain a constitution, for this very
reason and as soon as possible.’

Europe could not take action in a number of areas unless it had the
means to do so. As such, the solution was not to be found in the inter-
governmental approach and it was up to Parliament to spell out the
broad outlines of future institutional developments. Maria Luisa Cass-
саннанського Cerretti highlighted the need to give voters, on the eve of
the European elections, ‘a major vision for Europe, on the model of the
great battle embarked upon from the time of the first direct elections, a
battle for a federal, democratic and effective Europe’.

The Chairman of the Committee on Institutional Affairs, José María
Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado added the following: ‘This Parliament has a duty
to act in accordance with the position which it has consistently adopted,
to the effect that the Union’s competences must be clearly organised; it has
a duty to act in accordance with the function which it consistently assumes
of playing a leading role in the building of the European Union, of propos-
ing solutions, of being at the forefront of the preparations which must be
made for the major decisions to be taken in 1996’.

The Herman report was accompanied by a procedural proposal: the
Draft Constitution should be examined by the parliaments of the Mem-
ber States and then by a group of Wise Men appointed by the Member
State Heads of State and Government. It would subsequently be sub-
mited to an interinstitutional conference, which would precede the
1996 Intergovernmental Conference.

So, several months before its next date with the voters in June 1994,
the European Parliament had raised the bar with its institutional ambi-
tions, thereby continuing its role as the political catalyst of the integra-
tion process. Its expectations were only to be partially fulfilled. The
1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, provided for in Article N of the Maastricht
Treaty, might be considered a partial success. Its successor, the Treaty
of Nice, signed in 2000 by Heads of State facing the challenges of an
enlargement that was politically necessary but for which the institu-
tions were not prepared, was to prove a punishing defeat for the federa-
lists in the EPP Group (see Chapter 34).
Chapter XXIX

ENLARGEMENT TO INCLUDE AUSTRIA, SWEDEN AND FINLAND

The ephemeral European Economic Area (1992)

The development of the Single European Act and the establishment on 1 January 1993 of a European single market prompted the Community to redefine its relations with the members of the European Free Trade Association, which comprised Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Austria, Switzerland and Liechtenstein (the last two having already established a monetary and customs union). These countries, which had similar economic and political standards to the members of the European Community, had concluded bilateral trade agreements with the EC and carried out a large proportion of their trade with it. As a result, they did not wish to remain on the sidelines of the single market.

The EPP Group was very conscious of the interdependence between the Community and the EFTA states, and in August and September 1987 it devoted its Study Days in Konstanz (Germany) to the subject. In June 1998 the Group also organised a conference on the future of the Community’s relations with EFTA, at the initiative of and chaired by the German MEP Hans-Jürgen Zahorka.

The European Commission, for its part, was considering ‘a new form of association’ between the Community and the EFTA states. On 17 January 1989 Jacques Delors, when presenting his new Commission and its work programme, proposed the creation of a European Economic Area. He recommended that ‘our relations with the EFTA countries at both multilateral and bilateral level need to be highlighted’, perhaps via a ‘more structured partnership with common decision-making and administrative institutions’.

The negotiations led to the signing, on 2 May 1992 in Porto, of the Agreement creating the European Economic Area between the Twelve and the seven EFTA states.

But it was history itself that ultimately hastened the process. The fall of the Berlin Wall removed any doubt hanging over the accession of states that were outside the Communist bloc but which it had required
to be neutral, preventing them from joining the Community. The EEA, which at the outset had merely been a means of ensuring that these states were fully integrated in the single market, became a stepping stone to accession, thereby losing its *raison d’être*.

Between 9 July 1989 and 22 November 1992 all of the EFTA states, with the exception of Iceland which was content with the benefits the EEA offered it, decided to apply for accession to the European Union. However, only three of the initial seven were to join the EU on 1 January 1995: Switzerland withdrew its application after its population voted against joining the EEA in a referendum; Norway, whose authorities were determined not to remain on the sidelines of European integration any longer, also said ‘no’ to accession in a referendum. This left just Austria, Sweden and Finland to join the new European Union.

**The neutrality problem**

Although the accession of the EFTA countries to the Community did not pose any economic problems for it, and even strengthened it, it did, however, entail two concessions of sovereignty in the monetary and foreign policy fields. With regard to the former, there were no specific problems as the EFTA countries were *ipso facto* aligned with the EMS. The neutrality of the three new applicants, however, made the negotiations more complex. This status prevented them from taking any military action even though the Maastricht Treaty, which would provide the Union’s new political framework when they joined, provided for the development of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP).

‘The neutrality issue […] will be decisive in gauging the degree of commitment of applicant countries.’

Austria repeatedly stressed its commitment to the progress of Community integration and showed its willingness to alter its status in order to contribute to the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty objectives, including the CFSP. When the accession negotiations opened, the Austrian Foreign Minister confirmed that his country was committed to achieving the aims of the CFSP and developing security policy structures.

In cooperation with the *Österreichische Volkspartei* (ÖVP), the EPP Group organised a conference in Vienna on Austria’s accession to the European Union (16-17 June 1993). Austria stated that it intended to take over all of the Community *acquis*, including the Maastricht Treaty. However, the ÖVP also pointed out that the neutrality issue raised a number of specific problems. First, maintaining its neutrality would be incompatible with a Member State holding the Presidency of the
European Union with regard to the CFSP. However, the ÖVP also had to take into account the feelings of the Austrian public, which was still very keen on neutrality and which would have to vote on the Accession Treaty in a referendum. The members of the ÖVP hoped that this aspect of accession would not be overly explicit in the Treaty.\textsuperscript{554}

The question was somewhat different for Finland. A buffer state between the Soviet bloc and the Western bloc, its neutrality, formalised in the ‘Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine’, had not been codified in law and \textit{‘it has not met with the same difficulties in updating its position and adjusting to the changes which have occurred in recent years’}\textsuperscript{555}. Sweden, whose tradition of neutrality dated back to the 19\textsuperscript{th} century and was defined as \textit{‘not participating in alliances in peace time and seeking neutrality in war time’}, stated that it was committed to becoming a full partner in the CFSP. However, its policy of non-participation in military alliances remained unchanged.

In the end, the geopolitical changes in Europe – in Yugoslavia and in the former Soviet Union – had a significant impact on the approach of the three candidate countries, and during negotiations with the Commission they declared that, following the end of the Cold War, their neutrality was no longer relevant. There were thus no longer any major legal conflicts between the candidate countries’ constitutional provisions and their commitment to the CFSP.

**No widening without deepening?**

The second reservation concerning enlargement related to the still fragile structure of the European Community. After the Single Act the Community had begun to improve its decision-making processes with the aim of achieving the objectives of the single market and, eventually, establishing the European Union. The widening of the Community to include the EFTA states, which was of mutual benefit, should not take place to the detriment of the deepening of the Community. The Group Chairman, Leo Tindemans, underlined this in the Group’s activity report in 1992: \textit{‘True to its promises, the EPP Group wishes to build on the Union process, encompassing the continent within a federal system founded on effective democratic institutions. As the EPP Group sees it, European Union is a historic enterprise whose purpose is to consolidate peace and reunite Europe in solidarity. The Group consequently supports the accession of any democratic country that observes the provisions of the Treaty. However, widening cannot be brought about at the expense of deepening’}.\textsuperscript{556}

The EPP Group felt that it would be premature to conclude the negotiations with the candidate countries before all of the goals set out in
the Single Act had been achieved. Fernand Herman painted a dramatic image of the situation: ‘the moment of truth is fast approaching: either the Community deepens or it disappears because with its current structures it could not survive its own enlargement’.\footnote{557}

In the Programme which the European People’s Party adopted at its IXth Congress in Athens from 11 to 13 November 1992 it reiterated the fact that ‘strengthening the Community institutions is a very necessary – though not sufficient – condition for the success of its future enlargement. A debate and general decision on the institutional changes required by Community enlargement should precede rather than follow accession negotiations’.\footnote{558}

During the debate on the Maastricht Treaty, Leo Tindemans again outlined the EPP Group’s position on enlargement: ‘no expansion until we have a constitution for Europe, a constitution which will determine the future structure of the European Union, its democratic character, confirm it as a legal union […] enshrine the basic principles of subsidiarity and solidarity […] and give a clear definition of the purpose of the Union and a declaration of human rights as we understand them’.\footnote{559}

However, after the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty the Twelve preferred to avoid discussing how to strengthen the Community so as not to cause concern among the populations of the candidate countries and the Member States. The European Councils in Lisbon (26-27 June 1992) and Edinburgh (11-12 December 1992) gave the green light to begin accession negotiations with the countries that had applied for accession and that the Commission had approved.

The European Parliament, which had been obliged since the Single Act to give its assent before any accession, launched a major debate on enlargement and the size of the future European Union. Its report of 20 January 1993 on the structure and strategy for the European Union with regard to its enlargement\footnote{360} and the preparations for its assent to the accessions of Austria, Sweden and Finland, led to a broad and far-reaching discussion that put Parliament back at the heart of the institutional debate. Parliament sent a strong message to the negotiators: if accession was to take place on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty, then it was also essential to reform the institutions. That meant greater efficiency and democracy, with strict application of the principle of subsidiarity. Jean-Louis Bourlanges pointed out that a Community of 16, 20 or 25 members could not function in the same way as a Community of 12 members. The Community institutions needed to commit to the process of institutional change and ensure that Community solutions prevailed.\footnote{561} Fernand Herman warned: ‘It is no coincidence that the two countries most opposed to a supranational, federalist Europe are not only
the ones which have failed to ratify Maastricht but the ones which most want enlargement as fast and as broadly as possible. [...] They want it because to them it would be the beginnings of the kind of Europe they would like to see, a Europe without power, a simple free trade area’.562

In the course of the accession negotiations Parliament adopted several resolutions along these lines.563 By the time the negotiations had come to an end, the candidate countries had agreed to take over the Community acquis, including the Maastricht Treaty. Parliament maintained its position in favour of enlargement in December 1993564 and February 1994.565

EPP Group votes in favour of the three countries’ accession

During the debates within the Group to prepare for its final decision on the European Parliament’s assent, the Chairman, Leo Tindemans, expressed his regret that the decision on enlargement would be taken without the necessary reforms and that the talks on reform would be postponed to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. If it was politically and diplomatically inconceivable to turn down the candidate countries, there could be no question of accepting any other applicants before the outcome of the 1996 conference was known. According to Tindemans, the Members of the European Parliament ‘can endorse an enlargement today, but tomorrow work must start on making 1996 the year of the decisive breakthrough’.566

In the end Parliament refused to postpone the debate, as had been proposed by a group of MEPs, including the EPP Group,567 as it would have initiated a crisis that would have suggested mistrust of the candidate countries. By way of its assent procedure, Parliament expressed its support for the accession of the four candidate countries on 4 May 1994.568

Following an impassioned debate, the EPP Group had decided at its meeting of 20 April, by 77 votes to 23, to vote in favour of assent. This majority decision had been made easier by a letter addressed to the Group by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in which he gave a series of assurances that the Germany Presidency would make sure that the European Parliament participated in the 1996 institutional reform.
Part three
THE REFORMERS (1994-2009)
The 15-year period from 1994 to 2009 was marked by European expansion on a scale unseen.

While the European Community’s enlargement from six to nine Member States had taken 22 years (1950-1972), it would take just 13 years (1994-2007) for 12 to become 27.

The EPP Group, which had 121 members prior to the 1994 elections, found itself with 157 in July 1994, 201 in May 1999, 233 in July 1999, 268 in July 2004 and 289 in January 2008. At the same time, the number of heads of delegation belonging to the Group went from 15 in 1994 to 30 in 2008. This ‘inflation’ has not, however, been reflected in the Group Presidency, a collegial and supranational body governing day-to-day affairs and coming under the authority of the Group Chairman: the Presidency consisted of eight members in 1994 (under the chairmanship of Wilfried Martens) and 11 in 2007 (under Joseph Daul). The Secretariat, on the other hand, has seen its ranks swell on the same scale, from 134 staff members in 1994 to 267 in 2008, as the number of posts allocated to the political groups by Parliament’s Secretariat-General is calculated on the basis of a fixed scale according to the number of Members and of nationalities represented.

In 1999, the EPP-ED Group became Parliament’s largest political group and the only one to include parliamentarians from all Member States. The gap separating it from the Socialist Group grew wider still with the arrival of 10 new Member States in 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. In May 2008, the Group had a 71-member lead over its closest rival, which, in 1994, had outstripped it by 41 members.

Looking at this swelling of numbers and the new challenges facing the continent over this period, it is clear just how successful the EPP-ED Group has been in implementing reform and facing up to events that would transform Europe’s destiny and the Group itself.
In 1994, the 12 Member States of the European Union began to apply the Maastricht Treaty, which had come into force on 1 November 1993. The June 1994 elections did not bring any visible changes to Parliament as an institution. While assent had recently been given to the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, Members from these countries would not join until 1 January 1995, the date on which the Accession Treaties came into force. The plans to admit the fledgling democracies of Central and Eastern Europe to the Union had not been finalised at this point: in June 1993, the Copenhagen European Council had merely set out the criteria that prospective applicants would have to meet. These countries were primarily concerned with achieving political stability and finding their way out of the painful economic transition marking the post-Communist era.

Under the political steam of Helmut Kohl, who was chiefly responsible for the reorganisation of the centre-right in Europe during his chancellorship, which lasted until October 1998, the EPP Group reaped the greatest benefit from the continent’s reunification. The political campaigning carried out by the EPP, and by Wilfried Martens in particular, who was both Party President and Group Chairman from 1994 to 1999, had a decisive impact. Hans-Gert Pöttering, in his role as first Vice-Chairman of the group from 1994 to 1999 and then as Chairman from 1999 to 2007, was the third key figure in the EPP’s success story.

Between 1994 and 2009, while Europe was undergoing monumental changes, the EPP’s reforming members were busy overhauling the Group. While it had initially been heavily populated by members of the Christian Democrat movement, with each round of enlargement it had welcomed political families all over Europe. Since the latter varied in their ideological proximity to Christian Democracy, the Group had to find a way to draw together the different strands of the centre-right in order to ensure that it formed a strong and homogenous European political family whose values and ideas were adapted to the changes taking place in Europe at the dawn of the 21st century.

During this period, the Group would have to work to unite the different currents and traditions of the European right. However, in its efforts to do so, it would be faced with a dilemma: how to reconcile the Christian Democrats’ long-held traditional values, including the desire for a federal Europe, with measures to incorporate as partners within the Group political movements characterised by Eurosceptic tendencies.

In other words, did the strategic decision taken by the Group on 15 July 1999 to go by the name of ‘Group of the European People’s Party
(Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (EPP-ED)' in order to take account of the views of the British Conservatives, who were joined in 2004 by Czech parliamentarians from the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), represent a simple adjustment or evidence of an irreversible genetic mutation?
New Members join the Group in June 1994

The fourth direct elections to the European Parliament were held from 9 to 12 June 1994. They left the EPP Group with 157 out of 567 Members, compared with 121 of a total of 518 in 1989, and still in second place behind the Socialist Group.

The German delegation was again by far the most successful, with 47 CDU/CSU parliamentarians among the 99 German representatives. Of the new MEPs, four in particular would go on to build a solid career within the Group. Werner Langen, a Member from the Land of Rhineland-Palatinate, began to play an extremely active role, applying himself to economic and monetary issues, as well as the question of Turkey. He would become head of the German delegation in 2007, taking over from Hartmut Nassauer. The latter was also elected in 1994. A jurist, judge and lawyer, and former Interior Minister for the Land of Hessen, the meticulous and cool-headed Nassauer would repeatedly act as rapporteur for the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs. Co-Chairman of the German delegation, alongside the Bavarian Markus Ferber, Nassauer was elected Vice-Chairman of the Group in charge of parliamentary work in 2007. Markus Ferber, born in 1965, represented the next generation and was elected to Parliament from Augsburg in Bavaria at the age of 29. His Eurorealism and budgetary flair would be reflected in his speeches, which found resonance with his Conservative electorate in Bavaria. Finally, Bernd Posselt, born in 1956, who founded and headed the Paneuropa-Jugend, the youth movement of the German branch of the International Paneuropean Union, had worked at the European Parliament as an assistant to Otto von Habsburg. A CSU deputy strongly involved in defending the interests of displaced persons following the Second World War, Posselt was a straightforward and independent figure. In addition to being a great champion of Strasbourg as the seat of the European Parliament, he took on the role of ‘backbencher’, a grassroots parliamentarian protective of Members’ individual rights.
The Spanish delegation also made a breakthrough and, with 30 Members, all from the Partido Popular (People’s Party), with the exception of Concepció Ferrer i Casals, a member of the Catalan UDC, and Josu Jon Imaz San Miguel from the Basque PNV, emerged as the Group’s second delegation in terms of numbers. Carmen Fraga Estévez would remain an MEP from 1994 to 2002, prior to returning to Madrid to take up a high-ranking post in the fisheries sector. The daughter of Manuel Fraga Iribarne, founder of the Alianza popular (Popular Alliance) and long-time President of Galicia, Fraga Estévez embarked on a career as an administrator within the European Democratic Group and then the EPP Group before becoming an MEP. She specialised in fisheries and became Group vice-chairwoman in 1999. Gerardo Galeote was also an EPP Group official before becoming an MEP and had been an active campaigner for the Partido Popular since its foundation. Galeote was re-elected in 1999 and 2004, becoming a committed head of delegation who staunchly defended his Members’ interests and helped the Group to incorporate new centre-right forces. From 2004, he chaired the Committee on Regional Development, and later took over from Joseph Daul in the important position of Chairman of the Conference of Committee Chairmen of the European Parliament.

Íñigo Méndez de Vigo had taken up a seat in the European Parliament in 1992. This cultivated, erudite, courteous and multilingual lawyer divided his time between Madrid, where he taught European law, and Brussels and Strasbourg, where he put his talents as an orator and negotiator to full use: firstly within Parliament’s Delegation to the Convention drafting the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which he chaired, then as Chairman of the Delegation to the European Convention, and, finally, as the European Parliament’s representative to the intergovernmental conference negotiating the Lisbon Treaty. As an EPP coordinator within the Committee on Institutional Affairs, Méndez de Vigo, like his former mentor, Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, knew how to instil in his colleagues his own passion for Europe at the same time as appealing for pragmatism when the negotiations led to an achievement for Europe, no matter how small.

Ana Palacio Vallelersundi, together with her sister, Loyola de Palacio Vallelersundi, herself head of the Partido Popular’s list in the 1999 European elections and immediately appointed Vice-President of the European Commission, led the way for the women of the ‘Aznar generation’ in Spanish and European politics. An energetic and courageous parliamentarian, made chairwoman of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market on her re-election in 1999 before becoming chairwoman of the Conference of Committee Chairmen, Ana
Palacio Vallelersundi was appointed as Spain’s Foreign Minister in July 2002, a post she would occupy until March 2004, following which she would take up a position with the World Bank. Born in 1948 and 1950 respectively to the Marquis of Matonte, Ana and Loyola represented the Spanish right’s modern and liberal wing and, through their commitment, demonstrated their confidence in Spain’s European future.

José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil was an experienced politician who had sat in the Cortes from 1977 to 1994, prior to moving to the European Parliament from 1994 to 2009, where he would focus on economic and monetary affairs. Competent and precise, like his colleague Salvador Garriga Polledo, who was also a continuous presence in Parliament from 1994, García-Margallo y Marfil, in his role as coordinator for the Committee on Budgets, worked successfully with the latter to defend Spain’s access to the European Structural Funds.

At 39, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, already had a solid grounding in European affairs. His legal and diplomatic training took him to the Commission, where he worked in the offices of the Spanish Christian Democrat Commissioners Abel Matutes and Marcelino Oreja Aguirre. Re-elected to Parliament in 1999 and 2004, he played a prominent role in the Committee on Foreign Affairs and in relations with the countries of Central and South America. He succeeded Carmen Fraga Estévez as Group Vice-Chairman from 2002 to 2004.

The Spanish delegation, second within the Group in terms of numbers, replaced the Italian Christian Democrats in this position, who had been lodged there ever since the Group’s founding.

With 19 Members, the British delegation, in third place, was far from achieving its potential. It was identical in its composition to the delegation which had joined the group in 1992, save for the arrival of two new parliamentarians, Robert Sturdy and Giles Chichester, who would continue to serve until July 2009.

The thirteen French deputies elected from the list headed by Dominique Baudis represented both wings of the UDF, the Liberals and the Christian Democrats, which, in 1974, formed the core of the political family founded by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. Pierre Bernard-Reymond, the former Minister for European Affairs, who had been a Group member from 1984 to 1986, and was at this point Mayor of Gap in the Provencal Alps, one of France’s highest communes, and Bernard Stasi, Mayor of Épernay, the capital of the champagne-producing region, and a respected former minister known for his tireless commitment to human rights in France and all over the world, joined Dominique Baudis, Nicole Fontaine and Jean-Louis Bourlanges, who had been elected in 1989 as part of the Christian Democrat family.
Françoise Grossetête, a municipal councillor for Saint-Étienne, one of the departmental capitals of the Rhône-Alpes region, Jean-Pierre Raffarin and André Soulier represented the Liberals, which had aligned themselves with the EPP Group in December 1991 under the impetus of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.

Grossetête would take on an increasingly important role within the Group, with her knowledge of the issues at stake, her vigour in defending her opinions and her willingness to tackle all the tasks conferred on her, making her a formidable parliamentarian. While playing a particularly active role with regard to environmental and health issues, she would hold the position of vice-chairwoman of the Group from 1999 to 2007, throughout Hans-Gert Pöttering’s chairmanship, fulfilling the delicate and strategic role of Group whip and assuming responsibility for parliamentary work and conciliation. In the course of her duties, she demonstrated boundless energy, comparable to that shown by her predecessor, Ria Oomen-Ruijten, who had held the position from 1992 to 1999, under the respective chairmanships of Leo Tindemans and Wilfried Martens.

Meanwhile Jean-Pierre Raffarin, appointed one of the European Parliament’s Quaestors, would leave the Group in May 1995 to join Alain Juppé’s government. He went on to serve as Prime Minister under Jacques Chirac from May 2002 to May 2005. As Premier, he would continue to make clear his interest in and support for the Group, attending the ceremony held on 1 July 2003 to mark the EPP-ED Group’s 50th birthday. André Soulier took his place as Quaestor. Another of the Liberals, André Fourçans, a specialist in economic and monetary affairs, who had sat as an MEP in the Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group during the previous parliamentary term, joined the EPP Group in April 1996.

The Italian delegation was annihilated in the June 1994 elections, leaving it with 12 deputies, eight of whom belonged to the PPI, the successor to the DCI, three to Patto Segni (the Segni Pact) and one, Michl Ebner, to the South Tyrolean People’s Party. Two long-serving Christian Democrats, Pier Antonio Graziani and Pierluigi Castagnetti took on the tricky task of representing a political family in decline within the Group. The former was Group Vice-Chairman from 1994 to 1999, while the latter was head of the Italian delegation. Graziani, former editor of the newspaper Il Popolo and Senator, defended the Italian People’s Party with conviction, and often angrily, against repeated successful attacks from Forza Italia. Neither he nor Castagnetti, whose more diplomatic style enabled him to maintain a great ability to discuss and to listen to others, was able to prevent Forza Europa deputies
from joining the Group on 9 June 1998. From this delegation obliterated by Silvio Berlusconi’s overwhelming victory in June 1999, only Michl Ebner, regularly re-elected in South Tyrol, and Carlo Casini were able to hold on, the latter resuming his place in the EPP-ED in 2006 under the banner of the Union of Christian and Centre Democrats, a small grouping within Silvio Berlusconi’s majority.

The ten Dutch Members from the CDA, the nine Greeks from Nea Demokratia (New Democracy), the seven Belgians from the PSC and CVP, the four Irish Fine Gael Members, the three Danish Conservatives, the two Luxembourgers and the only Portuguese representative, Francisco António Lucas Pires, completed the panorama of the Group’s 12 nationalities. Most of these parliamentarians had first been elected the previous term, with the exception of Wim van Velzen, leader of the CDA, who would play an important role in the group from 1994 to 2004 in terms of its policy of enlargement to the parties of Central and Eastern Europe. The Greek delegation also had new Members among it, including Georgios Dimitrakopoulos, who was re-elected in 1999 and 2004 and proved to be particularly active in international and institutional relations. Antonios Trakatellis was also elected for each of these three parliamentary terms. A doctor of medicine and former Rector of the University of Thessaloniki, this scientist would regularly lend the weight of his opinion whenever the Group had to debate sensitive issues concerning environmental policy and bioethics. Finally, the Group had the honour of welcoming Nana Mouskouri, known all over the world for her singing talent and who would have several opportunities to share this talent with her colleagues on ceremonial occasions.

In January 1995, the Group expanded to include six MEPs from the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP, the Austrian People’s Party) and six Swedish Members representing two parties, the Moderata Samlingspartiet (Moderate Party) and the Kristdemokratiska Samhällspartiet (KDS, Christian Democratic Unity), along with four Finnish parliamentarians from Kansallinen Kokoomus (the National Coalition Party). The Group now numbered 173 MEPs.

Reinhard Rack, a Styrian professor of constitutional law served as an MEP from 1995 to 2009. The Group paid close attention to the opinions of this clear-headed and experienced legal expert. Charlotte Cederschiöld was also one of the new arrivals from the Nordic countries to win the prompt approval of her colleagues. This Stockholm parliamentarian, who was just as comfortable speaking English, German or French, was a member of the Convention for Fundamental Rights and Vice-President of Parliament from 2002 to 2004. She was re-elected for the 2004-2009 term. Her compatriot, Margaretha af Ugglas, who had
been Sweden’s Foreign Minister from 1991 to 1994 and instrumental in preparing for her country’s accession to the European Union, would chair the Group’s Swedish delegation.

**The Party President takes the reins (July 1994)**

The next task was to choose the Group Chairman. Leo Tindemans, the outgoing Chairman, put himself forward once again. However, he now had to contend with his party colleague and ‘eternal rival’ in Belgian politics, Wilfried Martens, who had an additional advantage: he was Party President.

In his memoirs, Martens talks of the circumstances under which he was elected Group Chairman. He does not conceal the fact that he had the strong personal support of Helmut Kohl, nor that the German Chancellor influenced developments in the Group: ‘Kohl had his opinion on the course matters should take in the Group and in Parliament. For years he had supported Egon Klepsch, but in 1994, when the latter ceased to be President of the European Parliament, Kohl considered Klepsch’s political career to be over. Nor was he one of Leo Tindemans’s greatest fans. In 1992, Kohl had made it known that he did not endorse Tindemans’s candidacy for Chairman of the parliamentary group. The fact that he was elected to this position anyway displeased him and, as soon as he was able, he made his influence felt. At the Chancellor’s Office in Bonn, Kohl had arranged a meeting to discuss the election of a new Group Chairman […] On this occasion Helmut Kohl’s message was clear: it was not Leo Tindemans who should head the parliamentary group but me [Wilfried Martens – ed.].’

The Belgian delegation was then asked to settle on one of the two candidates, which it did on 7 July 1994. The majority came out in support of Wilfried Martens following agonising internal discussions that laid bare its members’ divisions and uncertainties. Indeed, it was no easy matter to choose between the outgoing Chairman, Leo Tindemans, former Prime Minister, former President of the EPP Party and a fervent and respected European, and his compatriot Wilfried Martens, who had also been a long-running Prime Minister of Belgium, was the present incumbent as President of the EPP Party and was just as fervent and respected a European…

Following this endorsement by the Belgian delegation, Wilfried Martens was elected Group Chairman the same day, winning 118 of the 136 votes cast.

The strategic mission of the new Group Chairman, who would now have to combine his duties with those of head of the EPP Party,
becoming the first person to do so, was chiefly to ensure that the Group gained power: ‘My task was now to strengthen our position. Who could help us in pushing through our priorities as successfully as possible? In practical terms, it was a question of seizing political power in the European Parliament, and at the Socialists’ expense. This was most imperative for the Germans. The most influential figures among them were convinced of the importance of this goal and believed that I could soon achieve it. It was now time to put into practice, as far as we could, what we had fought so hard for in Maastricht. My combined role at the head of the Party and the Group, very much in line with Helmut Kohl’s thinking and the German tradition, was intended to help. During my five-year term, I was able to expand the Group; it went from 157 to 201 members, growing by a third.’

A new-look Group Presidency

The election of the Group Presidency on 5 July brought huge changes to the leadership. Only Ria Oomen-Ruijten retained her position as vice-chairwoman and the duties conferred on her under Leo Tindemans. It was agreed that Oomen-Ruijten had acquired experience and skill in handling parliamentary work that was appreciated by many members. It was necessary to demonstrate a combination of dynamism, flexibility, diplomacy and perseverance and, ultimately, a certain authority in order to handle the responsibilities of allocating speaking time in plenary at Strasbourg, coordinating the whips and providing the Chairman with constant and careful assistance, both within the Group and in plenary. Moments of tension arising from a procedural manoeuvre by the other groups were common. Internal disputes prior to the vote on a list of amendments to a report had to be managed in such a way as to ensure harmony within the Group, a key condition of its effectiveness. A flair for negotiation, an easy manner in personal relations, aided by knowledge of four languages, and vitality coupled with a formidable readiness to defend her views were just some of the assets that allowed Ria Oomen-Ruijten to retain this strategic and prominent post from 1992 to 1999, enjoying the direct confidence of two Dutch-speaking chairmen.

Wilfried Martens paid tribute to her with these words: ‘The vice-chairwoman, Ria Oomen-Ruijten, was my right hand in leading the parliamentary group. We worked together closely and had an excellent understanding. She was in charge of the internal organisation of the Group (speaking time, the voting list etc.).’

The arrival of a new Presidency also saw the election of Hans-Gert Pöttering as first Vice-Chairman. It was an endorsement of and a new
stage in the ascendancy of this parliamentarian beginning his fourth term as an MEP, who, after carrying out traditional parliamentary roles (coordinator and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament), rose to new political responsibilities with the backing of his delegation. Pöttering would be responsible for an area of key importance: enlargement, Study Days and the Group’s internal affairs. The other vice-chairmen appointed in 1994, Sir Henry Plumb, Panayotis Lambrias, Carlos Robles Piquer and Pier Antonio Graziani were allocated the areas they had hoped for: institutional relations, information, Latin America, the United States etc. Edward Kellett-Bowman, the second British Member among the Presidency, was appointed treasurer.

Wilfried Martens’ chairmanship was characterised by moderation and the art of compromise. The exceptional experience he had acquired in Belgian politics, including 10 years as Prime Minister, and his involvement within the party enabled him to begin his duties as Group Chairman with full knowledge of what the role required.

Martens successfully based his chairmanship on a strategy that embraced the opening-up of his original political family, the Christian Democrats, to other moderate and Conservative forces within the old Member States. In his parallel capacity as President of the EPP Party, he encouraged the alignment and gradual absorption of the emerging parties in the prospective Member States of Central and Eastern Europe. Recruiting the young groupings of the post-Communist era that held similar values and would be able to play a future role in furthering European integration in an enlarged Union was an historic task for the EPP and its leader. This approach helped to stabilise and restructure democracy in one of the most precarious regions of Europe, threatened by the return to nationalist and populist tendencies. The work accomplished by Martens between 1994 and 1999 contributed to the Group’s success in July 1999, allowing it to take first place in the European Parliament for the first time since direct elections began in 1979.

In his memoirs, the Group Chairman mentions the role played by the Secretariat, on which he was reliant at all times to ensure the day-to-day running of the Group. Of course, Martens also benefited during

---

a Of 160 staff members, I could genuinely call on 20 of them, the others being mainly there to serve the (large) national delegations. Among the Group’s staff, the Frenchman Pascal Fontaine was a real alter ego for me. Like me, he was a veteran of old Europe, in the good sense of the term. His father had been a close adviser to Jean Monnet; he himself was Monnet’s last assistant. We shared the same vision of Europe’s future: it was the perfect meeting of minds. He was the ideal person to draft my speeches, in particular because, within the Group, he was one of the rare few to be well acquainted with the classic works of the Christian Democrat movement. By writing summary reports on EPP summits and Presidency meetings, he
his time as Chairman from the cooperation of Klaus Welle, whom he had appointed Secretary-General of the EPP in 1994 and who took the helm of the Group Secretariat on 8 February 1999.

**The mortal danger of competition from the right: the Kohl-Martens strategy and response**

For Wilfried Martens, who began his chairmanship on 7 July 1994, the first challenge was the imminent threat of competition from the right of the Group and the Party, a threat emanating from inside Parliament itself.

The DCI, the Italian Christian Democrats, one of the two pillars of European Christian Democracy since the war, imploded in the June 1994 elections. Its representatives fell in number from 27 in 1989, accounting for 23% of Group members, to 12 in 1994, or 8%. The Group then found itself at mortal risk from the emergence of a political force and rival parliamentary group to its right, a magnet for political movements with national and populist tendencies, in both old and new Europe. The DCI’s collapse following the revelations of clientelism in the Tagentopoli scandal, and owing to the disillusionment with all of Italy’s traditional parties, which had proved incapable of ending the country’s political instability and corruption, opened up the way for Forza Italia, founded by Silvio Berlusconi. At first, the party’s 27 MEPs formed almost a single-nationality group within the European Parliament, Forza Europa. They then announced their intention of joining with French MEPs from the RPR. In spite of their election pledge, made in connection with their inclusion on the joint UDF-RPR list headed by Dominique Baudis, the latter did not join the EPP Group in July 1994, choosing to remain part of the Group of the European Democratic Alliance (EDA). In July 1995, Forza Europa and the EDA merged to become the Union for Europe Group, the third largest in the European Parliament.

Wilfried Martens tells how, as the new Group Chairman, he had been obliged to deal with this delicate political situation: ‘For the purposes of the 1994 European elections, the RPR had formed a joint list with the UDF

---

*made an important contribution to the development of the Party and the Group. His long service record meant that he was able to put decisive events in context. The Briton Edward Steen also belonged to the inner circle of staff members working for both the Party and the Group. As the working language of European politics had shifted to English, he took on an increasingly important role as translator and speechwriter.’ In Wilfried Martens, Mémoires pour mon pays, Bruxelles, Racine, 2006, pp. 322-323.

*On 15 December 1994, Enrico Ferri and Marilena Marin joined the Forza Europa Group.*
that was headed by the Christian Democrat Dominique Baudis. Both parties had promised that their deputies would join the EPP Group. This promise was set out in an agreement between the then party leaders, Jacques Chirac for the RPR and Giscard for his Republican Party, which, like the Christian Democrats, belonged to the UDF. At its summit in Brussels on 8 December 1993, the EPP had signalled its agreement, at the proposal of the CDS leader, Pierre Méhaignerie. But the RPR did not keep its word. Its MEPs remained part of the European Democratic Alliance because they wanted to keep their own group, with all that meant: a Chairman, staff etc.’

The summer of 1995 therefore proved to be the summer of danger. If the strategy launched in Paris by Philippe Séguin, the leader of the RPR, was successful, the new group could, in future, attract the new parties of Central and Eastern Europe without a deeply-rooted political tradition. The enlargement process beginning at that time could therefore see the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians and other movements not yet decided on their place in the EPP flock to the UFE. Was there not also reason to fear that the British Conservatives would leave the EPP Group?

With the passing of time, it is clear just how necessary it was at that point to react swiftly and effectively. Wilfried Martens’ actions, skilfully duplicated within the EPP Party by Klaus Welle, were decisive.

Klaus Welle had been noticed by Wilfried Martens when the latter, President of the EPP Party since 1990, was preparing to update the Party’s basic programme. The Athens Programme, adopted by the Party Congress on 11 and 12 November 1992, owed much to the contribution of the Benelux parties and to the summaries drawn up by a young CDU official, Klaus Welle.

Born in Beelen, North Rhine-Westphalia, in 1964, Klaus Welle was educated in Münster and at the Witten/Herdecke University, where he studied economics and bank management. He became part of the CDU’s influential circles in the party’s Department of Foreign and European Affairs. His ability to take on board all the strategic aspects of national and international political life soon enabled him to contribute to the work of the EPP. Eager to secure Welle’s long-term collaboration, Wilfried Martens recruited him to the Party and put him forward for the post of Party Secretary-General in 1994, when he was just 30, following Thomas Jansen’s departure.\(^a\)

\(^a\) ‘Following my speech to the UMP Convention in Paris on 24 September 2005, the party leader, Nicolas Sarkozy, apologised for what had happened in 1994 and confirmed the UMP’s commitment to the EPP’, in Wilfried Martens, Mémoires pour mon pays, Bruxelles, Racine, 2006, p. 342.

\(^b\) It was no surprise then when, on 8 February 1999, Wilfried Martens subsequently appointed him Mário David’s successor as Secretary-General of the EPP, a post he continued
The ePP Group under the chairmanship of Wilfried Martens

How did Wilfried Martens and Klaus Welle manage to overcome this problem? The key to neutralising the scheme thought up in Paris by Philippe Séguin and actively propagated in Strasbourg and Brussels by the Chairman of the EDA Group, Jean-Claude Pasty, lay in Italy. The eruption of Silvio Berlusconi onto the Italian political scene was initially observed within the EPP with caution. Martens knew that the vast majority of traditional DCI voters had supported the new political movement Forza Italia but, in his view, ‘it was primarily Berlusconi’s persona that was the obstacle in Italy too. And nobody in the Group, certainly not the Italians, was willing to bring about a rapid rapprochement […] Berlusconi, however, wished to establish contact with the EPP. I therefore met him for the first time in July 1994 […] It was why I flew to Italy alone for a private meeting at his home in Milan. It was a good-natured discussion, in which we spoke about the possibility of Forza Italia joining our political family. For the time being that was as far as it went […]’

However, in spite of its adherence to the Union for Europe Group since 1995, Forza Italia continued to seek closer cooperation with the EPP Group.

Martens goes on to say: ‘From mid-1997 on, a formal meeting was held each month, in the week prior to the Strasbourg part-session, between the head of the Forza Europa delegation, Claudio Azzolini, the Vice-Chairman of the EPP Group, Hans-Gert Pöttering, the Spanish MEP Gerardo Galeote and the head of the PPI delegation, Pierluigi Castagnetti.’

Matters came to a head at the end of 1997: ‘The Friday of the part-session in Strasbourg, I read by chance in the local newspaper that a new European party was going to be founded by Forza Italia and the neo-Gaullists of the RPR. It came as a shock to Hans-Gert Pöttering, seated at my side, and to myself. The setting-up of a new grouping to our right posed a real threat to the EPP’s future, as its potential attraction for our current and future member parties could not be underestimated. There was also the danger that the EPP’s efforts to open itself up to like-minded parties would come to nothing […] The plans were well and truly under way judging by the joint press conference held on 18 December 1997 by Berlusconi and the RPR leader, Philippe Séguin, to announce the founding of the Union for Europe. It was clear that the EPP would have to launch a counter-offensive. First, it was necessary to establish lasting relations to occupy when Hans-Gert Pöttering became Chairman, until 1 January 2004. He was then made Parliament’s Director-General for Internal Policies, before joining Hans-Gert Pöttering as the Head of the Office of the President of the European Parliament in January 2007. Klaus Welle continued his meteoric rise within the institution, taking over from Harald Romer in the role of Secretary-General of the European Parliament on 15 March 2009, at the age of 44.'
with Forza Italia. Following that, an alliance with the neo-Gaullists would markedly boost our representation in France."^{573}


The UFE Group’s members had announced that the new party, the Union for Europe, would officially come into being in spring 1998. Helmut Kohl took the initiative and, on 24 March, summoned key EPP figures to his bungalow on the banks of the Rhine in Bonn. Three serving Prime Ministers, José María Aznar, Jean-Luc Dehaene and Jean-Claude Juncker, the former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, and the Chairman of the CSU, Theo Waigel, met there, along with Wilfried Martens. On the basis of a note drafted by Klaus Welle, a long-term strategy was mapped out that would make it possible to offer Silvio Berlusconi an alternative.\(^a\)

\(^a\) Given the importance of the ‘bungalow conclusions’ for the EPP’s future, they were published in Wilfried Martens’ memoirs, on pages 316 to 317. At the time, they were not intended to be read by third parties, but, as their objectives have more or less been achieved, they are no longer confidential.

1. We need an EPP that, in keeping with its founding principles, is prepared to admit new parties and to work, in the context of the EPP Group, with parliamentarians whose views resemble our own. These founding principles are a Christian view of humankind, a European doctrine (a European Community and principle of subsidiarity) and a social market economy.

2. Following its growth over the last few years, the EPP has become a vast political movement incorporating people’s parties with differing geographical, historical and cultural backgrounds. We are no longer only Christian Democrats (social Christians) but also Conservatives and centrist Liberals.

3. The EPP must remain the decisive force. With the grouping as it stands today, we will not have a majority. We must consider admitting new members. Furthermore, a European party cannot limit its membership to European Union parties. That is why we must open the EPP up to sister parties in countries of Central and Eastern Europe that are candidates for Union membership.

4. If the ‘Union for Europe’ Party comes into being, it could have grave consequences and represent a huge danger. We all agree that we must prevent that from happening.

5. To prevent the launch of the UFE Party, we can, in the short term, take the following important steps:

a) continuing and strengthening our cooperation with British Conservative MEPs;

b) convincing the RPR to adhere to its 1994 agreement, i.e. to ensure that their Members join the EPP Group (or are affiliated with it). If the RPR so requests, it should be possible for it to join as a member party of the EPP;

c) encouraging the founding in Italy of a centre party to ensure the loyalty of former Christian Democrat voters. If Forza Italia MEPs wish to join the EPP Group, either as a national delegation or as individuals, the matter should be subject to a majority decision by the Group;

d) extending EPP summit invitations to opposition leaders belonging to the EPP’s member parties and to parties that work with the EPP. This will allow political and personal ties to be forged that can help prevent the emergence of a rival European party.
Wilfried Martens describes this decisive meeting: ‘The aim was to launch a strategy that would strengthen the EPP structurally. That is why it was essential for Forza Italia and the RPR to be able to join our family. The time had also come where it was necessary to merge the EPP and EDU (European Democrat Union) and, in order to ensure that our organisation was more responsive, to widen the EPP summits. Following the implosion of Democrazia Cristiana, the political void left in Italy needed to be filled; there was only one real candidate for the job: Forza Italia. In France, the neo-Gaullists had, under party leader Alain Juppé and with the support of President Jacques Chirac, rid themselves of the Eurosceptics and were about to join us.’

The matter was settled in Dublin on 7 May. Fianna Fáil, the Irish component of the UFE, had issued an invitation to the official launch of the Union for Europe Party. Silvio Berlusconi’s absence from Dublin was a strong signal that was picked up by the EPP straight away: ‘Our official delegation, which also included the Vice-Chairman Hans-Gert Pöttering and the Secretary-General, Mário David, set off for Milan. Berlusconi had a helicopter waiting for us at the airport to take us to his villa. He informed us quite plainly of his personal and definitive agreement. The agreement was sealed in a set of photos.’

From that point on, it was necessary to go about incorporating Forza Italia Members into the EPP Group in accordance with the rules, namely by means of a secret ballot, which was held on 9 June during a Group meeting in Brussels. The vote was conducted pursuant to Article 5a of the Rules of Procedure, which meant that the 20 Forza Italia deputies were each the subject of an individual vote on their admission as members agreeing to adopt the Group’s programme and Rules of Procedure.

The debate was held in camera and was tempestuous. Wilfried Martens went over the background to the issue, referring also to the EPP’s ‘bungalow’ summit of 24 March.

According to the minutes of the Group’s meeting, Wilfried Martens stated that he had contacted:
‘– President Chirac seeking discussions with the RPR Group concerning EPP membership,

---

6 The EPP summits should be held more frequently and in more varied configurations. Where specific preparation for the European Council is required, the present restricted arrangements should continue to apply. In all other situations, opposition leaders should be able to take part in the discussions.

7 We all agree that the European Democrat Union must be dissolved and brought within the confines of the EPP. By the end of 1998, all parties with members will leave the EDU. It is important to follow a precise timetable.
– William Hague, leader of the British Conservative Party, who gave his assurance regarding the continued EPP membership of Conservative deputies after the 1999 elections,
– Silvio Berlusconi, leader of Forza Italia, concerning the possibility of individual EPP membership applications by Forza Italia deputies.’

He then proposed that the Italian Members should speak for half an hour, followed by the representatives of any other delegations that wished to do so. The Italian PPI Members Gerardo Bianco and Pierluigi Castagnetti opposed the procedure and warned the Group of its impending loss of identity. Hanja Maij-Weggen, speaking on behalf of the Dutch delegation, Mary Elizabeth Banotti on behalf of the Irish delegation, Viviane Reding for the Luxembourg Christian Social People’s Party, and Concepció Ferrer i Casals, speaking on behalf of the Democratic Union of Catalonia, supported Forza Italia’s membership. A vote was held among the 135 members present. The 20 Forza Italia candidates were each admitted by an average of 92 votes to 36, with a few abstentions and invalid votes.576

The Group emerged strengthened by its new members, although the Italian delegation found itself divided into a minority of PPI Members and a majority of Forza Italia Members and their allies.a The gap between the EPP and the Socialist Group began to shrink. More importantly still, the threat of this right-wing parliamentary and political force had been swiftly neutralised. In July 1999, RPR deputies joined the EPP Group, and the UFE Group ceased to exist.

---

a No formal internal split emerged in the Group following the vote. The EPP had decided to act. On 23 June 1998, 35 years after the founding of the Christian Democrat Group in the European Parliament, the leaders of several parties – the Belgian CVP and PSC, the Dutch CDA, the Italian PPI, Ireland’s Fine Gael, Luxembourg’s Christian Democrats and the Basque and Catalan parties – founded the Athens Group, a reference to the Athens Programme adopted in 1992. The group was chaired by John Bruton, the Irish Prime Minister and Vice-President of the EPP Party. These party leaders wanted to ensure by joint initiative that the values set out in the basic Athens Programme were protected, including the EPP’s Christian Democrat roots. Wilfried Martens observed that this group had restricted its activities to four meetings held at the headquarters of his own party, the CVP. He adds in his book: ‘To my knowledge, it brought few tangible results.’ In Wilfried Martens, Mémoires pour mon pays, Bruxelles, Racine, 2006, p. 320.
Chapter XXXI
THE EPP-ED GROUP
UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP
OF HANS-GERT PÖTTERING
(1999-2007)


The fifth European elections, held on 10 and 13 June 1999, saw the EPP-ED Group triumph, increasing its presence from 157 seats in the previous election to 232 and far outstripping the Socialist Group, which won only 180 seats.

This success was down to the excellent results achieved by several delegations. The German delegation occupied more than half its country’s allotted seats in the European Parliament with 53 out of 99, just one year on from the CDU’s defeat in the national elections. Twelve new Members joined the group, nine of whom would be re-elected in June 2004: Michael Gahler, a former diplomat, who was elected at the age of 39 and specialised in foreign affairs; Ruth Hieronymi, a Member for North Rhine-Westphalia, an expert in audiovisual matters and a member of the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport; Elisabeth Jeggle, active in German socio-professional organisations in Baden-Württemberg and at federal level, and a member of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development; Ewa Klamt, a deputy from Lower Saxony and a member of the Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs; Kurt Lechner, from Rhineland-Palatinate, a member of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection; Hans-Peter Mayer, a professor of law from Lower Saxony, also a member of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market; Alexander Radwan, elected on the CSU list in Bavaria and a member of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs; Renate Sommer, an academic specialising in agriculture, elected in North Rhine-Westphalia and a member of the Committee on Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism; and Joachim Wuermeling, a Member for Bavaria, who would go on to join the regional government there following his re-election in 2004.
Another three deputies, Christian Ulrik von Bötticher, Emilia Franziska Müller and Brigitte Wenzel-Perillo would take their seats for the 1999-2004 parliamentary term only. Gabriele Stauner, who had served as a minister in the Bavarian regional government and was elected to the European Parliament in 1999, would return to it in 2006. During her first term, she was an active member of the Committee on Budgetary Control and played a role in the questioning of the European Commission’s financial management.

The British Conservatives doubled their number of MEPs from 18 to 36. Twenty-four new Members joined the EPP Group, 16 of whom would be re-elected in June 2004, testament to the ability of Conservative parliamentarians elected in a majority ballot to establish themselves in electoral strongholds. They were: Sir Robert Atkins, who had held several ministerial posts, including the portfolios of industry, Northern Ireland and the environment; John Bowis, an MEP for London, who had served as Health Minister and Transport Minister and, during both his terms, showed particular commitment to environmental and public health issues as Group coordinator within the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety; Philip Charles Bradbourn, an MEP for the West Midlands and a member of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs; Philip Bushill-Matthews, a director of a series of food manufacturers and a member of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs; Martin Callanan, representing North-East England and a member of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy; Nirj Deva, an MEP for South-East England an aeronautical engineer and economist, who became a member of the Committee on Development; Den Dover, representing North-West England and a member of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy; Jonathan Evans, who had pursued a ministerial career in Wales while working as a consultant to large insurance companies and would serve as head of the Group’s British delegation and Chairman of the Delegation for relations with the United States; Malcolm Harbour, a Member for the West Midlands, who, as a car industry expert, would prove to be a very active member of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, on behalf of which he would table a series of strategic reports; Christopher Heaton-Harris, an MEP for the East Midlands and a member of the Committee on Culture and Education; Timothy Kirkhope, a Member for Yorkshire, who would also become head of the British delegation, requiring him to conduct some tricky political arbitration among its members over these two parliamentary terms in order to reconcile the pro-European and Eurosceptic contingents; Neil Parish, a Member for
the South-West and a farmer in charge of a family business, who would be elected Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development in 2007; John Purvis, a Scottish MEP and member of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs; Struan Stevenson, equally proud of his Scottish roots, who would go on to be elected Group Vice-Chairman and Chairman of Working Group C, which covered fisheries-related matters, in which he had personal interest; Charles Tannock, a Member for London and psychiatrist by profession, who would prove to be a dynamic parliamentarian, whether in plenary or within the Group, in particular as regards human rights and the situation in Ukraine; and Geoffrey Van Orden, representing the east of England, who was a former brigadier-general in the British Armed Forces and an expert in defence matters.

Theresa Villiers, a lawyer representing London and an internal market specialist, would be re-elected in 2004, but would leave Parliament in 2005.

Roger Helmer and Daniel J. Hannan, also elected in 1999 and in 2004, repeatedly voiced opinions that were offensive to the Group and its leaders, resorting to deliberate shows of hostility at Parliament’s plenary sessions, which resulted in their expulsion from the EPP-ED Group, in line with its Rules of Procedure, in 2005 and 2008 respectively.

Finally, Jacqueline Foster, Robert Goodwill, Bashir Khanbhai, the Earl of Stockton and David Sumberg were elected for the 1999-2004 parliamentary term only. The Earl of Stockton, who was the grandson of the former Conservative Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, had pursued an interesting career as a journalist and a campaigner for European movements. His deeply British aristocratic style made him one of the Group’s most popular members.

The Italian delegation consisted of 35 Members, 24 of whom were newly elected. The majority of new MEPs arrived on the back of the success of Silvio Berlusconi and the Forza Italia lists. Berlusconi himself sat in Parliament until 2001, when he left to take power in Italy.

---

a The expulsion of Roger Helmer took place by a Group secret ballot on 7 June 2005, held pursuant to Article 8 of the Group’s Rules of Procedure. At the plenary sitting of 25 May 2005, Helmer had launched a personal attack on the Group Chairman during a debate on the adoption of a motion of censure against the Commission. Daniel Hannan had already received a warning from the Group and the British delegation following an article that had appeared in Die Welt on 2 March 2005 that contained ‘wrongful allegations about his colleagues’ (minutes of the Group meeting of 10 May 2005). On 31 January 2008, during a debate on the Lisbon Treaty, Daniel Hannan questioned Hans-Gert Pöttering personally in his capacity as President of Parliament, making reference to the Ermächtigungsgesetz (Enabling Act) of 1933. Joseph Daul, Chairman of the EPP-ED, immediately announced his intention to call for Hannan’s expulsion from the Group. This motion was passed in Strasbourg on 19 February 2008 with a two-thirds majority (155 votes in favour and 52 against).
forming a government that would include Rocco Buttiglione, who followed him from Brussels to Rome. Guido Viceconte also left the Group in 2001. Some deputies, such as Guido Bodrato, Luigi Cocilovo and Franco Marini, belonged to the PPI and found themselves in a difficult position within the Italian delegation, being in the minority and not sharing Forza Italia’s political strategy. The PPI Members would not return to the Group in 2004 and some, like Cocilovo, would join the Liberal Group. Renato Brunetta, Raffaele Lombardo, Mario Mantovani, Francesco Musotto and Amalia Sartori, close colleagues of Silvio Berlusconi, would be re-elected in 2004, along with Mario Mauro, who had strong links with Italy’s Catholic circles and would become a Vice-President of the European Parliament in 2004, after playing a prominent role in the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport. Luigi Cesaro, Raffaele Costa, Marcello Dell’Utri, Raffaele Fitto, Giorgio Lisi, Clemente Mastella, Pietro-Paolo Mennea, Giuseppe Nisticò, Giuseppe Pisicchio and Vittorio Sgarbi were elected for one term only. Francesco Fiori, also an MEP from 1999 to 2004, was Group Vice-Chairman and Chairman of Working Group D. Carlo Fatuzzo, meanwhile, served both terms on behalf of the Partito Pensionati (Pensioners’ Party), of which he had been national secretary since 1987.

The Spanish delegation had 28 Members, 13 of them newly elected. María del Pilar Ayuso González, MEP for Badajoz, was an expert in agricultural issues in the Partido Popular. Cristina Gutiérrez-Cortines, representing Madrid, would play a prominent role in the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy. Meanwhile Alejo Vidal-Quadras, a Catalan Member and internationally renowned nuclear physicist, would serve as Vice-President of Parliament from 2004. These three deputies would be elected for both terms (1999-2004 and 2004-2009). María Antonia Avilés Perea, a member of the Committee on Budgetary Control, Cristina García-Orcoyen Tormo, a member of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy, Juan Ojeda Sanz, a member of the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport, Mónica Ridruejo Ostrowska, a member of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Carlos Ripoll y Martínez De Bedoya, a member of the Committee on Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism, and Theresa Zabell, a double Olympic sailing champion, would be elected for one term only.

The list of new MEPs from Spain’s Partido Popular showed an increase in younger and female Members among the team under the iron grip of party leader José María Aznar. The system peculiar to Spain of having a proportional list at national level increases the
The ePP-eD Group under the chairmanship of Hans-Gert Pöttering

party's influence over the choice of Members, since no preferential votes are taken into account, as in Italy, nor are there regional constituencies, as in Germany, or British-style single-member constituencies. This explains the turnover of Spanish MEPs, who, unlike their British or German counterparts, are unable to establish firm roots in a constituency or to specialise within the European Parliament and Group, not having the possibility of election for several terms. The case of Alejandro Agag Longo was an unusual one. This young and brilliant banker's son joined the Partido Popular's youth movement and, at the age of 25, became part of José María Aznar's inner circle. He consequently appeared on the Partido Popular list and was elected to the European Parliament in 1999. At the same time, his name was put forward by the Spanish Prime Minister to succeed Klaus Welle as Secretary-General of the European People's Party. In 2002, he married José María Aznar's daughter and retired from politics in order to enter the business world.

The French delegation's success also helped to strengthen the EPP Group. The situation in 1999 was paradoxical. During its campaign for the June 1994 elections, the UDF-RPR list headed by Dominique Baudis had pledged that all its Members would sit as part of the same group, the EPP Group. However, as described earlier, RPR deputies decided in July 1994 to remain within their old group, the UFE. In 1999, the two large groupings, the UDF and RPR, put forward individual lists, with Démocratie Libérale (Liberal Democracy or DL) agreeing to run with the RPR. In the end, in line with the promise made by Nicolas Sarkozy on 30 May 1999, all elected Members on the list joined the EPP Group. The UDF list fronted by François Bayrou also included Nicole Fontaine, Philippe Morillon, Alain Lamassoure, Jean-Louis Bourslanges, Marielle de Sarnez, Janelly Fourtou, Thierry Cornillet and Francis Decourrière. From the RPR and DL list, the following were elected: Nicolas Sarkozy, Alain Madelin, Margie Sudre, Françoise Grossetête, Hugues Martin, Thierry Jean-Pierre, Joseph Daul, Tokia Saïfi, Marie-Thérèse Hermange, Christine de Veyrac, Roger Karoutchi and Hervé Novelli.

The incorporation of the 20 French parliamentarians within a single delegation was all the easier given that, at the time, they all belonged to the same presidential majority in France. Matters became trickier following the 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections. For this key date in French politics, a new grouping was formed, the Union pour un mouvement populaire (Union for a Popular Movement or UMP), consisting of the RPR, the DL and a large section of the UDF. François Bayrou decided to go down another route, preserving the autonomy of the New
UDF with a view to running himself in the 2007 elections. The second half of the term, until 2004, was characterised by good technical cooperation within the French delegation, thanks to chairwoman Margie Sudre’s diplomacy. Nevertheless, François Bayrou resigned from the European Parliament in 2002 to stand in the French parliamentary elections, leaving his allies, in particular Marielle de Sarnez and Jean-Louis Bourlanges, to represent the specific views of the New UDF within the Group. In the meantime, the UMP had become a full member of the European People’s Party, one of its most active in fact, especially while Jean-Pierre Raffarin held the post of French Prime Minister.

François Bayrou would subsequently bear responsibility for the UDF’s departure from the EPP-ED Group and the European People’s Party at the 2004 European elections and the move to the Liberal Group by its deputies, including Marielle de Sarnez, Jean-Louis, Bourlanges, Thierry Cornillet, Philippe Morillon and Janelly Fourtou. This decision was motivated principally by national politics. It came to the great astonishment and disappointment of the Group, the UDF’s traditional partner, which saw the party as the successor to French Christian Democracy, embodied within the Group notably by Robert Schuman, Alain Poher and Jean Lecanuet.

The other delegations – Greece (9 Members), the Netherlands (9), Portugal (9), Austria (7), Sweden (7), Belgium (6), Finland (5), Ireland (5), Luxembourg (2) and Denmark (1) – completed the line-up, which included representatives of all 15 Member States of the Union. Among the new Members from these countries, some would go on to play an important role within the Group. Othmar Karas, who was re-elected in 2004, had been Secretary-General of his party, the ÖVP, from 1995 to 1999. A highly influential figure within Austrian and European Christian Democracy, he was awarded the trusted position of Group Vice-Chairman and treasurer in 1999. Ever watchful as to the appropriateness of expenditure and committed to ensuring the Group’s Europeanism, he was also a hardworking member of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs.

One of the new Greek MEPs was Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou, an active campaigner within Greece’s European organisations and the Nea Demokratia party. She was greatly valued by her female colleagues in her role as EPP coordinator within the Committee on Women’s Rights and Equal Opportunities. Re-elected in 2004, her popularity and ability saw her elected first Vice-President of the European Parliament by her fellow Members.

Among Portugal’s MEPs, Vasco Graça Moura and Sérgio Marques, members of the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media
and Sport and on Regional Development respectively, would be re-elected in 2004. The Swedish delegation included three new Members, Per-Arne Arwidsson, Lennart Sacrédeus and Anders Wijkman, the latter, an MEP for Stockholm, being an international expert on environmental and development issues in the Third World.

**Hans-Gert Pöttering becomes Group Chairman (13 July 1999)**

In order to capitalise on this success, it was necessary to act swiftly. From 5 to 9 July, all Members, both outgoing and incoming, met in Marbella in southern Spain for the Study Days that traditionally follow the elections. The newly elected Members, some accompanied by their families, met each other for the first time. In the relaxed atmosphere, the bargaining for the allocation of responsibilities began. Many Members were sorry that Wilfried Martens would no longer be sitting among them in the European Parliament. Deeply hurt by his party’s attitude towards him in the drawing-up of the electoral list, (‘There is nothing worse for a politician than to be kept in the dark about decisions that concern him personally’), Wilfried Martens had decided not to stand in the election. a Still at the helm of the party and chairing the meeting in Marbella, he considered it right and natural that Hans-Gert Pöttering, who had been one of his most trusted and competent Group vice-chairmen during the previous term, should be put forward as his successor: ‘He and I share a deep European conviction’.

Hans-Gert Pöttering’s election as Group Chairman proceeded smoothly in Brussels on 13 July 1999, as he was the only candidate for the post. Of the 209 votes cast, 189 supported his candidacy, with 12 opposing it and 8 null and void. His vice-chairmen were also elected by secret ballot and the order of preference was established on the basis of the respective number of votes each candidate received. The new Presidency in place – Carmen Fraga Estévez, Françoise Grossetête, Staffan Burenstam Linder, James Elles, Wim van Velzen and Francesco Fiori, – could already count on the services of Klaus Welle, who had been appointed Secretary-General of the Group on 8 February 1999. The setting-up of such a powerful group required vision and experience.

---

a The CVP had decided that Miet Smet, a popular figure in Flanders who had been Family Minister and was a long-time colleague of Wilfried Martens in Belgian politics, would head the Christian Democrats’ list. Refusing to take second place on the list, in July Martens effectively ruled himself out of the running for the position of President of the European Parliament as outgoing Chairman of the largest political group.
That day, Hans-Gert Pöttering saw himself advance a step further on the long journey he had undertaken in 1979, at the age of 33, towards attaining the highest positions of European responsibility. This painstaking progress, marked by professionalism and built on conviction, would enable him to hold on to the chairmanship until January 2007, when, at the age of 61, he would be chosen to preside over the Chamber until July 2009.

It was on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, in 2005, that Pöttering decided to tell colleagues what had inspired his political vocation and European vision. His personal destiny, the war and European integration were all part of the same story. He was born on 15 September 1945 in Bersenbrück, Lower Saxony and had never known his father, who had left for the front several months before he was born. Neither he nor his mother ever found out where and when this ordinary soldier had met his death. It was probably on the eastern front in April 1945. It was not until 1955, when the first contact was established between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union, that the young boy stopped waiting for the return of his missing father, who had still not been declared dead. This tragic past was the origin of Pöttering’s convictions and his aversion to totalitarianism.

The issues that he would tackle most enthusiastically during his time as Group Chairman were, in essence, political: institutional improvements within and the democratisation of the Union, its enlargement to the new Member States of Central and Eastern Europe and the unification of the continent. He also attached fresh importance in the Group’s work to the spiritual aspects of European integration and interreligious dialogue. His huge capacity for work and the local and regional roots binding him to his home city of Osnabrück in the German region of Lower Saxony and to Europe made him one of the Chamber’s most experienced parliamentarians. The meetings he chaired among the Group Presidency, the heads of delegation, the Bureau and in plenary required him to be attentive and patient and to show a constant flair for compromise.

Hans-Gert Pöttering’s period as Chairman, from 1999 to 2007, coincided with the spectacular growth of the EPP-ED Group. This made problems all the more varied and complex. As the working day did not expand accordingly, the work of a Chairman of a group this size must be seen in terms of the sheer human commitment involved.

Going from 157 MEPs from 15 countries prior to the 1999 elections to 268 from 25 Member States in June 2004, the EPP-ED Group became a monumental institution that surpassed most of the Union’s national
parliaments in terms of size and diversity. It was only natural, therefore, that, with the backing of the powerful CDU-CSU delegation, the Group Chairman was confirmed in his role on both 14 November 2001 and 13 July 2004.

The new Chairman’s first political moves
– renaming as the EPP-ED Group
– the EPP-ED takes over the Presidency of Parliament
– the delicate matter of Austria

A first major political step was put to the Group: at its constituent meeting on 15 July 1999, the Group voted to change its name to the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (EPP-ED). This change was agreed by the Group in order to take account of the distinct nature of the British Conservatives and their numerical weight. The decision had been taken in Málaga the previous week. Wilfried Martens explains that, while the EPP Study Days had been going on, an informal dinner had been held, at which Silvio Berlusconi, José María Aznar and Wolfgang Schäuble, the leaders of the EPP’s three largest parties, had been present, along with William Hague, leader of the Conservative Party. In return for his MEPs’ continued membership of the Group, William Hague had requested that it be known as the ‘Group of the EPP-Conservatives’. Wilfried Martens saw nothing but drawbacks to such a proposal: ‘When I heard it over dinner, I almost fell off my chair. The explicit reference to the Conservatives was unacceptable to several of our parties and I knew that it could lead to a split.’

In the end, the name Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (EPP-ED) satisfied everyone’s expectations. The British also hoped to recruit other delegations to the ‘ED’ and to benefit from certain exemptions and special provisions in terms of financing and staff.

Hans-Gert Pöttering’s second undertaking was to form a new presidential majority within plenary that would put an end to the alliance between the EPP and PES. The EPP-ED Group’s numerical advantage over the PES allowed it to take the step of proposing an agreement with the Liberal Group for the Presidency of Parliament to be held that term by the two groups respectively. Nicole Fontaine, who had been a Member of the European Parliament since 1984 and had taken on growing responsibility, was chosen by all the Group’s national delegations to represent it for the first half of the parliamentary term.

---

a See page 216.
Hans-Gert Pöttering assured the Liberal Group that, under this agreement, it would back the latter’s candidate for the second half of the term, beginning January 2002, guaranteeing the election to this post of the Irish Member Pat Cox, Chairman of the ELDR Group. On the left, the Socialist Group pinned their hopes on Mário Soares, the former President of Portugal. In the first round of voting, Nicole Fontaine obtained 306 votes against Mário Soares’s 200, surpassing the absolute majority of 277 votes. This overwhelming victory was also an endorsement of Nicole Fontaine’s personal qualities; in her role as first Vice-President the previous term, she had demonstrated her parliamentary experience and knowledge of the issues at stake.

For the Group Chairman, this successful alliance with the other group occupying the centre ground had the virtue of clarifying the EPP-ED’s political position. Some member parties were pleased no longer to have to explain to their national activists the ‘technical’ alliance the EPP Group had long pursued with the PES Group.a

Another political front would open up for the Group Chairman at the beginning of 2000, when he would be called upon to manage the crisis dividing the EPP-ED family following the elections in Austria. The Austrian party within the EPP, the ÖVP, had decided on 4 February 2000 to form a governing coalition with the FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria), a minority party led by the populist Jörg Haider, whose xenophobic and anti-European opinions had aroused the mistrust of certain EPP members. Wolfgang Schüssel, a convinced European and leader of the ÖVP, had undertaken to serve as Chancellor based on one belief: the populist tendencies of a minority partner, albeit one that was needed to form a coalition without the Socialists, could be gradually tempered and would in no way alter the main policies or values of the Austrian Government.

Within the Group and EPP Party, Hans-Gert Pöttering and Wilfried Martens pursued a joint approach with regard to three member parties, the Belgian PSC, the French UDF and the Italian PPI, which had called on 10 February for the expulsion of the ÖVP from the European People’s Party and EPP-ED Group. A compromise was found whereby a ‘monitoring committee’ consisting of three members of the Group, Wim van Velzen, Gerardo Galeote and Hartmut Nassauer, would draw up a report on the political situation in Austria, with particular emphasis on the Government’s programme. The German delegation and Hans-Gert Pöttering were particularly opposed to such a brutal

---

a The EPP-ED Group would resort to such a technical agreement once more from 2004 to 2009, allowing the Spanish Socialist, Josep Borrell Fontelles, to take over as President in 2004, followed by Hans-Gert Pöttering himself in 2007.
decision that would isolate the EPP’s Austrian partners, and wanted to display solidarity towards and confidence in their democratic commitment. For their part, the parties in favour of placing Austria in quarantine harboured concerns about its domestic policy and wanted to pursue a different strategy. The Group Chairman’s approach was the one generally taken, and the seven ÖVP deputies were neither expelled nor suspended from the Group. In June 2002, the Monitoring Committee’s conclusions vindicated the decision not to exclude them, as Wolfgang Schüssel’s Government had not adopted any measure or policy that could be said to confirm the suspicions. The EPP Group and Party therefore paved the way for the adoption an agreement to the same effect at the 2000 European Council, which officially ended the policy of isolation with regard to the Austrian Government.

The minority parties that had called for sanctions against their Austrian partners acknowledged this development. However, some members had the idea to set up an informal group called the ‘Schuman Group’. This internal pressure group made it its mission to ensure that a federalist and Christian Democrat line was followed. The initiative, the brainchild of François Bayrou, did not have the Group Chairman’s approval; on the contrary, Hans-Gert Pöttering had his doubts about the legitimacy of an internal split within the Group, however informal, which could call into question his commitment to the principles and values at the heart of the EPP. In Pöttering’s opinion, Robert Schuman should not be used to undermine the Group’s unity and cohesion. The ‘Schuman Group’ held a few meetings in Strasbourg. These became less frequent and, in the end, the group ceased to exist. The departure from the Group of François Bayrou’s UDF and the Italian PPI at the 2004 elections confirmed the ephemeral nature of this internal opposition.

‘To be or not to be in the Group’: the British Conservatives once again consider their options

The Málaga agreement sealed in July 1999 between the leaders of the EPP’s main parties and William Hague, representing the British Conservatives, should have ensured at least five years of stability within the new EPP-ED Group in terms of the relationship between its two constituent movements. However, the Conservative Party elected a new leader in 2001 and, in the person of Iain Duncan Smith, who had voted against ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in the House of Commons, the Eurosceptics had taken control of the Conservative Party. Duncan Smith immediately called for the ED component of the Group to be
subject to new conditions that would, for example, allow it to admit other parliamentarians without the EPP contingent, which was in the overwhelming majority, being able to block this move. A development of this kind would have led to the de facto creation of two groups, and Hans-Gert Pöttering, backed by the Presidency, rejected this request outright. Nevertheless, arrangements relating to communication, staff and finances were negotiated and lent the ED component a certain autonomy.

As the 2004 elections approached, the political offensive resumed with renewed vigour. The Eurosceptics at the helm of the Conservative Party wanted to ensure that British voters would not interpret its membership of the EPP-ED Group as a sign of its endorsement of the draft European Constitution, which had been adopted at the Convention in June 2003 and under discussion at the Intergovernmental Conference since October 2003. Hans-Gert Pöttering was forced to confront a new demand from the Conservatives, presented as a condition of their ongoing membership of the Group following the 2004 elections. The stakes were high, as the British claims touched the very heart of the Christian Democrats’ convictions and the policy supported by the EPP movement. The matter centred on the alteration of the Group’s Rules of Procedure to make provision in Article 5b for members, i.e. the Conservatives, to have the right to promote and defend their point of view on constitutional and institutional matters relating to the future of Europe. In other words, to be able to campaign against the Constitution and vote differently in plenary from EPP Members. The Group’s ideological unity and its political coherence would clearly be undermined. However, the alternative to an agreement with the Conservatives was their departure from the Group. The EPP-ED Group would have risked losing its leading position in the next Parliament. Faced with this dilemma, Hans-Gert Pöttering took political responsibility, supported by the Presidency, for agreeing to this alteration of the rules.

Keeping to this strategy of inclusion, which from Pöttering’s point of view was preferable to one of isolation and the severing of relations with a partner, the Group Chairman was required to show a great deal of energy and patience when trying to convince all the delegations of the appropriateness of this decision. At the same time, Wilfried Martens held talks conveying the same message with the leaders of the EPP parties. Finally, a debate was held in Strasbourg on 30 March 2004 prior to the vote on whether to alter the Group’s Rules of Procedure. Opponents of the decision attempted to dilute it through a series of amendments. Jean-Louis Bourlanges, Gérard Deprez, Guido Bodrato and
The EPP-ED Group under the chairmanship of Hans-Gert Pöttering

Concepció Ferrer i Casals were finally forced to acknowledge that they occupied a minority position. The following day, the vote took place: 170 members supported the Presidency’s proposal, with 10 against it and 15 abstentions. This vote did not weaken the loyalty of any of the EPP parties to the pro-European positions they had traditionally held. However, it did constitute an additional push for two parties that had been planning, essentially for internal policy reasons, to leave the Group in July 2004: the Italian PPI and UDF members loyal to François Bayrou.

Hans-Gert Pöttering, who was re-elected Chairman of the Group on 13 July 2004, honoured the commitment undertaken in the amended rules by ensuring the election to the position of Group Vice-Chairman of the candidate put forward by the British delegation, Struan Stevenson, who took over from James Elles.

However, it was in Westminster again that difficulties resurfaced. The July 2004 European elections had not been a success for the British Conservatives, who had dropped from 36 MEPs to 27. The Eurosceptic stance taken by the party seemed, however, to harden with the arrival of the new party leader, David Cameron, on 6 December 2005. Sticking to a pledge he had made during the leadership campaign in an attempt to appeal to the most Eurosceptic of activists, Cameron had announced his intention to withdraw his Members from the EPP-ED Group in order to form a new group within the European Parliament with other sovereigntists. Hans-Gert Pöttering decided to take immediate action. On 12 December, he reassured the Group Presidency that the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, had written to David Cameron stating that she would end direct dealings with the Conservative Party if the latter left the Group. More specifically still, the Group Chairman travelled to London in January 2006 for a meeting with David Cameron, at which he informed him that the Conservatives’ withdrawal would represent a serious breach of the contract borne of the Málaga agreements. For a British Conservative, this failure to keep one’s word would be tantamount to a show of poor taste.

On 29 August 2006, however, the Chairman was forced to announce to his colleagues that David Cameron and the leader of the Czech ODS party, Mirek Topolánek, had adopted a joint position on 13 July on the possible creation of a new political group in 2009. Once again, Hans-Gert Pöttering declared himself ‘determined not to tolerate any initiative that harms the Group’s interests, and warned that anyone who undermined its solidarity would automatically be excluded from the

---

Both the leadership of the Conservative Party and the ODS, which saw Mirek Topolánek become Prime Minister on 19 January 2007, appear to be unwavering in their position, although there has been no question of their Members leaving the Group before June 2009.

**New MEPs arrive in June 2004 and January 2007**

A new generation joined the Group following the June 2004 elections, the most notable aspect of which was the arrival of parliamentarians from the 10 new Member States – eight in Central and Eastern Europe plus Malta and Cyprus, followed by Romania and Bulgaria in 2007.

Among the 15 old Member States, the turnover was just as significant, though it varied from one country to the next.

From Germany, 12 new Members joined the Group: Daniel Caspary, Albert Dess, Christian Ehler, Ingeborg Graessle, Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt (who had been an MEP within the Group from 1989 to 1999), Kurt Joachim Lauk, Markus Pieper, Herbert Reul, Andreas Schwab, Thomas Ulmer, Manfred Weber, and Anja Weisgerber.

Roland Gewalt and Horst Posdorf joined the Group in 2005, while Gabriele Stauner, who had been a member of the Group from 1999 to 2004, representing Bavaria, returned in 2006.

Thirteen new parliamentarians were among the Spanish delegation: Pilar del Castillo Vera, Agustín Díaz De Mera García Consuegra, Carmen Fraga Estévez, who had been an MEP from 1994 to 2002, Luis de Grandes Pascual, Luis Herrero-Tejedor, Carlos José Iturgaiz Angulo, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Ana Mato Adrover, Jaime Mayor Oreja, Francisco José Millán Mon, Cristobal Montoro Romero, Luisa Fernanda Rudi Ubeda and José Vila Abelló.

Among these new arrivals, Jaime Mayor Oreja was notable for having made one of biggest impacts on Spanish and Partido Popular politics. Starting out as a spokesman for the Popular Coalition in the Basque Parliament, he went on to represent the region in the Cortes over several terms and was appointed Interior Minister within the Aznar Government from 1996 to 2001. As head of the Spanish delegation within the Group, of which he was also Vice-Chairman, his work from 2004 to 2009 centred on the development of a strategic policy vision for the Group, the defence of values and matters relating to terrorism and security.

In 2008, an additional three Spanish MEPs arrived as replacements for outgoing Members: Florencio Luque Aguilar, Juan Andrés Naranjo Escobar, who had been an MEP from 1999 to 2004, and Salvador Domingo Sanz Palacio.
Nine new French members were elected in 2004: Nicole Fontaine and Tokia Saïfi, who had left Parliament to take up ministerial positions, three former ministers, Ambroise Guellec, Jacques Toubon and Roselyne Bachelot-Narquin, who would be recalled to government in 2007 and replaced by Elisabeth Morin, the President of the International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism, Patrick Gaubert, and a lawyer representing Haute-Normandie, Jean-Paul Gauzès. Véronique Mathieu, an MEP within another Group, joined the EPP-ED in 2004. Equally unexpected was the election on the UMP list of the former world rally champion, the Finn Ari Vatanen, by then a farmer in Provence.

Brice Hortefeux, a member of the Group during the previous term and a close colleague of Nicolas Sarkozy, would also return to government in 2005 and would be replaced by Jean-Pierre Audy, an expert in tax and monetary matters and an instrumental member of the Committee on Budgets, who would go on to head the UMP list for France’s central region in the June 2009 elections. The French delegation acquired an additional member in January 2008 in Brigitte Fouré, a replacement for Jean-Louis Bourlanges following his resignation. She chose to join the EPP-ED Group.

Following the very disappointing results in the United Kingdom in 2004, the majority of elected EPP-ED Members were outgoing MEPs. The only new face was Richard Ashworth, who was joined by Syed Kamall in 2005 and Sajjad Karim in 2007, who were replacing Members who had resigned.

Eight new Greek Members were elected in 2004: Ioannis Gklavakis, Meropi Kaldi, Manolis Mavrommatis, Marie Panayotopoulos-Cassiotou, Georgios Papastamkos, Antonis Samaras, Nikolaos Vakalis and Ioannis Varvitsiotis.

Ioannis Varvitsiotis was one of Greece’s most experienced politicians and one of the EPP’s most loyal members, having been Vice-President of the Party from 1985 to 1996. He had occupied several ministerial positions, twice serving as Defence Minister, and was one of the most respected figures in Nea Demokratia. He was appointed head of the Group’s Greek delegation.

Emmanouil Angelakas and Margaritis Schinas joined the Group in 2007. Margaritis Schinas had spent many years working at the European Commission, including with the Vice-President Loyola de Palacio Vallelersundi and Commissioner Marcos Kyprianou.

Among the four new Belgian MEPs, Ivo Belet, Frieda Brepoels, Raymond Langendries and Jean-Luc Dehaene, the latter was a veteran of Belgian and European politics. A federal minister since 1981, he had
succeeded Wilfried Martens as Prime Minister from 1992 to 1999. As Vice-President of the European Convention, he was one of the most authoritative voices in the institutional debates held in Parliament and within the Group. His reputation as a man of great imagination, daring and compromise was considered an asset by his colleagues in the negotiations that punctuated the 2004-2009 parliamentary term.

Three new Members represented Ireland: Jim Higgins, Mairead McGuinness and Gay Mitchell, the latter equipped with a solid grounding from his days as a Minister with responsibility for European affairs. Colm Burke was elected in 2007.

Eleven new Italian MEPs were elected to the Group in 2004: Marcello Vernola, Riccardo Ventre, Armando Dionisi, Antonio De Poli, Paolo Cirino Pomicino, Lorenzo Cesa, Giuseppe Castiglione, Giorgio Carollo, Vito Bonsignore, Alfredo Antoniozzi and Gabriele Albertini. In 2006, Iles Braghetto, Carlo Casini, Aldo Patriciello and Armando Veneto replaced colleagues who had resigned. At the same time, Vito Bonsignore took over from Lorenzo Cesa as Vice-Chairman of the Group.


The two new Finnish Members were Ville Itälä and Alexander Stubb. The latter, who had an excellent knowledge of the more obscure aspects of the Community, was appointed his country’s Foreign Minister in April 2008 at the age of 40. He was subsequently replaced by Sirpa Pietikäinen.

In Austria, Richard Seeber was elected in 2004 and was joined in 2006 by a former Group member, Hubert Pirker, who had served as an MEP from 1996 to 2004 and specialised in security and crime matters. He took the place of Ursula Stenzel, who had been recalled to her country to perform new duties.

The Luxembourgers achieved an excellent result, as the three Members elected to the Group in 2004 accounted for 50% of their representatives within the European Parliament. Erna Hennicot-Schoepges, who had held several ministerial posts and been party leader, was a new arrival.

Gitte Seeberg was a new addition to the Danish delegation in 2004. Christian Rovsing, a specialist in high technology, returned to represent the Danish Conservative Party from 2007, having already been a member of the Group from 1989 to 2004.

The six new Members taking up seats for Portugal in 2004 were Maria da Assunção Esteves, Duarte Freitas, João de Deus Pinheiro, Luís Queiró José Ribeiro e Castro and José Albino Silva Peneda.
The ePP-eD Group under the chairmanship of Hans-Gert Pöttering

João de Deus Pinheiro had been Portuguese Foreign Minister and a European Commissioner. His vast experience of the Community’s inner workings naturally marked him out for appointment as Group Vice-Chairman following his election.

The first-time MEPs among the five Swedish Members were Christofer Fjellner, Gunnar Hökmark and Anna Ibrisagic.

Gunnar Hökmark arrived as an experienced Swedish politician, having served as Party Secretary of the Moderata and sat in the Swedish Parliament for 12 years. On joining the EPP-ED Group, he was elected Group Vice-Chairman responsible for Working Group B. He put himself forward for the position of Group Chairman in January 2007, obtaining 115 votes in the third round to Joseph Daul’s winning total of 134.

The three new arrivals within the seven-member Dutch delegation were Camiel Eurlings, Lambert van Nistelrooij and Corien Wortmann-Kool. Camiel Eurlings, as head of the delegation, took on the important task of drawing up the report on Turkey within the Committee on Foreign Affairs, before being recalled to the Netherlands to carry out ministerial duties.

Esther de Lange, Joop Post and Cornelis Visser joined the European Parliament in 2007, replacing outgoing Members.

A change of scene as the new Member States take their place

In terms of the new Member States which had joined the Union on 1 May 2004, the Group found itself preparing for quite a change of scene. Sixty-nine new parliamentarians arrived from the 10 countries, with each country potentially represented by several parties. The Group’s linguistic diversity increased, along with variations in cultural approaches, historical background and national concerns. The EPP-ED Group became the only parliamentary group to represent the whole of the enlarged Union.

Three Members represented Cyprus: Demetriou Panayiotis, Ioannis Kasoulides and Ioannis Matsis.

Two Maltese parliamentarians were elected to the Group: Simon Busuttil and David Casa.

The Czech Republic was represented by 14 MEPs: Jan Březina, Milan Cabrnoch, Petr Duchoň, Hynek Fajmon, Jana Hybášková, Miroslav Ouzký, Zuzana Roithová, Nina Škottová, Ivo Štrejček, Oldřich Vlasák, Jan Zahradil, Tomáš Zatloukal, Josef Zieleniec and Jaroslav Zvěřina.

Thirteen Hungarian deputies became part of the Group: Etelka Barsi Pataky, Zsolt László Becsey, Kinga Gál, Béla Glattfelder, András Gyürk, Lívia Járóka, Péter Olajos, Csaba Öry, Pál Schmitt, György Schöpflin, László Surján, József Szájer and István Pálfi. The latter died in 2006 and his seat was taken by Antonio De Blasio.

Eight Slovak candidates were elected to the group: Edit Bauer, Árpád Duka-Zólyomi, Tomáš Galbavy, Ján Hudacký, Miroslav Mikolášik, Zita Pleštinská, Peter Šťastný and Anna Záborská.

Four Slovene Members took up seats: Mihael Brejc, Romana Jordan Cizelj, Ljudmila Novak and Alojz Peterle.

Tunne Kelam from Estonia, Valdis Dombrovskis, Aldis Kuškis and Rihards Pīks from Latvia, and Laima Andrikienė and Vytautas Landsbergis from Lithuania represented the new Baltic Member States.

These 69 new Members included many national parliamentarians and former ministers who had played a key part in their respective country’s transition to democracy since 1989/1990. Some of them, like Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, had a proven European track record, attested to in his case by his time as Poland’s Minister for European Affairs from 1991 to 1996. This experience and his personal authority within the Polish delegation saw him appointed to the position of Vice-President of Parliament following his election, and subsequently to the post of Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in 2007, a role he had fought hard to wrest from the hands of Elmar Brok, who had, however, performed it admirably.

Two former Prime Ministers also made their debut: Alojz Peterle, who had led Slovenia from 1990 to 1992, following the collapse of the Titoist regime, and Jerzy Buzek, who had served as Poland’s Prime Minister from 1997 to 2001 within his party, the Civic Platform.

One of Lithuania’s major historical figures also joined the Group in the form of Vytautas Landsbergis. A musician and chess player, this patriot and democrat had opposed the Communist dictatorship and assumed the role of Head of the new Lithuanian State in March 1990 under circumstances of extreme tension, followed by that of President of the Lithuanian Parliament from 1996 to 2000.

His Estonian colleague Tunne Kelam had also been a long-time opponent of the former Soviet Union. Co-founder of the National Independence Party, the light he and Vytautas Landsbergis were able to shed during debates on Russia’s strategy proved invaluable to fellow
Group members owing to the intensity of their personal experience. At the same time, József Szájer, who had played a decisive role in Hungary’s democratic transformation and the creation of the Fidesz party, which had governed from 1998 to 2002, became Group Vice-Chairman in 2004. His flair for political analysis and finesse in this regard made him an authoritative spokesman for the Group in debates on the post-Communist situation.

In 2007, the Group expanded once more, with the arrival of Members from the two most recent additions to the Union, Romania and Bulgaria.

The Romanian delegation grew very rapidly, as the Group was able to attract the country’s new governing parties, which had close ties to the EPP family. In February 2008, therefore, 18 Romanian Members sat among the group, representing the Partidul Democrat-Liberal and the Uniunea Democrat Maghiara din România (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania): Roberta Alma Anastase, Sebastian Valentin Bodu, Nicodim Bulzescu, Dragoș Florin David, Constantin Dumitriu, Petru Filip, Sorin Frunzăverde, Monica Maria Iacob-Ridzi, Marian-Jean Marinescu, Rareș-Lucian Niculescu, Dumitru Oprea, Maria Petre, Mihaela Popa, Nicolae Vlad Popa, Csaba Sógor, Teodor Dumitru Stolojan, Iuliu Winkler and Marian Zlotea. Flaviu Călin Rus was elected in 2008.

Owing to the Romanian delegation’s success, the EPP-ED Group’s membership came to 288 in 2008.

Marian-Jean Marinescu soon took on responsibility within the Group as head of his national delegation and Group Vice-Chairman responsible for eastern Europe, the countries of the Northern Caucasus and dialogue with the Christian churches.

The situation in Bulgaria was not easy for the Group to handle, as the long-standing parties traditionally aligned with Christian Democracy had been unable to reach the electoral threshold. The Group had therefore successfully persuaded the two parties representing the new right, including the GERB (Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria) to join the Group. Following this agreement, five Bulgarian Members sat within the EPP-ED Group from 2007: Rumiana Jeleva, Nickolay Mladenov, Petya Stavreva, Vladimir Urutchev and Dushana Zdravkova.
The Group's Secretariat saw its staff numbers rise spectacularly from 1994 to 2009, as the number of its MEPs increased. This growth reflected both the Union's enlargement during this period from 12 to 27 Member States and the Group's expanding political influence.

The various staff charts published over this period show that while in April 1993 there had been 129 staff members in categories A, B and C, the majority of whom were temporary officials, recruited by competition to carry out open-ended contracts, with others employed as auxiliary staff on temporary contracts, in May 2008 there were 267 staff members in total, representing a doubling of the workforce.a

The Secretaries-General: Gerhard Guckenberger, Mário David, Klaus Welle, Niels Pedersen and Martin Kamp

In 1994 the Secretariat was under the charge of Gerhard Guckenberger, who had held the post since 24 January 1991 and was assisted by a special adviser, the Dane Harald Rømer, who had been Secretary-General of the Group of the European Democrats before the latter merged with the EPP Group in 1992. Gerhard Guckenberger also had two Deputy Secretaries-General, John Biesmans, who had also come from the Conservative Group, and the Italian Franco Sestito.

Following Wilfried Martens’ assumption of the Group chairmanship on 5 July 1994, the November 2005 staff chart featured 134 staff

---

a On 20 August 2008, the number of former group staff members (i.e. no longer working) since the creation of the Secretariat in 1953 came to 207, of which 58 were from Germany, 31 from Italy, 23 from the United Kingdom, 19 from Spain, 17 from France, 15 from Belgium, 8 from Greece, 6 from Denmark, 5 from Portugal, 4 from the Netherlands, 3 from Poland, 3 from Hungary, 3 from Luxembourg, 3 from Sweden, 2 from Ireland, 1 from Finland, 1 from Latvia, 1 from Malta, 1 from Slovakia and 1 from the Czech Republic. This means that 474 people have appeared on the Group Secretariat’s organigram at some point between 1953 and May 2008.
members and three additional Deputy Secretaries-General, the Dutchman Jan Westenbroek, the Frenchman Pascal Fontaine and the Spaniard José Maria Beneyto. The latter remained in this post for a few months only and was replaced by his compatriot Gonzalo Bescós.

On 10 April 1997, following Gerhard Guckenberger’s departure, Mário David of Portugal, who had been Secretary-General of the Liberal Group, many of whose members had joined the EPP Group, was appointed Secretary-General.

Portuguese by nationality, Mário David was born in Angola on 20 August 1953. Although his studies qualified him for a career in medicine, one he pursued from 1977 to 1980, his passion for politics soon caused him to change track. From 1980 to 1989, he ran the offices of several government ministers who had risen to power during Portugal’s transition to democracy, before joining the European Parliament in 1989 to take up the post of Secretary-General of the Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group. When David’s party, the Portuguese Social Democratic Party, joined the EPP Group in November 1996, he followed them, first succeeding Gerhard Guckenberger as Secretary-General of the Group from April 1997 until February 1999, when he gave way to Klaus Welle and was appointed special adviser to the Group. In April 2002, he went to work for the Portuguese Prime Minister, José Manuel Durão Barroso, accompanying him to Brussels in June and July 2004 for the latter’s inauguration as Commission President. Mário David then continued his career in Portuguese politics, becoming Secretary of State for European Affairs and then a member of parliament. He was given a safe seat by his party in the June 2009 European elections and thus returned to the Group as an MEP.

Mário David was assisted by two special advisers, the former Deputy Secretaries-General Jan Westenbroek and Franco Sestito, and four Deputy Secretaries-General, John Biesmans, Pascal Fontaine, Gonzalo Bescós and Karl Colling. In February 1998, the number of staff members came to 149. By December 1998, it had risen to 163.

On 8 February 1999, Klaus Welle was appointed Secretary-General. On 16 February 2000, the updated organigram showed that the Secretary-General was assisted by a special adviser, Mário David, and five Deputy Secretaries-General. John Biesmans had also been promoted to Head of the Office of the Secretary-General, putting him second in

---

a Including, notably, the seven Italian officials who had accompanied the Forza Italia Members in June 1998: Amarylli Gersony, Stefano Guccione, Luigi Mazza, Orazio Parisotto, Emma Petroni, Alessia Porretta and Mario Schwetz. Three French officials followed from the same Group in July 1999 along with the RPR deputies: Antoine Ripoll, Natacha Scriban and Marie-Claude Delahaye.
the hierarchy, while the other three Deputy Secretaries-General in place were joined by the Italian Paolo Licandro. Shortly afterwards, Karl Colling was appointed a Director within the European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Finance and Gonzalo Bescós Director of Finance of the Committee of the Regions. He was replaced by his compatriot Miguel Papí-Boucher, who had been recruited to the Group in November 1988, then seconded to the office of the Spanish Prime Minister, José María Aznar.

As of May 2003 the Group employed 200 members of staff.

On 1 January 2004, Niels Pedersen was made Secretary-General. Martin Kamp was promoted to Deputy Secretary-General responsible for parliamentary work, the area previously occupied by Niels Pedersen. The staff chart published in February 2005 showed a staff of 236, rising to 261 in June 2006.

Niels Pedersen, who, having joined the European Parliament in 1974, had a great deal of experience to his name, took up the legacy left by Klaus Welle. There was a particular need to deal with the sharp rise in staff numbers resulting from enlargement and to continue with the Secretariat’s professionalisation drive. This Dane with the icy blue stare would demonstrate his composure and tenacity in the course of his three years as Secretary-General, from January 2004 to September 2007. The first challenge came with the arrival of the 10 new Member States and the need to assist the Chairman, Hans-Gert Pöttering, during the long and difficult negotiations to settle on a fair and politically acceptable allocation of parliamentary responsibilities among the Group’s 27 national delegations. In addition, as the EPP-ED Group was now Parliament’s largest group, its Secretary-General had an even more prominent role to play in discussions with the administration and other political groups. A constant presence at the side of the two chairmen he served, Hans-Gert Pöttering and Joseph Daul, Pedersen retained their trust right up until he left the institution.

The rapid swelling of the Secretariat’s ranks in the three years leading up to the May 2004 round of enlargement was down to the need to recruit auxiliary staff members from the future Member States, particularly in the press section. This policy of linguistic diversification and preliminary contact with the national political parties of the prospective Member States did much to help the new MEPs joining the Group in 2004 to integrate. Many of the auxiliary contracts signed with

---

a During the 1999-2004 term the following were recruited as Group advisers: Jesper Haglund, Philipp Schulmeister, Géraldine Philibert, Markus Arens, Knut Goelz, Adam Isaacs, Pedro Lopez de Pablo, Adriaan Bastiaansen, Stephen Woodard, Alwyn Strange, György Hölvenyi, Atilla Agardi and Marek Evison.
staff members from the new Member States were converted into open-ended posts once they had been the subject of a competition. This procedure saw thirty members of the Secretariat become officials between May 2004 and February 2008.

On 1 September 2007, Martin Kamp was appointed Secretary-General, which, coming after his stint as Deputy Secretary-General in charge of parliamentary work from January 2004 onwards, represented the crowning of his career within the Group. Born in Bad Nauheim in Hessen, Germany, on 2 August 1959 to a Silesian refugee father and Sudeten refugee mother, Kamp was a committed European, whose family history was a painful testament to war and the suffering of displaced civilians. After studying law and ethnology at the Universities of Marburg and Frankfurt, and following a period at the Federal Ministry of the Interior in Bonn, he completed a traineeship within the EPP Group, whose payroll he joined in January 1989 after passing an administrators’ competition. He was assigned to the Committee on the Environment and then to the coordination of a permanent working group and was also required to follow European Convention proceedings. Eighteen years of experience within the Secretariat, including within a parliamentary committee with a large legislative remit, enabled the new Secretary-General to face the numerous challenges involved in managing a team that size and charged with such complex tasks.

Above all, Kamp’s new role required him to ensure that Secretariat staff adhered to a multinational way of thinking and demonstrated a commitment to Europe. The Secretary-General acts as the hierarchical contact point between the political authority, the Group’s Presidency, and staff members, whose most important task is to be at the service of the Group’s parliamentarians. Taking his place beside the Chairman, the Secretary-General must be constantly au fait with the political issues of the day and the matters under discussion within Parliament and the Union. He must carry out the groundwork for the Presidency’s discussions and help the 10 vice-chairmen to find acceptable solutions. Availability, discretion, receptiveness, vigilance and good initiative are just some of the qualities a Group Secretary-General of this calibre must cultivate in order to win the unwavering trust of his Chairman.

Ultimately, the linguistic dexterity that enabled Martin Kamp to communicate in English, French and Portuguese, in addition to his mother tongue, clearly helped him in the daily dealings a Secretary-General necessarily has with a great many people both inside and outside the Group.

On taking up his duties, the new Secretary-General decided to promote to his previous role handling parliamentary work Miguel
Papi-Boucher, who had thus far been in charge of finance. John Biesmans saw his responsibilities extended to finance and all matters pertaining to internal organisation. Paolo Licandro became the head of a new department known as ‘Neighbourhood Policy and Intercultural Activities’ The Relations with National Parliaments department was set up under the authority of Béatrice Scarascia-Mugnozza. The new post of Head of Unit for Interparliamentary Relations was created and awarded to Joanna Jarecka-Gomez, becoming part of the International Relations department headed by Arthur Hildebrandt. The Secretariat also created the post of Group Legal Adviser, awarded to Oliver Dreute, and an internal auditor post awarded to Martin Hare, both directly answerable to the Secretary-General, reflecting the Group’s wish to gain greater independence from the European Parliament’s legal service and to step up internal financial auditing.

On 1 September 2008, there were further structural changes to the staff chart: Pascal Fontaine was appointed special adviser and Antoine Ripoll, the spokesman for the Group Chairman and responsible for dealing with the Francophone press, became Deputy Secretary-General in charge of a new Service, the Group Presidency Service. This Service was set up to rationalise the Secretariat, both internally through better preparation of its own bodies, and externally by providing Group MEPs with better assistance in the exercise of their responsibilities within the bodies of the European Parliament. The Group has therefore been better able to coordinate the political groups in Parliament before and after the elections and to optimise Parliament’s workload.

On 1 December 2008, the total number of staff members, including those on temporary contracts, came to 288, 176 of whom were women and 108 men, with 107 falling within the AD (administrator) category and 178 classed as ASTs (assistants).

The ‘Management Team’
The ‘management team’ practice was introduced to the Secretariat by Gerhard Guckenberger. It involved regular meetings held by the Secretary-General with the Deputy Secretaries-General and heads of
department in order to facilitate internal communication and to assess the work under way in the various sections. Initially, the meetings were held once or twice a month in Brussels and, for a time, were also attended by representatives of the offices of the Christian Democrat Commissioners. For more than two years, therefore, meetings took place regularly at the Commission headquarters in the presence of the parliamentary advisers of the EPP Commissioners.

Under the driving force of Klaus Welle, this informal management body took on a more definite structure from 1999. Each Monday, the Secretary-General formally invited to his office in Brussels or Strasbourg a restricted circle of staff members – the Deputy Secretaries-General, the special adviser(s) and the heads of department, along with the Deputy Secretary-General of the European People’s Party and the Secretary-General’s closest colleagues. All those present were called upon to report on relevant matters in their area of responsibility over the week to come.

New faces and professionalisation

On 13 October 2008, 115 of a total 203 permanent staff members employed by the Group had been recruited between 2000 and 2008, representing a huge intake of new staff within the Secretariat.

This increase in the number of Group staff members was accompanied by a specialisation of roles. The various departments were gradually becoming more structured. The strongest impetus came from Klaus Welle, who began in 1999 to identify more clearly the responsibilities of the individual Deputy Secretaries-General, with each being put in charge of a department. Other staff members were also made heads of department, without having been designated Deputy

---

a Klaus Welle also introduced a twice-yearly meeting for members of the management team that was held over two half-days at the Le Manoir Hotel in Genval, near Brussels, where the more convivial setting and seclusion allowed for in-depth exchanges of views on medium-term strategies and facilitated a team spirit. The Genval meetings continued to take place under Niels Pedersen at their twice-yearly frequency. The last meeting of this kind was arranged by Martin Kamp and held at Château de la Rocq Arquennes in Wallonian Brabant on 31 January 2008.

b Since 18 March 1999, Deborah Warren has been responsible for drafting a set of minutes following each meeting.

c From August 2004 to April 2008, 70 members of staff were recruited, including 22 administrators: Thomas Bickl, Kai Wynands, Theodoros Georgitsopoulos, Peter Adler, Greet Gysen, Michael Speiser, Alena Carna, Marzena Rogalska, Joanna Jarecka-Gomez, Andrea Laskava, Fani Zarfopoulos, Boglarka Bólya, Klemen Zumer, Mercedes Alvargonzales, Mauro Belardinelli, Daniela Senk, Balázs Széchy, Antti Timonen, Alfredo Sousa de Jesus, Nicole Wirtz, Mina Dermendjieva and Botond Török-Illyes.
Secretaries-General: Robert Fitzhenry was appointed Head of Press and Communication, while Niels Pedersen became responsible for parliamentary work. The latter department was divided into four sections and then five working groups, responsibility for which was assigned to heads of unit, and which corresponded to the permanent working groups headed by the Group vice-chairmen.

Under successive Secretaries-General, the organigram underwent regular facelifts, following consultation with and the approval of the Presidency, in order to respond to the Group’s needs while pursuing a staff policy that rewarded skills and merit. As a result, other departments and units sprang up, such as Relations with National Parliaments, Human Resources, Political Strategy, Finance, Interparliamentary Delegations, Information Technology, Internet and Plenary Sessions and Legislative Coordination.

The two largest departments in terms of staff numbers were Parliamentary Work and Press and Communication, which, between them, employed more than half of all staff. The Parliamentary Work Department included seven heads of unit all coordinated by the Head of Department, Miguel Papi-Boucher. Of significance also was the fact that the Group had opened external offices in the capital cities of the largest Member States, at each of which between one and three Secretariat staff were employed to assist the Group’s MEPs in the country in question. By 2008, there were external offices in Berlin, London, Paris, Rome and Warsaw, with one soon to open in Bucharest. The Robert Schuman Institute in Budapest also deserves a mention in this context.

The Finance Unit, which came under the responsibility of Andreas Folz in 2007, is charged with carrying out the often delicate task of managing the funds allocated by Parliament for information measures taken in conjunction with the national delegations and parliaments. The Group’s budget for 2009 comes to EUR 30 million, and does not cover officials’ salaries or MEPs’ allowances, which are paid by the European Parliament. It is mainly given over to funding information measures taken by Group members, the mission expenses incurred by Group staff, particularly when travelling to Strasbourg, certain costs arising from external meetings and administrative costs. With the rules governing the use of this funding becoming ever tighter, the Group’s accounting staff have been required to show rigour and diplomacy in their dealings with both MEPs and the administration.

As far as possible, taking account of the national delegations’ demands, the Secretaries-General have pursued a consistent policy with regard to staff. This policy is based on two principles: the holding
of competitions to fill the administrators’ and assistants’ posts made available to the Group each year on the basis of the present staffing situation and the Group’s numerical weight and linguistic diversity; and the recognition of the merits of each staff member put forward for promotion in consultation with the elected Staff Committee and in accordance with the Presidency’s decision.

In all cases, political trust is crucial to a good relationship between all members of the Secretariat and the Group as their employer. Without this trust, which involves loyalty to the EPP-ED’s ideological principles, a commitment to ensuring discretion and confidentiality and a constant willingness to address Members’ demands, the moral contract would be null and void. Breaches of the legal contract, which sets out officials’ obligations and rights, remain an exceptional occurrence in the Group’s history and culture.

The Secretariat has gradually been required to evolve from a ‘family-style’ political culture to a ‘professional’ one. Some management techniques in use in the private sector, such as professional training, individual coaching and away days, have been introduced. Staff members are assessed in annual reports identical to those drawn up within the administration. So-called passerelle or transition competitions are organised by the European Parliament’s administration to boost internal mobility.

Only rarely have officials within the Group managed to cross the Rubicon to launch a political career. Carmen Fraga Estévez, Gerardo Galeote and Guillermo Martínez Casañ all successfully stood for election, the first two to the European Parliament and the latter to the Spanish Cortes, returning to the Group after completing his term.

**Lifts in the Tower of Babel and wheeled suitcases**

The year 2000 onwards marked a change in atmosphere and the day-to-day life of Group members and the Secretariat. Firstly, the overall increase in staff members had required Parliament to do some careful planning with regard to the expansion of premises in Brussels and Strasbourg. The huge complex built around the Brussels Chamber went by both the anonymous initials indicating when the individual buildings had come into use (D1, D2, D3 and D4) and the more symbolic names of European figures: the Altiero Spinelli Building, which had, since 2000, housed the offices of Group MEPs and members of its Secretariat, the Paul-Henri Spaak Building, in which the Chamber, the offices of the Presidency and the administration could be found,
the Karamanlis walkway, the József Antall Building and the new premises encompassing the former Leopold railway station.\footnote{From 1979, the Group had had offices in the Belliard and then the Remard, Remorqueur and Montoyer Buildings. The successive moves between these buildings that were being newly built or renovated, the stark absence of parking spaces and the lack of room in general are not always fondly remembered by their occupants.}

In Strasbourg, the Group’s MEPs and some Secretariat staff have had their offices in the Louise Weiss Building since 1999, which is also the location of the new Chamber. Other members of the Secretariat have remained in the IPE or Winston Churchill Building on the other bank of the Ill. The walkway between the buildings, which operates in both directions, is swarming on days when Parliament is in session.

The EPP-ED Group, the only one to be represented in the 27 Member States, has meeting rooms in both Brussels and Strasbourg that are equipped with 21 interpreting booths. This means that, when the Group or its principal bodies are meeting, 63 conference interpreters are on hand to ensure that anything said can be instantly understood.

Anyone who has seen the profound changes that have occurred over the last two decades of Parliament’s life will have noted the institution’s adaptability. The growing technological capacity provided by new forms of communication (the Intranet and Internet) has helped bring about this gradual transformation from a society in which nine national cultures first learnt to live together from 1953 to 1986. The two decades from 1986 to 2006 have seen this diversity increase threefold. Officials who, when in a lift in Parliament or eating in the cafeteria, could identify their neighbour’s language without a second’s hesitation have suddenly found themselves stripped of this ability. If the mythical Tower of Babel had, in those days, been fitted with lifts, the same variety of accents and languages would have been heard there as in the European Parliament!

‘Tuesday Night Fever’

An official’s life is, to a large extent, the mirror image of that of an MEP. The missions to Brussels and Strasbourg and the Bureau meetings and Study Days are just some of the occurrences that lend the job its strong rhythm and identity and shape each person’s way of life. Trunks must be filled and then emptied; computers must be switched on and, if faulty, attended to promptly by the IT department; the familiar rumble of wheeled suitcases can be heard in the corridors of Parliament’s various buildings. This is all part of the daily life of those working for the Group. The moments of high activity, and sometimes tension, are frequent. There is something of a ‘Tuesday Night Fever’ when the many
MEPs take their allotted seat in Strasbourg for the Group meeting held from 7 to 9 p.m. Officials and assistants, whose access is restricted by the shortage of seats, attempt to follow the discussions at which decisions are made on the voting lists for plenary reports. Private conversations are conducted here and there. Everyone knows that it is the best opportunity for catching hold of as many people as possible.

It is sometimes reminiscent of a Roman forum, with the Chairman required to call everyone to order and restore quiet. The commotion is often followed by drama. Members and officials frequently have to work under pressure, particularly during part-sessions. A vote is often necessary in order to decide between two emerging points of view. It is the Chairman’s job to preside over the vote and the Secretary-General’s to count the votes. Some Members can be quite vehement in underlining the importance of an issue to their country or to industry, consumers, farmers or voters in their constituency. The Chairman and the Secretary-General must strive to keep their composure at all times.

Finally, one subject follows the next, the speakers become less insistent and the points of order dwindle in number. At the end of the meeting, everyone retires, in some cases to the hotel, in others, to a restaurant, where the discussions continue or the mood takes a more festive turn.

**The rising tide of youth**

The increasing youthfulness of staff and the ever greater number of parliamentary assistants has helped to fuel the general feeling of dynamism and vibrant energy. Parliament has also opened itself up to visitors. Glancing around the halls and wide corridors of the buildings in Brussels, and during part-sessions in Strasbourg, one has the impression of seeing a genuine rising tide of youth, bringing both diversity and a vitality. It is nothing like the hushed and undoubtedly less electric atmosphere of several years ago, which persists in Luxembourg, where only the staff of the European Parliament’s administration are employed.

A forum, exhibition space and stage for symbolic events and cultural occasions, the European Parliament is a living institution. The Group has played a full role in this strategy of public relations and democratisation. Its involvement each May in the Open Day in Brussels and Strasbourg is demonstrated by the marketing products bearing the heart and stars against a blue background. Its paper and online publications have also undergone a spectacular growth, while adhering to the

---

**Illustrative of the Group Secretariat’s youth and vitality was Martin Kamp’s announcement at the end-of-year party in Strasbourg on 17 December 2008 that there had been 20 births within the Secretariat over the past year!**
demands of multilingualism. A great deal of work is required to narrow the divide between public opinion and the European political institutions which led to negative results in public referendums in some Member States.

**Day labourers or cathedral builders?**

The Group still remembers how one of its very first officials, the Italian Arnaldo Ferragni, referred with a hint of nostalgia, to the pioneer spirit guiding members of the Secretariat in the early days: ‘*We were real soldier monks serving the European institutions*’. It is true that they were few in number and shared the feeling of being part of an unprecedented historical undertaking, the stated objectives of which were peace, reconciliation and reconstruction. Half a century later, the psychological and sociological backdrop is vastly different. The generational turnover is such that Secretariat staff no longer have a personal link to the Second World War, which constituted the ‘founding myth’ behind the European idea. For the young employees from the 12 new Member States, working at the European Parliament is a first-rate career opportunity, even if the new Staff Regulations that have applied to the European civil service since 1 May 2004 have brought a slight reduction in the financial advantages of the job. The salary gap between national civil servants in the former Socialist states and European officials, all of whom have the same university education, remains considerable.

**A certain pride**

Do material motivations exclude others that are more centred on values and on attachment to the nature of the work and its environment and prospects? It can be assumed that, for the vast majority of Group staff members, who are equipped with a high level of education and linguistic skill, the feeling of working in a cosmopolitan, globalised and influential environment at the heart of the European decision-making process is a gratifying one. Enjoying direct contract with parliamentarians well known at national level is rewarding and stimulating. The statutory guarantees connected with employment within the Group protect staff from the job insecurity that has plagued Europe’s labour market over the last two decades. The chance to travel on Group missions to the various countries of the Union, or further afield on one of numerous visits by interparliamentary delegations, is also valued. The specialisation of roles within the Secretariat, the large number of staff members, the occasional language barrier and the scattering of
offices over several floors of Brussels and Strasbourg premises mean that personal contact is not always easy. However, no one denies the strong sense of belonging within the Secretariat, and even a certain pride.

Charles Péguy recalled the similarities with the visit by the King of France to Chartres Cathedral, the building of which took decades. Speaking to the first workman he came to, who was busy breaking up stones, he asked: ‘What do you do, sir?’ – ‘You can see I am breaking up stones. It’s hard – my back aches, I’m thirsty, I’m hot. I’m carrying out a terrible excuse for a trade; I’m a subhuman.’ The King continued some way and saw another man breaking stones, but who did not seem unhappy. ‘Sir, what do you do?’ – ‘I’m earning a living. I break up stones. I haven’t found any other trade that will feed my family. I’m glad of this one’ The monarch carried on and approached a third man breaking stones, who was smiling and beaming; ‘Me, Sir, he said, ‘I’m building a cathedral.’

Within the Group Secretariat, there are some day labourers who no doubt attach less importance to their work and draw less satisfaction from it. However, an even greater number know that, through their work at Parliament, they are making their contribution to the European political project.
Chapter XXXIII
REUNITING THE CONTINENT: FROM A UNION OF 15 MEMBERS TO A UNION OF 27

‘We should also look eastwards when we think of Europe. Those countries, with their rich European past, are part of Europe too. They must also be given the opportunity to accede. Europe must be large; it must have strength and influence, so that it can assert its interests on the international political stage’.

Konrad Adenauer, 1967

Opening the door to Europe: the historic Copenhagen decision in June 1993

In December 1991, the Maastricht European Council stated that ‘the Treaty on European Union [...] provides that any European State whose systems of Government are founded on the principle of democracy may apply to become members of the Union’.

On 20 January 1993, the European Parliament voted on a resolution on the structure and strategy for the European Union with regard to its enlargement. In response to the historic changes taking place in the continent, the European Community reorganised its relations with the East. The process of accession had to be carried out on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty. At the same time, however, the Community had to be deepened, meaning it had to be made more efficient and more democratic. To that end, Jean Penders noted that ‘the European Union can accept new members only if it develops further, on the basis of a constitution, towards a union with a federal structure and specific limited powers and fully developed democratic institutions’. That would unavoidably mean changes on difficult issues such as the Council Presidency, the composition of the Commission or the language setup.

The task of taking up these challenges fell to the Danish Presidency in the first half of 1993. The Copenhagen European Council of 21 and 22 June formally recognised the will of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) to become members of the Union. To that end
the European Council laid down three essential criteria. A political criterion: the presence of stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; an economic criterion: the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the European Union; and the criterion of adopting the acquis communautaire: the ability of the applicant country to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

In its resolution of 24 June on the outcome of the Council, the European Parliament welcomed that decision. Accepting the EPP’s wording, Parliament stressed, however, that the European Community had to be able to withstand such an enlargement without the disruption of its normal operation. The accession of the CEECs to the EU would have to be preceded by a revision of the Community’s institutional framework. In a repeat of what the Group had said in respect of the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland, enlargement of the European Union had to go hand in hand with consolidation of the Union. Fernand Herman also complained that ‘the only thing’ European governments had managed to agree on was ‘enlargement on any terms, which, in the absence of institutional changes, will in the long run lead to the suicide of the Community and, above all, the Commission, which is a strange accomplice to this programmed suicide.’ Jean Penders added: ‘But that strategy cannot mean enlargement and only that. What about deepening the EC – something which has not been forgotten, I trust.’

Although the dialectics of deepening and enlargement would not be resolved until later, and then only in part, the Central and Eastern European Countries were gradually moving closer to the Community through the European Agreements, which gave them the status of associate members. As the Copenhagen European Council confirmed, that status effectively gave these countries an entry ticket to the Union for some as yet undefined future date.


The stakes were immense. In his report on the accession of the CEECs’, Arie Oostlander recalled that ‘the hope and prospect of unifying all the peoples of Europe in a free and democratic system in a “common European home” was one of the motivating forces for the foundation
Reuniting the continent: from a union of 15 members to a union of 27

of the European Community and of the democratic changes in central and eastern Europe’. He also stated, however, that ‘any eastward enlargement of the European Union required major institutional problems to be resolved’. During the debate in the plenary sitting of 30 November 1994 he dwelt on the need to modify Union policy in various sectors in order to allow political as well as economic enlargement to take place: ‘Internally that requires not only institutional changes but a variety of other changes too. Mention has already been made of agriculture policy, transport policy, coal and steel, the Structural Funds. […] The criteria for accession […] are very important. We want a European Union which truly embodies a sound legal order, based on broad acceptance of Judaeo-Christian cultural values. Democracy, the constitutional state, a good policy on minorities and human rights, these are our prime criteria.’

On 9 and 10 December 1994 the Essen European Council drew up a pre-accession strategy aimed at establishing closer ties with the countries that were signatories to association agreements with the European Union. It was based on the association agreements themselves; the White Paper drawn up in May 1995, which outlined the key measures in each sector of the internal market and laid down priorities for the approximation of national legislation; structured dialogue at institutional level; and finally the Phare programme, which was intended to be the main financial support instrument for pre-accession strategies.

One year later, the Madrid European Council decided that accession negotiations would be launched six months after the Amsterdam European Council in 1996, which, among other things, was to resolve the issue of deepening the Union.

The EPP Group’s pre-accession strategy

During the Helsinki Study Days in August 1996 the EPP Group drew up its strategy for future enlargement with regard to the CEECs. As usual, these meetings were an opportunity for a Christian Democrat family gathering and for members of the Group to hear from key figures. European Commissioners such as the Dutchman Hans van den Broek, who was responsible for relations with the CEECs, the Austrian Franz Fischler, who was responsible for agriculture, and Wim van Velzen, President of the EUDC and Chairman of the EPP Group’s Central Europe Working Group, were particularly active. The Group invited prominent figures from Eastern Europe, including László Surján, the Vice-President of the People’s Christian-Democrat Movement of Hungary, Jan Carnogursky, President of the Christian-Democrat Movement of Slovakia, and Hanna Suchoka, a member of the ‘Union of Liberty’ from
Poland. Mrs Suchoka expressed her vision and hopes for the enlarge-
ment process as follows: ‘I think that what is really very important at the
moment is trying to change mentality. But when I, as a Prime Minister, try
to achieve this I have the impression that the Western countries are facing
the same problem. I think that also citizens living in the West also need to
change their mentality to prepare themselves for living in an open world,
not in a bilateral world […] Now that we are in one group, the group of
European People’s Party, it is, I believe, very important for you to help us
to educate our society, not so as to create new barriers, not so as to create
new fears, but to create a new, open society. One of our greatest problems
at the moment lies in the education of our society. […] I would now like to
finish by quoting the words of the former Austrian Vice-Chancellor,
Dr. Busek, who paid a visit to Poland in 1992. He said: “Let us enlarge
Europe, not on the map and not in terms of States, not in the number of
institutions and their jurisdiction but rather in our minds and our hearts.
After all the search for Europe is a love story which is part of our tradi-
tion.”

The Amsterdam Treaty, signed on 2 October 1997, stated that the
possibility of membership depended on respect for the principles on
which the Union itself is founded: ‘liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law’. The
matter of the institutions was also raised once more. A further Inter-
governmental Conference would be necessary to reform a system of
institutions established initially for only six Member States. At the dis-
cussion in the plenary sitting of 26 June 1997, Wilfried Martens once
again raised the need for this: ‘Over the next few years, the European
Union must accept its historic responsibility by bringing democratic coun-
tries on the European continent into the Union. It cannot do this without
institutional reform, and in particular without qualified majority deci-
sions in the Council. […] Without these reforms, the Union will lose
momentum […] The great question is, who is defending the common
interest? Who is defending Europe’s interests? Helmut Kohl has been doing
that, and for many years. […] This is the new spirit we need to generate,
otherwise I fear that our historic mission to unite all the democratic coun-
tries of Europe within the Union will be too onerous, if we do not have
sound, coherent structures and the political will to create a genuine Union
rather than just a free trade zone, a genuine Union that has a role to play
in the world.

Only the European executive body could provide an answer. On
16 July 1997, the Santer Commission adopted its communication
on ‘Agenda 2000, For a stronger and wider Union’ to which opinions
on the various applicant countries were attached. The Commission
Reuniting the continent: from a union of 15 members to a union of 27

The proposal tackled three challenges: strengthening and reforming EU policies (in particular the Common Agricultural Policy and economic and social cohesion); full negotiations with the acceding States; and the new financial framework for the period 2000-2006.

This lengthy document also proposed that negotiations should be opened with a first wave of countries. All the applicants from Central and Eastern Europe, except Slovakia, had complied with the political conditions for accession. But Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania still had work to do before negotiations could be opened, especially where economic reforms and the adoption and implementation of European legislation and rules were concerned.

‘No discrimination between applicant countries’

This was not really what Parliament was asking for, especially not the EPP Group, in whose view negotiation should allow all applicants to accede in the same time-period. The Dutch Commissioner Hans van den Broek noted that: ‘The Commission’s opinions on each of the applications for membership take as their starting-point the conditions for membership established in 1993 by the Copenhagen European Council. These conditions relate to the applicant’s political and economic situation and its capacity to fulfil the other obligations of membership, known as the acquis […]. I am, of course, aware that Parliament has indicated a preference for a common start to the negotiations with all the applicants. The Commission, for its part, continues to stress that enlargement is an overall process involving all applicants. All will benefit from the reinforced pre-accession strategy, all will be invited to conclude accession partnerships, and all will receive extra support from the Union to overcome problems identified in the opinions. But the detailed objective analysis made by the Commission leaves no doubt that there is a natural differentiation among the applicants for a variety of historical, political and economic reasons […] There will not be “ins” and “outs” but “ins” and “pre-ins”, with the possibility for the latter to join the former as soon as the conditions are right.’

The Chairman of the EPP Group, Wilfried Martens, strongly criticised the European Commission’s decision here: ‘And I would warn your presidency of the disastrous consequences for the unity of our continent of any sense of frustration on the part of those peoples which are not included in the first wave of enlargement. We must never forget that the opening of the Union to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the

---

a The budget proposals were adopted by the European Parliament and the Council within the maximum budget set before enlargement was in prospect, namely 1.27 % of Union GDP.
Baltic States and Cyprus is, above all, a political process. If we confine ourselves to economic criteria, the European project will decline into nothing more than a free trade zone. What we wish to see, however, is a political Union inspired by a democratic ideal and backed by a project of civilization, for essential geopolitical reasons.\(^\text{603}\)

Hans-Gert Pöttering was in full agreement and communicated as much personally in a letter to Chancellor Kohl.\(^\text{a}\) In Parliament, he reiterated that: ‘When the Commission proposes that accession negotiations should begin with the six states – five plus one, in other words – it must be made clear that the other five states that are willing to join are not being excluded. There must be no clear-cut dividing line between ins and outs.’\(^\text{604}\)

Efthimios Christodoulou added: ‘In that connection, the European Parliament’s position was completely clear. We said that everyone ought to be included in the negotiations from the start, regardless of how long it took to conclude them.’\(^\text{605}\) He was therefore criticising the Commission when he added that: ‘In essence, therefore, countries not in the first stage of negotiations will be taking part as if they were normal participants, other than in the process of those negotiations as such […] So why should we not all begin together? I say this for political reasons as well, which have been explained earlier, because the basic political platform of the democratic forces in many of those countries is access to the European Union and we must not sow the seeds of doubt among those peoples.’\(^\text{606}\)

**The Stockholm watershed, 10 September 1997**

There were lively debates at the Group’s Study Days in Stockholm between 8 and 11 September.\(^\text{607}\) Commissioner Hans van den Broek himself questioned the Commission’s position while defending it: had it been discriminatory?\(^\text{608}\) Some MEPs thought it had, and some, such as Michl Ebner pointed to the commitment made by the Group in its Helsinki declaration. Frenchman Pierre Bernard-Reymond deplored the ‘impression of being out of control’ that the Commission was giving.

Hans-Gert Pöttering shared the view of the Group’s Swedish Vice-Chairman, Staffan Burenstam Linder, that the message coming out of Stockholm had to be one of encouragement to all applicant countries and should send the European Council and the Commission a definite signal. In his room in the Nelson Hotel in the heart of the old city, where the meticulous décor was reminiscent of the interior of a former British Naval vessel, he worked on the final document for the Enlargement Working Group which he chaired a document due to be adopted.

\(^{a}\) Interview with Hans-Gert Pöttering, 25 August 2008, Brussels.
the following day in the chamber of the Riksdag where the Group’s meeting was being held. His words were carefully considered and would be decisive for the future of all the applicant countries, would be adopted by the EPP Congress in Toulouse on 11 November 1997: ‘The EPP wishes the reinforced accession and negotiation process with all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which meet the political conditions of membership, as with Cyprus, [to] open in 1998. The intensity of negotiations and the time-table for their conclusion will depend upon the extent to which each applicant country fulfils the requirements for accession.’

Once Pöttering had received the approval (by telephone) of Arie Oostlander, who was the Group’s conscience on the question of enlargement, the Group and the Party proposed that negotiations should be opened with all the applicant countries on 1 January 1998 and conducted with greater or lesser speed depending on each country’s performance, with the end of negotiations and the date of accession of the future Member States being dependent on their individual performances.

The Group endorsed this strategy unanimously on 1 October in Brussels. A discussion with the Socialist Group’s coordinator on enlargement, Hannes Swoboda, meant that the agreement of the two main Groups on this wording was assured for the vote on the resolution in the European Parliament. Within the EPP Party, the task was to prepare an equivalent proposal for submission to the Party Congress due to be held in Toulouse on 11 November 1997. The final text of the Toulouse Congress reiterated word for word the key paragraphs of the Group’s resolution.

EPP proposals accepted by the European Council in December 1997

The Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 definitively endorsed the proposals made in Toulouse by the EPP. This came as no surprise, so active had its role in negotiations been. Even though it had not proved possible to prevent a division of the acceding States into two groups, they were nonetheless all fully involved in the accession process. The first group of States called to negotiations, also known as the Luxembourg Group, comprised Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Cyprus. At the same time, the preparations for negotiations with the countries in the second wave (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia) would be accelerated and a

---
a Interview given by Hans-Gert Pöttering, to the author on 25 March 2009.
total of EUR 100 million was allocated to the five applicants in the sec-
ond wave in order to finance projects to help them to catch up in imple-
menting economic reforms.

This genuine victory for the Group led Wilfried Martens to declare on 6 March 1998 during the Study Days in Berlin that: ‘To show the EPP Group’s keen interest in the enlargement process which has now got under way, we have asked the most senior government representatives of certain applicant countries to take part in our proceedings. We consider that it is in our common interest to work together in analysing the issues facing us in the context of the current enlargement process. The EPP Group has sought to ensure that the process of accession of this large number of new countries takes place without discrimination and allows each applicant to make the necessary efforts to take on board the “acquis communau-
taire”’.611

Also present in Berlin was the Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Algirdas Saudargas, who could not disguise his emotion: ‘If I were to compare this occasion with previous occasions, I can never forget those moments seven or eight years ago when I met the Christian Demo-
crat Group. In those now far off days they were quite different times and quite different speeches. If we compare those times with nowadays things have changed considerably; we have good prospects and we are members of the EPP – and these are great achievements. I would like to congratu-
late everybody in the European Union on Economic and Monetary Union. This is a great achievement and in line with EPP policy.’612 Vilém Holán, Vice-President of the Czech Christian Democrat Party and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Czech Parliament, said that ‘As a result of the start of negotiations for accession to the European Union, the Czech Republic now finds itself in a completely new situation. We have waited for this moment since the revolution and now after eight years it is finally here.’613

The home straight: 2004 – the target of the ‘Lamassoure amendment’

The European Conference, one of the innovations in the accession process put in place by the Luxembourg Council, opened for the first time on 12 March 1998. It brought the EU Member States and the acced-
ing States together to discuss cross-border issues such as justice, home affairs (including crime and drugs), and the CFSP. A second meeting was held in October the same year.

Spring 1998 also saw the launch of the ‘accession partnerships’. While the Commission reported on the progress made by each appli-
cant country, set the priorities for each of them and arranged for
funding and aid, each applicant country was in charge of implementing a national programme for the adoption of the acquis. Negotiations between the Fifteen and the six Luxembourg Group countries could begin.

For the Enlargement Working Group chaired by Hans-Gert Pöttering, the target of accession had to be achieved by 2004. The challenge was considerable but the Christian Democrats insisted that the schedule was necessary: accession should take place just before the European elections to allow the people who had just joined the Union to be fully involved in the democratic debate straight away. To that end, in September 2000 Alain Lamassoure tabled an amendment to the Brok report on enlargement which proposed that ‘the EU institutions, the Member States and the candidate countries with which negotiations have been started, do everything in their power to ensure that the European Parliament can give its assent to the first accession treaties before the European Parliament elections in 2004, […] and to the subsequent treaties during the course of the next parliamentary term.’

The Member States were not all of that view. It was therefore necessary to convince the Council, and the Group did all it could to tip the scales. In Gothenburg in June 2001 the Swedish Presidency finally found some common ground. The date of 2004 was confirmed along with a deadline for negotiations of 2002. In the European Parliament the Group supported the resolution on the European Council, which called on ‘the Commission and the governments of the Member States and the candidate countries to do everything in their power to ensure that the prospect of citizens of the candidate countries participating in the 2004 European elections becomes a reality. Consequently, the accession treaties should be concluded on a case-by-case basis by the end of 2002, reflecting the progress made by each of the countries, in order that the European Union’s historic commitments can be fulfilled.’

The tight schedule inevitably posed some problems, first for the European Community which, following the Irish people’s rejection of the Nice Treaty, had a new hurdle to overcome in its institutional strategy, and then for the applicant countries, where the pressures to adopt the acquis and viable political and economic structures weighed heavily. In political terms there was no need to lose hope, the Group said. On 4 September 2001, Elmar Brok tabled a resolution on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Committee reiterating the European Parliament’s support for the process of enlarging the Union. The Union needed institutional reforms just as it needed enlargement. It was therefore necessary to intensify the public information campaigns on the subject.
Preparing for enlargement in Parliament and within the Group

The process involved not only preparing for the integration of new Member States into Europe, it was also necessary to find room for their MEPs in Parliament. On 19 November 2002 the Strasbourg Hemicycle hosted 199 parliamentarians from the thirteen candidate countries for an extraordinary debate on enlargement. Sitting on the same benches as their colleagues, the attendance of these ‘MEPs for a day’ offered a glimpse of the face of European democracy for 2004. The deputies, as is the custom in the European Parliament, sat not by nationality but by political allegiance. The overriding feeling was one of enthusiasm, first for the fifteen years of political transformation undergone by eastern Europe, and secondly for all the efforts made by the countries which had applied to join the Union.

The following day the European Parliament adopted Elmar Brok’s report on enlargement by 505 votes to 20, with 30 abstentions.

In tandem, the EPP-ED continued to pursue its own strategy. The Group’s Bureau regularly visited the various CEEC applicant countries: Warsaw and Bucharest in February and June 1998, Bratislava and Riga in June and December 2000, Nicosia and Budapest in March and November 2001, Prague and Ljubljana in 2002, Warsaw in 2003, Sofia and Bucharest in 2005. These meetings enabled the Group to offer its support to these countries and to discuss progress made and problems encountered in relation to their accession to the European Union. The Group met the leading politicians of the applicant countries at the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Since the beginning of the 1990s several members of the Group had been working to rebuild Christian Democrat and Conservative parties in the East. The Group also worked through the Robert Schuman Foundation, whose Institute in Budapest provided training which contributed considerably not only to the emergence of a group of skilled young politicians in eastern Europe but to the growth of the European Christian Democratic political family.

As a consequence, the EPP adjusted the way it organised itself through a change to its affiliation structures and through the establishment of a Standing Working Group on enlargement headed by Wim van Velzen. At its Bureau meeting in Ljubljana on 17 September 2002 the EPP-ED Group launched a ‘Parliamentary partnership’ with its sister parties in the applicant countries. EPP-ED MEPs would mentor parliamentarians

---

a This meeting was an opportunity to meet the members of the new government, including the Prime Minister, Jerzy Buzek, who was to become a member of the Group in March 2004.
Reuniting the continent: from a union of 15 members to a union of 27

from the applicant countries between September 2002 and April 2003, when Official Observers would be appointed. The partnership would also enable the EPP-ED sister parties in the applicant countries to prepare for the forthcoming referendums on the ratification of the Accession Treaties and the European elections of June 2004.

Europe restored

On 16 April 2003, the delegations of the fifteen Member States of the Union and the first ten applicant States (Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic) climbed the slope to the west of the Acropolis. One by one, under the gaze of the Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis, they entered the stoa, now the Agora Museum. The exact replica of the gift from Attalus II Philadelphus, King of Pergamon, became the venue for the signing ceremony, the centre of a Europe restored.

Over the preceding months the members of the EPP-ED Group, Ministers and Commissioners close to the Group had met right up to the eve of the signature of the Accession Treaties, to finalise a declaration to mark this historic day: ‘The Europe of 25 is no longer a dream’.

In December 2002 the Copenhagen Council had definitively endorsed the accession of the first ten new Members. The European Parliament closed the file in April 2003, barely one week before the Athens Conference. Elmar Brok, the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee, was appointed rapporteur for the conclusion of the accession negotiations. The report, which was very much in favour of the accession of the ten countries, was adopted by a large majority of 458 votes to 68, with 41 abstentions.

On 1 May 2003, or one year before the ten actually joined the Union, the European Parliament opened its doors to 162 MPs from the acceding States as Official Observers. They were appointed by their own Parliaments and were able to follow and familiarise themselves with debates in Strasbourg. Sixty-nine of those MPs sat with the EPP-ED Group, which therefore accommodated the largest number of parliamentarians from the new countries.

As Chairman of the Group, Hans-Gert Pöttering welcomed this development: ‘I am delighted that the EPP-ED Group has attracted so

---

a EPP-ED MEPs Jürgen Schröder (Germany), Ursula Stenzel (Austria), Jas Gawronski (Italy) and Michael Gahler (Germany) were given responsibility for the reports on the Czech Republic, Malta, Poland and Estonia respectively. The EPP-ED also helped with the reports on the six other applicant countries, which were drafted by MEPs from other political groups.
many Members, 42% of the total, from the 10 new Member States. We have worked hard to prepare our sister parties for enlargement with a special “Partnership programme” and close contact throughout the accession negotiations. We will now work to complete the process of acquaintance and cooperation and ensure that our 69 new colleagues are quickly integrated into our Group and the European Parliament. In this way they can effectively represent the people of the 10 accession states. [...] Our task now is to work together to make the Europe of 25 a success for all concerned.”

Bulgaria and Romania remained. Both countries had been part of the enlargement process since 1997, but their economic situation had prevented them from joining the Union in May 2004. In his report on Bulgaria of February 2004, the British MEP Geoffrey Van Orden noted that the negotiations were moving rapidly. There was improvement on the Copenhagen criteria, the economic structures and Bulgaria’s performance. The deadlines would be met. On the other hand, Van Orden did not hesitate to point out areas where there was room for further improvement, notably the fight against organised crime and corruption, trafficking and protection of the Roma minority.

The accession date for Bulgaria and Romania was definitively set by an opinion of the Commission of 26 September 2006: the two countries were invited to join the Union as of 1 January 2007, subject to certain safeguards. On that date the Group welcomed 13 new Members to replace the Observers who had worked actively with it until that point.

**From dream to reality**

On 3 May 2004, the European Parliament welcomed representatives of the new Member States; in one and a half months the first European elections in the reunited continent would be held. This step was one more stage in the process of cementing the Central and Eastern European Countries into the European democratic scene. Hans-Gert Pöttering, speaking on behalf of the EPP-ED Group, expressed his feelings at the opening of the first sitting: ‘[The] dream has become reality. The fact that we are able, today, to welcome 162 Members of this Parliament from these 10 countries makes this a great day for democracy, and a great deal for parliamentarianism. Let us rejoice that we can welcome as colleagues our new Members today! “Solidarity” must mean for all of us a future in which we of course have to respect the national interests of individual

---

a The Observers were involved in all aspects of European Parliament proceedings, including the work of the political groups and parliamentary committees, but did not have the right to vote. The ten applicant countries would participate as full Member States of the European Union in the European elections of June 2004.
countries, such as those of the Baltic States with their minorities, whilst not jeopardising those countries’ independence, an obligation that is reciprocal. Anything else, therefore, we have to speak out against.”

The national parliaments of the new members chose to send experienced parliamentarians to Strasbourg. Quite naturally many of them took their seats on the EPP-ED benches. They included Ene Ergma, President of the Estonian Parliament, Andris Argalis, Vice-President of the Latvian Parliament, Antonio Tabone, President of the Maltese Parliament, Pavol Hrusovsky, President of the Slovak Parliament, and Peter Pithart, President of the Czech Parliament. On 26 September 2005, nine Romanian and four Bulgarian Observers joined the Group in their turn, prior to members of the Romanian and Bulgarian Parliaments being welcomed into the group on 15 January 2007.

Celebrating the EPP’s success in Budapest in July 2004

To underline the importance of the entry of the new countries into the Union, the Group decided to hold its first Study Days following the June 2004 elections in Budapest. The Hungarian capital provided its most beautiful venues: the Group opened its proceedings in the High Chamber of the Hungarian National Assembly, which stands on the banks of the Danube in the Gothic-inspired building which is modelled on Westminster.

After fifty years of Communist dictatorship no fewer than 10 States and 75 million people had just rejoined the European family. The Group had posted one of its best results at the ballot box, with successes not just in western Europe but also in the new Member States. The Hungarian delegation of the EPP had secured ‘an absolute majority of Hungarian seats (13 out of 24),’ as Hans-Gert Pöttering noted in his opening speech.

The Budapest Declaration adopted by the Group at the close of the Study Days recalled the long, tragic history endured by half of Europe: ‘On 13 June 2004 Europeans took a decisive step towards the realisation of the grand design of the founding fathers of the European Union: after 50 years of oppression and Communist dictatorship, people in eight Central and Eastern European countries won the right for the first time to join other, more fortunate citizens of Europe and decide as to who should represent them in the only directly elected institution of the European Union, the European Parliament. By this act Europe of the 25 has acquired full legitimacy.’
Commemorating Solidarność in Gdansk in September 2005 and the victims of Budapest in October 2006.

External meetings such as the one in Gdansk to mark the 25th anniversary of Solidarność also enabled commemorations to be held of major European historic events.

The Group invited several figures from States neighbouring the Union to the event: the Ukrainian President, who was swept into power by the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko; the Georgian President who emerged from the Rose Revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili; Ivo Sanader, the Croatian Prime Minister; Iurie Rosca, Chairman of the People’s Party – Christian Democrats of Moldova; Mirek Topolánek, Chairman of the Czech ODS party; Boris Nemtsov, of the Russian SPS party; Vincuk Viacorka, Chairman of the Belarus Popular Front Party; Stanislas Shushkiewich, the former Chairman of the National Council of Belarus. Also invited was Donald Tusk, Chairman of Platforma Obywatelska (Civil Platform), who was to become Prime Minister of Poland in 2007.626

The restored unity of a free continent also called for intensive ‘documentation and testimony’ to ensure that the victims of the totalitarian regimes would not be forgotten. The Hungarian Delegation to the Group took the initiative to involve the Group in a solemn commemoration on 24 October 2006 of the bloody days in Budapest in October 1956 when Russian tanks brutally ended the dream of Hungarian democracy. During the years since the accession of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, the victims of Soviet Communism and imperialism have for the Group become permanent symbols of the values and historical benchmarks of the EPP.
The inescapable date in Article N of the Maastricht Treaty

Although the Maastricht Treaty satisfied the expectations of pro-Europeans in economic and monetary matters, the same was not true of its institutional aspects. Parliament might just have acquired legislative power, but the Council still had the last word in the legislative procedure, and the areas of application were limited. It looked very much as though the decision-making mechanisms of the European Commission and the Council would very quickly become deadlocked if they were not reformed: the prospect of enlargement to include Austria, Finland and Sweden would inevitably show the first signs of this.

The draftsmen of the Treaty made no mistake when they included a rendez-vous clause in Article N. The rendez-vous was to take place no later than 1996 in the form of an Intergovernmental Conference convened at the request of any Member State or the Commission. The first proposals came in fairly soon in many different fields: cooperation under the second and third pillars (France and Germany), extension of the scope of the co-decision procedure (Belgium) or the establishment of a hierarchy of Community legislation.

Several front-line national political figures regularly expressed support for the ‘rendez-vous clause’, including Jean-Luc Dehaene, the Belgian Christian Democrat Prime Minister.627

On the eve of the European elections in 1994 the EPP took a more ambitious position: Europe needed a democratic constitution. Although the Maastricht Treaty marked a first step in that direction, the objective of 'a Europe which works, stands together and is democratic, close to the citizen, less bureaucratic and less centralised, has not yet been achieved. We must now, therefore, draw up a European Constitution and prepare for the Intergovernmental Conference scheduled for 1996, the mandate of which will be to add to the Treaty on European Union.628

That objective was based on three fundamental principles which were

---

Chapter XXXIV

MIXED FORTUNES, NICE (2000):
FAILURE
to serve as the inspiration for the future European constitution, namely subsidiarity, effectiveness and democracy. This was to be the clear position of the Group within the European Parliament. To that end it could rely on strong figures such as the Spaniard Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, the Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Institutional Affairs.

**The Bourlanges report (May 1995)**

Frenchman Jean-Louis Bourlanges was appointed co-rapporteur on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Following detailed work in committee his important, complex study elicited no fewer than 700 amendments which were voted on at Parliament’s plenary sitting on 16 May 1995. The document submitted, which aimed to be brief and clear, was accompanied by expressions of conflicting interests which undermined the consistency of the final text. It examined the main themes of the Treaty with the aim of eliminating the democratic deficit, reviewing the decision-making process and preparing the ground for the major challenge of the next millennium: enlargement. It gave genuine consideration to foreign policy, which needed to take account of trade policy, cooperation and development policy and a common security policy. It proposed a vital common strategy for international organisations, together with a move to qualified majority voting for humanitarian, diplomatic or military measures. States which did not wish to be involved would be able to abstain so as not to obstruct action by their partners. The Commission would retain the initiative in this field and democratic scrutiny would be provided by the European Parliament and the national parliaments. Human rights would be covered by acceding to the European Convention on Human Rights and a social policy, an essential companion of economic policy, was initiated.

At the end of this lengthy process the rapporteur stated that he was personally dissatisfied with his report: ‘the task which I am completing today has proved to be quite disappointing and very much a Via Dolorosa [...] I must say that we encountered major difficulties in discharging our mission. Why? Because, to be perfectly frank, the report submitted to you, which, I believe, accurately reflects the sentiments of Parliament – in this respect being both a coherent document and one which represents the prevailing sentiments of the House – is not in essence the kind of report I personally would have hoped for.’

In point of fact, instead of proposing a clear, innovative structure, MEPs opted for a variable-geometry system without laying down the real conditions for an efficient constitutional architecture. Following the vote in Parliament, however, the report on the review of the
Maastricht Treaty was sent to the Reflection Group responsible for preparing the groundwork for the 1996 IGC.

This Group, gathered in the Sicilian port of Messina on 2 June 1995 in a symbolic reference to the Messina relaunch on 1 June 1955 which led to the Treaties of Rome (see Chapter 1), comprised representatives of the Member States’ Foreign Ministers as well as the Luxembourg Christian Democrat Jacques Santer, representing the Commission, and two representatives of the European Parliament, one of whom was Elmar Brok. In Parliament, Hanja Maij-Weggen was appointed co-rapporteur\textsuperscript{633} for the Reflection Group.\textsuperscript{634} The follow-up work of the Institutional Affairs Committee allowed significant figures from the EPP Group to be heard, such as its Chairman, or others from the Christian Democrat wing such as the Spanish Commissioner Marcelino Oreja Aguirre.\textsuperscript{635}

Parliament took a largely favourable view of the results of the Messina Group’s work although it was disappointed that it did not have the opportunity to speak at the IGC.\textsuperscript{636} The MEPs’ main concern was to strengthen Parliament’s role in the codecision procedure, on which they were backed by the Commission President Jacques Santer.

In 1995, the Group asked its Vice-Chairman, Hans-Gert Pöttering, to chair a working group tasked with adopting a document focusing its objectives on increasing Parliament’s democratic powers. The final document was adopted by the Group in Toulouse in 1997.

\section*{The Amsterdam Treaty (October 1997): between light and shade\textsuperscript{637}}

The Intergovernmental Conference opened in Turin in March 1996. Negotiations on the revision of the Treaty on European Union took place principally between the Foreign Ministers of the Fifteen. That, however, did not prevent the European Parliament, through its Observers and its President since January 1995, José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado, from regularly taking a stand by demanding, as many other MEPs did, a more efficient decision-making process.\textsuperscript{638} Speaking on behalf of the institution he represented, he set out the list of ten priorities that MEPs wanted to see tackled at the Intergovernmental Conference: a reduction in the number of decision-making procedures to three; the establishment of genuine codecision in the budgetary field with no distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure and provision for obtaining Parliament’s assent for decisions on own resources; more democratic representation (through the adoption of similar electoral systems across Europe, European political parties,
and uniform rules for MEPs); greater protection for fundamental rights; greater commitment to social policy; greater consideration for public health, the environment and consumer protection; giving the Union a legal personality; strengthening the area of security and justice; ensuring citizens’ access to information; and finally, introducing mechanisms for increased cooperation where there was deadlock on one of these points. The demands made by President José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado were reiterated at the Amsterdam IGC on 16 and 17 June 1997. The Member States of the European Union were on the point of signing a new Treaty. The Dutch Presidency of the Union over the previous six months was credited with much of the progress made.

There is no question that the codecision procedure was simplified and its scope extended. Under the revised procedure the European Parliament would express its view at first reading on a text proposed by the Commission. It would examine it in plenary on the basis of the position formulated by the appropriate rapporteur in the committee with responsibility for the area concerned. The Council would then decide in its turn. In the event of disagreement among the three institutions, Parliament would give a second decision, this time on the common position of the representatives of the Member States. This second reading might result in agreement by Parliament or further amendments on which the Council and the Commission would adopt a position. If at second reading the Council did not agree with Parliament’s proposals, a Conciliation Committee of representatives of the Council and Parliament would be convened. As its name implies, the Committee would try to reconcile the differing opinions of the representatives of the governments of the 27 and of the MEPs.

MEPs once more emerged victorious from the reforms. The Schengen area became part of the acquis and British opt-outs on social policy were reduced in number. A true area of freedom, justice and security was established. In terms of the institutions, the Amsterdam Treaty allowed greater democratisation. Parliament was now to approve the appointment of the President of the Commission instead of simply giving its opinion, thereby strengthening the Commission’s role. The Commission’s departments were restructured, although there was no re-allocation of Commissioners among the States and the larger States retained two each.

However, the opportunity to undertake two crucial aspects of institutional reform – on the number of Commissioners and the distribution of votes in the Council – were missed. The President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, who was involved in the work, recognised
Much ink has been expended on issues such as the number of Commissioners and the weighting of votes in the Council. It is perhaps a matter of regret that there has been no definitive agreement on this matter but the protocol adopted demonstrates the political will of the Heads of State and of Government to resolve institutional matters before enlargement. Moreover, we have taken a step in that direction by introducing strengthened cooperation. The reduction in the number of Commissioners will occur when the time is right as part of an overall compromise including re-weighting of votes. If the Union is successfully to enlarge to over 20 members within an appropriate institutional framework, the Commission suggests in Agenda 2000 that a further Intergovernmental Conference should be convened as soon as possible after 2000 to decide on far-reaching institutional reforms.

Where the Commission specifically was concerned, a different formula had to be found for distributing Commissioner posts. At the time, each State had the ‘right’ to at least one Commissioner, or two for large States. With 15 Member States, the Commission had twenty Commissioners. The entry of twelve new Central and Eastern European States would increase that figure to over 30, yet the areas of competence of the Commission were not increasing to justify the inflation in the number of posts. In the Council’s view, the voting system under the first pillar was not improved: the blocking minority was now even stronger following pressure from several States which were against the supranational development of the European Union, whether in certain fields or as a general rule. The distribution of votes per Member State needed to be reviewed and a delicate balance struck between ‘large’, ‘medium-sized’ and ‘small’ countries; but paradoxically, mistrust had grown as eastward enlargement drew near and it proved impossible to prevent deadlock at times.

Other shortcomings persisted which certain MEPs made sure to keep in the spotlight. The Treaty of Amsterdam led a short time later to the drafting of a lengthy report, of which Íñigo Méndez de Vigo was one of the authors. The report systematically assessed the ‘results’ of Amsterdam compared to MEPs’ expectations. The verdict was far from satisfactory. Amsterdam had failed in several of its objectives. Paradoxically, that did not prevent Íñigo Méndez de Vigo from closing his speech in Parliament with an impassioned argument in favour of the Treaty: ‘I wish to address those who are good Europeans, who have always been in the vanguard of European integration, but who are currently tempted to abstain or vote against because they believe that the Amsterdam Treaty is inadequate. I would recall the words spoken by Ortega y Gasset, in a speech that he made in Berlin, with reference to
Miguel de Cervantes, who said, when he was old and tired of life, that there are times in a man’s life when he has to choose between the inn and the road. Choosing the inn means not moving, standing still. Choosing the road means moving forward. The Treaty of Amsterdam is a road. Undoubtedly, it is a road which is too short for our ambitions. Undoubtedly, it is a road which is too narrow – many of us would have wished that road to be a broad avenue. But it is more important to choose the road and move forward than to choose the inn and stand still. I would therefore urge all those who have always wanted to take Europe forward, who have always been in the vanguard of European integration, to reflect on this and join in building that road.\textsuperscript{645}

The EPP Group maintained its position: despite its manifest shortcomings, the Treaty was a step forward, however small. Efforts therefore needed to continue. Elmar Brok already had his eyes on the longer term: ‘It is not a case of incorporating each particular area into the treaty by means of special rules; we actually need fewer special rules and greater simplification of the treaty to bring all policy areas under the same rules. We must not end up with a huge treaty, but at a smaller treaty. We need in the long term to arrive at a constitution because this is the only way to really make progress.’\textsuperscript{646}

Sights should therefore be set on a further institutional review. This was, ultimately, the outcome of the policy of ‘little steps’ initiated by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, which, given patience and perseverance, made for progress in the process of European integration.

**The Union faces the same old dilemma: does enlargement mean the end of deepening?**

Everyone had high hopes of the Intergovernmental Conference which opened in Turin in March 1996. The Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed one and a half years later, left open the question of whether ‘deepening and widening’ were two sides of the same coin. During the electoral campaign before the European elections of 10 and 13 June, Wilfried Martens noted that institutional reform was the EPP’s main priority.\textsuperscript{647} Amsterdam, ultimately, would be merely ‘one phase in a process which is constantly evolving’, and now ‘European institutions were in need of more far-reaching improvements.’\textsuperscript{648}

Once again it was the prospect of enlarging the European Union that raised awareness of the importance of major institutional reform. The objectives that Amsterdam had failed to achieve fully would have to be achieved at a future Intergovernmental Conference. Following the Cologne European Council on 3 and 4 June 1999, the Heads of State and
Government of the European Union confirmed that it was necessary to convene an Intergovernmental Conference to resolve the institutional questions left over from Amsterdam.

For his part, the new Italian President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, asked the Christian Democrat Jean-Luc Dehaene, the former Prime Minister of Belgium, Richard von Weizsäcker, the former President of the Federal Republic of Germany and Lord David Simon of Highbury, the former Chief Executive of British Petroleum and a former Minister, to give a fully independent opinion on ‘the institutional implications of enlargement.’

The report they presented on 18 October 1999 was incontrovertible. In order to be ready for the next enlargement to include the Central Eastern and European Countries, institutional reform was urgently needed: ‘The institutional structure of the European Union was designed in the fifties for a Community of six Member States […] there are now clear indications that the system is no longer working as it should in a Union of fifteen members. The question automatically arises whether the institutions, as initially conceived, will be able to serve efficiently a Union which may in the foreseeable future extend to 25-30 or even more participants.’

The authors of the report drew up a list of institutional solutions. They proposed clarification of the individual responsibility of Commissioners while at the same time strengthening the authority of the President of the Commission; extending qualified majority voting to the second and third pillars; and that ‘whenever qualified majority voting applies in legislative matters in the first pillar, […] Parliament should have the power of co-decision’. They also wished to see reform of the Council, the aim being to make it more effective and efficient, and proposed: ‘a significant reduction of the number of Council formations or an effective co-ordinating mechanism between Councils’. Finally, the report pressed home the need for the European Union ‘to act as a unit […] on the world stage’ and to enable forms of closer cooperation to be established between Member States who wished to go further, especially in the field of common foreign and security policy.

The French and German initiatives

Even though a new IGC to lay the groundwork for further institutional reform had been scheduled since February 2000, Joschka Fischer, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, decided to take back the initiative. Relying on the Franco-German axis, he gave a highly pro-federalist speech on 12 May 2000 at the Humboldt University in Berlin, hoping to win favour with the French Government, which would hold the
Presidency of the Union during the negotiations on the agenda for the IGC. President Jacques Chirac replied on 27 June in a more balanced speech to the Bundestag.

In formal terms, the EPP-ED Group welcomed the fact that Europe’s leaders had returned to the institutional debate. The ‘Franco-German engine acting as the driving force for European unification adds a fresh impetus’ to European integration while it was experiencing difficult times. In terms of substance, on the other hand, the two proposals were carefully and uncompromisingly examined by the Group, which was unable to support several aspects of the German position, and kept a close eye on the French position throughout the Presidency.

The failure of Nice (December 2000)

There was no progress on the institutional debate in Nice when the Heads of State and Government met there at the end of the French Presidency in December 2000. Worse still, the meeting became a clash of national egos. None of the leaders was ready to surrender any share of his/her influence in the decision-making process to the common interest, and the same was true of the right of veto. A drastic reduction was needed in the number of Commissioners; the Nice negotiators ‘agreed’ to keep one for each Member State. The weighting of votes in qualified majority voting became more complex because some States feared, often irrationally, that their national influence would wane.

At the other end of the town the federalists took a stand in the square at what had been the southern railway station. Compared to the anti-globalisation protesters who had formed the public backdrop to international conferences since Seattle, only a few were willing to brave the rain to demand real change in Europe. There were Italian and French socialists, German Greens, Swedish liberals. Also in attendance were José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado and Alain Lamassoure, who came to the microphone after Daniel Cohn-Bendit: ‘The important thing today in Nice is not what is going on at the other end of the town in the Acropole, which will only produce some fairly minor decisions. One Commissioner more or less, two or three voting points more or less, these are not things that will change Europe. What will change Europe are people on the streets in Europe’s name.’

Nice was a spectacular failure. Less than four years before its biggest enlargement, Europeans had failed to reach agreement on the future rules for a life together. On behalf of the Group, Hans-Gert Pöttering addressed Jacques Chirac, the French President, on 12 December 2000 when the latter reported on the Summit: ‘You said at the end of the
summit that the Nice Summit would go down in the history of Europe as a major summit. Unfortunately, our group cannot concur with that. [...] Unfortunately, we also witnessed the contrast between large and small countries over recent months – and this too should never be repeated, because it acts as an insidious poison in the European Union – with many large countries behaving most meanly and many small countries behaving most generously [...] And we have seen with great concern over recent weeks and months, that governments are taking ever greater recourse to intergovernmentalism [...] and I can only hope that the spirit of Pierre Pflimlin, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet will be the spirit and vision which determine the future of Europe [...] because we are firmly convinced that only a Europe of communities with strong European institutions can safeguard law, democracy, solidarity and peace for us on our continent.  

Despite its disappointment, in its desire not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, the EPP-ED Group decided to campaign in favour of ratification. The argument was simple: it would be better to have less than perfect formal foundations for the enlargements than no treaty at all. The Group also wanted to go further and in January 2001 decided to table a resolution at the Party Congress in Berlin aimed at preparing for the post-Nice period and providing ‘clear perspectives [...] to overcome [the] shortcomings [of the Treaty]’. The EPP-ED Group worked hard in the post-Nice period to persuade the governments to review the Treaty. The Laeken Declaration barely one year later would reflect a number of the positions taken by the Berlin Congress.
Following the failure of the Nice Intergovernmental Conference (December 2000) comes the success of the European Convention (2002)

It would be no overstatement to say that the European Parliament was dissatisfied with the outcome of the Nice European Council of 7-11 December 2000. The Resolution adopted almost unanimously on 14 December ‘considers that the way in which most Heads of State and Governments have led their final negotiations on the Treaty of Nice shows that they gave priority to their short-term national interests rather than to EU interests’. The complexity of the decision-making process within the Council in order to achieve a qualified majority, the inadequate extension of the scope of majority voting in areas important for enlargement, and the restriction of Parliament’s legislative codecision powers showed that the institutional reform sought by Parliament and the EPP-ED Group was far from being achieved. The institutionalists in the Group were convinced that the intergovernmental method of negotiation, with its endless round of strictly national viewpoints, had again proved utterly fruitless. On 14 December, therefore, Parliament called for ‘a Convention similar to the one which produced the Charter of Fundamental Rights [to] be convened, comprising representatives from the applicant countries as well as those of the Union, in which no party has a right of veto; after a broad public debate it should produce a draft to reform, simplify and reorganise the Treaties into a single, clear and concise document (“Constitution”).

The reference to the Convention which drafted the Charter of Fundamental Rights was not without significance. The Charter was one of the few successes of Nice, where it was ‘proclaimed’ by the European Council on 10 December 2000. Comprising representatives of the national parliaments (2 representatives for each of the 15 national
parliaments and the same number of alternate members), personal representatives of the Prime Ministers of the Fifteen, one representative of the President of the European Commission and a delegation of 15 MEPs (and the same number of alternate members) from the European Parliament, the Convention reached consensus over ten months of debate, producing a clear, precise text. The Convention was regularly attended by Observers from the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the Council of Europe. The Economic and Social Council, the Committee of the Regions and the European Ombudsman were also invited in their capacity as agencies of the European Community to express their views on the Charter. Two extraordinary settings were held, one with the representatives of the candidate countries, and the other with representatives of other bodies, community groups, non-governmental organisations, and civil society. A computer-based mechanism, run by the General Secretariat of the Council, was set up to enable all interested parties to send in their contributions, estimated at several hundred in all, for distribution to Members of the Convention, thereby establishing a direct, transparent participation procedure. Since this approach encouraged agreement and consensus, it allowed an even-handed text to be drawn up which was accepted almost unanimously by the Members of the Convention.

Thanks to its numerical size in the European Parliament, the EPP-ED Group was strongly represented in the Parliament Delegation, with Charlotte Cederschiöld, Thierry Cornillet, Ingo Friedrich, Timothy Kirkhope, Hanja Maij-Weggen and Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, who was also the Chairman of the European Parliament Delegation and would become one of the supporters of the convention method. A number of these individuals were also to be involved in the work of the Convention on the Future of the Union.

**A new target to aim at: a European Constitution**

At the European People’s Party Congress in Berlin on 11 January 2001, Wilfried Martens called for a European Constitution. What was needed, he said, was ‘*a fundamental text that some of us are already referring to as the European Constitution*’. The document adopted at the Berlin Congress, ‘A Europe of Values’, reiterated the position which the Group had taken in the debate in Strasbourg one month previously in its support for the proposal for a new Convention, among other things: ‘The European Union needs a constitutional Treaty to define the decision-making procedures for the European institutions and the division of responsibilities between the European Union and the individual Member States based on subsidiarity. Furthermore, the constitutional Treaty
Giving Europe a future

should include a Charter of Fundamental Rights, it should be able to be adopted by the peoples of Europe using the most democratic procedures, and it should be drawn up by a Convention with a similar composition to that of the Convention responsible for drafting the Charter of Fundamental Rights.'

**The Group pushes for ‘the convention method’**

The establishment of the European Convention was directly thanks to the Group, which extracted a promise that it would be set up in exchange for accepting the Treaty of Nice. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who was himself the reason why European Councils had become major diplomatic conferences, addressed the Group’s MEPs at their Study Days in Paris in March 2000, and spoke of the failure of the intergovernmental method in institutional reforms. Nice was ultimately just one more example of this failure. In order to kick-start institutional reform, more than one IGC would therefore be necessary, as Íñigo Méndez de Vigo had essentially said in his 2001 report on behalf of the Constitutional Affairs Committee: ‘The fact that the intergovernmental method has outlived its usefulness is implicitly recognised in the Declaration on the future of the Union annexed to the Treaty.’

In preparation for the Gothenburg European Council of June 2001, the Group tabled a resolution in which it stated that ‘the final outcome of the forthcoming IGC will depend essentially on how it is prepared, and [Parliament] therefore calls for a Convention to be established with an organisational set-up and mandate similar to those of the Convention which drafted the Charter of Fundamental Rights.’

The task as the EPP-ED Group saw it was to make active preparation for a Convention. A key document for the Christian Democrats was issued on the eve of the Laeken Summit as a result of the synergy between the Group and the Party: ‘A constitution for a Europe that works’. In its conclusions in this document, the EPP set out its commitments for the Convention: ‘We want to take the lead in presenting a clear and coherent concept for the future of the European Union in order to continue the success of European integration and create a Europe which works – for us and for future generations […] This is our contribution to building a Europe which is more democratic, transparent and efficient. Our goal is a Europe which is able to face the challenges of a globalised world and to give the appropriate answers to the questions our citizens are concerned with […] Institutional reforms are not objectives in themselves, but they are necessary in order to construct an enlarged Europe which is capable of acting and of safeguarding freedom and democracy, human rights, peace and prosperity for all citizens.’
In the Final Declaration of their meeting in Laeken in December 2001 the Heads of State and Government decided to convene ‘a Convention composed of the main parties involved in the debate on the future of the Union’ in order to ‘pave the way for the next Intergovernmental Conference as broadly and openly as possible.’

The historic reference to the precedent set by the Philadelphia Convention was also not all it seemed. The issue faced, as summarised in one sentence by Alain Lamassoure, was exactly the same: ‘How do we transform a loose confederation of neighbouring States into a strong union which nonetheless recognises the individual identity of each State?’ But a further element, perhaps, was that some people had an ambitious dream of becoming the founding fathers of a United States of Europe, just as there had been Founding Fathers of the United States of America ...

In the document ‘A Constitution for a Europe that works’ which was drafted by the Party and the Group and presented to the Political Bureau of the EPP on 6 December 2001, the EPP set out its goals. Seizing upon the innovative features of the Herman report, it advocated that the European Parliament should elect the Commission President, who would then be confirmed by the Council by a simple majority vote. There should be a similar procedure for the individual Commissioners, although the newly elected President would be free to make his own choices. By allowing ‘European parties the opportunity to present their own candidates to the European Parliament in an election campaign’, this system would unquestionably constitute significant progress for democracy in the Union. To the minds of the MEPs, this was not a case of keeping a tight rein on the European executive, but rather of conferring upon it ‘a fundamental role in the Community method’, especially in terms of initiative, as Jean-Luc Dehaene pointed out at the Group meeting in Genval in September 2001. The Commission would therefore become ‘the genuine executive power of the Union’. Laeken was to take up the same idea a few months later.

The European Parliament should also enjoy new powers in line with the need to make the Union more democratic. It was not enough to have a significant number of MEPs at the Convention; in the future institutional structure, Parliament had to become ‘a legislative body equal to the European Council, including budgetary powers […] Parliament’s composition should be as proportional as possible a reflection of the population distribution while safeguarding a minimum representation for the smaller Member States […] The number of MEPs must not exceed 700 in order to ensure its ability to function.’

Finally, although not the last of the contributions contained in the Group’s proposal, the Christian Democrats echo one of the essential
initiatives in the Herman report: the protection of human rights. The new Charter of Fundamental Rights had just been proclaimed and could therefore easily be incorporated into the outcome of the Convention proceedings. The benefits would be tangible, as once the text of the Charter became enshrined in the Constitution, it would potentially ‘lead to legally binding decisions.’

In October 2002, just a few months after the Convention opened, the European People’s Party held its annual Congress in Estoril. The joint text drafted by the Group and the Party was presented to the national parties, which debated it before adopting a final position. The debate was also something of a testing ground, because each of the national parties was represented at the Convention in their capacity as parliamentary parties and some as parties of government. Three members of the EPP-ED Group at the Convention were responsible for reporting to the Congress on various issues: Elmar Brok, Alain Lamassoure and Íñigo Méndez de Vigo. These were three ‘big guns’: the first was an experienced MEP, well-versed in the mysteries of the Strasbourg Chamber and the corridors of Brussels; the second was a brilliant graduate of the elite French ENA, and a former Minister for European Affairs; the third was a highly respected Spanish constitutional expert. A few months after the end of the Convention, two of the three were to become the authors of renowned books which were to influence the debate in their home countries: *Histoire secrète de la Convention européenne (Secret History of the European Convention)* in France by Alain Lamassoure, and *El rompecabezas. Así redactamos la Constitución europea (The jigsaw. This was how we drafted the European Constitution)* in Spain by Íñigo Méndez de Vigo. They shared the Group’s federal views and had important roles within the Convention. The vote at the Congress on the final text took two days of intense discussions and procedure. The outcome foreshadowed the text subsequently adopted by the Convention: ‘we could not have foreseen it that day, but a re-reading ten months later confirms that it does in fact contain all the key elements which were to be included in the final draft!’

The EPP was not, of course, alone in presenting such federalist and innovative documents. Most of the authors, however, were isolated. ‘That meant that what the British appropriately describe as the “mainstream” of the European People’s Party was the exact mainstream of the Convention itself. And since Members of the European People’s Party accounted for 30 % of the delegates to the convention, they were obviously a very influential force.’
The influence of the EPP-ED in the Convention Praesidium (February 2002-June 2003)

The feeling that the Christian Democrats had a determining influence was reflected in the choice of the individuals who were called upon to sit in the Praesidium of the Convention. A Chairman had to be chosen before work began. He or she had to be a convinced European, preferably a strong figure who would have to manage a very mixed and occasionally fractious assembly; he or she also had to have an established record of European experience and above all had to be available for the many months that the work would take. In other words, as the Christian Democrats put it, ‘a distinguished European political figure with parliamentary experience.’ Feeling that he would be a good potential candidate, but without openly declaring his intentions, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was finally given the job to the great joy of the Group, as the former French President had previously been one of its members.

The Group argued that the Praesidium, whose task was to support the Chairman in his work, should have a balance of representatives from the European Parliament, national parliaments, the Council and the Commission. The Council agreed with this suggestion and gave three places to representatives of the next three Member States to hold the Presidency of the Council, and two places each to representatives of the European Parliament, the national parliaments and the Commission.

Two Vice-Chairmen were appointed to assist the Chairman: the Belgian Jean-Luc Dehaene and the Italian Giuliano Amato. Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, who was elected Chairman of the European Parliament delegation, had a seat in the Praesidium.

Seven of the thirteen members of the Convention Praesidium could be regarded as belonging to the EPP political family: in addition to the Chairman, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and the Vice-Chairman Jean-Luc Dehaene, there were seats in the Praesidium for Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, Michel Barnier, a Member of the Commission, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs Ana Palacio, the former Irish Prime Minister John Bruton, and the Slovene Alojz Peterle, a future member of the Group, who represented the candidate countries.

When Elmar Brok, Timothy Kirkhope, Alain Lamassoure, Hanja Maj-Weggen and Antonio Tajani became Members of the Convention, six of Parliament’s 16 representatives were members of the Group.

The Convention was dominated by parliamentarians, who accounted for 46 of the 62 Members, with 30 Members of national parliaments in addition to the representatives of the European Parliament. The governments had 15 representatives and the Commission two.
The EPP-ED Group had been determined that the Convention should have democratic legitimacy, and this was incontrovertibly the case.

**Full marks from the Group for the outcome**

The role of the EPP-ED Group during the period of the Convention was decisive in several respects. It gave a large number of the speeches on targeted subjects. In contrast with other Groups, politicians or representatives of institutions, it achieved a degree of consistency in the positions it took and in debates. That was not always an easy thing to accomplish as the Group had been prey to a significant split on integration issues since the British Conservatives had joined.

Alain Lamassoure noted that: ‘the work of the European People’s Party had [...] two things to commend it. Firstly, it meant that our work was associated with figures who were very close and who contributed their experience [...] Secondly and more importantly, the European People’s Party provided a relatively discreet framework in which to thrash out clashes between those who favoured the “Community” approach and those who favoured the “intergovernmental” approach, between “small” and “large” countries, between “old members” and “new members”, between “Christians” and “secularists”, etc. The Party was as divided as the Convention on these lines, but it was easier to find an area of understanding within the “family” structure of the Party.’

The dominant position of the Group within the European Parliament delegation at the Convention ensured that one of the Group’s members, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, chaired one of the six Working Groups set up by the Praesidium: Working Group I, which was responsible for responding to issues involving the monitoring of the principle of subsidiarity. The Secretariat also made its equipment and human resources available to members of the Group to ensure the best possible publicity for the Convention’s work. As a result a letter from the EPP-ED Group to the Convention was written at the end of each Convention sitting, and a file was kept covering all the issues tackled by the Convention and its Working Groups.

The EPP-ED Group was also able to use its presence in the European Parliament to influence the Convention’s proceedings through reports drafted by its MEPs. Parliament’s Constitutional Affairs Committee took its lead from the work of the Convention and asked the Frenchmen Jean-Louis Bourlanges and Alain Lamassoure to draw up two reports on the hierarchy of legislation and the division of competences respectively. The Lamassoure report was adopted at the plenary on 16 May 2002 by 320 votes in favour to 60 against, and was supported by Parliament’s four major groups.
The EPP-ED Group held its Study Days on 25 and 26 June 2003 in Copenhagen to debate the outcome of the Convention and its strategy towards the final adoption of the Constitution. Íñigo Méndez de Vigo explained how the text of the Convention overcame the Union’s democratic deficit: it put States and citizens on the same footing; participation in the Union was enhanced through recognition of the role of NGOs and citizens; qualified majority voting was the rule in many areas; the communitisation of the third pillar meant that Parliament would have more legislative power; legal instruments had been simplified; the institutional balance was retained; the Commission was reformed; several important posts were created (Minister for Foreign Affairs, etc.); and the Charter of Human Rights became part of the Constitution.

British MEPs expressed some reservations through their spokesman Timothy Kirkhope. The first and by no means the least of these was the very idea of a Constitution which could take precedence over the people, a notion which was entirely alien to the British constitutional approach. Likewise, to Britain, the country where Habeas Corpus originated, the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights would appear to reduce rights. Finally, sovereign areas that were covered by the European Constitution – foreign affairs and justice – were seen as an attack on British sovereignty. Kirkhope concluded his speech on a positive note: the Treaty was a useful document. Overall, however, the British were not in favour.

Other matters touched on in Copenhagen included the issue of Europe’s Christian roots, the legal personality of the EU, the role of smaller States and scrutiny of the Executive by the European Parliament. The members of the Group discussed the future of the text, including its presentation to the IGC and probable adoption by public referendum. Overall, however, the EPP-ED Group was very satisfied with the outcome of the Convention, which achieved ‘the majority of the goals set at its Congress in Estoril’, as Alojz Peterle, the Slovenian member of the Praesidium, emphasised.

Towards the Constitutional Treaty (October 2004)

In order to finalise the institutional reform of the Union an Intergovernmental Conference or IGC was held on 4 October 2003 in Rome. The aim was to negotiate the main points of the constitutional text and to reach a consensus very quickly. The main players involved within the EPP-ED Group hoped consensus could be reached before the end of the Italian Presidency in December 2003.
Nonetheless, the European Parliament was aware that governments would be reluctant to accept such a pioneering text. Even so, José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado, co-rapporteur on the Draft European Constitution, warned the heads of State that ‘dealing with and resolving these specific issues will be legitimate provided that we thereby improve the democratic consensus achieved so far. This, however, must not be a reason for reopening the constitutional negotiations, as if we were weaving Penelope’s shroud. I would say to the Heads of State or Government that that would be a great error.’

The EPP-ED Group gave the Italian Presidency every support in the hope that the IGC would end successfully. Elmar Brok said as much in the plenary debate on 19 November 2003 after the IGC: ‘We should […] encourage the Italian Presidency to maintain its present course and to stick as closely as possible to the text produced by the Convention, because that text represents a balance that would be hard to replicate. […] I believe that subject to that condition there is a chance of bringing the IGC to a successful conclusion.’

Realising that the December 2003 Summit was likely to fail, two members of the EPP-ED Group, Elmar Brok and Alain Lamassoure, joined other MEPs in issuing a statement sounding the alarm. First they stated their view that the IGC was in danger of undermining the achievements of the Convention. They believed that certain proposals – the introduction of qualified majority in the Council, the shape of the Commission after 2009, the reform of the financial system and the establishment of a post of Minister for Foreign Affairs of the European Union – should not be called into question by governments, much less by the Commission. Furthermore, they doubted ‘that a European Constitution that failed to give the European Parliament at least those budgetary rights as agreed by the Convention would command the approval of either the European or national parliaments’.

The statement ended on a distrustful note: ‘We feel that the credibility of the IGC is now under serious threat.’

The Summit of December 2003 closing the Italian Presidency was a genuine disappointment, particularly for the members of the EPP-ED Group. The Group Chairman did not hesitate to take the floor during the plenary sitting of 16 December: ‘I would like to say – speaking on behalf of the Members belonging to the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats – that 13 December 2003 was not a good day for Europe’.

During the first half of 2004, the Irish Presidency worked behind the scenes to try and find common ground between the conflicting positions over the constitutional text. Although the large founding States
and the United Kingdom were able to accept the draft Convention, which offered them some benefits, fairly easily, several medium-sized States objected to the new decision-making procedures within the Council. The Nice compromise, said Spain and Poland for example, must not be called into question.

The EPP-ED Group tried to tease out the points of disagreement. Through its frequent meetings, especially its Study Days, it was able to monitor the positions of the States and try to work with them to find points of agreement or act as a go-between with European public opinion. A speech given by the Polish Ambassador to Austria, Irena Ewa Lipowicz during the Study Days in Vienna (Austria) on 23 and 24 March 2004, gave the EPP-ED Group the opportunity to hear Poland’s views on the distribution of votes in the Council and the reference to Europe’s Christian roots in the Constitution.686

It was only after the European elections, which confirmed the position of the EPP-ED Group as the dominant political group in the European Parliament, that a solution was found. During the Brussels European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004, the Irish Presidency succeeded in establishing common ground among all Members of the Union. The EPP-ED Group was broadly satisfied with the results, as its Chairman, Hans-Gert Pöttering, stated in the plenary sitting: ‘we can say yes to [the European Constitution], and it will be signed in Rome, that great European city in which, in 1957, the Treaties of Rome were signed.’687

The text adopted in Rome on 29 October 2004 by the heads of State and government differed slightly from the final text of the Convention. Nonetheless, the EPP-ED Group took the view that it was an historic date for European integration.688

On 11 January 2005, in Strasbourg, the European Parliament finally approved the European Constitution by a large majority, with 500 of the 677 votes cast being in favour.689 The resolution690 presented by the EPP-ED Group’s spokesman on constitutional affairs, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, thus received outstanding support.

Hans-Gert Pöttering noted that the vast majority of the Group voted for the European Constitution, ‘because this Constitution will help us to achieve a Europe of freedom, democracy and peace in the 21st century […] A Constitution needs values. The values that bind us together are almost as crucial as the procedures, for if we have no awareness of values, we have no foundation for taking political action. We welcome the fact that many of our values, which we define as Christian, have been included: human dignity, the dignity of older people, the dignity of children too […]’.
The ‘thunderclap’ of the ‘no’ votes in the referendums in France and the Netherlands (May 2005)

On 30 May 2005, Europe awoke from a bad dream to find that it had become reality. The French referendum on the European Constitution had produced a ‘no’ vote. By a small majority, one of the founding nations of Europe had rejected the text. Only a few days later another founding nation, the Netherlands, also voted ‘no’. What was there to say, what could be done? The people had expressed their democratic will, and had to be heard. Yet at the same time ‘nine countries of the European Union, representing 50 % of its population, [had] already voted in favour of this Constitution’ and ‘one country [could not] stop all other countries from making up their own minds about the future of Europe.’

The Group carried out an uncompromising analysis of the failure of the French referendum, for which the socialists were partly to blame, the left having run what had frequently been a pernicious and populist campaign. The Group also rejected the term ‘crisis’: to accept it would be counter-productive given that nine countries, with a population of 220 million people, had ratified the constitution so far, one by a referendum in which 76 % voted in favour. Work should continue. Following the Dutch ‘no’ vote, the Chairman of the Group announced that he was setting up a reflection group on the future of the European Union.

At the European Council of 16 June the same year, the heads of State and government proposed a period of reflection. Waiting was the order of the day. The initiative had to come from the States, and they were a long time in coming up with an adequate response. Other countries successfully ratified the text even though its future was no longer assured.

The Group sized up the situation: the public needed to have their faith in Europe restored. Talk of peace, said Margie Sudre at the meeting of the Group’s Bureau in Bordeaux in June 2006, was no longer sufficient for a generation that had no experience of war.


In September 2006 Nicolas Sarkozy, the UMP candidate for French President, called for a simplified treaty incorporating the substance of the Constitution in a different form. The French proposal was simple and pragmatic. Without abandoning the significant progress achieved in the text of the European Constitution, particularly with regard to decision-making mechanisms, the emotional impact of some of its
symbols had to be reduced. As the proposal was from France, it also offered a way out of the institutional stalemate.

A new, simplified treaty was what Alain Lamassoure also called for on the eve of the French Presidential election from his EPP-ED colleagues who had assembled for a hearing on 8 March 2007 on the future of the Constitutional Treaty. Essentially, the French MEP proposed no expansion of the draft Convention – it should remain the only working basis. Although the ‘Pandora’s box’ of institutional negotiations should not be re-opened, a number of provisions which made the text unclear or cumbersome should be removed. Finally, Lamassoure argued in favour of the timetable set by the German Presidency so that the deadline of 2009 could be met.

While the people of Europe were gradually realising the need to act and were recovering their trust in Europe, the EPP-ED Group decided to pull out all the stops. On 25 March 2007, at a meeting of the entire Christian Democrat family at the Brandenburg Gate to mark the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, the Party and the Group jointly published a declaration, the main aim of which was to underline what Europe had achieved and to look once more to the future.

The Berlin Declaration, short, precise, and effective, foreshadowed the declaration made by the States two days later.

‘After 50 years of European integration, we are able to look back proudly to our achievements. Many things that seemed inconceivable 50 years ago appear obvious today. There have, of course, been setbacks and disappointments, but they have been far outweighed by the achievements of the Union. These achievements give us courage to face the future. Our task, as politicians, is to reconcile conflicting interests and find solutions to problems. The spirit of the Treaties of Rome will enable us to face the challenges that lie ahead. The EPP, in the spirit of the Treaty of Rome, will continue to work for the consolidation of European integration, in the service of all citizens and on behalf of peace and freedom in the world.’

The process was relaunched. European leaders seized the initiative once more, especially those within the EPP family. The election as French President of Nicolas Sarkozy on 16 May 2007, whose European programme was based on the resumption of EU institutional reform, meant that a new treaty could be signed on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon. Supported by Chancellor Angela Merkel who, as President of the Council for the first half of 2007, gave new impetus to the constitutional process, this mini or simplified treaty incorporated the main substantive commitments of the European constitution but left to one side aspects that might jar with some sectors of European public opinion. The text underwent changes that were mainly semantic: there was no longer talk
of a Minister for European Foreign Affairs, rather of a “High Representative”, but the powers that went with the office were substantively the same. The symbols of Europe (anthem, flag, motto) were abandoned in the text but not in practice. European laws and framework laws returned to being directives and regulations. In short, although the letter of the Constitution changed, its spirit lived on. And Parliament’s fears that it would unravel proved unfounded because ‘the mandate [of the 2007 IGC] safeguarded much of the substance of the Constitutional Treaty, particularly the single legal personality of the Union, the abolition of the pillar structure, the extension of qualified majority voting in the Council and of codecision by Parliament and the Council, the legally binding status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the provisions enhancing the coherence of the external action of the Union.’ To that should also be added the stable Presidency of the Union, the enhancement of the European Parliament’s budgetary powers, the compromise on the composition of the Commission, etc. Even better, the period of reflection that had gone by had allowed ‘the introduction of new elements […], such as the explicit references to climate change and solidarity in the field of energy’ which the Group welcomed. Admittedly, the text adopted and signed in Lisbon by the Twenty-Seven was not as ambitious as the Constitution but, as Alain Lamassoure put it, ‘Europe is back on track.’

Ireland’s turn to say ‘no’ (13 June 2008)

Once the Treaty was signed it still had to be ratified by each of the Member States. A dangerous business, especially where referendum is the method of choice. For historical reasons and by democratic tradition, some States have never taken that route: Belgium and Germany, for example, prefer to leave the job of determining the commitments entered into by the State to their national representatives. Other States have a choice of routes. The parliamentary route was the route chosen by all States to which the option was available. France, for instance, ratified on the basis of the electoral mandate given to President Sarkozy, who had personally made renegotiating the constitutional treaty subject to parliamentary ratification. His insistence was all the more courageous and determined because the Rome and Lisbon texts were so similar. He was strongly committed because his argument was incontrovertible: ‘[…] it is strange to say that the European Parliament is the place where the democratic heart of Europe beats, and yet you say at the same time that parliamentary ratification in France would not be democratic: if Europe is democratic in the European Parliament, France is democratic in the French Parliament!’ The French President set out
his thinking clearly in his address to the European Parliament at the beginning of the French Presidency of the Council: ‘Before the elections, I offered the French people parliamentary ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Before the elections, I said that I would not hold a referendum in France. I said this to the people of France in a democratic spirit; it was a choice I made three days before I was elected, which could have been highly significant. I do not regret that choice. I truly believe that institutional issues, the way in which we do things in Europe, are something for members of parliament rather than for referendums. It is a political choice that I am making (applause) and it is a political choice that I made in my own country before the elections. Therefore, it is perfectly democratic.’

The only State that could not make that choice was Ireland. The Irish Constitution requires that European texts be ratified by referendum. The vote was held on 13 June 2008 and, in what came as a predictable development to some and a surprise to others, the result was a ‘no’. Despite deep-seated respect for the outcome of a democratic vote, disappointment was naturally the overriding feeling among the EPP family.

It was another great disappointment but European integration was never going to be a long, placid river. Such was the message of Elmar Brok, who said on that very day that the ratification process must continue nevertheless: ‘The Irish “No” to the Lisbon Treaty is very unfortunate. Nevertheless, it continues to remain in the best interest of the EU Member States and their citizens that the Treaty comes into effect. Therefore, the ratification process must continue without any delay.’

On 31 July 2008, Italy ratified the Lisbon Treaty, then at the end of November 2008 it was the turn of the Swedish Parliament. The Czech Republic, whose Constitutional Court had eliminated any lingering doubts about the compatibility of the Lisbon Treaty with the Constitution a few days later, was well on the way to ratification. By the end of 2008, 26 States had ratified the Treaty. This was excellent news, but time was against the European Parliament, and on 9 October 2008 the two spokesmen for the EPP-ED Group, Elmar Brok and Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, expressed the Group’s impatience at the Irish Government’s inaction. It was unacceptable for Dublin to have an indefinite period of time in which to propose solutions: ‘Our message to the Irish is: it’s for you to tell us what you want, it’s your responsibility to formulate proposals, but please formulate them quickly, by December at the latest, because we need the Lisbon Treaty before the European elections.’

The Group felt that if the Lisbon Treaty was not in force by November 2009, the new Commission which would follow the Barroso Commission would have to be formed on the basis of the Treaty of Nice, which would force the Member States to reduce the Commission by at least one member from 2009 onwards.
Interinstitutional relations between Parliament and the Commission after Maastricht (1992)

The Maastricht Treaty changed the playing field for relations between Parliament, the Council and the Commission. The new decision-making procedures strengthened the role of the European Parliament and interinstitutional agreements had to be concluded in order to apply all the innovations introduced by the Treaty.

A first set of agreements was adopted in 1993. They related to democracy, transparency and procedures for implementing the principle of subsidiarity, the regulations and general conditions governing the performance of the Ombudsman’s duties, and the arrangements for the proceedings of the Conciliation Committee provided for in the event of disagreements between the Council and the European Parliament at the end of the codecision procedure (Article 189b of the Treaty establishing the European Community). The negotiations were laborious and the European Parliament regularly complained about the limits imposed by the Council on certain principles of transparency, for example, which was restricted by the Council’s refusal to vote to adopt legislative texts in public, as was the practice in Parliament.

Nevertheless, the democratic impetus brought by Maastricht was evident and José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado expressed his satisfaction at the agreements reached between Parliament and the other two institutions: ‘Citizens of Member States need to know […] that the European Parliament is committed to ensuring that the other institutions do not merely pay lip-service to transparency but actually put it into practice; Community legislation must be codified and clarified so that
everyone can understand it [...] This is the only way [...] we can stop them feeling that the Union is something remote and impenetrable and make them identify with it as a means of winning back their well-being and, above all, [...], as a way out of despair.’

In 1994 a second set of interinstitutional agreements was concluded, this time concerning the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the European Parliament’s right of inquiry and the implementing measures for acts adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 189b.

The first agreement gave the European Parliament the right to set up a temporary committee of inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Community law by an institution or a body of the European Communities or a public administrative body of a Member State. The Committee on Institutional Affairs appointed José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado as co-rapporteur on this matter. During the debate in the plenary sitting on 18 January 1995, he stressed the importance of Parliament’s increased capacity to review the functioning of the Union: ‘Today we are approving one of the matters pending from the Maastricht Treaty [...], that concerning the European Parliament’s right of inquiry [...] I am confident that Parliament will be equal to the task and will make full use of this text to protect the European citizen, which is our duty here.’

The second agreement took the form of a modus vivendi and concerned the ‘comitology’ procedure. This somewhat complex procedure was essential to the adoption of implementing measures for legislation: in order to facilitate drafting, the Commission was assisted by a committee composed of national experts. Parliament played no part in this, whereas, for some legislation, it was co-legislator with the Council. Participation by the European Parliament in the comitology procedure was therefore a legitimate claim for MEPs and the 1994 text represented a partial agreement allowing them to exercise closer control over the implementation of acts adopted in accordance with the codecision procedure. Adopted in the course of the Interinstitutional Conference on 20 December 1994, the text of the modus vivendi comprised three key elements: an informal information and consultation procedure, to which the Commission had made marked improvements compared with the previous practice; a consultation procedure to be observed by the Council when a projected measure had been referred to it following a dispute between a Committee of Experts and the Commission; and a conciliation procedure to be followed by Parliament and the Council when Parliament had delivered an unfavourable opinion.
The co-rapporteur on this matter, Jean-Louis Bourlanges, did not conceal the difficulty of an issue which might have appeared obscure to many. Nevertheless, the French MEP stated: ‘What are Parliament’s wishes on this matter? Parliament believes that since, in legislative matters, it possesses powers that are comparable with and parallel to those of the Council, it is wrong that this parallelism should not also occur in respect of the implementing measures taken in order to bring legislative acts into force.’

The Santer Commission embarks on the gradual ‘parliamentarisation’ of the European political system (1994-1999)

The end of the Presidency of Jacques Delors, who had successfully led the Commission from 1985 to 1994, left the European Council with the task of appointing a successor unanimously supported by the Member States. After the United Kingdom had vetoed the candidature of Jean-Luc Dehaene, who was deemed to be too close to the federalists, Jacques Santer, Luxembourg’s Prime Minister, was chosen by the European Council on 15 July 1994. For the Christian Democrats, who had also supported Jean-Luc Dehaene, the appointment was one of the most respected members of the EPP’s political family.

The European Parliament had to express its opinion in accordance with the new investiture procedure under Article 158 of the Treaty on European Union.

The hearings of the Commissioners were closed without a vote or individual assessments. The parliamentary committees’ unfavourable opinions of some candidates made no difference to the composition of the Commission or to the portfolios its members were given.

When the Commission’s programme was presented by President Santer, the President of the EPP Group, Wilfried Martens, offered his support, whilst reminding him of certain responsibilities created by the new appointment procedure: ‘You must bear in mind the fact that, at the head of a college of 20 Commissioners, you will be required to uphold the principles of collective responsibility and independence at one and the same time. Nevertheless, the institution over which you will preside is provided with greater democratic legitimacy by the Maastricht Treaty than any previous Commission. And this legitimacy implies both increased powers and increased responsibilities.’

Lord Plumb added: ‘In exercising our right under the Maastricht Treaty to approve a Commission we are not seeking to diminish the authority of
the Commission. Quite the contrary. The European Union needs more than ever a strong, competent, effective and responsive Commission backed by the democratic legitimacy which this procedure provides. As Mr Santer said, we need a strong Commission and a strong Parliament."720

**The ‘mad cow’ crisis strengthens Parliament’s control over the Commission**

One of the first challenges to be faced by the Santer Commission was the outbreak in the United Kingdom of a contagious disease affecting cattle. Dubbed bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) by scientists, there were fears over its effect on public health throughout Europe. The scale of the disease prompted the European Parliament to set up a committee of inquiry in July 1996. Responding to public opinion, which was increasingly concerned about this threat to public health, the European Parliament saw the ‘mad cow’ crisis as a possible way to increase its influence in the institutional balance. It was also an excellent opportunity to show its detractors that it could fully exercise the new powers of control conferred on it by Maastricht. A member of the Group, Reimer Böge, ‘one of our best parliamentarians’ according to the memoirs of President Martens,721 was appointed as Chairman of the committee of inquiry and the MEPs began work on 3 September. EPP members included Antonios Trakatellis, Jean-Pierre Bébéar, John Corrie, Ria Oomen-Ruijten and Encarnación Redondo Jiménez.

The committee of inquiry played a full role and advocated a reorganisation of veterinary inspection services, a strengthening of the right of intervention enjoyed by the European Parliament and the European Union in the field of public health, and a radical reorientation of the CAP (based on the quality of foodstuffs and no longer dictated by a concern for productivity) for both the internal market and international trade in agricultural produce. Parliament needed to ensure that the Commission put those commitments into practice. The situation was strained, and if the Commission failed to respond, Parliament would have grounds to withdraw its confidence in the Commission. The European Commission therefore undertook, in plenary, to comply with the recommendations made by the European Parliament.

The report on the management of the ‘mad cow’ crisis demonstrated to the public that the European Parliament was able to exercise its new powers and to fulfil the mandate which it had been given by voters. Reimer Böge welcomed the success of this ‘new experiment’. He said that Parliament was able to use its right to establish a committee of inquiry at any time and in any other case. It was a warning to everyone and that would perhaps be enough. The European Parliament had
Parliaments strengthens its political control over the Commission

obligations to citizens and only to citizens. It was only by providing full information, indicating those who were responsible and accepting the necessary political consequences, that it would be possible to restore the confidence of which citizens had lost, he said.

The European Parliament examined the final report delivered by the committee of inquiry on 18 February 1997. The outcome was catastrophic for the European Commission. The shortcomings and omissions were clear: in order to prevent the collapse of the beef and veal markets, the European Commissioners had failed to take note of the risk of human contamination. But, for all that, should the current Santer Commission be condemned? Its defence had certainly been clumsy, it had itself been guilty of mismanagement and it had often taken on the attitudes and behaviour of its predecessor. However, the members of the EPP Group did not believe that it alone should be blamed for the affair. It would not be the best strategy to censure the Commission. The resolution, supported by the EPP and by the majority of MEPs, took the view that this would only delay the implementation of the necessary measures in connection with BSE, in particular changes to the legal provisions, the restructuring of responsibilities within the Commission departments and disciplinary measures against officials bearing responsibility. The Commission was therefore asked to implement the comprehensive and concrete recommendations of the committee of inquiry by October 1997. The European Parliament put forward the idea of a conditional motion of censure.

As a result of the work of the temporary committee of inquiry and the monitoring committee, Parliament had created a new dimension for its institutional position vis-à-vis the Commission. This was stressed by Reimer Böge at the plenary sitting on 18 November 1997: ‘I believe that in the last 16 months Parliament has tried, with the committee of inquiry and in dealing with the recommendation, to recreate a front rank position for protection of health and the consumer in the internal market. I also warn the curious that Parliament is now able to reopen such a procedure. Therefore, let the past be a lesson to us all! I would like to ask the Commission to remain the committed ally of the European Parliament in the future, when what matters is to put precautionary consumer and health protection at the centre of the internal market effort!’

---

a They were not the only ones implicated. In his column of 21 February 1997 in the Courrier de la Bourse et de la Banque, Fernand Herman also blamed the Major government which, throughout the crisis, had held back the implementation of the measures needed to contain the outbreak of the disease, as well as the Council of Ministers, which had visibly lacked political courage. See Fernand Herman, Europa Patria Mea, Chronique des 15 années de vie politique, économique et sociale européenne, ed. Didier Devillez, 2006, p. 138-141.
Weakening of the Commission or parliamentarisation of the European Union?

A new relationship was now established between Parliament and the Commission. Traditionally the Group had championed the principle of unconditional support for the Commission, which had represented a priori the Community interest. Over three decades, the Christian Democrats had systematically supported the institutional position held by the Commission, which it had regarded as the guarantor of the Community interest and the future executive of a federal Europe. The Christian Democrats had, amongst other things, protected the Commission against diplomatic attacks from certain governments bent on reducing it to playing the role of a mere secretariat for the Council of Ministers.

A process of parliamentarisation was now moving the whole Community political system forward. The EPP Group took an active part in this process, the effects of which would be felt on other occasions, leading even to the collective resignation of the Santer Commission.

From the budget discharge (1996) to the resignation of the Santer Commission (15 March 1999)

Less than a year later, the European Parliament was required to give a decision on the budget discharge for 1996. By this budgetary review procedure, Parliament is ‘responsible to the citizens of the Union for ensuring that their money is spent as economically and efficiently as possible’. It verifies whether the European Union’s budget has been properly used. The Committee on Budgetary Control (COCOBU) takes the lead in this parliamentary audit. At the end of the review, the European Parliament grants discharge to the European Commission, approving its accounts or not, as the case may be.

In March 1998, following the report by the British MEP and Group member James Elles, COCOBU, chaired by Diemut Theato and supported by the EPP members of the committee, expressed serious doubts over whether the discharge for the implementation of the 1996 budget should be voted on. Parliament did not refuse to vote, but postponed the granting of the discharge, highlighting the following points: the lack of democratic accountability in the fight against fraud within the European institutions; the failure to implement the recommendations of the committee of inquiry on the transit procedure; the lack of consistency and absence of sound financial management, as well as the scant implementation of all the main foreign policy programmes; and mismanagement in terms of staff policy. This was a first warning, and in order to speed up the process and avoid an institutional crisis,
the European Parliament called on the Commission to implement all necessary measures to resolve these issues by 15 September 1998.

Meanwhile, with a view to analysing and resolving the problem of Community fraud, at the request of the EPP Group the Commission set up UCLAF (Unit for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention), a body responsible for fighting fraud affecting the Community budget. The only problem was that the unit was based within the Commission itself. Hence, in October 1998, Parliament adopted a resolution, opposed by the majority of Socialists, placing emphasis on independence and on the role of the anti-fraud body and calling for the creation of an independent office, which would become OLAF.726

In December 1998 the European Parliament, dissatisfied with the Commission’s replies, and with the all-important backing of the EPP Group, refused to grant discharge to the Commission for the 1996 budget on the basis of the second Elles report727, by 270 votes to 225, with 23 abstentions. The report was referred back to the Committee on Budgetary Control. ‘What had previously been merely a technical procedure now became a political issue’, Wilfried Martens would say some years later.728

During the debate in the plenary sitting, Diemut Theato pointed out that the European Parliament had the task of ‘monitoring how the Commission handles European taxpayers’ money. The responsibility is ours alone. The Council merely gives us a recommendation, but we have to decide whether we can give the Commission discharge in respect of its implementation of the budget or not. However, to make this decision, we need to have the necessary information. Since this was not the case, we had to postpone the discharge in March; nor were we in a position to decide in September, as announced. It is now December, and we still do not have all the information we have requested, despite the Commission’s recently sending us a document – which it considered to be exhaustive – with a view to obtaining the discharge. On the other hand, Parliament can only have felt cheated, for example, when it received the UCLAF documents […] which had been tampered with. I ask you: can it be right for the institution under audit to determine on what and to what extent it wishes to be audited?’729

The PES Group used the refusal to grant discharge as a pretext to lodge a motion of no-confidence against the European Commission.730 It was not a subtle move: the Commissioners who were implicated were of a socialist persuasion and the Socialist Group wished to spare them any criticism by means of a blanket rejection of a Commission headed by a Christian Democrat.

On 14 January 1999, the motion was finally rejected by 293 votes to 232. President Santer had recently announced the formation of a group
of independent wise men to get to the bottom of the matter. Barely two months later, on 15 March, the wise men’s report was published\textsuperscript{731} and, just a few months after its mandate had been renewed, the Commission submitted its collective resignation.

Wilfried Martens wrote bitterly of these few crucial weeks in spring 1999: ‘As it feared a motion of censure would secure a majority, the Commission itself took the initiative to resign. Its fall led to one-upmanship between the different Groups. The EPP Group called for the departure of Edith Cresson, the former French Prime Minister, and the Spaniard Manuel Marin, who had been a good Commissioner. I did everything I could to save Santer and his Commission, but my efforts were in vain. It was a very difficult time. Throughout the life of the Santer Commission, the differences between Green [Pauline Green, Chair of the PES Group – ed.] and me were very evident. Whereas I sought compromise with the Commission and was therefore in favour of negotiations, Green was set on “clear decisions”. She was not disposed to compromises at all. In the wreck of the Commission, she was able to save face, and to a great extent, to avoid blame being placed on her political family, even though three socialists – Cresson, Marin and the Finn Erkki Liikanen – had their heads on the block.’\textsuperscript{732}

The Prodi Commission gives the EPP-ED Group cause to make demands (1999-2004)

The replacement for Jacques Santer was quickly chosen. At the end of March 1999, during the Berlin European Council, the Heads of State or Government agreed on the appointment of Romano Prodi. Speaking to MEPs at the April part-session, he presented the broad lines of his future programme, reiterating his commitment to initiate a series of reforms of the European Union. He also stated that the new Commission would be more transparent, more accountable and more efficient, conditions which were vital to the proper functioning of the European Union.

Wilfried Martens, who welcomed the swift appointment of Romano Prodi, stressed three points specifically: the appointed President would have to establish a new decision-making culture within the Commission both on the political and on the administrative side, especially by introducing new monitoring systems; he would have to ensure that his team was evenly balanced with both men and women being suitably represented; and he would have to fill the European decision-making vacuum with regard to the common foreign and security policy: after
the introduction of the single currency, a political Europe was pivotal in view of forthcoming enlargement.

The MEPs approved the new Commission President by 392 votes to 72, with 41 abstentions.

It was then necessary to appoint the other Commissioners. Following the elections in June 1999, the EPP-ED Group became the largest group in Parliament. Its main concern following its election success was to turn its victory into political influence over the running of the European Parliament and over the formation of the new European Commission. For the EPP-ED Group, and more specifically for its Chairman, Wilfried Martens, it was clear that the European Commission had to reflect the political balance resulting from the European elections. Immediately after the elections, Martens sent a letter to President Prodi in which he called for full recognition of the outcome of the European elections in the composition of the new Commission. He pointed out that the EPP-ED Group’s approval of the Commission depended on how it reflected the new political balance resulting from the elections, overall and in the distribution of portfolios and Vice-President posts, on the quality of the candidates and on a sufficient representation of women in the college.733

During the plenary sitting on 14 September 1999, following the statement made to Parliament by Romano Prodi, the new Chairman of the EPP-ED Group Hans-Gert Pöttering reaffirmed the Group’s position vis-à-vis the new Commission: ‘At the July part-session of Parliament, Romano Prodi spoke of the Commission as a kind of government. If this expression is adopted – and I personally am sympathetic to its being so – then this government (that is to say, the Commission) is answerable to the European Parliament. This means that the period of ignoring the European Parliament must now finally be over […] This is a new beginning after months of crisis and transition’734.

In order to consolidate the new relationship between the two institutions, Pöttering put forward five conditions as being essential for future cooperation between the European Parliament and the executive: respect of the parliamentary calendar, which should take priority over all other Commission commitments; the Commission should respond positively to parliamentary initiatives and draw up proposals at the request of the European Parliament; the President of the Commission should undertake to accept the consequences of any vote of no-confidence against an individual commissioner; the Commission should regularly inform and consult Parliament on administrative reform; and lastly, the Commission should support the European Parliament during the intergovernmental conference (IGC) on the reform of the Treaty, to ensure that it was not merely filling in the gaps of the Treaty of Amsterdam.
The pledges made by the President of the Commission represented a success for the EP and for the EPP-ED Group. The new President of the Commission ‘could therefore receive his group’s full backing’.

At the end of July, Romano Prodi was able to present his team of 19 Commissioners to Parliament. Prodi’s choices immediately aroused sharp criticism from the EPP-ED. Despite the greater powers conferred upon him by the Treaty of Amsterdam (effective from 1 May 1999), the President-designate presented a Commission that was not politically balanced. Hans-Gert Pöttering deplored the democratic deficit manifest in the composition of the Commission, which did not reflect the wishes of European citizens as expressed in the last elections. He particularly underlined the case of Germany, where the choice of Commissioners had been made by the German Chancellor, who had failed to take account of the CDU/CSU’s success in the European elections and of the custom, previously observed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and by other nations such as France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, of appointing one Commissioner from an opposition party.

Pöttering nevertheless guaranteed that the EPP-ED Group would be diligent, honest, unbiased and fair in its participation in the hearings of the Commissioners-designate and that the final vote on the Commission as a whole would be decided on the basis of the outcome of the individual hearings.

The object of the hearings was to examine the attributes of the individual candidates, not only with regard to their personality and their opinions, but also in terms of concordance between their professional skills and their designated role, of their pro-European sentiment and their integrity.

In her book a few years later, Nicole Fontaine, then President of Parliament, commented: ‘We can objectively say that this exercise was an example of democracy on a European scale, both on the part of the future Commissioners, who were subjected to barrages of questions however irritated they may have been inside, and on the part of the European Parliament, which avoided partisan temptations and demonstrated its responsibility.’

The approval of the Prodi Commission on 15 September 1999 thus represented a success for the European Parliament and opened a new era of cooperation between the two institutions. All efforts made by both Parliament and the Commission were intended to restore European citizens’ faith in the European institutions, by increasing the transparency of Community action both at decision-making and administrative levels and, above all, by respecting their wishes.
A ‘framework agreement’ on relations between Parliament and the Commission was signed on 5 July 2000\textsuperscript{736} and incorporated the points agreed between Hans-Gert Pöttering and Romano Prodi before Prodi’s appointment.\textsuperscript{737} The main points of the framework agreement concerned the legislative procedure, participation by and provision of information to Parliament in connection with international agreements and enlargement, and the transmission of confidential information. From now on, all Commissioners had to take responsibility for their individual actions, and Commissioners could be asked to resign if Parliament expressed no confidence. They also had to give priority to attendance in Parliament for subjects in their portfolio.

Thus, for the first time, the Commission agreed to keep Parliament fully informed of all stages in the negotiation of international agreements and enlargement, and to improve the involvement of Parliament in developments in the Home Affairs and Justice areas, so that Parliament could adopt positions in good time. A good balance was struck and a new culture of relations was established, combining the parliamentary control required by European democracy and the European Commission’s rights of initiative.

However, these developments were not accepted without some reticence by the national authorities, which were quick to challenge the validity of this action. Nicole Fontaine reported on a conversation she had with the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer: ‘You wanted to subdue the Commission’, Fischer said. ‘But you have weakened it. Parliament has made a mistake’.

– ‘I do not agree, Minister’, replied the President of Parliament. ‘Exercising our control over the Commission does not weaken it, but strengthens democracy. We are in favour of a strong Commission.’

– ‘You say that you want a strong king, but you have cut off his head.’\textsuperscript{738}

The Barroso Commission enjoys strong support from the EPP-ED Group (2004-2009)

Immediately after the European elections in 2004, which marked another victory for the EPP-ED Group, Hans-Gert Pöttering, called on ‘the Heads of State or Government to take account of the results of the European elections when they present a candidate for the Presidency of the European Commission’\textsuperscript{739}. The EPP-ED Group was seeking a parliamentary logic in the appointment of the new Commission. The spirit of the European Constitution\textsuperscript{740} which was being drafted made it possible seriously to envisage a link between the political hue of the President of
the Commission and the possible majorities within the European Parliament.

Above all, the Treaty of Nice, the only text in force at the time, gave the President’s duties special importance in the eyes of the members of the Group: the President himself organised his Commission, which had then to be approved en bloc by Parliament. The President’s personal accountability to Parliament was therefore greater than it had been previously. For his choices to be confirmed, he at least had to have the support of the largest political group.

The EPP-ED Group proposed ‘its’ candidate to the Heads of State and Government, the Portuguese Prime Minister and member of the Social Democratic party, José Manuel Durão Barroso, who was up against the Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, a committed Europhile, but a liberal. Hans-Gert Pöttering warmly welcomed Barroso’s appointment during the European Council of 27 June 2004: ‘José Manuel Durão Barroso belongs to the EPP political family, which fully supports him. This is a positive sign for democracy in Europe: EU state and government leaders have, as the new Treaty proposes, chosen a candidate from the political family which won the European elections.’ At the end of July, the European Parliament expressed its confidence in Barroso by a majority of 413 votes. A first battle had been won.

**The difficult case of Rocco Buttiglione**

In August 2004 the former Portuguese Prime Minister presented a 25-strong team. The hearings before the parliamentary committees were held in October. Choosing the Commissioners was a hard task and, by and large, the College seemed to be well-formed and balanced, bearing in mind the requirements relating to nationality, number and political tendency. Nevertheless, three Commissioners were challenged, either because of conflicts of interest, on account of debatable ethical positions and political convictions, or because they lacked the necessary competence for the tasks in hand. The Dutch Liberal Neelie Kroes was due to handle competition matters, but had a past as a business woman and a director of big corporations, which raised a problem of conflict of interests. The Hungarian Socialist László Kovács failed to convince the Committee on Energy of his competence.

However, it was the former member of the EPP-ED Group, the Italian Rocco Buttiglione, put forward by Silvio Berlusconi, who attracted the greatest opposition. A fervent Catholic, he did not shy away from expressing his beliefs before the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. The Liberals and left-wing MEPs, already deeply disappointed at not having been able to impose their candidate at the
head of the Commission, took certain statements made by the candidate for Commissioner as a pretext to apply their veto. The President of the European Parliament, the Socialist Josep Borrell Fontelles, was quick to abandon the reserve traditionally expected of him to criticise a man who, in all other respects, had the necessary competences. The EPP-ED Group did its utmost to prevent Buttiglione falling victim to a form of persecution. Mario Mauro, Vice-President of Parliament, criticised the tendentious interpretation of the comments made by Buttiglione in the official summaries of the proceedings of the parliamentary committee.

The Committee on Civil Liberties, chaired by the Liberal Jean-Louis Bourlanges, a former member of the EPP-ED Group who had recently been re-elected on the list of François Bayrou allied to the Liberal Group, refused to support Rocco Buttiglione by a single vote. A vote of no-confidence therefore seemed inevitable, despite all the Group’s efforts to save the Commission. The Group’s Chairman Hans-Gert Pöttering issued a warning in the plenary sitting on 26 October 2004: ‘Everyone here should be aware that if this college does not win the vote of confidence tomorrow it will not mean that one, two, three or four members will be replaced: no, the status of every member of the team that is here today will then be open to question. This is not about one person, it is not about two or three people; it is about the whole college and we should be aware of that.’

The main risk that the EPP-ED Group wished to avoid was, of course, the weakening of the Commission.

Despite the EPP-ED Group’s support, and displaying pragmatism, on 18 November President Barroso presented a revised college which no longer included Rocco Buttiglione amongst its members. During the parliamentary debate on 17 November, Hans-Gert Pöttering commented on how the crisis had been resolved and reaffirmed the Group’s support for the new college: ‘The hour of decision is now upon us. In the vote, a very large majority of the EPP-ED Group will be expressing its confidence in the Commission. The EPP-ED Group wishes you, Mr Barroso, and all your Commission, every success in the onerous task of working for the well-being of the citizens of the European Union and for the unity of our continent.’
The 1993 ‘Single Market’, an engine for growth?

On 1 January 1993, when the single market became a reality, Europe was still stuck in the economic crisis it had been unable to escape since the 1970s. Unemployment, which had reached levels in the Community unequalled since the end of the Second World War, became a great cause for concern: ‘The fight against the economic crisis and unemployment must therefore be the Community’s main priority. If Europe fails to develop a large-scale plan to reduce unemployment, the European ideal will be the first to suffer’, warned Leo Tindemans. According to Karl von Wogau, ‘Europe is experiencing one of the worst recessions in the post-war period. At Community level, the unemployment rate has now risen to almost 11%, accounting for 17 million of the working population [...] In addition, we have the budget deficits at all levels of government which have reached record levels, causing the authorities to impose radical cost-cutting measures. Economic and social policy solutions have therefore to be identified as a matter of urgency to ensure that social peace is preserved in the individual Member States.’ The European Parliament published a report on the unemployment crisis in the European Community, which maintained that the decisions taken at the Edinburgh Council in December 1992 were not ambitious enough. The EPP Group devoted much of the first half of 1993 to the economic crisis. Fernand Herman was given the task of formulating the draft EPP programme of action to promote a stronger European economy, whilst Ferruccio Pisoni concentrated on social policy.

At Maastricht a social protocol had been incorporated into the treaty, allowing Europe to move forward in this field. It did not, however, include the United Kingdom, which had rejected it.

An effective strategy had to be adopted. First of all, the right of veto in the Council of Ministers had to be abolished and the codecision procedure had to be applied in order to strengthen the role of the European Parliament. Then the social protocol had to be incorporated
into the Treaty on European Union and made legally applicable to all the Member States. Above all, the Union had to answer one key question: how could the efforts made by the Member States to combat unemployment be supported effectively at European level? In 1994 the European Parliament created a Temporary Committee on Employment, giving it a mandate to analyse the problem of job losses and to carry out detailed research into measures to combat unemployment. The Temporary Committee, chaired by the Spaniard Celia Villalobos Talero, a member of the EPP Group, advocated reforms on the labour market and an end to overtaxation of wealth created by business. It was necessary to create a more favourable environment where growth was translated into job creation. To that end, it was important to establish a flexible labour market and to promote small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which were important job providers.

Alongside this, at the request of the Copenhagen European Council on 21 and 22 June 1993, the European Commission published a third volume on growth, competitiveness and employment. ‘The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century’ presented by the Commission brought together several themes: full use of the single market; speedy completion of trans-European networks in transport and energy; swift adaptation to developments in the new information and communication technologies; reduction of financial risks to ensure that private investors were involved to a greater extent in projects of European interest; and implementation of an ambitious research framework programme for 1994-1998, particularly in the area of information technology.

This document formed the bulk of the work programme of the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs for the year 1993-1994. Karl von Wogau, the rapporteur, and the EPP Group believed that the final document should be ‘seeking improvements in productivity through dialogue with the two sides of industry rather than raising the tax burden through additional programmes of expenditure […] thereby jeopardising more jobs’. This Christian Democrat influence on economic policy encouraged the EPP Group to vote in favour of the White Paper. At the Summit of Heads of Government of the EPP Parties in December 1993, Jean-Luc Dehaene stated that ‘the White Paper represents a good working basis for the debate on employment, but it is vital that our presentation does not fuel false hopes among the public. The Community actions proposed by the Commission and their financing are reasonable and commit the Union to forward-looking enterprises, such as the creation of large-scale networks. The financial
The single market and globalisation

dimension of European action on employment is merely the corollary of the Action Plan to be implemented.\textsuperscript{756}

The Group devoted itself to the issue, as the economic crisis in Europe worsened again. The crisis was cyclical and linked to the global economic situation. It was also structural: European industry was confronted with the collapse of entire sectors, such as iron and steel and shipyards. The implementation of the single market had reduced market rigidities, enhancing labour flexibility and removing obstacles to trade.\textsuperscript{757} This was how the internal market was to enable the European Union to adapt to globalisation and to the new international trade situation, as well as the emergence of China, India, Brazil and Argentina in the global economy.

On 6 June 1997 the Commission presented an Action Plan for the Single Market for 1998-2002\textsuperscript{758} which defined four strategic targets: making the rules more effective, that is to say better transposition of the rules in force; dealing with key market distortions; removing sectoral obstacles to market integration; and delivering a single market for the benefit of all citizens. The Commission suggested the introduction of a ‘single market scoreboard’ for each Member State, providing information each year on the degree to which single market measures had been implemented. Karl von Wogau was appointed as rapporteur once again.\textsuperscript{759} By the resolution which was adopted, the European Parliament supported the Action Plan and hoped that it would allow a genuine internal market to be created for 2002. It also supported greater freedom of movement for workers and stated that certain fiscal reforms were needed.

The entire European political machinery was mobilised. Speaking to his peers, Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker laid down Europe’s objectives with a view to resolving the crisis: it was necessary to ‘trigger an irreversible process’, he said, and to have ‘wider EU involvement in the field of employment, including the fixing of common objectives for the Member States and mutual monitoring to ensure that these objectives are respected’.\textsuperscript{760} Addressing the European Parliament, the Luxembourg Prime Minister went on: ‘Do not forget the grievances that have been expressed for more than a decade: the political authorities were reprimanded for devoting themselves exclusively to monetary and economic policy, and for lacking ambition in the area of employment […]. We wanted to make the European project more complete by putting the human being, in particular the jobless human being, back in the centre of our concerns.’\textsuperscript{761}

However, the strategies implemented to combat unemployment highlighted differences between the different institutions. On the eve
of the Extraordinary Summit on employment, Parliament adopted the report by Wim van Velzen in which several large-scale measures were recommended: a sizeable increase in education and vocational training budgets, support for long-term unemployed, organisation of working time, introduction of a social levy etc. Parliament’s report called on the Member States to move from passive to active measures to promote employment.

Unable to identify with all these demands simultaneously, at the EPP Congress in Toulouse on 11 November 1997 the EPP drew up its own employment guidelines. The text stressed job creation, integrating into the labour market disadvantaged sections of the population (young people, women, the elderly, the disabled), lifelong training for workers, sustained economic growth, the promotion of investment and the strengthening of R&D, which were the key elements enabling Europe to become the engine of the world economy.

The Extraordinary Summit on employment in Luxembourg in November 1997 launched a European strategy based on the method adopted for economic convergence. National policies had to be coordinated around four guiding principles: improving work integration capacity, developing entrepreneurship, encouraging adaptability in businesses and their employees, and strengthening the policies for equal opportunities.

Jean-Claude Juncker spoke about a new departure at the Summit: ‘Faced with this challenge, to which there is no simple response, today’s European Council, entirely devoted for the first time to the problem of employment, marks a new departure in respect of the approach and action by the Member States. The machinery has been started, and I do not think we shall be able to stop it.’

**A Europe ‘of growth and employment’ builds on the Lisbon Strategy**

Lisbon was the real turning point. In March 2000 the European Council approved the strategy for employment and growth. It set a strategic objective for the EU ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.’ According to the Austrian Othmar Karas, ‘the Lisbon process is Europe’s answer to globalisation.’ Regular coordination was established. A special spring summit had been held since 2000, at which the European Council focused on economic policy, evaluating in particular the progress
The single market and globalisation

The EPP-ED Group made the economy one of its political priorities for 2004-2009. In 2002 it set up a working party, chaired by the Dutchman Wim van Velzen, which has played a very active role in the votes on resolutions following the spring European Councils. In order to create jobs, the EPP-ED Group proposed that priority be given to research, education and new technologies. Long-term sustainable development must be instituted, based on a social market economy which is environmentally friendly. On the eve of the 2004 European elections, the Group believed that the starting point had to be ‘the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy for structural reform.’ Marianne Thyssen stressed that the content of the Lisbon Strategy was ‘satisfactory and struck a good balance between the three pillars, knowledge, research and development.’

The EPP-ED Group met in Vienna on 23 and 24 March 2004 for its Study Days on the subject of relaunching the European economy. Östmar Karas stressed the need to put words into action, a view shared by the Vice-Chairman Wim van Velzen. To that end more resources were needed and during the debates on the budgetary procedure for 2005, the Group was keen to be ‘contributing to an economic growth and a long-term sustainable development’ and to be ‘ensuring that citizens and enterprises are at the centre of internal policies’. Supported by other political groups, the EPP-ED MEPs succeeded in increasing the Lisbon-related budget lines.

The EPP-ED used its Study Days in Rome in March 2006 to clarify its positions. The keynote speakers underlined their conviction that globalisation should be understood as a chance and not as a threat. However, there was also a prevailing consensus that its economic and social consequences should be balanced. The Lisbon European Council had set out the main challenges: ‘The European Union is confronted with a quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the challenges of a new knowledge-driven economy. These changes are affecting every aspect of people’s lives and require a radical transformation of the European economy. The rapid and accelerating pace of change means it is urgent for the Union to act now to harness the full benefits of the opportunities presented.’ Joseph Daul summarised the dilemma: ‘This strategy cannot be based on the strongest defeating the weakest. It must be a mixture of free competition, high employment rates and full social protection. What we need is a reasoned globalisation.’

The Lisbon Strategy gave rise to great hope, but the progress made was disappointing. The EPP-ED Group could only regret the political
inertia and indeed the backward steps taken by some Member States. The key structural reforms under the Lisbon process were not being implemented. As was stressed by José Manuel Garcia-Margallo y Marfil, ‘lack of political courage to undertake the necessary reforms was what was making it difficult to achieve the Lisbon objectives.’

In order to guarantee the timely adoption of these reforms, the Group proposed a clear road map setting out the measures to be taken. A new action plan for structural reform was needed, laying down a strict timetable to be completed by 2010. Greater emphasis had to be placed on the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy, in particular public and private investment, specifically in human capital and research and development, consolidation of entrepreneurship in European society, assistance for SMEs and reductions in the overall level of taxation in the European Union. The Member States had to accept their responsibilities as regards growth, the environment and an appropriate social network.

In order to relaunch the strategy and to ensure that the Member States complied with their commitments under the Lisbon programme, the European Parliament undertook to involve the national parliaments more in the process. According to Marianne Thyssen, ‘the involvement of national parliaments is [...] essential as it is they who will have to transpose many of the necessary reforms in their national legislation.’

In order to make the involvement of the national parliaments as effective as possible, the European Parliament organised joint meetings on the future of the Lisbon Strategy. Similarly, the EPP-ED Group organised preparatory meetings bringing together national and European parliamentarians from the same political family, in order to allow Parliament to take account of the reservations and the wishes of the members of the national parliaments.

In their Berlin declaration in March 2007, the Heads of State and Government acknowledged the success of the Lisbon Strategy, reflected in higher growth and falling unemployment figures. The European Council emphasised that a functioning internal market and the promotion of innovation, research and development provided important impetus to support this positive progress in the long term.

During the debate in plenary on the Berlin declaration, Joseph Daul, Chairman of the EPP-ED Group, explained that ‘in a globalised world in which new focal points are emerging rapidly – I am thinking of Asia, and also of Brazil – Europe must react by means of economic and social reforms. Europe must make the most of its history and develop its social model.”
Three success stories for citizens: cheaper telephone charges, higher quality services and respect for the environment

At the same time, the Group believed that the benefits that citizens could derive from the existence of the internal market should be maximised.

Three cases illustrate this specific commitment by the EPP-ED Group. They have an impact on the life of European citizens, since they affect them directly: regulation of mobile phone charges (roaming charges), the services directive, known as the Bolkestein directive (after the Dutch Commissioner behind it), and important legislation for consumer protection and health, the Reach directive.

The roaming regulation stemmed from the Group’s anger, shared by Commissioner Viviane Reding, at the excessive roaming charges that consumers travelling abroad within the Community had to pay mobile phone operators. Because the charge to the consumer bore no relation to the actual cost of the service, the roaming regulation sought to set a ‘Eurotariff’ capped at EUR 0.49 per minute for calls made and EUR 0.24 per minute for calls received. The regulation was adopted at first reading on 27 June 2007. The European Parliament’s position after the first reading was adopted without modification by the Council. The political agreement between Parliament, the Council and the Commission had been reached very quickly, despite the importance of the issue and strong lobbying from operators.

The Briton Giles Chichester chaired Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. The Austrian Paul Rübig was appointed rapporteur. They both had backgrounds in economics and industry and their expertise was especially vital as the issue was so complex. Mobile phone companies were opposed to the adoption of the Reding proposal.

Negotiations between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission began very early, which obviated the need for several readings. The great speed with which the regulation was adopted surprised even Commissioner Reding, who said ‘it is very rare, if not to say unusual, to bring about an agreement on a legislative action in only ten months.’ In his capacity as Parliament’s chief negotiator, Paul Rübig welcomed the outcome: ‘All in all, the EPP-ED Group has successfully pushed for and secured the best possible deals for mobile phone consumers all over the EU. Now worry-free calls home truly have become a reality’, he concluded.

The aim of the ‘services’ directive was to promote economic growth and employment in the European Union by creating a genuine internal
market for services, including local services which are useful in the daily life of Europeans: plumbers, painters, door-to-door services, vehicle hire and soon. It sought to eliminate the legal and administrative obstacles to the development of these kinds of services and to reinforce the rights of users.

The key points of the proposal presented by the European Commission concerned the range of services covered, the question of the legislation and rules applicable to foreign services (in the country of origin or in another country) and the protection of consumers by administrative cooperation between States. The EPP-ED Group devoted a great deal of energy to the proposal, believing that the protectionism advocated in some parts of Europe served only to undermine economic performance. In the Committee on the Internal Market, the responsible committee, the matter was handled for the EPP-ED by the Briton Malcolm Harbour. The Committee on the Internal Market was the arena for a constructive dialogue between the two main groups. Parliament had all the more need for a large majority to amend the original text presented by the European Commission because it had given rise to major reservations among professionals in some Member States. In Strasbourg, whilst MEPs were debating the amendment of the Commission proposal, 30,000 people demonstrated peacefully in support of Parliament’s efforts.

The legislation which was adopted by the MEPs at first reading on 16 February 2006 was a significant improvement on the text proposed by Commissioner Bolkestein a few years previously. The Chairman of the EPP-ED Group stressed the important role played by the Group in the adoption of the compromise: ‘the Group [...] came up with some substantial improvements to what the Commission had proposed [...]. Our Group virtually rewrote the directive, and the document we have before us today is the result of those efforts, in the course of which we showed all the willingness to compromise that was required.’

The country-of-origin principle was replaced by freedom to provide services: free movement of services was guaranteed. At the same time, important exceptions were retained as regards public security and order, social security, health and the environment. Malcolm Harbour stressed that they ‘are an important part of this compromise’. Services of general interest (health, transport, audiovisual, social and legal services) were excluded from the scope of the directive. The main demand made by MEPs was that the application of the directive should not affect the right to work applicable in the Member States or the social security legislation applied by them.
At the second reading in the European Parliament on 15 November 2006, all speakers stressed the essential work done by MEPs in drawing up a compromise. According to Charlie McCreevy, Commissioner for the Internal Market, ‘the European Parliament has shown its maturity and capacity to find well-balanced compromises on very complex issues.’ Mauri Pekkarinen, President-in-Office of the Council, described the text adopted at first reading as an ‘historic compromise’. One month later the text was definitively adopted by Parliament and the Council.

The REACH directive provided another example of important legislation adopted by the European Parliament. This highly complex piece of legislation regulates the chemicals sector. The initial draft sought to provide a new regulatory framework for the regulation, evaluation and authorisation of chemicals. To that end a European Chemicals Agency was created. The draft attempted to reconcile the different interests of the European chemicals industry (31% of global production) and those of the health and environment of European citizens. The challenge for the Group was to protect consumers and nature without prejudicing the competitiveness and innovation of chemicals undertakings. This problem lies at the heart of sustainable development.

In October 2003 Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety was made responsible for the Commission proposal. A sign of the importance attached to this piece of legislation was a joint hearing of the Environment, Industry and Internal Market Committees, which was attended by more than 1,000 representatives of the stakeholders in January 2005.

Before the plenary sitting on 15 November 2005, Hartmut Nassauer, draftsman of the opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market, set out the Group’s position, which was more pragmatic. Faced with a complex text, he said that it was necessary to ‘find the most direct, efficient, fast, unbureaucratic and least expensive way of registration for chemicals according to their actual risk potential.’ The Group was sensitive to concerns relating to the competitiveness of chemicals undertakings. The chemicals industry and many downstream users of chemical products (like the automobile and textile industries) criticised the approach adopted by the Commission as expensive and ineffective. On the other hand, account had to be taken of the enthusiasm of environmental and consumer protection associations, which saw substantial guarantees contained in the Commission proposal. The process risked becoming entrenched. The different interests could tip the balance in favour of one side or the other, or worse still, produce such a consensual text that it would be ineffectual.
Nassauer very quickly proposed replacing the inadequate quantitative approach taken by the Commission, which was supported by the Socialist rapporteur, with an approach based on risks to humans and the environment.\textsuperscript{799} In his view, chemicals had to be classified by hazardousness.\textsuperscript{800} Nassauer was able to secure the support of all the members of the Committee on the Internal Market and reached an agreement with the Socialists and the Liberals.\textsuperscript{801}

A majority in Parliament agreed on the objective of the legislation: free movement of chemicals in the internal market having regard to the duty of care. The understanding reached between the main groups in the European Parliament once again proved to be a strong force in the negotiations with the Council.

**The Group supports expansion of global trade (the Seattle, Doha and Cancun rounds)**

The European economy had to take account of one major parameter: globalisation. Following the completion of the single market, the European Union had become the leading trade power. Its economy depended largely on other regions of the world: the United States and Japan, of course, China and India obviously, but also Africa and Latin America. In these new relations of interdependence it had a clear role to play. It participated in international regulatory organisations such as GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), which is now the WTO (World Trade Organisation), where the European Commission represented all the Member States of the Union, which was unprecedented in the history of international relations. This was partly the result of the resolution tabled by the German Peter Kittelmann on the WTO, which was adopted on 13 November 1996 and called for the Commission to be the sole representative of the European Union for all sectors discussed in the WTO negotiations. At the same time, he made the recommendation to ‘involve the European Parliament as far as possible in the WTO’s activities through the appropriate parliamentary committees’ and for ‘all agreements negotiated within the WTO framework to be submitted to Parliament for its approval.’\textsuperscript{802}

Increased parliamentary scrutiny was one of the main demands made by the Group. At the Third WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999, the Group decided to set up its own WTO working party. Chaired by the Finn Ilkka Suominen, it was to monitor the work of the WTO and to hold regular meetings of the members of the Group involved in various parliamentary committees dealing with related subjects.\textsuperscript{803}
In the same year, the European Parliament decided to send a delegation to the Seattle negotiations. The EPP-ED Group had the largest representation there, with thirteen members: the general rapporteur of the European Parliament on the WTO’s millennium round Konrad Schwaiger, the Committee on Agriculture’s rapporteur on the WTO Arlindo Cunha, the Committee on Development’s rapporteur on the WTO John Corrie, the Vice-Chairman of the EPP-ED Group James Elles, the Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Industry Renato Brunetta, Joseph Daul, Michel Hansenne, Thomas Mann, Ruth Hieronymi, Joachim Wuermeling, Anders Wijkman, Paul Rübig and Marialiese Flemming.

The Group considered that it was time to ‘ensure that the views of the public are heard.’ The delegation from the European Parliament, supported by members of the national delegations from the Member States, proposed that a WTO Parliamentary Assembly be set up. The proposal made by the Group, which emerged as the champion of the cause of a more democratic WTO, was accepted by the majority of the parliamentarians present on 3 December. The European Parliament immediately set to work organising a preliminary conference with a view to the creation of that Assembly. The first meeting was held in Geneva in February 2003, bringing together nearly 500 members of parliament from 77 different countries. It has met annually since then.

The ‘battle of Seattle’, which represented a real revolt against the global economic order, saw the emergence of a wide-ranging anti-globalisation front and highlighted the need for democracy. Within the WTO, the members had not been able to agree on the agenda for the millennium round negotiations. The delegates from the EPP-ED went to work to convince the EU’s trade partners of the need for a new round of negotiations.

The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Doha in Qatar from 9 to 14 November 2001. At the conference, the European Parliament delegation formed part of the official EU delegation and was fully involved in the negotiations. Joseph Daul thus praised ‘the constant transparency that prevailed between the Council, the Commission and Parliament during the negotiations.’ The agenda adopted in Doha reflected the objectives set by the EPP-ED Group: reaching an agreement on liberalisation of trade and investment, strengthening of the WTO’s basic rules, and confirmation that the aim of that round and of the WTO in general was to respond to the problems experienced by developing countries.

The Group set to work preparing for the Fifth Ministerial Conference which was held in Cancún from 9 to 12 September 2003. The WTO
working party met again with Wim van Velzen in the chair. It put together a team of experts on services in order to reach agreement on the positions to be taken in this sensitive area, and stressed the importance of better market access for industrial goods and comprehensive reductions in customs tariffs. The members of the working party also called for the opening of the WTO to the ‘Singapore issues’, namely the protection of investments, competition rules, trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement. In order to integrate developing countries more effectively, the Group called on the WTO member countries to follow the example of the EU and allow duty-free or quota-free access to their markets for products from the least-developed countries.808

Several members of the EPP-ED Group travelled to the conference as part of the European Parliament delegation in order to follow the progress of the negotiations.809 The delegation was in permanent contact with the two Commissioners representing the European Union, Pascal Lamy and Franz Fischler, discussing progress made and determining the strategy to be adopted. However, negotiations broke down once again, to the regret of the European Parliament delegation and the EPP-ED Group.810

After a further two failures, in Hong Kong in December 2005, then in Geneva in 2006, the EPP-ED Group expressed deep concern. Georgios Papastamkos and Robert Sturdy, who were members of the Committee on International Trade, stated that ‘the stakes are high. Not only might we lose benefits resulting from trade liberalisation and benefits to the world economy estimated at over EUR 100 billion, we risk destroying the credibility and the future of the WTO as an institution to regulate a rules-based system for international trade.’811

Since then the Group has continued to reaffirm ‘its firm belief in open markets, benefiting to all, [...] within the globalising economy [where] the international rules on trade should be respected by all trading partners, to ensure the practice of a free and fair trade.’812
‘The long road to the euro’

On 1 January 2002 tens of millions of citizens of the Union were able to obtain new euro bank notes from cash dispensers. This single currency, which had been anticipated for years, was palpable at last. Some banks had already issued their customers with bags containing euro and cent coins, one of the faces of which represented the issuing country. Collectors started to build up their euro collections and the success of the new currency was confirmed when the central banks of the twelve member countries of the euro zone announced that within just two months notes in the old currencies had been replaced almost entirely by the new denominations.

The fiduciary euro was undoubtedly the most tangible symbol in the everyday life of Europeans, after the single passport, since the birth of the EEC. Admittedly, some consumers thought, often rightly, that tradespeople had a tendency to round up their euro prices, giving the impression that the cost of living had risen. However, since then, the euro has become part of everyday life and no one wishes to go back.

The single currency was invented, first and foremost, for the benefit of Europeans, to facilitate trade, of course, but also physical movement. Fernand Herman, who would play a key role throughout the process, was keen to highlight the benefits of a single European currency through a simple calculation: if, in the early 1990s, a Belgian decided to tour round the Europe of the Twelve with 1 000 Belgian francs in his pocket, and if he decided to change his kitty into local currency at each border, the 5 % exchange commissions alone would mean that he would lose 45 % of his initial sum and return to Brussels with just over 500 Belgian francs, even if he did not buy anything.

What was now a clear symbol also enshrined a vision and a political commitment which the EPP Group had patiently supported for a long time. It had taken no less than 33 years from the first steps taken in
economic and monetary policy in 1969 for the notes and coins to be become ‘common currency’.\textsuperscript{814} Throughout this lengthy process, the EPP Group continually offered its support and demanded further integration of economic and monetary policy.\textsuperscript{815}

The turning point came at the end of the 1980s, when the EPP family rediscovered its European ambitions. Wilfried Martens explained: ‘The end of the Eurosclerosis was also felt within the EPP where there was particularly strong unity of views on the future of Europe. At the EPP summit which was held in the Chancellery in Bonn on 30 May 1988, there had already been a lengthy debate on the link between the single market and monetary integration. Kohl was personally a big supporter of monetary union and believed that the European integration process should be irreversible […] Our final declaration was almost prophetic: “The next step which must be taken for 1992 on the road to European Union is the completion of the large internal market and its social framework. The creation of the European Union remains the Community’s political task and objective. To that end, it is necessary to take decisions and measures going beyond the reforms envisaged by the Single Act, namely […] creating the conditions for the establishment of a European central bank which would oversee the value and stability of a European currency on an autonomous basis […].”’\textsuperscript{816}

In 1987, shortly after the Single European Act and eight months after the Hannover Council, the Group held a seminar in Paris dedicated entirely to the objective of EMU for 1992\textsuperscript{817}. Economic and monetary union had become a priority. The Paris seminar brought together several of the Group’s leading lights: Karl von Wogau, Fernand Herman, and Isidor Früh, who would play a crucial role in the creation of the single market. Alongside them, the Group invited key figures such as Franz Andriessen, the Vice-President of the Commission, former French Prime Minister Raymond Barre and future Commissioner Jacques Barrot. Lastly, the seminar was also attended by people who would later hold key positions and who would help EMU to become a reality, such as Edmond Alphandéry. The future Minister for the Economy in the Balladur government (1993-1995) was himself convinced: ‘The Europe of the single currency must be built. So long as we do not have a single currency in Europe there will be a fear that the edifice will remain fragile. Moreover, look at how since the collapse of the Bretton Woods […] system in 1971, Europe has been constantly beset by currency crises […] It is not enough for us, who believe in the European idea, to show that we have fully understood the importance of what is at stake and have weighed up the obstacles. This is the only way in which we shall ensure that the boldness of our proposals will be acceptable.’\textsuperscript{818}
The agreement between President François Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl did the rest. The Hannover European Council on 27 and 28 June 1988 called on the European Commission to study the creation of a single monetary area and a connected central bank. The Delors Plan was approved and presented by the Commission on 12 April 1989. Three conditions were laid down for the completion of EMU: total and irreversible conversion of currencies, complete freedom of capital markets, and fixed parities between currencies. The plan would be implemented in three stages: complete the single market, create a European System of Central Banks (ESCB), transfer monetary and economic powers to the European institutions and create a single currency.

In accordance with the Delors Plan, the Maastricht Treaty signed on 7 February 1992 laid down the four convergence criteria which were essential for the single currency: - budget deficit lower than 3% of GDP, - government debt lower than 60% of GDP, - inflation not exceeding by more than 1.5% inflation in the three Member States with the best result in terms of price stability, - long-term interest rates not exceeding by more than 2% those in the three Member States with the best result in terms of price stability.

The second phase of EMU began on 1 January 1994. The European System of Central Banks envisaged in the Delors Plan was abandoned in favour of the European Monetary Institute (EMI), composed of the governors of the central banks of the Community and a President. Monetary policy remained the preserve of the individual States until the ESCB was actually put into place during the third phase of EMU. The Institute was given the task of implementing the third stage, strengthening cooperation between the Member States and promoting the euro.

Within the Group Karl von Wogau took up the baton. This veteran of the single market recommended that all the possibilities set out in the Maastricht Treaty be implemented as soon as possible. In his view, it was ‘unbalanced because it describes the paths towards an economic union without laying down the necessary transparency and without guaranteeing the necessary checks on the implementation of the economic union. Central to our question here is the procedure under the Treaty of Maastricht on the excessive deficits, in which the European Parliament is practically excluded from the procedure’. Von Wogau also stressed the need for information: ‘Economic and Monetary Union, as laid down in the Treaty of Maastricht, can only be successful if it is supported by the citizens of the European Union. That is why it must be explained to the public.’ These few sentences summarise the entire strategy of the Group: democratise the process and inform the citizen.
One year later, the European Parliament was alarmed at how slowly the single currency was being implemented. Three years had passed since the Maastricht Treaty had been signed and the EMI was only one year old. In the European Parliament resolution on the Institute’s first annual report, drafted by Efthimios Christodoulou, MEPs called for the ECB to be set up quickly, if necessary before the third stage of EMU. On 7 April 1995 they called on the Council, the Commission and the EMI to provide urgent clarification over the timetable envisaged for EMU, to provide information on the advantages of the single currency and to accelerate the technical preparations for the third stage of EMU. Parliament reiterated its call one month later during the debate on the introduction of the ecu as a legal means of payment.

In the face of pressure from the European Parliament, the Commission’s response came on 31 May 1995 with the publication of the Green Paper on the practical arrangements for the introduction of the single currency. The Green Paper stressed three aspects: technical preparation for the changeover to the single currency, psychological preparation, and relations between the single currency and other European currencies. The members of the Group welcomed the proposed timetable. Reference was made to the rapid introduction of the single currency. In the view of Karl von Wogau, the Commission’s proposal was realistic.

Another concern related to the transition period between the beginning of the third phase and the actual introduction of the single currency. The single currency must not suddenly become unstable if the convergence of the national currencies was not achieved. All in all, the Group considered it necessary to tackle any attempts at speculation and to make provision for the necessary mechanisms.

One of the responses, also laid down in the treaty, would be to admit States according to their degree of convergence, at different rates of integration. The EPP Group insisted that ‘nobody should be excluded from EMU’. Those countries which were not part of the first contingent should be closely involved in the convergence exercises, so that they were carried along.

Fernand Herman proposed that reflection should be given to new monetary cooperation mechanisms to manage and therefore stabilise exchange-rate relations between the single currency and the currencies of the countries which had not yet joined the monetary union. However, the main part of the communication strategy in the Green Paper was psychological. One of the primary objectives was to convince the European public, who were strongly attached to their
The euro, a buffer against international monetary disorder

currencies in each Member State, that the single currency was needed. It was a huge job. In the surveys conducted in the mid-1990s there was a clear information deficit among the public.

The European Parliament wanted to tackle this problem by proposing a joint information campaign with the Commission. It hoped to convince the public of the advantages of the single currency and, above all, to dispel their doubts over the changeover to the new reference value. Karl von Wogau summarised the situation in this way: ‘The point is to ensure that European monetary union is a success for our citizens, for companies, and not least for farmers too’.830

The Madrid European Council on 16 December 1995 took the decisions that were vital to the introduction of the single currency: confirmation of the irreversibility of entry to the third phase of Economic and Monetary Union; adoption of the scenario for the changeover to the single currency; unequivocal confirmation that 1 January 1999 would be the starting date, in accordance with the convergence criteria, timetable, and procedures laid down in the Treaty, and choice of the definitive name of the single currency, which would now be called the euro.832

Íñigo Méndez de Vigo was pleased that the timetable had been adhered to and mentioned two important subjects: ‘the relationship between the currencies which are to be in the union and those which are to remain outside’ and ‘how we are to draw up an instrument of financial solidarity in order to maintain the principle of economic and social cohesion’.833

The official name of the single currency, the euro, put an end to a lengthy debate which had taken place in Germany over the previous few years: some users of the Mark had not wanted their currency to be associated with an ecu which had already been devalued on numerous occasions. The new name, which replaced the ecu in the Treaties, was welcomed by the Group.834

The successful changeover to the euro required high-level preparations. On the basis of the recommendations from the Commission, the EMI and the Ecofin Council, the Madrid European Council formulated a reference scenario in three stages.835

The first step was to launch Economic and Monetary Union. That stage would be completed in the course of 1998 with two major decisions: drawing up of the list of participating States and creating the European Central Bank. The framework for the single monetary and exchange-rate policy would be defined. Manufacture of coins and notes would begin. Preparations in the participating States would be stepped up, in particular in administrative authorities, banks and financial institutions.
Economic and Monetary Union would actually begin on 1 January 1999. Over a maximum period of three years, the conversion rates between the euro and the participating national currencies would be fixed irrevocably. The single currency would become a full currency and a series of banking and financial operations would lead the way to it.

Lastly, on 1 January 2002, there would be the physical changeover to the euro. In the first six months, the new euro notes and coins had to replace the national currencies. This period was kept deliberately short so as not to complicate users’ lives with prices being displayed in two currencies. This physical changeover to the euro was the most complicated matter: cash registers had to be reprogrammed, dispensers had to be supplied and so on. Thus, as was noted by President Nicole Fontaine, ‘and to quote only the example of France’, no less than 36,000 tonnes of coins and notes ‘or four times the weight of the Eiffel Tower’836 had to be transported.

The battle over convergence criteria

After the timetable for the introduction of the euro, the Group’s second biggest concern was the maintenance of the convergence criteria. Devised to make the economy of the future euro zone more homogeneous and more stable, they were the essential preconditions for the smooth functioning of EMU.

The EPP family was very committed to this arrangement on which the success of the euro depended. At its congress in Brussels in December 1993, it pointed out that ‘[...] the convergence criteria set out in the Treaty are fundamental to the credibility of the process, and the European Union and the Member States must maintain all the criteria for joining the monetary union [...] Any challenge undermining the process of monetary union would simply increase distrust and uncertainty’.837

Like the Commission, the EPP Group was very cautious about revising or even relaxing those criteria. They were the product of a political balancing act. To call them into question would also call into question the entire fragile structure: ‘The differences concerning the spirit and the letter of the Treaty and the calling into question of the convergence criteria can only have an adverse effect. [...] In this area, as in others, uncertainty may be detrimental to the process.’838

Following the Dublin European Council on 14 December 1996, which definitively adopted the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’, the Group devoted all its energy to explaining tirelessly that control over inflation and public spending was a basis for low interest rates, healthy growth
and job creation, attracting foreign capital. The more the States demonstrated good budgetary discipline in their day-to-day management, the more stable the currency would be and the more support it would have from Europeans.

For that reason, the Group supported the Stability Pact presented by Theo Waigel, the German Minister for Finance. Whilst it responded to the Bonn Government’s concerns that the German public would be assured of a European currency that was as solid as the Mark, the Group considered that the Pact went beyond the introduction of the single currency and, through its system of sanctions, channelled the policies of the Member States.

The big debate on matters relating to convergence and the single currency took place in November 1996. On the initiative of the EPP Group, it was decided that the countries in the monetary union which failed to respect the Stability Pact criteria in connection with budgetary discipline should pay into the Community budget fines imposed on them (0.5 % of GDP) (Christodoulou report on budgetary positions and excessive deficits).

Other own-initiative reports dealt with fundamental issues for the future of EMU: the Hoppenstedt report on the changeover to the single currency and the Fourçans report on the coordination of fiscal and taxation policy in the monetary union called for the accelerated harmonisation of fiscal policies in order to combat fiscal dumping in the implementation of the euro.

The closer the deadline approached, the more it was necessary to keep convincing the European public. This was noted by Fernand Herman in his columns: ‘So, from now (this was July 1995 – ed.), it is important to embark on a huge information campaign which should highlight the advantages of the single currency, criticise the dangers of the status quo, and dispel misunderstandings or prejudices which continue to circulate in relation to the single currency. Normally, this should be the task of the national governments and national monetary authorities. However, it would be illusory to expect all the governments to embark on this path with the same enthusiasm. Some will drag their feet. It is therefore for the Commission and the European Parliament to take on this role.’

Within the European Parliament this would be the job of the Subcommittee on Monetary Affairs, supported by the EPP Group, which took an active part in its work, particularly during the third phase of EMU. An information campaign was launched by the Subcommittee in 1996, aimed at the public as well as professional circles [...] It is essential that not only large companies and banks, but also all other companies
gear up to take the requisite internal organisational steps to prepare for the transition to the euro [...].”

The report by Fernand Herman on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro called for a more in-depth discussion with citizens and better quality information for consumers through measures such as the dual display of prices in the period from 1999-2002. During the debate in October 1996, the rapporteur stressed the need to tell European society about the process that was taking place: ‘Never before in the history of our peoples has there been an operation on such a scale, representing such a radical change affecting so many people. That is why Parliament cannot overemphasise the need to inform, prepare and reassure the population’.

MEPs, directly elected by the public, are particularly attentive to the voice of the man and woman in the street. In the period ahead of the introduction of the euro, they all related the fears of the average European and told of their experience on the ground. ‘Last Saturday’, Karl von Wogau told the plenary, ‘I spoke to a woman in the market place in Offenburg, and she said to me that she was very sceptical about the European currency. I asked her why. She told me that she had been working as a saleswoman for 54 years and was now planning to retire. She obtained a printed notice of her pension entitlement, and learned that she could expect DM 1 130.00 per month. Her rent is DM 700.00. So anyone will understand that woman wondering whether rents and food prices are going to go up in the fairly near future, because her very existence is at stake here.’

‘There was also a need to confront the scepticism displayed by the Anglo-Saxon economic press, which continually presented arguments against monetary union and heralded its failure.

The need for an independent European Central Bank

In order to ensure the greatest possible stability for the currency, the EPP Group advocated giving control to an independent institution. ‘Only an independent institution’, Fernand Herman told Group members in Crete in 1990, ‘can stand up to the time-honoured traditional attempts of governments to gear monetary policy to what may be laudable objectives, such as growth and employment […] whereas the measures to achieve these objectives are fiscal or budgetary in nature and are therefore much more problematic or more unpopular […] Monetary policy measures, however, are less painful, more anonymous and more amorphous. The effect of a policy of monetary expansion is a little like that of a drug; but the initial euphoria soon gives way to withdrawal symptoms.’
The signatories of the Maastricht Treaty understood well the lessons of the past and agreed to hand over their monetary sovereignty, which was transferred to the European Central Bank. Democratic control of the institution was ensured through the presentation of annual reports to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission.

A guarantee of the ECB’s independence was also provided through the choice of its President, who had to be a person of conviction, who was well-known and recognised, and above all was able to safeguard his powers. When the Belgian Alexandre Lamfalussy decided not to extend his term at the head of the EMI, a successor had to be appointed who would become the first President of the ECB on 30 June 1998, and would deal with the introduction of the single currency on 1 January 1999.

The EPP’s choice, who was also the preferred candidate of the governments of the European Central Banks, was Wim Duisenberg. Holding a doctorate in economics from the University of Groningen in the northern Netherlands, he had spent part of his career at the International Monetary Fund, before becoming his country’s Minister for Finance in the mid-1970s. Having become the President of the Central Bank of the Netherlands, he was the architect of the strong Florin and of a rigorous monetary policy.

Karl von Wogau, the European Parliament’s rapporteur on the appointment of the President of the European Monetary Institute, stressed in the plenary sitting how seriously the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs took the hearing of Wim Duisenberg, ‘because we are aware that this is an exceptionally important appointment’. The independence of the European Central Bank depended largely on the person at its head.

The euro, a success for the EPP

The euro was an undeniable success. The convergence policy had borne fruit: in less than five years the European economies had managed to adopt the same budgetary requirements laid down in the Stability Pact.

At the Brussels European Council on 3 May 1998, the Heads of State or Government of the fifteen Member States of the Union decided on the list of States that would adopt the euro. There were eleven of them: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. Greece joined the group a little later, in 2001. The United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden opted not to participate.
In order to reach the decision on 3 May, it was necessary to have the agreement of the Commission and of the Council, as well as the support of Parliament. As Wilfried Martens stressed, ‘we are all aware that an event without precedent is taking place here today. Parliament is taking part in a decision which will radically change the course of European integration. [...] We, the Group of the European People’s Party, have always defended monetary union as one of the most important objectives of European integration. It is the logical final piece in a single market which is nearing completion and within which exchange rate fluctuations will no longer disrupt competition. It may also mean a new phase and, like the Schuman Plan, bring about real unity between the countries taking part. [...] the eleven countries which are to form the euro area are the pioneers of enterprising Europe. Europe can now justify itself in the world as a partner with a forceful instrument of international sovereignty.’

In this process, the eleven founding countries of the single currency wanted to make the euro a strong and stable currency. The EPP Group supported their efforts, in particular those made by Italy and Spain, which both undertook major reforms in order to be part of the first wave of countries participating in EMU.

The establishment of the new European Central Bank and the appointment of its Executive Board took place in mid-1998. As agreed, its first President was Wim Duisenberg. Continuity was ensured for the institution.

The third and final phase of EMU began on 1 January 1999 with the birth of the single monetary policy and the changeover to the euro. The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) was set up and the euro’s value in relation to the yen and the dollar was fixed. The currency, financial and stock markets operated in euro and new public debt was denominated in euro.

The EPP Group did not lose sight of two objectives: the confidence of financial operators and of European citizens. The tenacity shown by the Group would not be in vain. Immediately after the euro had been introduced onto the financial markets, the single currency began a slow, but steady fall against the dollar. Introduced at a rate of 1.17 dollars, after less than a year the euro achieved parity with the green bill and even fell below it at the end of January 2000. The psychological effect could have been disastrous. The financial markets seemed to be testing the strength of the new currency, at a time when the euro zone was in a growth period, despite an unfavourable international situation (Asian crisis and conflict in Kosovo).

In July 1999 the Group noted that ‘public interest in the euro exchange rate should not disguise the fact that the widely promised stability of the
The euro concerns its internal and not its external value. The important issue is price stability, i.e. avoiding inflation. The exchange-rate trend is of secondary importance.\textsuperscript{856}

In the end, the European currency stood firm. Coins and notes could be introduced on 1 January 2002. The Union, and above all many of its citizens, had taken a decisive step. At the sitting in January 2002, the MEPs gave over their discussions to the event. For Karl von Wogau, a new page was being turned. After spending almost twenty-two years in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, many of them as Chairman, and working unstintingly for the creation of Economic and Monetary Union, he saw the successful completion of his work: ‘Seeing the enthusiasm that greeted the euro on 1 January, welcoming this new currency for 300 million people in the European Union, we have to recall […] how difficult was the road to this.’\textsuperscript{857}

Ten years after the Brussels Council, the success had been no lie, as when ten new Member States acceded to the Union in 2004, all without exception asked to join the euro zone. Slovenia was the first to join in January 2007, followed by Malta and Cyprus in January 2008. In 2009 it was the turn of Slovakia. The euro became a fundamental element of integration.

For the Group the changeover to the euro had not just meant a change in the cash used. The adoption of the single currency created a strong symbol of identity. European economic structures had also been strengthened: the euro was a continental currency which allowed international economic and monetary shocks to be better absorbed. The price explosions in raw materials, including oil, which were traded in dollars could largely be offset by a strong euro. Above all, the euro had strengthened Europe’s economic stability. The European Parliament regularly took on the role of observer when it studied and discussed the situation in the euro zone and the ECB. In 2007 the reports delivered had been positive.\textsuperscript{858} There was growth and stability.\textsuperscript{859} Othmar Karas noted that ‘the euro has been a success: the euro is the EU’s best response to global challenges. The euro and the four freedoms are the cornerstones of a strong internal market. To my mind, the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact are the greatest regulatory principles to have been achieved by the European Union. […] We are glad that there are economic benefits, and we call for those benefits to be used to reduce trade deficits and public debt, whilst at the same time allowing the workers to share in the benefits.’\textsuperscript{860}
October 2008: Europe faces the global financial crisis by relying on the Eurogroup and the strength of the single currency

The subprime crisis in summer 2007, and then the problems facing the entire global financial system one year later, did not shake the Group’s confidence in the euro. On the contrary, as with the price increases for raw materials, the single currency was fully able to absorb the shocks. Even more, it made Europe’s leaders aware that it was now better to respond to crises together and not individually. In September 2008 the French Presidency of the Council assessed the risks: if the banking sector, which had been badly hit, could no longer lend, the entire real economy would fall into recession. Nicolas Sarkozy invited his European partners to the Elysée on 12 October. It was a Sunday and the European leaders hoped to be able to intervene by the Monday so as to take the financial markets by surprise. The announcement had a considerable impact and produced a positive effect on the markets the following day: more than EUR 1 700 billion were made available to banks in Europe in order to stem the crisis. By way of comparison, the US plan put forward by US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson was USD 700 billion, just over EUR 500 billion.

On the eve of the October European Summit, which had been given over to the crisis, the Chairmen of the EPP-ED Groups in the European and national parliaments met at the European Parliament for their Ninth Summit. The lengthily debated theme was the crisis and the coordinated response by the European governments. At the end of the meeting, Joseph Daul welcomed the fact that ‘this measure is strong evidence that when Europe is united, it can assert itself and find solutions to complex international crises, while remaining faithful to its values and its vision of a social market economy’.

A European economic government?

One of the most experienced members of the Christian Democrat family, Jean-Claude Juncker, was made President of the Eurogroup, which brought together the Finance Ministers of the member countries of the euro zone, as from 1 January 2005. A forum for identifying common interests and individual responsibilities of the countries which had adopted the euro, the Eurogroup does not foreshadow a European economic government, and no such provision is made in the Treaties. However, it forms a kind of political vanguard within the European Union, bringing together the States which have agreed to hand over the sovereignty necessary for the circulation of a single currency.
Ultimately, the European economy is managed jointly by the Member States, the European Central Bank, the Eurogroup and the Commission. This requires diplomacy, excellent understanding of the markets, and the moral and political authority needed for decision-making, even where decisions are unpopular, if the three main institutional actors, Jean-Claude Trichet for the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Juncker for the Eurogroup, and José Manuel Durão Barroso for the Commission, are to be able to carry out their duties in accordance with the Treaties, whilst following the political line taken by the national governments. In the second half of 2008, which saw the most violent monetary turbulence experienced by Europe since the war, the EPP-ED Group considered that it was the members of its political family, with Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel leading the way, who had mainly ‘piloted the European plane’. Nevertheless, there were serious concerns that this financial crisis would become an economic and social crisis, heralding a recession for 2009.
Chapter XXXIX
THE GROUP’S NEW INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE

The European orientation of the Western Balkans

In 1996, and after years of armed conflict in the Balkans, the European Union decided to establish a direct link with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania. This was the beginning of a long-term, patient strategy whose aim was to bring the Western Balkans back into the European family, even though tensions had not eased.

Indeed, the embers of war were still smouldering in the Republic of Serbia. The Belgrade regime led by Slobodan Milošević tightened its grip on the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, a region inhabited by an ethnic Albanian majority but falling under Serbian political domination and representing, since the ‘Battle of Kosovo’ in the 14th century, the historical, cultural and religious ‘cradle’ of the Serbian people. From the early 1990s, Milošević stoked the fires of Serbian nationalism and questioned the autonomous status of Kosovo. In response, the Kosovar Albanians founded the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) which, in 1996, unleashed a campaign of terror against the Serb leaders. The climate of intolerance between the two communities increased. Despite the efforts of the international community to appease the conflicting sides, war raged once again on the European continent. The crackdown launched by the Belgrade regime was brutal: following the news blackout imposed by the Serbs on the international media across the whole of Kosovo, a steady stream of Albanian refugees fleeing the fighting arrived in Macedonia and Albania. Europe had no desire to relive the horrors of past conflicts. The fear of an ‘ethnic purge’ and a ‘planned genocide’ was a cause of concern to the Council of the European People’s Party, which adopted a Resolution on 8 April 1999 demanding that, ‘On the eve of the 21st century, the European Union must state clearly that persecution and expulsions should be banished definitively from a Europe respectful of human rights.’

The EPP Group supported NATO intervention, which was inevitable. Tom Spencer, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, called
For decisive action: ‘Europe will fight and Europe will be right.’

Throughout the crisis, Doris Pack, heavily involved in the Balkans issue, called on Europe to play its role as peacemaker. The Serbian Government capitulated in June 1999 following intense bombing by NATO forces in Belgrade. That year, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia indicted Slobodan Milošević for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In autumn 2000, his government was dismissed from office after being ousted by popular vote. This marked the downfall of one of the last of Europe’s dictators, a development which was warmly welcomed by the President of Parliament, Nicole Fontaine, on 5 October 2000: ‘The people of Serbia have taken their destiny into their own hands.’ Doris Pack hoped that there would be ‘new contacts’ in Serbia, and that the EU should ‘help them on the path to Europe’.

Milošević was arrested by the new Serbian Government on 1 April 2001 and then transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal in June. He was never to know the outcome of his trial: he died on 11 March 2006 at the UN detention unit at Scheveningen in the Netherlands.

As early as 1999, the European People’s Party called on the European Council to propose a ‘comprehensive and generous’ Balkan Reconstruction and Stability Plan aimed at addressing the immediate refugee and instability problems, as well as longer-term issues such as the reconstruction of the region. The EPP also believed that the Balkans should be included in a wider Europe.

These calls were partially realised on 26 May 1999, when a Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) was established for the Western Balkan countries. The SAP provided a political framework for the European Union’s relations with the Western Balkan countries until completion of their accession process. The 2000 Feira European Council confirmed the European orientation of the Western Balkans by describing all the countries of the region as ‘potential candidates for EU membership’.

Meanwhile, the EPP-ED Group focused its position on two points: the definitive stabilisation of the region and its eventual integration into the European Union, neither of which would be possible without the other. In 2002, Ursula Stenzel presented her own-initiative report on the performance of the European Agency for Reconstruction, urging that Europe ‘must not turn a blind eye to the Balkans’, while Kosovo and Macedonia needed the support of the Union to strengthen their democracy.

In 2005, the European Parliament devoted its April plenary sitting to the regional integration of the Western Balkans. The Group’s position
was presented by Doris Pack, Chairman of the Delegation for relations with the countries of South-East Europe. She called on the Council and the Commission to become involved in the integration of the Balkan States and urged those States to adopt western governance and election standards and intensify their cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague.872

The Group also encouraged efforts wherever they were being made. In the Croatian city of Split, Hans-Gert Pöttering talked about the Group’s support for Croatia’s accession to the European Union and its desire to see Croatia advance quickly on its way to EU membership.873 The Croatian Government led by Ivo Sanader, he said, was committed to democracy, freedom, the rule of law and the market economy. It was therefore clear that Croatia would be able to take ‘its rightful place in the European Union in the near future’.874 Elmar Brok considered it to be in the interest of the Union’s founding Member States to open the door to the Balkan countries. Moreover, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs believed that enlargement was the most successful foreign policy tool and that these countries’ move towards Europe and their development towards the rule of law and democracy were the best security policy that could be pursued.

Similarly, in Sarajevo, in 2007, on behalf of the Group’s Bureau, Vito Bonsignore expressed his ‘great optimism shortly after the initialling [of] the Stabilisation and Association Agreement’ by Bosnia and Herzegovina.875

On 17 February 2008, Kosovo declared its independence. The decision on whether to recognise the former autonomous province as an independent state was not an easy one: it ‘will not be dictated by threats of violence or radicalisation’, said Joseph Daul.876 As Doris Pack pointed out during the debate held by Parliament on this topical issue two days later, ‘Kosovo is not a test case. It is unique. [...] We wish the Serbian politicians composure, and hope that they will now devote all their energy to taking Serbia along the path to EU membership.’877 This independence marked the opening of a new chapter in relations between Europe and the Balkans.

**EPP-ED Group support for the democratic forces in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia**

In December 2005, Charles Tannock presented his own-initiative report on the European neighbourhood policy.878 The British MEP himself admitted that he had been initially sceptical879 about this policy which was aimed at defining relations between the enlarged Union
and its new neighbours and which had been developed only in 2004. However, in conclusion, his report ‘confirms the European Parliament approval’ of a policy that viewed Europe’s external relations in terms of a commitment to ‘the rule of law, responsible governance, respect for human rights and equal opportunities, the principles of the social market economy and sustainable economic development.’

The Tannock report proposed relations based on respect for democratic values in return for trade relations with countries which were often rich in energy resources or which provided strategic European supply routes. It was crucial that these countries enjoyed the same level of political stability as the EU Member States.

Indeed, there was no shortage of examples of unrest on Europe’s doorstep: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia were all areas of conflict and instability.

Against the dictatorship in Belarus

With regard to the first of these, Belarus, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski remarked that ‘Belarus is not on the way to becoming a dictatorship; it is already there.’ Under its leader, Alexander Lukashenko, whom Christopher Beazley himself described as a dictator, Belarus was a real cause for concern.

From the start of the October 2004 parliamentary elections, the Group kept a close eye on the situation. In mid-September, Bogdan Klich and Charles Tannock tabled a resolution on the situation as regards human rights and democracy in Belarus, in which they called for ‘a more active and subtle approach […] which makes it possible to isolate an undemocratic government without isolating society’, as well as for an observer mission to be sent to Belarus.

An EPP-ED Group delegation led by Bogdan Klich visited Minsk in order to observe the parliamentary elections. Afterwards, Vytautas Landsbergis and Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou tabled a resolution in Parliament on behalf of the Group questioning the legitimacy of the elections. The Group called for measures to support the democratic opposition and for action to be taken against the Belarus regime by extending the list of officials barred from travel within the European Union.

The same year, Bogdan Klich, Charles Tannock and Michael Gahler nominated the Belarusian Association of Journalists for Parliament’s Sakharov Prize. The Association had, for many years, been committed to freedom of opinion and of the press, a commitment which had exposed many of its members to considerable personal risk. A large majority of EPP-ED Group members supported this nomination, and
thanks to the Group’s support, the Association was awarded the Sakharov Prize in Strasbourg in December 2004.891

The Group established contacts with democratic forces in Belarus, including Irina Krasovskaya, President of the ‘We Remember’ civil initiative to promote human rights,892 whom it welcomed to its meeting of 7 July 2005, and Angelika Borys, President of the Union of Poles in Belarus, who described to the Group at its meeting of 8 September the acts of persecution and repression being perpetrated against her organisation.893

The Group kept an ever more watchful eye on the situation in the run-up to the Belarusian presidential election held in March 2006. On 1 February 2006, in Brussels, Alexander Milinkevich, the opposition presidential candidate, together with the leaders of the United Democratic Forces, emphasised the importance of the media and pessimistically predicted that his opponent, President Alexander Lukashenko, would win the election.894 Following Milinkevich’s speech, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski proposed that an EPP-ED Group delegation should once again be sent to observe the elections.895

During the election campaign, the repression of the opposition forces continued unabated. Alexander Milinkevich was jailed, and Bogdan Klich, who was following the case closely, reported back to the Group,896 whose members expressed their solidarity with the opposition leader: Struan Stevenson called on the European Union to take action against Belarus and Zita Pleštinská proposed lighting candles in the windows of the European Parliament as a sign of support, while Vytautas Landsbergis suggested writing a letter to the Russian Government, known to have considerable influence over President Lukashenko.

The Group nominated897 Alexander Milinkevich for the 2006 Sakharov Prize, which he was duly awarded. Prior to the official award ceremony, Milinkevich was arrested twice. The Group protested strongly. Angelika Borys, who had also been subject to intimidation at the hands of the regime in Belarus, was unable to attend the award ceremony, and so only the winner came to receive his Prize on 12 December 2006, when he was warmly welcomed and congratulated by the Group.898

In February 2007, the Group held its Study Day on Belarus, which the democratic opposition and many experts were invited to attend.899 The event took place under new circumstances, since, one month earlier, Moscow had plunged Minsk into a severe energy crisis. The Lukashenko regime, which could no longer rely on the unconditional support of its neighbour, seemed to want to move towards a closer relationship with the European Union. Nevertheless, the EPP-ED Group did not
relax its monitoring of the situation. When new legislative elections were held in September 2008, Jacek Protasiewicz served as a member of the European Parliament observer delegation. The Polish MEP’s findings were conclusive: the elections were still a long way short of the recognised democratic standards, and he was disappointed that the process did not guarantee that there would be a single opposition representative in the newly-elected Belarusian Parliament.900

**Support for the Orange Revolution in Ukraine**

When Ukraine held presidential elections in autumn 2004, the Group immediately sensed that there would be problems. During the election campaign, Vladimir Putin paid a visit to Kiev, clearly in order to influence votes. Charles Tannock was worried by this and voiced his concerns about the dominance of the Russian Federation given that many polling stations were located in its territory. The Group decided to participate in the ad hoc parliamentary delegations as well as two fact-finding missions.901

The outcome of the second round of the presidential elections sparked fierce accusations of fraud from the opposition forces in Ukraine, who rallied behind Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. Elmar Brok, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, was among the first to react, severely criticising the failure of the Ukrainian authorities to conduct the elections according to democratic standards.902 The Ukrainian people held a month-long peaceful demonstration calling for democracy. The Orange Revolution dealt a fatal blow to the regime led by Leonid Kuchma, a former Soviet apparatchik who had ruled Ukraine since its independence. During this long period of unrest, Working Group A proposed to set up an EPP-ED evaluation group and to send a European Parliament observer mission to Ukraine.903

Under pressure from the public and also the international community, the regime held a ‘third round’ of elections on 26 December. The results confirmed a victory for Viktor Yushchenko, whom Jacek Saryusz-Wolski proposed to invite as soon as possible to address the European Parliament.904

President Yushchenko’s visit took place on 23 February 2005. The President, who was proud to be able to address the European Parliament, said that MEPs should consider themselves the ‘godfathers and godmothers’ of newly-born democratic Ukraine: ‘Your support was a great symbol and encouragement to us in our struggle in the difficult month of December. […] The EU cannot be deaf to the legitimate European aspirations of Ukraine. It is the responsibility of the EU to broaden
its offer to [...] Ukraine and offer it an Association Agreement with an open perspective on membership.\textsuperscript{905}

On 8 December 2005, the EPP-ED Group held a Study Day on Ukraine to which it invited academics, experts and politicians to come and discuss, one year on from the Orange Revolution, the changes that had taken place and the future of Ukraine. The Chairman of the meeting, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, said: ‘The time of grand declarations has passed and the time for hard work has come – taking on European standards and the acquis. European integration is a stimulus for modernisation, so when Ukraine is ready to join the EU, the Union will be ready to accept Ukraine.’\textsuperscript{906} In the Group’s view, therefore, a democratic Ukraine might legitimately aspire to EU membership.

During the summer of 2007, Ukraine plunged once more into a state of instability. The political turmoil in the spring which pitted the government of Yulia Tymochenko against President Viktor Yushchenko had escalated into a constitutional crisis. This did not deter the Group from expressing its support for the possible accession of Ukraine, and when the European Parliament discussed the report on a new enhanced agreement between the European Community and Ukraine, Zuzana Roithová stated that ‘Europe will not be whole until Ukraine becomes part of the European Union.’\textsuperscript{907}

An EPP-ED Group delegation, led by Marian-Jean Marinescu and including Nickolay Mladenov, Aldis Kušķis and Zbigniew Zaleski, visited Ukraine during the general elections of 30 September 2007. It observed the elections in the capital, Kiev, and in the regions of Obukhov, Mykolaiv and Lviv. Following the elections, Marian-Jean Marinescu said that the Ukrainian people had voted in a free environment.\textsuperscript{908} Democracy was still fragile, but progress was being made.

**Moldova or the last frozen conflict in eastern Europe**

Moldova, which Charles Tannock defined as a ‘small landlocked country, the poorest in Europe’\textsuperscript{909}, also became the focus of the Group’s attention. Following the enlargement of the EU to include Romania and Bulgaria, Moldova became a close neighbour. This former republic of the Soviet Union had many problems: organised crime, trafficking of all kinds and the smouldering political conflict with the breakaway territory of Transnistria, which had remained under Russian occupation since the bloody confrontations of 1991. The situation was a confusing one, since Transnistria was not recognised internationally, not even by its ally Russia, and was a de facto independent republic that was not controlled by the Moldovan Government.
In 2005, Moldova held parliamentary elections. The Group was concerned that the elections would not be fair and decided to take part in the observer mission to monitor the way in which they were conducted. The Moldovan Government needed to find a solution to the Transnistrian conflict, while ensuring respect for human rights and media freedom.

On 24 February 2005, a resolution on the parliamentary elections in Moldova, drafted by Armin Laschet, Charles Tannock and Bogdan Klich on behalf of the EPP-ED Group, was adopted by Parliament. During the debate, Zdzisław Zbigniew Podkánski said that the elections of 6 March ‘may open a new phase of development, and thus also give rise to the implementation of the strategy adopted last year for future membership in the European Union.’

Four MEPs from the EPP-ED Group, Bogusław Sonik, Tadeusz Zwiefka, Laima Andrikiene and Zdzisław Zbigniew Podkánski, were members of the ad hoc delegation of election observers. The elections confirmed the Communist Party in power, but did not resolve the conflict with Transnistria.

In September 2006, a referendum was held in Transnistria by the local authorities seeking to join that part of the Dniester valley with Russia. Tensions between the separatist Transnistrian authorities and the Moldovan Government remained and were a cause of instability throughout the whole country. On 25 October 2006, the Group tabled a resolution which strongly condemned the conduct of the referendum because of its lack of transparency and respect for basic democratic principles. The Group declared that the outcome of the referendum could not be recognised as an expression of the popular will, and MEPs called on Russia to discontinue its support for the Transnistrian separatists, who posed a threat to peace and stability in the region.

The Georgian crisis of summer 2008: a return to the Cold War?

In summer 2008, Europe held its breath as Russian tanks rolled into South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The crisis that had been brewing for years suddenly erupted between the government in Tbilisi and Russian-Ossetian separatists. President Mikheil Saakashvili took advantage of the hostilities and, in early August, sent Georgian troops into the province in a bid to regain control. Russia’s response as a longstanding supporter of the Ossetian separatists was immediate and its use of force disproportionate, as the President of the European Parliament, Hans-Gert Pöttering, stated in his press release. On the military level, the Georgian army was swept aside and Russian tanks advanced to within a few kilometres of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi. The Group
Chairman, Joseph Daul, called for an immediate ceasefire. Vytautas Landsbergis condemned the Russian expansionist doctrine, an issue which had already been the subject of debate in the European Parliament. It took every ounce of determination on the part of the French Council Presidency to broker a ceasefire between the two belligerents. When Parliament reconvened on Monday, 1 September 2008, MEPs held a debate on the crisis. The EPP-ED Group offered its support to Georgia. Joseph Daul said that the European Union ‘must actively participate in the resolution of this conflict’ and invited ‘the Commission, the Council and all the Member States to demonstrate both their unity and also their resolve with regard to our Russian neighbour.’

Difficult relations with Russia

Against the backdrop of these tensions, the special relationship between Europe and Russia was emerging. Although Russia was an important and close neighbour, its spheres of influence regularly collided with those of an enlarged Europe. It was therefore crucial that a new partnership be forged, as proposed in the report on EU-Russia relations which the European Parliament adopted on 26 May 2005 and which received the support of a large majority of the EPP-ED Group. The report found that there was ‘a growing disappointment and frustration’ over the state of Russia’s democracy and economy, which still fell short of European standards. Over the preceding few years, the Group had disapproved of Russia's conduct in several areas: the Chechen conflict, management of hostage-taking incidents in Moscow (2002) and Beslan (2004), the assassination of the journalist Anna Politkovskaya (2006), the poisoning of a former Russian secret service officer, Alexander Litvinenko (2006), repeated attacks on freedom of the press and repressive measures against the opposition.

Europe was struggling to find a coherent response. Consequently, there was a risk of seeing Russia play European governments off against each other, or at least widen the divisions between them. This fear proved to be well founded when, in 2007, Russia exerted pressure on Estonia following the relocation of a Soviet memorial. The matter caused quite a stir just days before the opening of an EU-Russia Summit. The Group reacted strongly in plenary. On 9 May, the anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, Joseph Daul condemned the actions taken by Russia, which ‘must not think that […] it will succeed in dividing us.’ ‘Today, we are all Estonians,’ he declared. Jacek Saryusz-Wolski said there was a real need to continue working closely with Russia, ‘but not at any price, nor at the price of EU or Member State sovereignty.’
On the subject of Russia’s policy towards Estonia, he said that ‘Russia must realise that its efforts to play some Member States of the European Union against others are totally counterproductive. The policy of dividing the EU will not work. […] if one Member State is being treated in a way that is contrary to all the rules of the international community in whatever area – be it trade, energy or political discrimination – our Union as a whole will intervene on its behalf. Our Parliament is the guardian of this solidarity.’

Europe’s energy dependence on Russia lay at the heart of the problem. From 1999 onwards, Russia’s economy, bolstered by its energy capacity, experienced strong growth, and the country became one of Europe’s leading energy suppliers. At its meeting held on 13 June 2007, the Group was divided on the issue of Russia’s accession to the WTO. Some of the Group felt it desirable for Russia to become a member of the WTO, since that meant that Russia would have to obey the WTO rules. However, other Group members were not convinced of the sincerity of a partner which did not appear to comply with the agreements it signed. A few months later, Christopher Beazley, a member of Working Group A, acknowledged that the Group’s position on Russia lacked coherence.

Remaining open to the Mediterranean and Arab world

The Mediterranean and the Arab world were still high on the Group’s agenda. With the initiation of the Barcelona Process in November 1995, Europe launched an ambitious Mediterranean policy. The following year, this was one of the subjects discussed by the Group during its Study Days held in Vouliagmeni, Greece. Juan Manuel Fabra Vallés, a member of the Delegation for relations with the Maghreb countries and the Arab Maghreb Union, was asked to introduce the topic. His speech on the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference highlighted the complexity of the issues involved: ‘In the early 1990s the problems facing the southern Mediterranean began to emerge clearly: political instability, terrorism, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, large-scale immigration, stagnant economies, drug trafficking and smuggling, together with the lack in some countries of strict respect for the most basic human rights. It was beyond the individual capacity of the Member States to resolve these problems by themselves and the European policy developed up to that time was inadequate, based as it was on broad objectives with little practical action.’

The Barcelona Process initiated a rebalancing of the EU’s foreign policy, which, since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, had been focused
more towards Eastern Europe. There was a need for a Mediterranean policy based on a new partnership. During the time that Hans-Gert Pöttering served as Chairman of the Group, he travelled to many Arab Islamic countries, including Iran, where he held informal political discussions. Alongside the Vice-Chairman, Francesco Fiori, and other members of the Group, he took part in the Second Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum held in Brussels on 8 and 9 February 2001. On the eve of the Forum, he explained that, ‘with a region which, like no other, has been a crossroads for history and cultures and which has touched Europe on a great number of occasions in the past, dialogue and cooperation between cultures lie at the heart of political understanding and form a precondition for fruitful political cooperation.’

A few days after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Hans-Gert Pöttering, addressing the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament, stressed the need for solidarity with the United States at that difficult time. Speaking on behalf of his Group, he called on the European Parliament also to take the initiative in organising a third Mediterranean Forum, since it was necessary ‘to send clear signals to the Arab countries to show them that we do not want a “clash” of civilisations’.

The idea was, indeed, taken up by the Conference of Presidents. Nicole Fontaine, who, as President of the European Parliament, also served as Co-President of the Euromed Parliamentary Forum, opened an extraordinary meeting of the Forum on 8 November 2001. Calls for peace and mutual understanding were made repeatedly during the Forum, which the Group considered to be an antidote to terrorism. The Forum continued its work on a regular basis, and, in 2004, it was converted into the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA).

A Euromed Working Group was set up within Working Group A to monitor the work of the EMPA. The EPP-ED Group regularly visited the countries of the southern Mediterranean and held, jointly with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, political seminars and Euro-Mediterranean meetings. From March 2008 to March 2009, Hans-Gert Pöttering was President of the Assembly. For Pöttering, who, in the 1980s, had made a name for himself early in his European career as the author of a report on Europe’s Mediterranean policy, his appointment to this post was a source of genuine satisfaction.

---

a Together with Abdelwahad Radi, Speaker of the Moroccan House of Representatives. Radi was to become Moroccan Justice Minister in 2007.
The Turkey issue: ‘a matter of conscience’ (2004)

Finally, there was ‘the thorny subject’ – in the words of Jose Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra – of Turkey. Relations between the European Community and, subsequently, the European Union with Turkey went back a long way. A traditional ally of the West through its membership of the OEEC (1948), the Council of Europe (1949) and NATO (1952), Turkey signed an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community in 1963. The EU established a customs union with Turkey in 1995, and in 1999 the Helsinki European Council recognised Turkey as a candidate for EU membership. However, in Brussels, it was decided that this sensitive issue was not to be rushed. In 2004, the European Commission issued a Recommendation on Turkey’s progress towards accession. The Commission was in favour of opening accession negotiations. In Parliament, the Dutch MEP Camiel Eurlings was appointed by the Committee on Foreign Affairs to draft a parliamentary report on the subject.

In September 2004, the EPP-ED Group held two Study Days on Turkey in Brussels, prior to Parliament’s debate on the subject. The Group’s views, expressed during the debate in plenary on the Eurlings report on 13 December 2004, were mixed. Although Turkey was increasingly close to meeting European economic standards, there was still a lot of progress to be made. EPP-ED Group members argued that the problem of respect for human rights remained acute, despite Ankara’s reform efforts. Turkey’s refusal to recognise Cyprus also did nothing to help its application. Finally, as the Group Chairman pointed out in his speech, there was a fear that, ‘should Turkey join the European Union, this enlargement might prove fatal and Europeans might lose their identity, that it might be detrimental to the sense of being “us” on which solidarity in the European Union is founded.’ This speech reflected the sentiments prevailing among the Group’s members, the majority of whom were in favour of a ‘privileged partnership’.

The debate in plenary was ‘lively and animated’, but the European Parliament eventually gave the green light for the opening of negotiations with Turkey. This was a conditional ‘yes’. The Brussels European Council held on 16 and 17 December agreed to the opening of accession negotiations, which subsequently began in October 2005.

In September 2006, Camiel Eurlings drafted a further report on the negotiations with Turkey in which he condemned the lack of respect.

---

a It has become almost a tradition for the Group to entrust the task of drawing up political reports on Turkey to one of its members from the Dutch Delegation, such as Arie Oostlander, Camiel Eurlings, Jean Penders and Ria Oomen-Ruijten.
for freedom of expression and minority rights and pointed out that further efforts needed to be made to eradicate corruption and violence against women. In November 2006, it was the turn of the European Commission to present a report which was, to say the least, negative. At the end of that year, the Council noted that Turkey’s refusal to recognise Cyprus was holding up proceedings.

From 2007 onwards, the negotiations made painfully slow progress, particularly because the political situation in Turkey remained unstable. In 2008, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which had won a resounding victory in the 2007 parliamentary elections, narrowly escaped being banned by the Constitutional Court because of its ‘anti-secular activities’. Originating in Turkey’s Islamic movement, with which it claimed to have broken off relations, the AKP regarded itself as a Conservative party and had observer status within the European People’s Party. Its conservatism could be defined as a combination of a universal approach and local features of Turkish politics and society, one which rejected all forms of radicalism. It advocated modernity without rejecting tradition, and rationality without denying spirituality. Although the election, in August 2008, of Abdullah Gul as President of Turkey strengthened the AKP’s leadership of a country in the throes of change and reform, the Group continued to wonder whether Turkey really was suitable for membership the EU.

---

a The Turkish authorities were refusing to apply the 2005 Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement to Cyprus.
Chapter XL
FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Schengen area (1985-1995): achieving the free movement of persons...

Of all the freedoms, the free movement of persons is the most practical benefit for the man in the street. Despite being established as a Community objective as early as the Rome Treaties, it was achieved only much later, after several calls from MEPs for its implementation (especially in 1981 through the resolution on the adoption of a European passport). The Commission’s White Paper on completing the internal market and Article 8a introduced into the EEC Treaty by the Single European Act gave it a legal and economic basis: individuals were now entitled to move freely. However, this provision made political sense only if the very symbol of borders was actually abolished.

On 14 June 1985, the Luxembourg Presidency convened a meeting of representatives of the Benelux States, France and Germany for the signing of an agreement that would be indelibly etched into the history of Europe: the Schengen Agreement. The location chosen for the signing was anything other than insignificant. Schengen, a small Luxembourg village on the Moselle near the point where the borders of Luxembourg, France and Germany meet, lies at the heart of a Europe characterised by borders that the representatives of these five pioneering States, after a historic meeting on board the pleasure boat ‘Princesse Marie-Astrid’, were about to abolish.

Although the Agreement came into effect almost immediately, it provided for the gradual abolition of controls at common borders. Five years later, the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement was signed (19 June 1990). When it came into force on 1 January 1995, it abolished for good internal border checks for all nationals of the ‘Schengen area’. The free movement of persons was therefore three years behind the other freedoms of movement and had been achieved in only half of the EU Member States. These were quickly joined by Italy in 1990, Spain, Greece and Portugal in 1992, Austria in 1995 and Denmark, Finland and Sweden in 1996. Following the 2004 enlargement, a further
nine Member States had already joined the Schengen area by late 2007: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Only Cyprus had wanted to maintain controls at its borders, and, following the 2007 enlargement, Bulgaria and Romania had been granted transitional arrangements. Outside the European Union, agreements had been concluded with Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland on their participation in the Schengen area. Within the EU, only Ireland and the United Kingdom did not apply the Schengen acquis.

From Nuorgam in the far north of Finland to Cabo de São Vicente in Portugal and from Isafjördur in Iceland to the Ionian Islands in Greece, European citizens were no longer required to show visas and passports. This constituted a major step forward.

In order to ensure this freedom without compromising security, it was necessary to harmonise national legislation in such sensitive areas as immigration, asylum, police cooperation, the fight against terrorism and illegal trafficking. The principle enshrined in the Schengen Convention therefore provided for the abolition of checks at the internal borders of the Schengen Member States except where public policy or national security required such checks to be reintroduced (Article 2). The Convention introduced a set of compensatory measures: the tightening of controls at the external borders of the Schengen area, the mutual recognition of visa policy and the establishment of a uniform visa format, residence permits, the processing of asylum applications, as well as police cooperation and mutual assistance in criminal matters. The Schengen Information System (SIS) was set up to allow the competent national authorities to search for and exchange data on persons and objects.

Throughout the period while the agreements were being put in place, the EPP Group adopted a very realistic approach. Accordingly, in response to the slow pace of the whole process, the Group advocated a policy of moderation on this complex issue. In 1994, Parliament also adopted a resolution tabled by the Group which, although it regretted the delays, called on the governments of the Schengen countries to establish effective cooperation and requested that all necessary steps be taken to solve the outstanding technical questions. Regarding security issues, the Schengen Convention required that checks carried out in relation to immigration, asylum and extradition policies be transferred to the external borders of the participating Member States. This entailed the harmonisation of Member States’ rules in these areas and the most extensive cooperation between the services concerned (police, judicial authorities, etc.). The EPP Group, fully aware of all the
implications of abolishing physical barriers, repeatedly questioned the Council and Commission about the creation of an ‘internal security area’. It was absolutely essential that Member States’ laws on immigration, asylum, the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking be coordinated and harmonised. Finally, the Group also focused attention on the arrangements for monitoring the Schengen area, which was not covered by Community law but came under the auspices of intergovernmental cooperation. Georg Jarzembowski, the Group’s specialist in this field, consistently called for parliamentary and judicial supervision of the Schengen regime.

The Schengen area was the forerunner of the EU as we know it today. By requiring Member States to cooperate through police and judicial cooperation in areas of national sovereignty such as internal security, immigration and asylum and the fight against crime and drug trafficking, Schengen became the successful prototype for experiencing a multi-speed Europe.

...while also ensuring their safety

Schengen was therefore, by nature, an extension of an existing freedom but also, inevitably, a matter of continuing concern for the European Parliament. The battle was tough, particularly because, in the House, some MEPs did not understand that the opening of borders had to be accompanied by improved police and judicial cooperation. Christopher Beazley summed up the situation rather well: ‘What politically divides this House [...] is that although we insist as vigorously, if not more vigorously, on the free movement of people, we also insist that the people of Europe be reassured and given the true reasons why borders have not been opened, and that reassurance can only be given when the public are shown that police cooperation is critical and essential, that the borders have not protected our citizens from terrorism and from drug trafficking.’

In 1994, the agenda of the Group’s Study Days in Estoril, Portugal, included the question of internal security. Two leading figures, both of whom were politically close to the EPP Group and occupied senior high-level posts in their respective countries, were asked to draw up a statement for the rest of the Group. Pierre Méhaignerie, French Minister of State, Keeper of the Seals and Justice Minister, and Günther Beckstein, Interior Minister of Bavaria, Germany, emphasised the need to strengthen European political cooperation on internal security and called on members of the EPP Group in the European Parliament to join in the efforts to that end. In his closing remarks, Beckstein said
that, ‘In this fight against crime, the European Parliament is of the foremost importance, [...] for it is you who drive European unification forward. I would therefore ask you in this area, and in this area in particular, to concentrate your influence and efforts on this issue. All Europe’s citizens will thank you for it if it results in greater security.’

When Parliament reconvened after the elections, the EPP Group was well represented in the newly established Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs responsible for these issues. After the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, this involvement of the EPP Group in the work of the Committee would be the basis of its strategy for ensuring internal security, as outlined in its manifesto for the 1994 elections. ‘The European Union has considerable responsibilities in the field of internal security, which means the security of the people of Europe.’

In February 1999, at its 13th Congress in Brussels, the European People’s Party noted that the time had come ‘to depart from traditional models of crime-fighting, which are based on an outdated conception of impermeable borders, and to use methods based on close cooperation by the judiciary, intelligence organisations, experience gained within the framework of external security, police, and customs authorities working together transnationally.’

At its Bureau meeting and its Study Days in Vienna from 1 to 5 March 1999, the EPP Group discussed the subject of ‘Europe: towards an area of freedom and security based on the rule of law’. Hartmut Nassauer, a member of the EPP-ED Group, looked at ‘the need to communitarise major sections of the third pillar’. In relation to national sovereignty, he asked: ‘Would it not be more sensible to transfer a tiny part of this sovereignty to the Community level to ensure that we win the fight against crime? Would that not be in the interest of citizens?’

The agenda of the EPP-ED Group’s Study Days in Thessaloniki from 7 to 11 May 2001 included the question of asylum, immigration and internal security policy in the future enlarged Europe. Hubert Pirker, a member of the EPP-ED Group, pointed out that ‘security is a basic need for citizens’ and that, ‘while security falls within the remit of the states, it is increasingly up to the European Union to ensure it can be guaranteed. The threats have changed. Organised crime knows no frontiers, [...] their progress in communication technologies is giving rise to new forms of crime.’

The fight against drugs

There was no shortage of new threats. In 1995, Sir Jack Stewart-Clark, then Vice-President of the European Parliament, drafted a report on
the fight against drugs on behalf of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs. The rapporteur was a leading expert on the issue, as he had already been, in 1986, rapporteur for the Committee of Inquiry into the drugs problem in the Member States of the Community. His findings provided significant insight into drug-related phenomena and the harmful consequences of drugs for society. The British MEP considered it essential to fight against this ‘nihilistic philosophy’: ‘The drugs problem continues to worsen inexorably from year to year. International drugs cartels are becoming more aggressive and more expansionist in attacking new markets with new drugs with ever changing distribution patterns and with increasing skill in concealment and in handling the money from their sales. Even more worrying, they are using their increasing resources to interfere in the democratic and economic processes of countries by political influence and by taking over key sectors of business and financial services. […] All member and applicant countries of the European Union must be fully committed to international cooperation against drugs trafficking and the growing menace of international crime. A steady move must take place to multilateral cooperation throughout the European Union in matters such as extradition, penalties, powers of pursuit, sharing of information, etc. Timetables must be set, but in the meantime, bilateral agreements with every country on these important matters should be put in place. This will require a high degree of political will which is not yet sufficiently evident. We must surely expect that our action must be anticipatory and not always reactive to the exigencies imposed by criminal organisations.’

However, it was not until the first half of 1997 that the parliamentary committee began drawing up a recommendation on the harmonisation of drug policies, as well as two reports on documents published by the Commission and the Council on synthetic drugs. The approach adopted by the EPP Group in these reports was based on the objective of a totally drug-free society.

In 1998, Hubert Pirker was responsible for drawing up a new report on the control of synthetic drugs (designer drugs). The EPP Group advocated the adoption of a clear policy rejecting the legalisation of certain drugs, as was being recommended at the time by the Socialist Group. Accordingly, when a report tabled by a member of the PES Group, Hedy d’Ancona (Netherlands), recommended the legalisation of soft drugs and the provision of heroin on prescription, the EPP Group voted against. During the debate in plenary, the Socialists, who were themselves divided on the subject, successfully called for the report to be referred back to committee.
The Group spokesman, Hartmut Nassauer, considered that ‘this [Socialist] amendment represents quite simply a vote of no confidence in the work of my charming colleague Mrs d’Ancona.’ 963 The rejection of the report, which was strongly supported by the British Labour Government of the time, unfortunately stopped the debate prompted by the d’Ancona report. A second report drafted by Mrs d’Ancona which, this time, did not advocate legalisation, was finally approved by the EPP Group. 964 The Group spokesman, Sir Jack Stewart-Clark, said that this report ‘is a compromise document but nonetheless puts forward many sensible, pragmatic suggestions which the great majority can support.’ 965

New terrorist threats

Over a period of many years, the EPP Group tabled a number of resolutions condemning terrorist acts. These included: the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 1995 on the assassination by ETA of Gregorio Ordóñez, Chairman of the People’s Party of Guipúzcoa and Member of the Basque Parliament, in San Sebastián; the European Parliament resolution of 18 May 1995 on the kidnapping by ETA of the Basque industrialist José María Aldaya Etxeburu, in the town of Hondarribia; and the European Parliament resolution of 14 December 1995 on the terrorist attack carried out in Madrid on the eve of the European Council of 11 December 1995. 966

In 1995, Viviane Reding was appointed rapporteur on combating terrorism in the European Union. 967 In her report, she found that ‘Nearly every day some minor or major act of terrorism is committed somewhere in the world, killing, maiming or otherwise physically injuring people, and destroying, damaging, spoiling or rendering unusable buildings or other property. Although news of such events has become part of the daily routine, we should not allow ourselves to become accustomed, inured or even resigned to them.’ 968

At the time, terrorism was not an unknown or new phenomenon in Europe, but it did affect only a few areas, mainly in France (Corsican separatists), Spain (ETA) and Northern Ireland (the IRA). Nevertheless, the rapporteur emphasised that ‘the victims of terrorism require special support. To them, a terrorist attack primarily entails indescribable suffering (death of close relatives, maiming, other serious and painful physical injuries, fear and serious trauma, destruction of hopes and expectations and of the material basis of their livelihood). It is therefore extremely important to provide effective material and psychological assistance to the victims of terrorism and their families, in order to help them to come
to terms with these painful experiences and thereby help them to resume their place in society." \(^969\)

The report recommended various preventive measures, proposing that ‘security precautions should be stepped up particularly in civil aviation’. This own-initiative report, which followed a hearing held by the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs in February 1996, classified acts of terrorism carried out in the European Union as criminal, not political offences (in order to distinguish them from resistance campaigns against the state terrorism practised by some third countries). Having rejected and condemned all acts of terrorism and warned the media against being exploited to further terrorists’ objectives, the resolution set out a series of concerted measures to investigate and avert acts of terrorism. In the section entitled ‘Investigation and prosecution’, the Council was called on to vest in Europol, as soon as possible, the necessary competence to combat terrorism. The Member States were also called on to classify acts of terrorism as serious, extraditable crimes in their respective criminal laws and to prosecute everyone involved in a terrorist act. Finally, it called on the Member States to step up police and judicial cooperation with a view, in the longer term, to harmonising criminal law on serious crime with a cross-border aspect. \(^970\)

During the debate on 29 January 1997 on the Reding report, the Group spokesman, Ana Palacio Valdelezsundi, spoke with great eloquence about a cause that was very close to her heart: ‘A blue bond, Mr President. The sky over the European Union today is an immense blue bond stretching from Las Palmas to Malmö, from Rhodes to Dublin. A blue bond which is the silent witness of a daily struggle, of social rejection of terrorism in the Basque Country of Spain, an area particularly scarred by this social ulcer. Echoing the rapporteur, the citizens of Europe, represented in this chamber, raise their voices loud and clear today. They have had enough, they are all united against terrorism, and they are drawing a line in the sand: democrats on this side, terrorists, who are common criminals, on the other.’ \(^971\)

Unfortunately, this was only a foretaste of what terrorism had in store and of the lasting and dramatic impact it was to have on Europe and the rest of the world. On 11 September 2001, office workers were already at work when two commercial aircraft smashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York. A third plane crashed into a wing of the Pentagon in Washington. In Brussels, it was already afternoon. The parliamentary committees had already begun their meetings when the rumour that had been going round became a terrible reality: a massive terrorist attack had been perpetrated against the United States. The world had entered a new era.

467
Besides condemning terrorism in all its forms and expressing its solidarity in the immediate aftermath of these attacks, the EPP-ED Group again proposed the establishment of effective instruments to combat terrorism. During the plenary sitting on Wednesday 3 October 2001, Hartmut Nassauer spoke about the new challenges facing the European Union: ‘The United States of America and world public opinion will be looking to see whether we demonstrate our solidarity and our capacity to act in the face of the new challenges of international terrorism which have just become visible. European effectiveness has hitherto often fallen at the hurdle of national sovereignty. Effective joint action has often been blocked by invoking national sovereignty. Now, national sovereignty is not an objective in itself, and certainly not if it tends to hinder rather than promote the defence of national independence against terrorists and the effective protection of citizens against terrorist attacks. It is for that reason that the future will see us having to develop effective Community instruments and examining whether national sovereignty helps or hinders us in doing so.’

The issue of internal and external security became a key element in responding to citizens’ need for greater physical and legal security.

The EPP-ED Group recognised that combating terrorism effectively required fresh impetus and improved implementation for the Europol and Eurojust systems, and a recasting of European defence policy and foreign policy structures, with regard both to individual states (Afghanistan) and to regions (the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership).

During the 2004 elections, the EPP-ED Group took a firm stance in the fight against terrorism: ‘As a priority, existing measures must be swiftly implemented, in particular the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States. A common definition of terrorism should be integrated into the acquis and a legal basis created in the Treaty allowing the Union to [act effectively and promptly and, at international level, to step up cooperation, particularly in the field of exchanging intelligence.] In parallel with this, relevant European Union measures for the compensation of victims of terrorist acts must be foreseen. The Union’s strategy to combat terrorism should be subject to ex-ante as well as ex-post democratic scrutiny.’

**EUROPOL**

As long ago as 1975, the establishment of the Trevi Group had led to intergovernmental cooperation to combat serious crime, terrorism

---

^a At the Rome European Council meeting held in December 1975, the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers decided, in the context of European Political Cooperation (EPC), to
and drug trafficking. The Schengen Agreement advocated the strengthening of police cooperation in these areas, and the 1990 Implementing Convention established the Schengen Information System, a computer system which enables police forces to track wanted criminals or stolen property.

The exchange of information was, nonetheless, inadequate. Germany, backed by Spain, called for the establishment of a real European federal police force which would have the right of hot pursuit and also the right to make arrests. However, France, the United Kingdom and most of the countries of the Community were opposed to the idea. On a proposal from the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, the principle of the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol), responsible for combating international drug trafficking and organised crime, was adopted at the Luxembourg European Council held on 28 and 29 June 1991. Europol came into being with the establishment of a ‘Drugs Unit’ by the Maastricht European Council held in December 1991.

The Convention establishing Europol was signed on 26 July 1995, but, despite repeated calls by European Councils and because of the slow pace of ratification procedures, it did not enter into force until July 1999. Europol’s powers are limited to dealing with offences on an international scale, including drug trafficking, illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings, motor vehicles or radio-active substances, money laundering, counterfeiting and terrorism. The Council of Ministers may, by a unanimous decision, extend Europol’s jurisdiction to other offences not included in the list.

Initially, Europol’s tasks were limited to providing coordination, assistance and advice to national police forces and supplying information to any Community institution for control purposes. The report by the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs of 22 January 1993 recommended that Europol’s remit should cover other aspects of international organised crime such as drugs and financial and fiscal offences. The resolution on the setting up of Europol called for the establishment of a body of appeal against decisions taken by Europol, a Community inspector for data protection and an improved legal aid create a forum to combat international terrorism, partly because Interpol did not, at the time, have the issue on its agenda. In June 1976, a Council resolution set up the Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and International Violence (TREVI) Group to exchange information and coordinate the fight against terrorism and training practices. This measure involved the nine Member States of the European Community, later joined by Austria, Finland and Sweden, meeting at ministerial level.

system. It insisted that Parliament be granted the right to hear and question officers of Europol and other police forces.977

The EPP Group itself supported contacts between members of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs, initially chaired by Amédée Turner, and Europol project leaders in Strasbourg.978 The Group also took advantage of the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and made this issue the focal point of the discussions held during the December 1993 part-session, questioning the Council directly.979 It was supported by the President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, who felt that the current third-pillar arrangements were inadequate and that the 1996 IGC should significantly improve the decision-making process by basing it on the Community method.980

At the Dublin European Council on 13 and 14 December 1996, the Irish Presidency included the issue on its agenda. The establishment of a high-level group responsible for devising possible measures to combat organised crime was proposed.981 An Intergovernmental Conference would be convened with the aim of revising the Treaties accordingly. In contrast to these general objectives, the EPP Group’s findings were more clear-cut. Nor did it wait until 1996 to address the situation. At the request of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs, Hartmut Nassauer drafted a report on Europol that was published on 20 December 1995.982 The rapporteur noted that, ‘In Europe, the number of recorded crimes has been increasing for years, while the clear-up rate has simultaneously been falling. Crime thus appears constantly to be gaining ground, while crime-fighting agencies fight an increasingly hopeless battle against it. […] The public is also disturbed to note not only that crime is increasing, but that there is also a greater readiness to use violence on the street and in public places. […] There are fateful implications for democracies and the rule of law.’983

In the rapporteur’s view, Europol was the only solution. During the debate in plenary on 14 March 1996, he conceded that Europol was not the ‘wonder weapon’ against organised crime, ‘but it is an important instrument which must be used’.984 Despite the difficulties encountered in ratifying the Convention establishing Europol,985 the EPP Group broadly supported the Nassauer report.

If Europol was to be the framework for police cooperation, it was also necessary to provide it with sufficient substance to meet Member States’ expectations in terms of security. When Europol was being set up, a debate was held in the European Parliament on this topic, one to which the EPP Group attached particular importance. Sir Jack Stewart-Clark was responsible for drafting a report on the draft joint action on police cooperation in the EU.986 The rapporteur wished to go further
than the two proposals originally made by Germany at Maastricht and extend such cooperation to the creation of ‘a multi-disciplinary group which comprises heads of police, customs and other law enforcement agencies, for example top civil servants in interior ministries.’ It was also important to ‘beef up’ Europol’s role, and the rapporteur tabled amendments calling for Parliament to be involved in discussions. The EPP Group gave its unconditional support to the report, which, as its spokesman, José Mendes Bota, pointed out quite succinctly, was ‘short, to the point and effective. If only the authorities entrusted with enforcing the law in a spirit of liberty, security and justice could be as swift, direct and effective in fighting both organised and spontaneous crime, which unfortunately are constantly on the increase.’

The European arrest warrant

It was self-evident that police cooperation would need to be backed up by its judicial counterpart. However, although police cooperation was initially implemented in 1999, it was not until the devastating attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 that the Member States of the European Union decided to step up judicial cooperation. The creation of the European arrest warrant was part of that commitment.

On 6 February 2002, the European Parliament delivered its opinion through the consultation procedure on this new instrument that would help attain internal security objectives. During the plenary debate, the EPP-ED Group was broadly in favour of the report drawn up by the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs. Gerardo Galeote, spokesman for the Group, said that he was ‘convinced that with this process, we will not only be responding to a demand expressed very firmly by Europe’s citizens, but we will also be making an invaluable contribution to the cause of freedom. There is no greater risk to the freedom of thought, of expression and to the right to life itself, than violence expressed through terrorism. Every democratic State has an obligation to provide justice with instruments such as those we are discussing today, which will make its work more effective.’

The European arrest warrant was implemented in 2005. One year later, the European Parliament drew up a report on evaluation of the European arrest warrant. During the plenary sitting of 14 March 2006, Demetriou Panayiotis, speaking on behalf of the EPP-ED Group, expressed his support for the report, which he considered to be exceptional. In particular, the Group spokesman said that ‘the European arrest warrant tests the willingness to cooperate and the spirit of mutual respect and mutual trust between the Member States of the European
Union. It constitutes a huge step in the direction of the creation of a single area of justice and security, as well as a strong measure for combating crime. It puts an end to fugitives from justice, an end to the complications of the political process to extradite criminal suspects.”

Panayiotis believed that ‘The presumptuous invocation by certain Member States of national sovereignty, of human rights and of the alleged supremacy of their national law in order to circumvent the institution of the European arrest warrant is dangerous. It goes without saying that each Member State individually and all the Member States in general have a fundamental obligation to comply faithfully with and apply human rights in their judicial proceedings and there is no room for needless doubt.”

Monitoring immigration policy

The Group continued its efforts to define the concept of controlled immigration and devoted special attention to the issue at several of its Study Days. During those held in Helsinki in 1996, Hartmut Nassauer looked at the issues involved: ‘Should Europe, should the European Union, take in immigrants and, if so, under what conditions? [...] Disregarding [the illegal immigration] aspect for a moment, one crucial question remains: do we here in Europe want, over and above political refugees, refugees from civil war, families joining their relatives and immigration on humanitarian grounds, to open the door to immigration in general? Traditional countries of immigration in the narrower sense are, for example, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. These countries lay down conditions for immigration and set quotas. If you look carefully at each of these conditions, you will see that these countries use them to define their own national interests in terms of immigration, and take no account of the interests of individual immigrants. As a general rule preference is given to young people, well-educated people and those with skills or specialist knowledge. To put it rather crudely: Olympic medallists and Nobel prizewinners.”

In Parliament, the Group engaged in the debate. In June 1995, Charlotte Cederschiöld and Kyösti Toivonen were members of a parliamentary delegation which visited the eastern borders of Germany and Austria, where they observed the impressive technical means available to customs services to combat illegal immigration (in particular, infra-red detection). In 1996, the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs issued a report, initiated by the Council, on asylum policy. Speaking on behalf of the EPP Group, Hartmut Nassauer maintained that Europe needed a harmonised asylum policy. In 1999, the
Council adopted a new regulation determining the third countries whose nationals required a visa to enter the European Union. During the plenary debate on the subject, Klaus-Heiner Lehne said that the Group was pleased to see immigration policy move in a direction that made it more effective and more humane.999

It was especially the Tampere European Council held in October 1999 that enabled European immigration policy to take a decisive step forward. The seeds of immigration policy that had been sown in the Treaty of Amsterdam grew into a ‘comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit.’a Following on from Tampere, European Councils were held at regular intervals to discuss the subject of immigration: Laeken in 2001, Seville in 2002, Thessaloniki in 2003 and so on.

The imminent enlargement of the European Union to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe put the issue in a different light, and in order to prepare more effectively for internal discussions, the Group held a hearing attended by a number of experts (lawyers, academics, national experts and European Commission representatives) on immigration on 29 March 2001 in Brussels.1000 During the hearing, the Vice-Chairman of the EPP-ED Group, Francesco Fiori, pointed out in his opening statement that immigration was not a recent phenomenon in Europe and that, throughout history, it had been used to make up for labour shortages. Nevertheless, he also noted that, since the 1970s, the situation had reversed. Conventional and official capacity had gradually been reduced, but had been partially replaced by illegal immigration, which was more difficult to identify and, consequently, more worrying, and by an increase in the number of asylum applications. Meanwhile, the demographic and political situation in countries of origin was such that the phenomenon could not be kept under control. For the last 10 years, each Member State had been making efforts to monitor immigration more closely.

In May 2001, the agenda of the Group’s Study Days in Thessaloniki included asylum and immigration policy and internal security in the future enlarged European Union. Hubert Pirker, the EPP-ED Group coordinator in the Committee on Civil Liberties, identified three major groups of migrants: economic migrants, who made up the largest of the three groups, asylum seekers as defined by the Geneva Convention and war refugees as defined by the Tampere European Council, most of whom were nationals of the Balkans.

---

a Paragraph 11 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council held on 15 and 16 October 1999.
Each of these groups would need to be supported by different policies and legal instruments. As regards asylum seekers, minimum standards were needed for asylum procedures and for the recognition of refugee status. It was unacceptable that asylum seekers had to wait years to find out whether their application had been accepted or rejected. However, it was also necessary to combat fraud by implementing the Eurodac system and the Dublin Convention. As for economic migrants, Pirker focused on how the problem had developed: whereas, during the 1980s, high levels of unemployment had forced Member States to pursue restrictive policies towards immigrants, current demographic trends were instead raising the issue of labour shortages in some economic sectors. Finally, Pirker also emphasised the need to combat illegal immigration. Here he suggested taking preventive measures by launching an information policy in the countries of origin on new immigration policies in the European Union, by promoting economic and social stabilisation policies in the countries of origin and by adopting border measures to combat illegal immigration and fight organised crime in this area.\footnote{1001}

In June 2008, the EU adopted an instrument that had been eagerly awaited by the Group and constituted an essential component of immigration policy. The Directive on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals was adopted under the codecision procedure by the European Parliament and the Council. Manfred Weber was responsible for drafting the report in the Civil Liberties Committee.\footnote{1002} For the first time, Member States agreed to establish a minimum regulatory framework on the treatment of illegal migrants, whereas before, the ‘every man for himself’ mentality had prevailed and many situations had been recorded where respect for human rights was barely being applied. Patrick Gau bert, Vice-Chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, member of the Committee on Civil Liberties and, in France, President of the International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism (LICRA), believed that the advantages of the European directive were undeniable, since it would ‘increase the level of protection [afforded to illegal immigrants living] in those Member States where such protection is at the lowest level’ and would enable Europe to receive immigrants ‘under conditions of dignity’.\footnote{1003}

In July 2008, the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union proposed to its partners a European Pact on Immigration and Asylum. It was one of four priorities identified by the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, and it received strong support from the EPP-ED Group. Its originator, Brice Hortefeux, French Minister for
Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidarity Development, was a member of the Group from 1999 to 2005. A European immigration policy was under way.

**For a safer Europe**

The issue of security was now one of the Group’s priorities. It featured strongly in *The Ten Priorities for the EPP-ED Group*, the Group’s political strategy drawn up under the direction of Jaime Mayor Oreja. The security question was taken up during the Group’s Study Days in Paris in July 2008 which addressed five issues: terrorism, organised crime, European security and defence policy in the light of new threats, security of energy supply and food security. The wide-ranging debate, as evidenced by the diversity of the issues addressed, reflected the concerns expressed by European citizens: energy and environmental issues, the new geopolitical situation, organisation of a common military defence in Europe, etc. It was also the result of the efforts made over many years by the Group towards the establishment, as Joseph Daul put it, of ‘a Europe that protects, without being protectionist’.
‘We are establishing a Union of values’

In November 1992, in Athens, the EPP adopted its Basic Programme in which it spelled out and reinforced the fundamental values which, for half a century, had informed the Christian Democrat political philosophy, namely, the dignity and the primacy of the human being, freedom coupled with responsibility, the fundamental rights of the individual, justice, solidarity between the people and the European Communities, the rejection of totalitarian ideologies, and action at the centre of political life: ‘As a Christian Democratic but non-confessional party, the European People’s Party is essentially a political party of values. If it rejects, forgets, neglects or dilutes its values, the European People’s Party will be no more than an instrument of power, without soul or future, while also forfeiting the universal and original nature of its message, which is based on a global understanding of the irreducible complexity of every human being and of life in society.’

These values have provided the EPP-ED Group, since its establishment, with an unshakeable foundation on which to build its policies. They constitute the enduring legacy of a political philosophy developed during the inter-war period by the founders of Christian social teaching, Jacques Maritain and Don Sturzo, whose ideas were taken up by statesmen such as Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi when, in 1945, it was necessary to rebuild a continent that had been left economically and morally devastated. To the parties which represent the EPP, they are a sign of recognition, and they promote the emergence of a common political approach as referred to in Article 138a of the Treaty on European Union which stipulates that ‘Political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.’

In the document A Union of Values, adopted at the 14th EPP Congress held from 11 to 13 January 2001, the Party set out its vision of the future
of Europe and the world. In this charter, the EPP outlined the main thrust of its political agenda and reiterated its commitment to the undertakings entered into by the Founding Fathers. Four decades of European integration had demonstrated that it was possible to develop a system of values based on an altruistic approach. The charter endorsed by the EPP family in Berlin in 2001 continued to promote this value system and gave it a new slant. In setting out these values in a reference document, the Group sought to be their champion and defender. The EPP’s common set of values, listed in the Athens Basic Programme and consistent with the Christian Democrat philosophy, therefore remains a valuable yardstick for us all.

In Berlin on 24 March 2007, the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties on which today’s European Union is founded, the EPP renewed its intellectual and moral commitment: ‘The EPP regards 50 years of successful European integration as a commitment to the re-invigoration of the European idea in the 21st century. As the leading political force of the new Europe and as heirs to the legacy of the Founding Fathers of the European Union, we are determined to live up to our responsibilities to future generations.’

Fundamental rights

The EPP-ED Group exerted a decisive influence on the drafting of the Charter of Fundamental Rights between December 1999 and December 2000. Under the direction of Ingo Friedrich, Vice-President of the European Parliament, members of the Group participated fully in the drafting of this essential element of political union. Once it had adopted the Charter, Europe was no longer just a market; it became a Community of values: ‘A “made in Europe” value standard is an indispensable foundation for a stable Europe. Incorporating the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the European Constitution would make the Christian image of man an important and binding foundation of our community. The Charter of Fundamental Rights enshrines human dignity and the right to the integrity of the person. And “person” means responsibility for the individual – himself and herself – and at the same time responsibility for the society.’

The final draft, the result of a compromise, was profoundly influenced by the Group, particularly with regard to the wording of the second paragraph of the Preamble. Despite the fact that the Member States had very different constitutional traditions, it had been possible, during debates within the Convention, to reach agreement on the inclusion of an explicit reference to the ‘spiritual and moral heritage’ of the European Union.
The spiritual values of the EPP-ED Group

With regard to Article 3 on the ‘right to the integrity of the person’, the Convention did not concur with the views of the EPP-ED family, which wished to extend the ban on reproductive cloning of human beings to cover cloning for therapeutic purposes. Nevertheless, the integrity of the human person is afforded a high level of protection in so far as the free and informed consent of the person concerned is always required in strict compliance with the law. This protection is further enhanced by the confirmation of the unconditional prohibition of eugenic practices and of any attempt to make the human body a source of financial gain.

Chapter II on freedoms places emphasis on respect for family life and the right to marry, thereby enshrining fundamental freedoms that the EPP-ED Group played a decisive part in formulating, such as in Article 11(2) on respect for the freedom and pluralism of the media, Article 13 on academic freedom and Article 14(3) on freedom of education, freedom to found educational establishments and the right of parents to decide on their children’s education.

Article 15 on the freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work and Article 16 recognising the freedom to conduct a business appear in the Charter. The final wording of Article 17 on the right to property was amended in accordance with the Group’s wishes to include the expression ‘subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss’ in order to qualify the right of public authorities to expropriate a person’s private property in the public interest.

Article 10(2), which recognises the right to conscientious objection, was introduced at the insistence of the European Parliament delegation. In order to align the terms of the Charter with current legislation, the right to the protection of personal data was included as one of the inviolable personal freedoms.

Chapter III on equality refers to the prohibition of any discrimination against minorities in addition to the recognition of cultural, religious and linguistic diversity. The women of the EPP were also particularly insistent that equal rights for men and women, the rights of the child and the integration of persons with disabilities should be recognised and enshrined in the Charter.

Chapter IV on social, economic and cultural rights was so important in the eyes of the EPP-ED delegation that it submitted its own contribution to the Praesidium. The wording of the articles on workers’ right to information, on the right to collective bargaining and action and on protection in the event of unjustified dismissal toned down the often radical and unrealistic approach adopted by the left-wing groups.
EPP values in the European Constitution: the debate on the inclusion of a reference to Europe’s ‘Judaeo-Christian heritage’

At the EPP Summit in Meise on 15 October 2003, the Party’s leaders proposed the inclusion of a reference to Europe’s Christian roots in the European Constitution: ‘We think it is necessary to make a reference to our “Judaeo-Christian heritage”’, explained the EPP President, Wilfried Martens. The Group had already unanimously adopted this formula a month earlier, at the proposal of Hans-Gert Pöttering, during the Group’s Study Days in Madrid.

Indeed, some members of the Group had advocated the inclusion of a reference to God in the European Constitution, together with an explicit reference to our Judaeo-Christian heritage because of its decisive role in shaping European history. Not all members of the Convention backed this proposal.

The European Parliament ultimately rejected the amendment tabled by the Group. In response, Hans-Gert Pöttering said: ‘I would not wish to deny that many of us would have welcomed a reference to God in the Constitution, because it affirms that our human capacities are not infinite. We would also have been glad to see reference made to our Judaeo-Christian heritage, for, at a time when dialogue with the world’s cultures is so necessary – particularly with the Islamic world – I believe that it is important that we know where our own roots are, and that our cultural and religious development should be mentioned in the Constitution. Even though that is not in the Constitution, every Constitution is of course a compromise, and so we say ‘yes’ to this Constitution, because it reflects our values.’

The Constitution does, however, make an indirect reference to our Judaeo-Christian inheritance in its Preamble, which explicitly refers to Europe’s religious heritage. By incorporating the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the Constitutional Treaty, the Christian concept of humanity is established as a key part of the Constitution. Furthermore, Article 51 of the draft Constitutional Treaty specifically recognises the status of churches and religious communities which share a common faith. The inclusion of a solidarity clause in the Constitution also reflects the principles of Christian social teaching.

Following the adoption of the European Constitution by the 25 Heads of State or Government on 18 June 2004, the Chairman of the EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament said: ‘For the Christian Democrats, it is also disappointing that a reference to Europe’s Judaeo-Christian heritage was not included in the Preamble. However, whilst we may criticise certain points, the adoption of the Constitution is a great success.’
The EPP Group: an ecumenical community

Since its establishment, the Group has sought to demonstrate its respect for religious diversity by welcoming members of different faiths and even those of non-faith. ‘In our Group, Catholics, Protestants, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Methodists, Orthodox, Muslims and Jews are united. The Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats is truly ecumenical.”

At a time when many are predicting a ‘clash of civilisations’ and there is a temptation for communities to close ranks, the affirmation of these principles takes on a political dimension. During his time as EPP Chairman, Hans-Gert Pöttering repeatedly said that: ‘We respect Christian values as a fundamental component of our Western culture. At the same time, in our activities we place emphasis on dialogue with other religions and cultures. In that way the EPP-ED Group […] contributes to a spirit of understanding, both within Europe and with our neighbours south of the Mediterranean and in the Arab world. The aim is to enhance mutual understanding and find common approaches to resolving problems.”

The Presidency of the EPP Group holds regular meetings with representatives of the Catholic Church in order to discuss the future of Europe. Such meetings took place even in the time of Paul VI, but they became more frequent during the pontificate of John Paul II and, more recently, that of Benedict XVI. During the various pontificates, the Group has sought guidance from the Church and conducted its relations on the basis of understanding and deep respect. This regular dialogue takes the form of meetings when the Group is presented to the Pope, at the beginning of a new parliamentary term, or when the Pope visits the European Parliament.

Pope John Paul II repeatedly pledged his support for the European integration process. As long ago as 11 October 1988, the Holy Father delivered a speech to the European Parliament in which he reiterated that, ‘Since the end of World War II, the Holy See has not ceased to encourage the construction of Europe. Indeed, the Church has for mission to make known to all men their salvation in Jesus Christ, whatever be the conditions of their present story, for there is never any preliminary to this task. Therefore, without going beyond the competence that is hers, she considers it her duty to enlighten and to accompany the initiatives developed by the peoples and which are in conformity with the values and the principles which it is her duty to proclaim, attentive to the signs of the times which require that it express in the changing realities of existence the permanent demands of the Gospel. How could the Church be indifferent to the construction of Europe, she who has been implanted for
centuries in the peoples who compose her and whom she brought to the baptismal fonts, peoples for whom the Christian faith is and remains one of the elements of their cultural identity?"

On 6 March 1997, the Group was invited to attend a formal meeting at the Vatican to mark the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Rome Treaties. At the meeting, the EPP Group Chairman, Wilfried Martens, said that the European People’s Party had never abandoned its spiritual roots: ‘As a movement based on Faith, Christian Democracy is dependent on the commitment of its Christian members [...]’. He emphasised that ‘The size of our Group will depend on our ability to transform the European Union into a Europe which is democratic and transparent, and which has a social and human dimension.’ In response, John Paul II told the Christian Democrats: ‘One often hears talk of the need to build Europe on the essential values. This requires that Christians involved in public affairs should always be faithful to Christ’s message and take care to have an upright moral life, thereby testifying that they are guided by love for the Lord and for their neighbour. Thus Christians who participate in political life cannot refrain from paying special attention to the very poor, to the most destitute and to all the defenceless. They also want just conditions to be created so that families are assisted with their indispensable role in society. They recognise the incomparable value of life and the right of every being to be born and to live in dignity until his natural death.’ He went on to speak about the role of the Group itself: ‘In the years to come, your task will be important, particularly if all the countries that so wish it are to acquire the necessary conditions for their participation in this great Europe with everyone’s support. With your discussions and your decisions, you belong among the future builders of European society. By restoring hope to those who have lost it, by encouraging the social integration of those who live on the continent and those who come to settle on it, you are responding to your vocation as Christian politicians.’

Each meeting provided the Group with an opportunity to reaffirm its respect and high regard for the strength and courage that Pope John Paul II had inspired in the peoples of Eastern Europe. As a tribute to the role that the Pope had played in uniting the continent, Hans-Gert Pöttering presented the Holy Father with the Robert Schuman Medal on 30 November 2004. After receiving the Medal, the Pope sent Pöttering an apostolic letter in which he emphasised the need to uphold basic values such as respect for life. He also thanked the Group and its Chairman for their attempts to ensure that a reference to Christian values was included in the European Constitution. ‘Only a Europe with a strong
The spiritual values of the EPP-ED Group

religious, moral and cultural identity can open itself to others in a constructive and peaceful way."

During the long pontificate of John Paul II, the Pope emerged as one of the highest moral authorities of our time. Consequently, when he passed away in April 2005, it was as though the entire European family had been left orphaned.

Hans-Gert Pöttering said that John Paul II had been ‘a great Pole, a great European and a great Pope’. He paid tribute to him as a ‘giant in the history of mankind’. It was thanks to his efforts that it had been possible to unite Europe in peace and freedom, and the fact that there were now MEPs from the eight new countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the European Parliament was largely his doing.

Pöttering and several members of the Group Presidency attended the funeral ceremony held in Rome on Friday, 8 April 2005.

The Group paid a further tribute to the Holy Father at its Bureau meeting in Gdansk on 1 and 2 September 2005. The date of the meeting was particularly symbolic because the Group was also there to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Solidarity trade union. The Group Chairman made particular reference to the role played by Pope John Paul II in the development of Solidarity and the restoration of freedom in Poland. The Pope’s address to the Polish people – ‘Do not be afraid! Change the face of the world!’ – had set them on the path to freedom.

When Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger was elected as the successor to John Paul II on 19 April 2005, he took the name Benedict XVI. The EPP-ED Group Chairman took part in a celebratory mass held in St Peter’s Square in Rome to mark the start of the new Pope’s pontificate. In a congratulatory letter to the new Pope, Hans-Gert Pöttering referred to the significance of the name that he had chosen for himself: ‘You have chosen the name of St Benedict, the patron saint of Europe. This is an especial pleasure for us in the Christian Democrat Group. We see in this name support for the unification of our continent, something of great importance at a time when the European Constitution is being ratified.’

During its Study Days on Europe that it held in Rome, the EPP-ED Group was granted an audience with the Pope on 30 March 2006. The Pope began his address by referring to the particular attention that the Pontiffs had always devoted to Europe. Benedict XVI was all too aware that that day’s audience ‘takes its place in the long series of meetings between my predecessors and political movements of Christian inspiration.’ The Pope’s ministry might be spiritual, but he is still concerned about the world. His view of Europe is that of an informed observer.

Accordingly, if Europe is to attain the goals it has set itself, ‘it will be important to draw inspiration, with creative fidelity, from the Christian heritage which has made such a particular contribution to forging the identity of this continent. By valuing its Christian roots, Europe will be able to give a secure direction to the choices of its citizens and peoples, it will strengthen their awareness of belonging to a common civilisation and it will nourish the commitment of all to address the challenges of the present for the sake of a better future.’ The Pope went on: ‘I therefore appreciate your Group’s recognition of Europe’s Christian heritage, which offers valuable ethical guidelines in the search for a social model that responds adequately to the demands of an already globalised economy and to demographic changes, assuring growth and employment, protection of the family, equal opportunities for education of the young and solicitude for the poor. Your support for the Christian heritage, moreover, can contribute significantly to the defeat of a culture that is now fairly widespread in Europe, which relegates to the private and subjective sphere the manifestation of one’s own religious convictions.’

**Dialogue with the Orthodox Church**

In 1996, principally at the behest of the Greek Delegation in the Group, the Group established a regular Dialogue with representatives of the Orthodox Church. The first meeting was held at the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul on 27 and 28 April 1996 at the invitation of Bartholomew I. A Dialogue has been held annually ever since. This process has provided an opportunity to bring the peoples of the Balkans closer together, to strengthen civil society in South-Eastern Europe and to forge links between the various churches and political bodies so that they might work more closely together.

The accession of Bulgaria and Romania, two countries which are predominantly Orthodox, widened the scope of this mutual interest. The 11 Dialogues held from 1996 to 2008 between the Orthodox Church and the EPP-ED Group had two main priorities: human rights and cooperation with local churches participating in the reconstruction of post-Communist societies. As the Group Chairman, Joseph Daul, pointed out in 2007, ‘If we expect human dignity, civil societies also need their faith communities. The right to believe is a personal human right which must be respected. Our annual dialogue must be an instrument for progressing this work. It also must demonstrate to the peoples of Europe, to the faithful of our various churches, the nature of religion and politics in action.’

This Dialogue helps to bridge both the social and cultural divide between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe: ‘When we in
Germany speak of Christianity, we think first of Catholicism and Protestantism. But a glance around our European neighbours soon shows us that Christianity in Europe has many other faces. The eastward enlargement of the Union will make this particularly apparent [...]. The significance of Eastern Orthodoxy has not in the past been widely understood by us in Western and Central Europe. That is a defect that our Group has for some years been trying to remedy.\[1016]

The aim is to narrow the psychological gap that dates back to the Great Schism of 1054, the political and cultural consequences of which are still being felt today, for the social divide between East and West could hamper the process of integration of some Eastern European countries.

The Group and the representatives of Orthodoxy pursue a number of objectives. In an address given at the Fourth Dialogue held on 8 and 9 June 2000 in Istanbul, Hans-Gert Pöttering set out these objectives as follows: ‘The first objective is to put an end to a thousand years of separate paths of development pursued by Christians in Europe, just as the Christian Democrats, after the Second World War, put an end to the fratricidal wars that tore Europe apart. The second objective of this dialogue is to encourage the Churches in the countries which have applied for accession to the European Union, such as Bulgaria and Romania, and possibly Serbia, to implement measures aimed at strengthening civil society, promoting human rights and democracy and improving the quality of life of their peoples.’

The holding of this meeting in Istanbul, the capital of the Byzantine Empire which lies at the crossroads of many civilisations and provides a bridge between Christianity and Islam, afforded an opportunity to open a dialogue with the other great monotheistic religion, Islam. Wim van Velzen, Vice-Chairman of the Group, presented the conclusions of this two-day meeting, emphasising that a dialogue between European Christian Democracy and Islam was necessary and that this dialogue with Islam required the MEPs taking part to have good prior knowledge of their own faith.

As a result, the Dialogue has been gradually expanded to include representatives of the Jewish and Muslim faiths. In 2002, representatives of the Holy See and the Reformed (Calvinist) and Lutheran Churches took part in the Fifth Dialogue. In 2003, the agenda focused on the European Constitution and the role of the Churches in preparing the clergy and the people for the 2004 European elections. On 20 and 21 October 2005, the Ninth Dialogue of the EPP-ED Group and the Orthodox Church was held, again in Istanbul, to discuss the spiritual foundations of an enlarged Europe. In the meeting’s Final
Declaration, participants particularly welcomed the EPP-ED Group’s decision to establish a Working Group on Dialogue with Islam. Participants from the three great monotheistic religions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam, emphasised the importance of freedom of religion and, in particular, the right for people to express their faith freely, to educate their children in their own faith and for faith communities to own property.

The 10th Dialogue, which was held on 9 and 10 November 2006 in Bratislava, focused on the European prospects of the Western Balkan countries under the ‘Thessaloniki Process’ adopted by the European Council in 2003. The meeting was chaired by Alojz Peterle, the former Slovenian Prime Minister and EPP-ED Group Coordinator for Dialogue with the Orthodox Church, and the opening address was given by the Archbishop of Slovakia.

The participants concluded that the Thessaloniki Process had resulted in welcome steps in consolidating peace and in promoting the status of Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as candidates for membership of the European Union, and had offered a European perspective for the peoples of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia (Kosovo). They called for the European Commission to support a restoration programme for historic religious buildings of importance for Europe’s cultural heritage, buildings which had been damaged during recent conflicts.

The 11th Dialogue was held in Romania in October 2008 on the subject of ‘Intercultural dialogue based on common values as a tool for peace and prosperity in Europe’. In 2008, the Group initiated two Regional Dialogues. The first was held in March in Tbilisi, Georgia. It was co-chaired by Marian-Jean Marinescu and His Eminence Metropolitan Emmanuel, Archbishop of France. The resolution on ‘Cooperation on the Culture of Peace’ adopted at the end of the meeting called for open dialogue with churches and religious communities to become an integral part of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Second Regional Dialogue was held in July in Kiev, Ukraine. Joseph Daul, Marian-Jean Marinescu and His Eminence Emmanuel Metropolitan of France led the proceedings, which focused on dialogue with Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Romania and Poland. This Regional Dialogue was attended by political and religious representatives of the EU and the countries concerned, who discussed the ‘Role of the Churches in the Region of Eastern Europe'.
Establishing contacts with the Muslim world

At the same time, the Group held meetings with representatives of the Muslim world. The idea was similar to that of the dialogue with prominent members of the other major religions: to hear the views of the various religious communities in Europe. The dialogue with Muslims, which had begun before the 11 September terrorist attacks, was particularly relevant given the tendency afterwards to associate all Muslims with them.

On 6 March 2002, Tokia Saïfi arranged a meeting between the members of the EPP-ED Group and Ambassadors to the EU from Arab and Muslim countries. This meeting, which was held in the European Parliament, served as a kind of testing ground. Entitled ‘After the attacks of 11 September 2001, what kind of Euro-Arab dialogue should there be?’, it was to be the first in a long series of meetings at the highest level. Under the co-chairmanship of Hans-Gert Pöttering and Nassir Alassaf, Dean of the Arab Diplomatic Corps and Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, MEPs and Ambassadors discussed Euro-Arab cooperation, the fight against international terrorism and the situation in the Middle East. During the meeting, Tokia Saïfi said that ‘Europe and the Arab-Muslim countries have addressed the full implications of the tragedy of 11 September. Europe’s political commitment to establishing closer relations and a partnership with the Mediterranean world must be translated, at the earliest opportunity, into tangible measures.’

Hans-Gert Pöttering called on the meeting to adopt three objectives: to work together to combat terrorism, to work together for peace in the Middle East, and to seek to establish a structured spiritual dialogue between the monotheistic religions, which all trace their origins back to the same patriarch, Abraham. ‘Europe has a special responsibility to strengthen this dialogue and consolidate our partnership, particularly through the Barcelona Process,’ Pöttering concluded.

Tokia Saïfi received strong support from the EPP-ED Group Chairman, Hans-Gert Pöttering, when she put forward a further proposal to the Islamic World Conference. As a result, on 23 April 2002 a delegation of 22 eminent figures from the Muslim world attended a meeting with EPP-ED Group members at the European Parliament. Among the members of the delegation were Dr Abdullah Al-Turki, Secretary-General of the World Islamic League, and Dr Mustafa Ceric, Grand Mufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On 19 February 2003 Hans-Gert Pöttering and Edward McMillan-Scott, the member of the Group responsible for relations with the Arab world, held discussions in Brussels with the Ambassadors of six
Arab countries and the representative of the Arab League. With the United States launching a second war in Iraq, it was even more important for Europe to strengthen the ties established by its dialogue with the Arab world.

However, it was not always the Group which took the initiative to convene such meetings. In November 2005, members of both houses of the National Assembly of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Shura (Consultative) Council and the Council of Representatives, requested a meeting with members of the EPP-ED Group, who were led by Othmar Karas, one of the Group’s Vice-Chairmen. The discussions covered issues such as civil society, value-based politics, the Islamic faith, Christian values and the political and economic situation in the Gulf Region.

At the end of the meeting, the delegation from the Kingdom of Bahrain and the EPP-ED Group members drew up a Joint Declaration in which they recognised that the peoples of Europe and the Islamic world were near neighbours and that they had an opportunity to cooperate for human progress. They also emphasised the need for Muslims and Christians to exercise tolerance and mutual respect. They were determined to continue the fight against terrorism and to pursue respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and they hoped that their dialogue would be a stimulus to mutual understanding among Arab and European peoples.

Meetings with the Dalai Lama

While the three religions descended from Abraham are at the forefront in Europe, the Group is also well aware of the importance of another of the world’s major spiritual traditions, Buddhism, one of the greatest representatives of which, the Dalai Lama, has received unfailing support from the Group because of his fight for not only moral, but also political, values. The Tibetan Buddhist leader has visited the EPP Group several times. In October 1996, Wilfried Martens welcomed the Dalai Lama on behalf of the Group, whilst, in 2001, it was the turn of Hans-Gert Pöttering: ‘It is important for politics and for politicians, concerned as they are with everyday problems and events, to consider the larger questions in discussions with world spiritual leaders. The Dalai Lama is one of the most outstanding and undisputed religious personalities of the world and it is a great event to receive him and listen to his wisdom in the European Parliament.’

In response to an invitation from Hans-Gert Pöttering, the Dalai Lama returned to Brussels to address the House at a formal sitting held
on 4 December 2008. As always, he received a warm welcome, despite the tensions that his visit had caused with China.

This visit was the culmination of four months of preparatory work by the European Parliament’s Tibet Intergroup, which is chaired by Thomas Mann and has around 40 MEPs as members.

**A Group core value: tolerance**

The Group’s keyword is tolerance. The principle of tolerance, which became particularly important in the 1980s with the rise of racism in Europe, is one of the core values underpinning the philosophy of the EPP-ED Group.

In 1996, the Bureau chose Malta as the location for the Group to address this issue. On 14 June 1996, the Group adopted the Malta Declaration on Tolerance. The concept of tolerance was defined as follows:

> Intolerance is the refusal to accept other people on their own terms. It is the pretext for a return to the fundamentalist values that spring from the same collective fears and thrive in the same conditions, namely societies unable to maintain the social bonds of solidarity between strong and weak, rich and poor. People look for a meaning in their lives. They seek security by affirming their own identity, which, too often, means rejecting that of other people. The declining vigour of representative institutions, the changing face of society, and the weakening of religious belief are making individuals vulnerable to the attractions of populism and fundamentalism.'

It was not for nothing that Malta was chosen as the place where the Declaration was to be proclaimed. Carlos Robles Piquer, Vice-Chairman of the Group and driving force behind the adoption of this Declaration, had chosen the Mediterranean island precisely because it has the distinctive feature of being a place where the three monotheistic cultures coexist in harmony.

The Group opted to look at the historical, philosophical and political aspects of tolerance, and invited Andrea Riccardi, Professor at Rome’s La Sapienza University and founder of the Community of Sant’Egidio in Rome, and Abdeljelil Temimi, Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Tunis, to discuss the relationship between Christianity and Islam.

In its Declaration, ‘The Group of the European People’s Party of the European Parliament, whose cultural and political vision is founded on each human being’s dignity and value, and then the respect for the other in its difference as well as in its complementarity, declares its strong commitment to the values of tolerance and mutual understanding as essential prerequisites for world peace and the advance of civilisation.’
A similar initiative was taken after Margie Sudre, Chairman of the Group's French Delegation, invited the Presidency and the Heads of National Delegations, led by the Group Chairman, Hans-Gert Pöttering, to undertake a fact-finding visit to Réunion Island from 27 to 30 October 2003. The EPP-ED Group Delegation held a meeting with the Inter-Religious Dialogue Group of Réunion, which pointed out the exemplary value of working together to promote tolerance and understanding among its members: the Jewish, Buddhist, Bahá’í, Muslim, Orthodox Catholic, Roman Catholic, Hindu, Lutheran Protestant, Malagasy Protestant and Tamil Catholic religions have been represented in this Dialogue since 1998. The main objective of the Inter-Religious Dialogue is to uphold the principles of peace and ‘laïcité’ – the French version of secularism which insists on the strict separation of church and state or, more generally, of politics and religion – which seek to move from a position of religious ‘co-existence’ to religious ‘pro-existence’. A particular achievement of the Dialogue has been the drafting of a manifesto which emphasises the right to be different; this involves, inter alia, gaining a better understanding of each other, so that we can say that ‘our differences unite us’ rather than ‘our differences frighten and divide us’. On 27 and 28 October 2008, again at the suggestion of Margie Sudre, the Group returned to Réunion, this time under the chairmanship of Joseph Daul. During the visit, emphasis was again placed on the exemplary nature of the inter-religious dialogue taking place on the island.

‘Tolerance is important; but it is a two-way process’

The Group is well aware that, where religion is concerned, tolerance should be applied to all religions, as can be seen from this anecdote by the EPP Group Chairman, Hans-Gert Pöttering, during a speech in Strasbourg on 15 February 2006: ‘I have visited 16 Arab and Islamic countries since 1989. On a visit to Riyadh, the Saudi Arabian capital, the Chairman of the Shura Council, a pleasant, educated senior Muslim cleric, asked me how Muslims were treated in Germany and Europe. I replied that they were able to pray in their mosques and had full religious rights, although Muslims in Europe were not always sufficiently integrated into society. I countered by asking whether it was the case that if a Muslim wanted to become a Christian, this would be punishable by death according to the law. I did not receive an answer, which amounted to a confirmation. The German Ambassador accompanying me later remarked that nobody had so far dared to ask such a question. I did not regard my question as particularly brave, but I am of the firm conviction that the necessary dialogue with Islam will be a success only if it is based on truth and mutual tolerance.’
In another speech, he concluded that ‘Tolerance is important; but it is a two-way process. Tolerance, reconciliation and understanding must be based on the truth, and that is what we advocate.’1022

The Group has attempted to demonstrate that tolerance is a concept that has its limits. Tolerance is not an end in itself, it relies on prior knowledge of one’s own identity: ‘At the core of our Western values stands human dignity. On this basis we must engage in the most important intellectual challenge of our time: the dialogue of cultures and civilisations. It will only succeed if we are honest with ourselves, open with each other without hiding behind taboos of all sorts and if we are united in the willingness to work together for the common human good.’1023

Hans-Gert Pöttering believed that tolerance was possible, in so far as people had their own religious beliefs and, armed with that certainty, they could also open up to and respect other faiths.1024

The EPP Group’s iconic figure – Robert Schuman

Every institution draws strength from emphasising its origins, its culture and its beliefs. Since the establishment of the EPP Group in the European Parliament, the Christian Democrats have regarded Robert Schuman as the person who most faithfully embodied their ideals. Schuman, who was a founding member of the Group and President of the European Parliamentary Assembly, also became the Group’s iconic figure when, on a proposal from Egon Klepsch, the Presidency decided in July 1986, the date of the commemoration of the centenary of Robert Schuman’s birth, to institute the ‘Robert Schuman Medal’ in order to ‘pay tribute to public figures who have advanced the cause of peace, the construction of Europe and human values through their public activities and personal commitment.’ From 1986 to 2007, the Medal was awarded to 114 eminent figures, including 9 posthumously. The highest number of medals were awarded under the chairmanships of Egon Klepsch, Wilfried Martens and Hans-Gert Pöttering: 32, 35 and 31 respectively. Under the chairmanship of Leo Tindemans, five eminent figures were honoured, including Egon Klepsch himself and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and, under the chairmanship of Joseph Daul, two leading political figures received the Medal: Angela Merkel, the German Federal Chancellor, and Guido de Marco, the former President of Malta. Most recipients represent the ‘sure values’ of Christian Democracy: former Group Chairmen, Presidents of the European Parliament, Members of the Commission, Heads of Government and EPP Group members. a Some,

a See Annex 4.
such as John Paul II, Jacques Delors and Yelena Bonner-Sakharov, were honoured to mark the great esteem in which the Group held them.

On 12 October 1993, Horst Langes, President of the ‘Foundation for Cooperation between Christian Democrats in Europe’, called for the Foundation to be renamed the ‘Robert Schuman Foundation’. The Foundation, established by the EPP Group in July 1989, is managed by a Governing Board whose members are appointed by the Group. Its objectives, as set out in Article 2 of its Statutes, are to promote the values and ideals of Christian Democracy and European unification by providing financial support for training programmes, publications and democratic activities. In addition, Budapest is home to the Robert Schuman Institute for Developing Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, and the EPP Group’s meeting room in Strasbourg bears the name ‘Robert Schuman Forum’.

The Group naturally celebrates landmark anniversaries of the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950.

The Group is keeping up a certain tradition with this unquestionably ‘iconic’ figure, a who stands for reconciliation, the authentic values of Christian Democracy and the birth of Europe.

Finally, it should be noted that the Group’s tradition of commemorating significant anniversaries also applies to its own history, for, on 1 July 2003, Hans-Gert Pöttering pulled out all the stops in marking the 50th anniversary of the Christian Democrat Group by organising a ceremony in Strasbourg attended by, among others, Mikuláš Dzurinda, Prime Minister of Slovakia, Loyola de Palacio Vallezersundi, Vice-President of the European Commission, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, French Prime Minister, Helmut Kohl and Wilfried Martens. A commemorative book was published for the occasion, and three university students were awarded a Robert Schuman Scholarship.

---

a On 8 August 1988, the EPP Group also adopted a ‘heart of Europe’ logo which appears on all of its material.
Engaging with the people of Europe

The Group has always taken an open and proactive view of its role as a political player on the European stage. Its principal concern has been to discharge the traditional parliamentary duties associated with its legislative, budgetary and supervisory powers – discussions in committee, debates and votes in plenary sittings – but the Group has also developed other activities which have enabled it to extend its political influence.

It considered that it was essential to seek the views of local councillors and citizens, of leading figures in political, institutional, business and trade union circles and in the worlds of culture and research, and of the spiritual authorities, and at the same time to explain more clearly the issues involved in European integration, the role of the European Parliament, the Group’s objectives and the results it has achieved.

This projection of its image beyond the places where the work of the institution was usually conducted, this multiplicity of contacts, encouraged the establishment of networks and contributed to the Group’s growing strength in Europe, decade by decade.

Study Days and Bureau meetings in other places

As early as 1957, the EPP Group chose to hold some of its meetings – Study Days and Bureau meetings – in places other than in Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg, where it usually works. Members also travelled with interparliamentary delegations to various regions in Europe and other parts of the world.

Study Days, which may be attended by up to 500 people, allow members to work for two-and-a-half days in a more relaxed and convivial atmosphere than the somewhat formal setting of the European Parliament.

The Study Days define the Group’s political line on essential aspects of current political and Community developments.
Bureau meetings and Presidency and Heads of National Delegation meetings are smaller, being attended by 100 to 130 people, including officials and interpreters.a

More than 100 meetings in 32 different countries

Between Rome in November 1957 and Kiev in July 2008, the EPP Group held Bureau meetings or Study Days or attended dialogues with religious leaders or interparliamentary forums in places other than the European Parliament on no fewer than 209 occasions in 32 different countries. Before the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament, these meetings in other places were regular but not very frequent events. Four years elapsed between the first and the second. After 1961, the Group generally organised between one and three a year, mainly Study Days, until 1975. The national capitals were favourite destinations for a time: Rome, Paris, The Hague, Luxembourg, Bonn,b reflecting the Europe of the founding countries. After 1976, the increasing incidence of meetings in other cities foreshadowed the democratic direction the institution was to take and the efforts the Group was to make to be as close as possible to its electors.

Study Days have been organised or Bureau meetings held in almost all the national capitals of the 27 Member States, in major regional capitals such as Nice (France) in 1968, Namur (Belgium) in 1973, Florence (Italy) in 1973 and 1982, Aachen (Germany) in 1981, Munich (Germany) in 1983, Toulouse (France) in 1985 and 1997, Granada (Spain) in 1992 and Edinburgh (United Kingdom) in 2002, but also in smaller towns such as Bressanone (Italy) in 1976, La Grande-Motte (France) in 1980, Marbella (Spain) in 1989 and Cannes-Mandelieu (France) in 1995, as well as in isolated areas such as Sardinia with Cala Gonone (Italy) in 1975, Funchal in Madeira (Portugal) in 1989, Saariselkä in Lapland (Finland) in 2002 and the Azores (Portugal) in 2007. Altogether, more than 70 places hosted EPP-ED Group events between 1962 and 2007.

a Following requests by members of the Group, a half day is set aside during meetings for exploring the host town and for visits to places of cultural interest, such as the visits to the Hungarian Parliament and the crown jewels of the first king of Hungary, St. Stephen, in Budapest in 2001, to the Pilat Regional Nature Park and the Museum of Art and Industry at St. Etienne (France) in 2003, and to the Palace of the Romanian Parliament and the National Museum of Art in Bucharest (Romania) in 2005. These visits afforded an opportunity to share some moving and vivid moments: the dramatic swinging of the great censer in the cathedral at Santiago de Compostela (Spain), finding Buddhists, Muslims and Christians living in harmony in Réunion (France), and meeting ‘Father Christmas’, not by chance, among the Laplanders in Finland!

b Brussels does not figure on the list, probably because the Belgian capital had rapidly become one of the places where the European Parliamentary Assembly met. However, the Group organised Study Days and held Bureau meetings in the period 1957-1975 at Ostend (1965), Liège (1970) and Namur (1973).
Exploring political, regional and national realities in Europe

These varied destinations provide an insight into the realities of life in the different Member States and enable members to appreciate the full measure of their diversity. The Study Days also present an opportunity to address the particular problems of the region, city or country where they are held. Thus, the Study Days at Cala Gonone (Italy) in 1975 concentrated on regional policy, at Toulouse (France) in 1985 on the new technologies and Airbus, at Palermo (Italy) in 1988 on relations with the Mediterranean and the developing countries, at Valencia (Spain) in 1993 on the structural funds and the Mediterranean region, and at Schwerin (Germany) in 1993 on the situation in the new Länder. But the main purpose of these meetings is to review each country’s political situation at national and European level, for example the meeting at Porto Carras (Greece) in 1986 on the political situation in Greece, in Estoril (Portugal) in 1994 on the political and socio-economic situation in Portugal, in Bruges (Belgium) in 1995 on Belgium in Europe, in Helsinki (Finland) in 1996 on Finland in the European Union and the Baltic countries, in Stockholm (Sweden) in 1997 on Sweden in the European Union, in Vilamoura (Portugal) in 1998 on the political situation in Portugal, in Vienna (Austria) in 1999 on the political and economic situation in Austria, in Paris (France) in 2000 on the political situation in France and the French Presidency of the Council, and in Rome (Italy) in 2006 on the political situation in Italy.

In Vienna (Austria) in 1999, the Group welcomed Andreas Khol, leader of the Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) Group in the Austrian Chamber of Deputies, and the Vice-Chancellor, Wolfgang Schüssel; the Study Days in Paris in 2000 heard from François Bayrou, leader of the Union for French Democracy (Union pour la démocratie française, UDF), the former President of the Republic, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and several French MPs, originally members of the Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République, RPR), Françoise de Panafieu, Pierre Albertini and Pierre Lequiller; the Study Days in Madrid (Spain) in 2003 included addresses by José María Aznar, the Spanish Prime Minister, and Mariano Rajoy Brey, the leader of the People’s Party (Partido Popular, PP); and lastly the Study Days held in Budapest (Hungary) in 2004 were attended by Pál Schmitt, Vice-Chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), and Ibolya Dávid, Chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF).

The Study Days thus present an opportunity to learn more about the 53 national parties which form part of the EPP-ED Group, to appreciate their rich variety, to provide the political support in their own
countries that is so often needed at election time, and to confirm their commitment to Europe.

The strong local and national establishment of EPP members and elected representatives of the political parties that belong to the EPP Group has also paved the way for visits to towns, regions or countries where the elected leaders are members of the EPP, as in the case of Toulouse (France) in 1985 with the city’s Mayor Dominique Baudis, Lisbon (Portugal) in 1986 with the Portuguese Prime Minister, Aníbal António Cavaco Silva, Konstanz (Germany) in 1987 with Alois Partl, the Governor of Tyrol, Lourdes (France) in 1991 with Philippe Douste-Blazy, Mayor of Lourdes, Bruges (Belgium) in 1995 with the Minister-President of the Government of Flanders, Luc Van den Brande, Helsinki (Finland) in 1996 with Sauli Niinistö, Finnish Minister of Finance and leader of the Coalition Party (Kokoomus), Berlin (Germany) in 1998 with Roman Herzog, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Eberhard Diepgen Mayor of Berlin, Vienna (Austria) in 1999 with Wolfgang Schüssel, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Saint Etienne (France) in 2003 with Françoise Grossetête, Deputy Mayor of the city, Copenhagen (Denmark) in 2003 with Bendt Bendtsen, Deputy Prime Minister of Denmark and leader of the Conservative People’s Party (Det Konservative Folkeparti, KFP), and lastly Bordeaux (France) in 2006 with Hugues Martin, Deputy Mayor of Bordeaux.

During the Study Days in Paris, members of the Group were invited to meet the President-in-Office of the European Council, Nicolas Sarkozy, at the Elysée Palace on 2 July 2008, for open and friendly talks, accompanied by a vigorous appeal for commitment to Europe.\(^a\)

**Supporting friendly political powers in the candidate countries**

Equally significant were the meetings held in states which would go on to join the Union or had just joined it. In 1977, the Group’s Bureau held one of its meetings in Madrid soon after the death of General Franco, when the process of establishing democracy in Spain was in its infancy. In 1978, the Bureau met at Oporto in Portugal. These early examples became, as it were, ‘institutionalised’ in the period preceding Austrian and Swedish accession (the Bureau met in Vienna in 1990 and in Stockholm in 1992). Hans-Gert Pöttering pointed out that, as part of the preparations for the forthcoming enlargement to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, ‘the EPP-ED Group had been keen for its Bureau to meet twice a year in the capital of a candidate country.’\(^{1025}\) In

---

\(^a\) The dinner held by the Group at Versailles on the following day was naturally a high point and it occupies a very special place in the personal memories which members and Secretariat staff have of events in recent years...
The EPP-ED Group broadens its base in civil society and European politics


The Group has made a special effort to welcome political leaders from the candidate countries: Jan Carnogursky, leader of the Christian Democratic Movement in Slovakia, Gediminas Vagnorius, Prime Minister of Lithuania, Ivan Kostov, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, Algirdas Saudargas, Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Radu Vasile, Prime Minister of Romania, Jerzy Buzek, Prime Minister of Poland, Mikuláš Dzurinda, Prime Minister of Slovakia, Victor Orban, Prime Minister of Hungary, Glafkos Ioannou Clerides, President of the Republic of Cyprus, and Ioannis Kasoulides, Cypriot Foreign Minister.

Study Days may also be organised in countries that have recently acceded to the Union, for example at Dublin (Ireland) in 1974, Rhodes (Greece) in 1983, Lisbon (Portugal) in 1986, Helsinki (Finland) in 1996, Stockholm (Sweden) in 1997, and Budapest (Hungary) in 2004. The economic, political and media impact of such meetings, which may be attended by several hundred people, is deeply appreciated by the Group's national delegations.

The Orthodox Dialogue initiated by the Group has also provided opportunities to visit the capitals of countries for which accession is only a distant or a purely hypothetical prospect, for example Istanbul in 1996, 2000, 2003 and 2004, and Tbilisi in Georgia and Kiev in Ukraine in 2008.

Meeting distinguished Europeans from many different walks of life

Holding Study Days and Bureau meetings in other places also provides opportunities to meet men and women of distinction in civil society and in spiritual, economic and social circles, who are of great assistance to the Group in increasing its knowledge and understanding of the realities of European life. Religious leaders: Pope Paul VI, Pope John Paul II on several occasions and Pope Benedict XVI in 2006, Cardinal Pappalardo, Antonio Mattiazzo, Bishop of Padua, Tadeusz Gocłowski, Archbishop of Gdańsk; eminent academic figures: Jerzy Lukaszewski, Rector of the College of Europe in Bruges, Étienne Cerexhe, Dean of the Faculty of Law in Namur, Joachim Starbatty, Professor of Economics at the University of Tübingen, Jean-Louis Quermonne, Chairman of the
working group on the reform of the European institutions set up by the French Commissariat au plan, Carlo Secchi, Rector of Bocconi University; and important political leaders: Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine, Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia, Ivo Sanader, Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia. Lastly, a great many distinguished members of civil society including, among others, Hugo Geiger, Chairman of the German Savings Bank, George Van Reeth, Director General of the European Space Agency, Claude Goumy, Director of the Matra Centre in Toulouse, Albert Scharf, Director General of the Bavarian Broadcasting Corporation and President of the European Broadcasting Union, Leif Johansson, President of Volvo, Jean-François Dehecq, CEO of the Sanofi-Synthélabo Group, shed light on specific issues in the European economy and European society.


Nostradamus: a small planning group
In the autumn of 1995, Wilfried Martens, who had been Chairman of the Group for just over a year at the time, confided to a close colleague: ‘The day-to-day management of the Group involves a lot of hard work and close attention. Meeting after meeting, one spends all one’s time dealing with current European business. There must surely be some way of reaching wider circles, thinking and planning for the future in the broadest possible context?’

Orders were given to sound out a few MEPs who also felt that discussions should be held with distinguished people from a variety of backgrounds, outside the formal framework of the Group, as an investment in the future. Karl von Wogau, Efthimios Christodoulou, José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado, and some heads of delegations expressed an interest. After three preparatory meetings in Brussels, Wilfried Martens launched an informal working group, dubbed Nostradamus, which became a forum for considering the principal challenges facing

---

a Many Commissioners have also come along to explain the European Commission’s position and their own ties with the Christian Democrat and EPP political family, including for instance Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, Karl-Heinz Narjes, Lorenzo Natali, Etienne Davignon, Peter Sutherland, Filippo Maria Pandolfi, Franz Andriessen, Frans Fischler, Viviane Reding, Peter Schmidhuber, Stavros Dimas, Jacques Barrot, Giorgios Contogeorgis, Abel Matutes, Sir Leon Brittan, Marcelino Oreja, Mario Monti, Yves-Thibault de Silguy, Loyola de Palacio Valolelersundli, Christopher Patten, Michel Barnier, Ján Figel’, Franco Frattini, Andris Piebalgs, Joe Borg, Benita Ferrero-Waldner.

b Wilfried Martens in conversation with the author.
European society in the 21st century. Four seminars were organised in Belgium, at which experts expressed their views. At the first, held at Limelette on 28-29 March 1996, Professors Hughes Portelli, Jan Kerkhofs and Alain Stekke addressed the issue of values and political representation. The other three were held at Genval, near Brussels. The seminar on 4 and 5 July 1996, to which Jan Pieter Hendrik Donner, Chairman of the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, and Jérôme Vignon, Director of the European Community Planning Cell, were invited, among others, dealt with the future of European society in the context of globalisation. On 28 and 29 November 1996, the working group discussed the values and future of the welfare state. The last seminar, held on 30 and 31 January 1997, addressed new threats, new forms of terrorism, and police and judicial cooperation in Europe. Guests included Xavier Raufer, Professor at the Paris Institute of Criminology, Jürgen Storbeck, Director of Europol and Gustavo de Arístegui, Principal Private Secretary to the Spanish Minister of the Interior.

Nostradamus initially consisted of selected members of the Group and their guests.

In March 2000, the Group Presidency decided, at the request of Hans-Gert Pöttering, to form a more ambitious group including delegates from the national parties to identify the points on which the centre-right parties agreed and to address the points on which they differed. These meetings too were held by Lake Genval, in the heart of the Brussels countryside, and are known as the Genval meetings.

The first Genval meeting, on ‘the future of People’s Parties in Europe’, was held on 14 and 15 September 2000. It was attended by the Group’s Bureau and by guests, leading politicians and men and women of distinction in civil society such as Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Wolfgang Schäuble and Lord Brittan of Spennithorne.

The second meeting, on the topic of men and women in the new economy, was held on 26 and 27 April 2001. Guests included Alain Madelin, former Minister for Industry and an early advocate of French-style liberalism and European-style benchmarking, Peter Norman, and Chris Gent, CEO of Vodafone, the leading European telecommunications group.

The third meeting, on ‘governance: the implications for Europe’s political aims’, was held on 13 and 14 September 2001 and was attended by Hans-Gert Pöttering, Michel Barnier, Alain Lamassoure, Dirk Hudig, former Secretary General of UNICE, and Jean-Luc Dehaene.
The EIN: the emergence of a centre-right European think tank (2002)

The Genval meetings generated a new form of centre-right think tank which James Elles, the Vice-Chairman of the Group, had the idea of establishing as a network. On 5 February 2002, the project for a European Ideas Network, better known under the English acronym EIN, was presented to the Group Presidency, which approved it and decided to give it financial support. As the founder of the network explained: ‘The EIN is founded on the belief that the ideas process is the life-blood of politics. For the centre-right to succeed where the left has failed, we need to be imaginative and open, responsive and forward looking. The EIN is an essential part of that process.’

The EIN is more ambitious and more structured than Nostradamus, and was designed from its launch in the summer of 2002 to promote new thinking and exchange information on the best way to respond to the major economic, social and international challenges facing Europe. The aim is to develop a community of political leaders at European level, whose experience and expertise would serve to strengthen the Group’s strategic thinking and action. It brings together politicians, businessmen and women, academics, intellectuals, journalists and representatives of civil society close to the centre-right, as well as non-party experts and commentators. The network is also unique in Europe, as James Elles explains: ‘Our political family is the only one to have created a think tank of this kind. We have done it because there is a growing need to exchange ideas, develop new thinking, and benchmark national and European experience.’

The EIN has six aims: to promote new ideas and exchange best practice on how to address the economic, social and international challenges; to broaden the experience of policy-makers in a more global context; to operate on a deliberately Europe-wide basis; to reach out to people who are not traditionally involved in party politics, especially the young; to organise conferences and seminars; and lastly, to strengthen the collective intellectual resources of, and improve the quality of policy-making within centre-right politics in Europe.

Within a year, the EIN had established contacts with some 20 national think tanks, including the ÖVP Politische Akademie, the Fondation pour l’Innovation Politique, the Fondation Robert Schuman, the Institut Montaigne, the Hanns Saidel Stiftung, the Konrad Adenauer

---

a The Nostradamus secretariat was run by Pascal Fontaine from the outset. The EIN secretariat was gradually built up between 2002 and 2008 under the direction of James Elles, in cooperation with Anthony Teasdale, Henri Lepage and Guillermo Martínez Casañ among others.
The EPP-ED Group broadens its base in civil society and European politics

Stiftung, the Walter Eucken Institut, the Fondazione Liberale, Nova Res Publica, FAES, Civitas, the Conservative Research Department, the European Policy Forum and Policy Exchange.

The EIN was to be a ‘virtual centre for exchanging ideas on the web’. It now has its own website and a six-monthly newsletter, started in the summer of 2006. Eight working groups were formed in 2002, which had risen to 12 in 2008 and an advisory group had also been established. Coordination of EIN activities is handled by the working group steering committees at their summer and winter meetings, which are attended by the Chairman of the EPP-ED Group. These policy meetings are followed by a dinner during which a guest of honour gives a speech.

Each working group is guided by a steering committee comprising a Chairman, a rapporteur and four or five other experts. The working groups have a set annual routine: they meet during the first half of the year in Brussels and other European capitals, and present their ideas at the Summer University in September. Their term of office is renewed annually in the autumn.

The Summer Universities, three-day events which have been held in September each year since 2002, are the cornerstone of the EIN. Focusing on one or more themes and inspired by the Summer Universities organised by the national parties, they bring together members of the EPP-ED Group, leading national politicians, experts, members of civil society and research workers and intellectuals associated with the EIN think tanks.

The first Summer University was held at Christ Church College and the Saïd Business School in the famous university town of Oxford in the United Kingdom. It was attended by 150 people and supported by many leading European political figures including Angela Merkel, who was Chairman of the CDU at the time, José María Aznar, the Head of the Spanish Government and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who was Chairman of the Convention on the Future of the European Union.

The host city in 2003 was El Escorial in Spain. The issues addressed at this second and larger Summer University, attended by 250 people, were terrorism and climate change – the subjects of two new working groups.

In 2004, the EIN network broke new ground. The Summer University in Berlin, organised with the active assistance of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, was attended by 300 people. The links with national think tanks were strengthened and the event was divided into two parts for the first time. The first was the Summer University itself, at which the working groups presented their conclusions. Several
eminent European men and women contributed. Angela Merkel, leader of the CDU/CSU Group in the Bundestag, gave a speech on ‘Modernising Germany and enlarging Europe: the key challenges’, José María Aznar, former Prime Minister of Spain, spoke on ‘Fighting terrorism and unifying the West’, Edouard Balladur, former Prime Minister of France, on ‘Realining the Atlantic Alliance’, Kenneth Clarke, former British Home Secretary, on ‘Learning the lessons of Iraq’ and Rockwell Schnabel, United States Ambassador to the European Union, on ‘Strengthening the transatlantic partnership’. The second was the European Ideas Fair. The subject of the fair was ‘The world in 2020’ and a number of eminent political figures and distinguished intellectuals took part in the open discussion: Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister of Sweden, Frederick Kempe, editor of the Wall Street Journal Europe, Alain Madelin, Ana Palacio Vallelersundi, former Spanish Foreign Minister, Francis Fukuyama, author of ‘The end of history’, Bruce Sterling, science fiction writer, and lastly Peter Sloterdijk, the German neo-Kantian philosopher. At the end of the fair, 25 organisations signed a joint statement affirming their determination to work together and to support centre-right policies in Europe.

After Berlin, the network met in 2005 in the Portuguese capital: 300 people from 27 countries assembled at the Centro Cultural de Belém in Lisbon. They represented various categories and included, among others, ‘33 MEPs, 15 national parliamentarians, 64 think tank or policy experts, 34 business leaders, 35 political advisors or activists, 28 academics and 23 journalists’. The discussions were opened by Wilfried Martens and Luis Marques Mendes, leader of the Portuguese Social Democratic Party, and a number of eminent figures were then invited to speak: Chris Patten, former European Commissioner, José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission and former Prime Minister of Portugal, José María Aznar, former Prime Minister of Spain, and Ernest-Antoine Seillière, President of UNICE and former President of MEDEF in France. The European Ideas Fair took the form of two round tables. Professor Anibal Cavaco Silva, former Prime Minister of Portugal, Antonio Borges, former Deputy Governor of the Bank of Portugal, Ashraf Ghani, former Finance Minister of Afghanistan, and Craig Mundie, Senior Vice-President and Chief Technical Officer of Microsoft, participated in the first round table on ‘Economics, society and culture in tomorrow’s world’, chaired by MEP Jacek Saryusz-Wolski. A second round table on ‘European responses to the challenges ahead’ was attended by Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister of Sweden, John Wood, Chairman of the European Strategy Forum on Research
Infrastructures (ESFRI) and Bernard-Henri Lévy, French philosopher and writer. This round table was chaired by János Martonyi, managing partner of Baker and McKenzie and former Foreign Minister of Hungary.

In 2006, the network chose Lyon for its fifth Summer University. Attendance remained constant at 300. The plenary discussions were on globalisation and the ongoing need for the EPP-ED Group to produce an ‘Agenda for revival’ based on economic reform. José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission, Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister of Sweden, Jacques Barrot, Vice-President of the European Commission, and Dominique Perben, French Minister for Transport, participated. Speakers at the round tables during the European Ideas Fair included such outstanding figures as Clayland Boyden Gray, United States Ambassador to the European Union, and Jean-Marie Folz, PSA of Peugeot Citroën.

In September 2007, Warsaw was chosen to host the EIN Summer University on ‘The world in 2025: Facing the challenges of tomorrow’. Members of the network, think tanks and political foundations are divided during the year into twelve working groups on various topics and seven task forces which meet in various places in Europe – Brussels, Paris, London, Berlin, Budapest, The Hague, Bonn and Madrid – and in Washington DC. At Warsaw, eminent figures including José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission, Garry Kasparov, representing the United Civil Front in Russia, Ashraf Ghani, Chancellor of Kabul University and former Finance Minister of Afghanistan, Jeremy Rifkin, author and President of the Foundation on Economic Trends, José María Aznar, a familiar figure at these meetings, and Jerzy Buzek MEP, former Prime Minister of Poland, spoke during the discussions, which covered three topics: the third industrial revolution, Russia, and networking through the internet. Dave Winston, President of the Winston Group, Fred Smith, President of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and Lech Wałęsa, former President of Poland and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, also spoke.

The 2008 Summer University, on ‘The place for values in an uncertain world’, was held at Fiuggi in Italy and was attended by Wilfried Martens, José Manuel Durão Barroso, Hans-Gert Pöttering, and the French Prime Minister, François Fillon. The discussions were naturally concerned mainly with economic problems, in view of the events of the year.

This meeting, the network’s last in the parliamentary term, was chaired by the Vice-Chairman of the EPP-ED Group, Jaime Mayor Oreja. James Elles had resigned on 11 March 2008 on the grounds that...
he no longer had the time he felt he needed to continue his work. The fact is that, despite its prestige and all the new ideas it produced and the contacts in centre-right think tanks in Europe, the EIN had come to be regarded by many members of the Group as a ‘State within a State’ within the Group, an increasingly expensive and Byzantine ‘talking shop’. The Presidency of the Group expressed its intention for the Group’s existing bodies to take over more of the network’s aims and activities, particularly in connection with the Group’s parliamentary work and in the run-up to the European elections in June 2009. In December 2008, the Presidency decided to renew the network’s budget of EUR 370,000 for 2009, and to make Vienna the location of the 2009 Summer University. It will be for the new Presidency to determine the future of the EIN when it takes over in July 2009.

Maintaining the special relationship with the national parliaments

In 1984, at the beginning of the directly elected Parliament’s second term, Giovanni Giavazzi, Vice-Chairman of the Group, was put in charge of relations with Christian Democratic parliamentary groups. This initiative was prompted by three meetings with parliamentary group leaders organised by the EPP Group in Luxembourg in 1982, and in Berlin and Rome in 1983.\(^{1045}\) It was also a response to a criticism raised when MEPs began to be elected: while relations between the European institutions and national parliaments had in a sense been direct and natural before 1979, with the emergence of a separate European Parliament members of national parliaments feared that they would lose influence in the Community. A new form of cooperation between MEPs and members of national parliaments was required. The EPP Group responded by establishing links with its national counterparts. Between November 1984 and April 1985, Giavazzi visited eight of the nine Community countries and met the political parties in the EPP family. It rapidly became apparent that both sides were keen to have closer and more regular contact.\(^{1046}\) In 1989, the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (Conférence des Organes Spécialisés dans les Affaires Communautaires des Parlements de l’Union européenne) – better known as COSAC – was established, with six representatives of each national parliament and representatives of the European Parliament participating in the work. This forum for cooperation was recognised in the 13th and 14th declarations adopted in connection with the Treaty on European Union and it provides a
quasi-institutional framework for relations between the European Parliament and national parliaments.

This did not prevent the EPP Group from continuing to establish its own links with the national parliaments. In 1991, Georgios Saridakis, Vice-Chairman of the EPP Group in charge of relations with national Christian Democratic parliamentary groups, visited all the Community capitals to establish links with national Christian Democratic leaders. The future Maastricht Treaty was being discussed at the time and he presented the EPP Group’s priorities in connection with the two Intergovernmental Conferences on Political Union and Economic and Monetary Union. Georgios Saridakis’s visits to Luxembourg (26 March), Paris (18 April), Madrid (10-11 April), Bonn (25 April), Rome (23 May), The Hague (28 May) and Dublin (29 May) prepared the way for the Interparliamentary Symposium organised by the EPP Group in Luxembourg on 3 and 4 June 1991. These meetings had three aims: first, to promote dialogue, consensus and joint action with parliamentary groups in national parliaments that were close to the EPP; then, to ask the parliamentary groups and parties to bring pressure to bear on their respective governments to ensure that the intergovernmental conferences produced concrete results in terms of the standardisation of the European Union; and lastly, to involve the parliamentary groups in the process of ratifying the results of the intergovernmental conferences.1047

Relations between the Group and the national parliaments were given greater substance. In 2007, the Group Secretariat established a Service for Relations with National Parliaments which manages relations with the EPP-ED parliamentary groups in the national parliaments, joint parliamentary meetings on various topics, relations with COSAC, and relations with the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe and Western European Union, and with the Interparliamentary Union.

Each time the Presidency of the Council changes, the Group organises a Summit with the chairmen of the national EPP-ED parliamentary groups on specific subjects: positions in the light of a forthcoming European Council,1048 or a major European event,1049 or on a particular issue.1050 Topical subjects are not ruled out, such as at the 9th Summit on 13 October 2008 which reflected the financial crisis.1051

The Group is especially conscious of the national parliaments’ role in that the part they play in the functioning of the Union is reinforced under Article 12 of the Lisbon Treaty. As Edward McMillan-Scott observed: ‘Under the new guidelines of the EU Reform Treaty, National Parliaments will be given an enhanced role in Europe’s decision-making
process for the first time. Now, not only will they be directly involved in activities in the area of freedom, security and justice, but also in the revision procedure of Treaties and in notification of any applications made for accession to the EU.

The relationship with the national parliaments is now regarded as essential to increase public confidence. It remains for each of the two organs of democratic representation, the national parliaments and the European Parliament, to exercise their powers with due regard to the powers of the other. The direct election of the European Parliament since 1979 has conferred a special legitimacy on it, a legitimacy that has grown as the process of European integration has advanced. A point of no return has now been reached, where there is no longer any possibility of renationalising control of the European executive organs.
Chapter XLIII

The election of Joseph Daul and the new EPP-ED Group Presidency (9 January 2007)

Hans-Gert Pöttering had decided with the unanimous support of the Group to stand as a candidate for the Presidency of the European Parliament. The EPP-ED Group had struck a deal with the Socialist Group at the beginning of the previous parliamentary term to support the Socialist candidate for the Presidency, the Spaniard Josep Borrell Fontelles, who was duly elected in July 2004. It therefore came as no surprise when, on 16 January 2007, Hans-Gert Pöttering was elected President in the first round with 450 votes, against Monica Frassoni, Francis Wurtz and Jens-Peter Bonde with 145, 48 and 46 votes respectively.

One member sitting on the EPP-ED benches was particularly pleased. Joseph Daul, who now took the seat in the Chamber that his predecessor, now President of the European Parliament, had held for 7½ years, had good reason to rejoice in the success of a well-planned strategy. For him, Hans-Gert Pöttering was a colleague who had become a friend over the years, sharing the same convictions, the same passion for politics and the same ambitions for Europe. The bond between them was based on a common attachment to Franco-German understanding, the goal pursued since 1950 by Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle. Joseph Daul, like his compatriot Pierre Pflimlin, hails from Alsace, a man accustomed to life on the border, with a family history marked by memories of wars and the sufferings they bring in their train. He was born in Strasbourg in April 1947, just two years after the liberation of Alsace. Being of the same generation, with the same interest in reconciliation, the two men have naturally come to feel that they have much in common. Yet there are many differences between them. Hans-Gert Pöttering is an academic, a lawyer, involved in CDU party politics from a very early age. Joseph Daul comes from a farming
family and he took over the 7-hectare farm, specialising in cattle-rearing and sugar beet, when he was only 20. Hans-Gert Pöttering has been a member of parliament for almost 30 years and European politics is his life. Joseph Daul did not seek national or European office until 1999, when he was elected to the European Parliament. However, after completing his agricultural studies, he was active in the trade union movement while at the same time continuing to serve as mayor of Pfettisheim, a small town with 1,000 inhabitants, 12 km from Strasbourg. Hans-Gert Pöttering could be regarded as a ‘theorist’ and Joseph Daul as a ‘practical man’. But any such classification would overlook the essential feature they have in common: they are both politicians, fascinated by the opportunities for action that public life and the exercise of power present.

Joseph Daul had risen through the ranks to the very top of the French agricultural union movement, one of the most powerful European lobbies, representing a considerable number of rural holdings and dealing with matters of major economic interest to France and to Europe. As Chairman of the National Federation of Beef Producers (Fédération nationale des producteurs de viande bovine) in France during the ‘mad cow’ crisis in 1997, he was able to put the experience acquired in cooperatives and farmers’ associations and through professional channels to good use, working with the national and European authorities to bring the crisis to an end.

These exceptional assets led Nicolas Sarkozy to invite Daul to join the RPR list of candidates for the European elections in June 1999. Members on Sarkozy’s list joined the EPP-ED Group in accordance with an undertaking given by Jacques Chirac and Alain Juppé. For Joseph Daul this chimed with all his ideas about Europe. A fluent German speaker, he very quickly established links with the members of the German Delegation. He was a valued member of the Committee on Agriculture, where his expertise led to his nomination by the EPP-ED Group to take over as Chairman of the Committee in January 2002. In that capacity, he dealt with the delicate and complex issues involved in the reform of a policy that was in a constant state of renewal, subject to social developments and fluctuations in world prices. He was also deeply involved in the GATT multilateral trade negotiations. At the same time he was gaining experience in another high office: Chairman of the Conference of Committee Chairmen, a strategic body in the European Parliament responsible for coordinating issues cutting across the 20 parliamentary committees and for preparing the agenda for plenary sittings.

With these formidable achievements to his credit, Joseph Daul was approached by the German Delegation, which was looking for a
suitable candidate to succeed Hans-Gert Pöttering. He had the full support of the French Delegation and negotiations with the other national delegations in the Group opened in the last few weeks of 2006.

**A close-run thing**

The meeting in Brussels on 9 January 2007 opened at 14.10 with Hans-Gert Pöttering, still President for a few days more, in the chair. Pöttering began by welcoming the new Romanian and Bulgarian MEPs. The first item on the agenda was the election of the Chairman. There were four candidates, and each was given 10 minutes to speak: first, Othmar Karas, the outgoing Treasurer, then Gunnar Hökmark, followed by Antonio Tajani and lastly Joseph Daul. The meeting room was packed. The results of the first round were announced at 16.35: of the 256 valid votes cast, Gunnar Hökmark had obtained 74, Joseph Daul 71, Antonio Tajani 62 and Othmar Karas 49 votes. In the second round, Joseph Daul moved into the lead with 88 votes, Gunnar Hökmark and Antonio Tajani came second and third, with 86 and 77 votes respectively. At 18.00, in the third round, two candidates were still in the running and Joseph Daul obtained 134 votes against his competitor, Gunnar Hökmark, who had 115.

Some people said that the result was a victory for the Group’s traditional line, based on Franco-German entente, a social market economy, and a Union built round common policies. The alternative line, allegedly pursued by Gunnar Hökmark and his supporters, preferred a Union on more liberal lines, a free trade area that would eventually merge with a vast Atlantic area. Voting was by secret ballot, so the candidates’ preferences in the matter of political models may have been one of the factors determining the outcome, but they were certainly not the only one. National alliances and personal factors also played a part.

Joseph Daul accordingly took the chair. His first message was brief, a foretaste of the brisk style that was to mark his term of office. He made two promises. The first was naturally to support Hans-Gert Pöttering in his bid to be voted President of Parliament in the elections to be held the following week; the second, a real political challenge, was to maintain the EPP-ED Group’s substantial lead over the other Groups in the June 2009 elections.

The 10 Vice-Chairmen: Othmar Karas, Marianne Thyssen, Struan Stevenson, Jaime Mayor Oreja, Vito Bonsignore, Gunnar Hökmark, József Szájer, Hartmut Nassauer, João de Deus Pinheiro, and Marian-Jean

---

a It should be noted that the 11 members of the new Presidency included only one woman, compared with two in the previous Presidency. Candidates for these appointments are selected by the national delegations, in accordance with the number of posts allocated to them under the d’Hondt system.
Marinescu, were then elected at a Group meeting in Brussels on 10 January.

Organising parliamentary work as efficiently as possible

Joseph Daul is an expert in the art of negotiating compromise solutions that will satisfy most parties and enable action to be taken quickly. As leader of a Group of 278 MEPs from 27 nations and 51 national parties, he was to have plenty of opportunity to demonstrate his prowess.

The first task was to allocate duties to the 10 Vice-Chairmen. This is always a difficult exercise. The first step is to ascertain, in the strictest confidence, what each Vice-Chairman would like to do. Then, to plan the distribution of responsibilities covering most of the Group’s activities. And lastly, to ensure that this elected body – which represents the whole Group and not just the national delegations – is truly collegiate and international, especially as the national delegations are represented elsewhere, namely at the monthly meetings of the Presidency and heads of national delegations in Strasbourg.

An agreement was reached relatively quickly. Othmar Karas continued to act as Treasurer, with responsibility for external Group meetings and for preparing the election campaign. Marianne Thyssen, Struan Stevenson, Jaime Mayor Oreja, Gunnar Hökmark and João de Deus Pinheiro were each appointed to chair one of the five standing working groups, A, B, C, D and E. Hartmut Nassauer was to be responsible for the parliamentary work, with a prominent part in the work connected with votes on reports at plenary sittings. Vito Bonsignore was given the portfolio on relations with national parliaments, a portfolio frequently allocated to an Italian Vice-Chairman. József Szájer was to coordinate the Group’s institutional strategy, and Marian-Jean Marinescu was to be responsible for relations with all the countries covered by the ‘neighbourhood policy’, including the Orthodox Dialogue.

The inaugural sitting and the d’Hondt system

The discussions during the Parliament’s inaugural sitting in January 2007 were equally important. In accordance with the usual custom, decisions had to be taken on the key posts in the Group and in Parliament. At this point a problem arose, with some delegations calling for a review of the rules of the d’Hondt system. This system of proportional distribution, named after an early 20th century Belgian political scientist, had been employed by all the Groups for years, by common consent. The main advantage of the system is that it ensures strictly proportional distribution in accordance with the numerical size of the
national delegations. Each post to be allocated, from the Group Chairman to the vice-chairmen of parliamentary delegations, is given a certain number of points. A list is drawn up and each head of delegation presents his desiderata in turn, in order of size, at a meeting with the Presidency: the German Delegation first, then the United Kingdom Delegation, the Italian Delegation, and so on. Most of the ‘smaller’ delegations have to wait for the ‘larger’ ones to make their choices before their turn comes, so a certain amount of flexibility and political tact are required to ensure that no-one feels that they have been very badly treated. The Chairman plays a considerable part in these meetings, which sometimes start to resemble a cross-country marathon. If there is a serious problem, the decision may have to be put off until the following day. In the meantime, various possible solutions can be explored in the Chairman’s office with the parties concerned.

The negotiations ended on 15 January, when a reasonable consensus was reached. Gunnar Hökmark was nevertheless asked to chair a working group tasked with settling a number of points that were still in dispute: did the negotiations cover Quaestors’ posts, how many points were allocated to each function, how were coordinators appointed? These points were ultimately settled after several months of discussions. It was finally decided that the Quaestors’ posts would be included in the distribution by the d’Hondt system, coordinators would not be included, and the points allocated to the various functions ranged from 1 to 3.

‘It is always a mistake not to be there on the day’
Joseph Daul is a Chairman who is not afraid of hard work and he is unsparing in his efforts to find the right solution for every problem. But he is firmly convinced that colleagues who fail to comply with the basic rules of the Group are unlikely to stay the course. The most important of these rules is that members must attend when items on the agenda for the part-session are discussed and a decision taken. When an MEP who was not in Brussels during the week of the Group meeting sought in Strasbourg to reopen a debate that had already been closed, the Chairman absolutely refused to review the work already done. He simply said: ‘It is always a mistake not to be there on the day’ and no-one disagreed. Discussions are kept as short as possible to avoid the same arguments being repeated over and over again and to leave more time for other matters. Joseph Daul is nevertheless always careful to find an appropriate answer to questions raised by his colleagues. In order to avoid a deadlock and defuse the situation when a political conflict arises between two national delegations or a number of interests, he
suggested that a Restricted Working Group be formed with one of the relevant Vice-Chairmen in charge. He adds, on the relaxed note that comes naturally to him, that the matter might perhaps be discussed over a glass of the excellent white wine produced in Alsace...

Daul advocates a spirit of cooperation combined with firmness in dealings with the other political groups. Cooperation is essential when an absolute majority is required under the Treaties for Parliament to exercise its power of codecision. ‘Working with the other political groups is tremendously important in the European Parliament. To take the “health check” on the Common Agricultural Policy, the Group has always succeeded in forming a very substantial majority, not to say unanimity, in its work with the other political groups.’

Firmness is essential when solidarity and loyalty to the EPP-ED Group are at stake. Thus, Daul was resolutely opposed to the Socialist Group’s plan to veto the appointment of Gerardo Galeote as Chairman of the Conference of Committee Chairmen, and he carried his point. Similarly, the Group Chairman responded instantly to Daniel J. Hannan’s gratuitous remarks during the plenary sitting in Strasbourg on 31 January 2008 about the way Hans-Gert Pöttering conducted debates. The British Conservative MEP was formally barred from the Group a few days later. On the strength of his Group’s numerical predominance, Daul endeavours, like his predecessor, Hans-Gert Pöttering, to ensure that the positions and interests of the EPP-ED Group prevail in meetings of the Conference of Group Chairmen. But it is not always possible to win alone, without an absolute majority, and that is the case with the Group. The Chairman is consequently often required to exercise his skills as a negotiator to form temporary alliances. These may be on the left, with the Liberal Group or the Socialist Group, or on the right with the UEN Group.

The Group Chairman also displayed solidarity with his colleagues and the firmness that such solidarity sometimes demands, when he found himself faced with a delicate diplomatic problem. Having visited Washington and Beijing, the Presidency of the Group made contact with Moscow. This resulted in an invitation in the autumn of 2008, including an invitation for the Group Chairman only to meet the Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin. Joseph Daul repeatedly made it clear that he would not come without his vice-chairmen. The Kremlin remained adamant, so the visit was postponed and finally took place – on the Group’s terms – on 11 to 13 February 2009.

---

a See page 339.
b An absolute majority of Members of the Parliament is 393. The EPP-ED Group was therefore short of 105 votes (393-288=105) in 2008, which had to be found in other groups.
Proliferation and reorganisation of bodies within the Group

The increase in numbers in the early years of the new century was accompanied by a positive proliferation of bodies within the Group – working groups, intergroups, foundations and think tanks – which had the merit of developing a very wide range of political activities and putting the abilities and ambitions of the most enterprising members to good use. But, as Joseph Daul pointed out at the Presidency meeting on 22 April 2008, the distribution and coordination of these various structures needed to be improved in order to avoid duplication and unnecessary competition. For example, the Group was responsible at the time for the Schuman Foundation, which had been established on Egon Klepsch’s initiative and which funded courses for trainees from the new member countries and other activities including publications and participation in conferences to promote Christian Democratic ideals. The President of the Foundation in 2008 was Jacques Santer. The Robert Schuman Institute is a separate body, with headquarters in Budapest and a remit to support training courses for young executives in parties close to the EPP. The European Ideas Network, headed by the Vice-Chairman, Jaime Major Oreja, since James Elles’ resignation on 11 March 2008, organises meetings of working groups on specific subjects and an annual Summer University in collaboration with a number of centre-right European think tanks.

Lastly, the Orthodox Dialogue has met regularly since 1997 in one of the Balkan countries and has also organised ‘regional dialogues’ in various countries, including Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. The Euro-Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Dialogue, and Summits with members of national parliaments, also serve to extend the Group’s influence in areas not covered by parliamentary activities.

The number of public hearings organised by standing working groups A, B, C, D and E since January 2008 alone bears witness to members’ keen interest in the opportunities presented by the Group and the Parliament in general: hearings on Syria, plant protection products, roaming regulations, women in business, civil aviation, the anti-missile shield, nuclear waste, disasters at sea, trade defence instruments, Sharia law in Europe, governance within the European Union, transport, supervision of financial markets, regional policy, student mobility, Tibet, the CAP, women and religion, etc.

One of Joseph Daul’s many tasks is therefore, with the requisite support from the Secretariat, to settle any disputes that may arise over the choice of dates or the appointment of a Presidency. He must even be prepared to veto some of the proposals submitted to the Presidency. The schedule is always tight and there is very little time to spare during
the Group meetings in Brussels preceding the part-sessions in Strasbourg, and during the weeks of the mini-sessions in Brussels and the part-sessions in Strasbourg themselves. The Group has certain facilities provided by the European Parliament administration, including meeting rooms and teams of interpreters. Group meetings, including plenary meetings, meetings of the standing working groups, the Presidency, the Bureau, and the Presidency with the heads of delegations, are naturally the first priority. The Group’s daily schedule has consequently developed over the years into an impressive succession of meetings, quite apart from the meetings of national delegations at which interpreters are not required.

This general scenario, together with the Study Days and external meetings of the Bureau held in other places, such as the meetings in 2008 held in Nicosia in February, Portoroz in Slovenia in April, Paris in July, and Réunion in October, the Orthodox Dialogue meetings held in Georgia in March, Ukraine in July, and Romania in October, and the EIN Summer University at Fiuggi in Italy in August, gives some idea of the powerful political and administrative machine the Group has become over the years.

**Joseph Daul’s personal commitment to supporting sister parties in Central and Eastern Europe**

The Chairman takes the view that the Group’s culture of cooperation, partnership and team spirit should also extend to relations with the new member countries. Joseph Daul has given priority to contacts with the countries that joined the Union in 2004 and 2007. ‘My activities were marked by numerous visits to these countries to ensure that their integration in Europe was proceeding according to plan, so that in 2009 there would be no more talk of old and new members of the Union.’

---

a Group meetings in Strasbourg are held in the Robert Schuman room in the Louise Weiss building. In Brussels, they were held in the Paul-Henri Spaak building for the first 10 years and, since December 2008, they have been held in a room in a new building, the József Antall building, which seats 450.

b An attempt to rationalise the time available and to speed up decision-making within the Group has been made with the decision adopted on 6 May 2009 by the Presidency, reorganising the way in which the standing working groups operate. They have been reduced from five to four, each chaired by a Vice-Chairman of the Group. The four working groups meet on the Tuesday of the Group week in Brussels. They are each preceded by a meeting of a Bureau, formed by the Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen and the coordinators. Interpretation is provided for these meetings. The meetings of the working groups, better prepared, can therefore take decisions thereby cutting down debate within the EPP-ED Group meeting in full on the Wednesday and then in Strasbourg.
A triple strategy: first, the new members of the EU

From January 2007 to June 2009, the new Chairman pursued a strategy entailing action in three areas. First, he assured the parties in the two new Member States, Romania and Bulgaria, whose accession to the Union coincided with his appointment as Group Chairman, that they had his full support and that special attention would be paid to ensuring that they were well represented in the Group. During the first European election campaign in Romania, he travelled to Timisoara on 7 October 2007 to support the Democratic Party led by the President of the Republic, Traian Băsescu.

His visit to Sofia paved the way for an increase in Bulgarian membership of the Group. He met Boïko Borisov, leader of the new GERB (Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria) Party, and assured him that the EPP-ED Group would welcome this new arrival on the Bulgarian political scene. Five members were elected on the GERB ticket and took their places in the Group. Above all, the Group benefited from the sharp increase in the number of Romanian members as a result of the alliance between the Democratic Party and the Liberal Party, enabling 18 Members to join the Group and bringing the total number of members to 288 in January 2008, the highest level in the Group’s history. The Group’s decision to hold its Bureau meeting in Sofia on 19 and 20 March 2009, a few weeks before the European elections, was further proof of its commitment to the pro-European democratic forces in a new member country of the European Union.

The Group Chairman travelled to Slovenia to support Alojz Peterle, a candidate in the presidential elections of 21 October 2007, a member of the EPP-ED Group and a historic figure in the establishment of democracy in Slovenia.

In the same way, visiting Slovakia in June 2006, he drew attention to the personal contribution made by Mikuláš Dzurinda, leader of the centre-right coalition from 1998 to 2006, to the modernisation and reconstruction of the country. The Group backed Iveta Radicová, the centre-right EPP-ED candidate in the presidential elections in Slovakia, who obtained a very respectable score in her duel with the outgoing Socialist President, Ivan Gašparovič, in the second round of the presidential elections held on 5 and 12 April 2009.

Hungary was also able to rely on the Group’s support after the Socialist Prime Minister’s highly controversial decision to impose a police cordon round the Hungarian Parliament in October 2006, preventing FIDEZ members from exercising their political rights. Joseph Daul visited Budapest on 19 May 2007 and spoke at the FIDEZ Party Congress at the request of Viktor Orbán, the former Prime Minister. ‘There is no
such thing as old member countries and new member countries;’ he said, ‘there are only old ideas and new ideas, “old-fashioned” political leaders and innovating and reforming political leaders’.

Poland occupies an important place in Joseph Daul’s strategy of establishing personal contact with EPP party leaders in the new member countries. His first contact with Donald Tusk, leader of the Civic Platform party, was in Warsaw on 20 September 2007 during the EIN Summer University. Donald Tusk was to win the next legislative elections and he was Prime Minister by the time he welcomed the Group on the occasion of the Study Days which opened in Warsaw on 28 April 2009. Waldemar Pawlak, leader of the other component of the ruling majority, the Polish People’s Party – another EPP member party – also addressed the Group in Warsaw in his capacity as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the Economy.

The Baltic States are also on the Group’s agenda: on 26 February 2009, Joseph Daul congratulated Valdis Dombrovskis, a member of the Group since 2004, on his appointment as Prime Minister of Latvia. The 38-year-old economist will not have an easy time, as he has a financial crisis on his hands, one of the most serious crises his country has faced since independence.

The Group’s Bureau also met in Tallinn on 16-17 April 2009, where it was welcomed by Tunne Kelam, a leading figure in the democratic resistance to Communism and the sole member of the Estonian Delegation, and by Maart Laar, former Prime Minister and leader of the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union party (Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit, IRL), which joined the EPP on the break-up of the Soviet Union. Important strategic issues were covered at the meeting in Tallinn: the future of EU-Russia relations, security on the Union’s external borders, and the development of the Baltic region.

Then, the candidates for future accession

Croatia filed its application for accession to the European Union in February 2003. This country, once part of the former Yugoslavia, has been culturally and economically European for decades, and the Prime Minister, Ivo Sanader, whose party is a member of the EPP, is unsparing in his efforts to secure Croatian accession in 2010. As Joseph Daul recalled during a visit to Zagreb on 9 January 2009, the Group, which had held its Bureau meeting in Split in May 2006, had always supported Croatia’s application. Its efforts to join the Union had been held up for many years by a territorial dispute with Slovenia, but that should shortly be resolved through the good offices of the political authorities in the two countries.
Ukraine raises more complex problems and no definite date has been set for accession in this case. A substantial section of the Group, including the Polish delegation from the Baltic countries, advocates a process of irreversible rapprochement leading to full accession, arguing that, by virtue of its history and its geographical situation, this large and important country – also a candidate for membership of NATO – is the last remaining part of the former Soviet Union’s geopolitical buffer zone. Since the ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004, Ukraine has been seeking a future in Europe, while of necessity bearing in mind the difficult problems of its energy dependence on Russia and the notorious touchiness of this powerful neighbour. The Group Presidency met in Kiev on 13 June 2008, reaffirming the EPP’s support for the country’s economic reforms, anti-corruption measures and efforts to improve security and protect citizens against crime. It is clearly difficult for the Presidency of the Group to overlook the political rivalry and the occasional exchange of bitter recriminations between the President, Viktor Yushchenko, and the Prime Minister, Yulia Tymochenko. Nevertheless the fact is that, while the two Ukrainian leaders may be personal rivals, they share the same general vision of their country’s future with the West and the same determination to strengthen the links with the EPP and affirm that their country’s future lies in Europe.

Lastly, the ‘Eastern neighbourhood’ countries

Ukraine, which has not formally applied to join the Union, is the principal power in this geographical region, which extends from Europe’s eastern border to the Caucasus. The former Soviet Republics of Moldova, which naturally has close ties with Romania, Georgia, which has experienced its own democratic revolution and is still in a situation of latent conflict with Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus, which is still under authoritarian rule although it is represented and recognised abroad by active democratic forces, were invited by the European Union to join it in a regional partnership. In the light of the forthcoming ‘EURONEST’ agreement between the European Union and the seven States, signed in Prague on 7 May 2009, the Group Chairman and the Chairman of the EP Committee on Foreign Affairs, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, took the initiative, proposing to Parliament’s Conference of Presidents that a common assembly of all participants in EURONEST should be established. On 15 January 2009, Parliament endorsed this proposal, which will be implemented after the elections in June 2009.

---

a A sign of this marked interest in the EPP was the fact that both rivals attended the EPP Summit in Brussels on 19 March 2009.
and the installation of the new Parliament. The future assembly, modelled on the EUROMED Assembly with the Southern Mediterranean countries and the EUROLAT Assembly with the Latin American countries, will have 120 members and will be based on the principle of parity between Members of the European Parliament and members of the Parliaments of the Eastern Partner States. The new assembly will be responsible for dealing with sensitive issues such as energy supplies, the environment, combating organised crime, and economic competitiveness. Above all, the EPP regards the establishment of such links as the most democratic way of reinforcing the process of stabilisation in these countries, which have problems associated with their proximity to Russia, where politicians and public alike have never really accepted the break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of territorial ambitions in the region that hark back to the days of the Tsars.

Russia, a difficult but indispensable partner

In the course of his many visits to the new countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Eastern Neighbourhood countries, and his many political contacts with EPP leaders in those countries, Joseph Daul has come to realise the full extent of the weight Russia carries in this region, where it is regarded by turns as a difficult, sometimes threatening, partner with whom it is nevertheless essential to establish a working relationship. The Presidency of the Group therefore decided to approach the Russian authorities through the Group’s parliamentary counterparts in the Duma. This was simply a matter of extending to Russia the custom, already established by Hans-Gert Pöttering during the previous parliamentary term, of holding regular meetings with members of the US Congress.

The visit, planned for the autumn of 2008, was postponed because the Russian authorities let it be known that the Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, would be prepared to meet Joseph Daul but not the accompanying Vice-Chairmen of the Group. The Group Chairman declined this exclusive invitation and the Kremlin eventually agreed in principle to a meeting on 13 February 2009 between the Prime Minister and a delegation from the Group consisting of the Chairman and six Vice-Chairmen, Othmar Karas, Jaime Mayor Oreja, József Szájer, Hartmut Nassauer, Struan Stevenson, and Marian-Jean Marinescu.

The Presidency was greeted on its arrival by the Chairman of the Duma, Boris Gryzlov, the chairmen of a number of parliamentary committees, and two members of the Government, with whom the Presidency discussed questions of human rights and the possibility of
increased cooperation between the European Union and Russia in the economic and energy sectors.

The meeting with Vladimir Putin took place at the Prime Minister’s residence. He began by saying that he attached great importance to establishing links with the largest political Group in the European Parliament. The discussions opened in an atmosphere of frankness, using the customary diplomatic forms employed to indicate that both parties are being absolutely open and direct. The first subject to be broached was the problem of human rights. Putin roundly declared: ‘We must extend and deepen the relations between us, but when I see what the Parliament is saying about Russia, I am aghast. Where do you get your information?’ and he went on to point out that some of the countries in the European Union had yet to find an entirely democratic solution to the problem of their minorities. ‘In Russia, we have 145 million citizens from different ethnic groups, most of them with their own languages. That is the scale of the problem we have to deal with … ’ The conversation lasted for an hour and a half and Joseph Daul had an opportunity to raise with Vladimir Putin all the subjects he felt were essential: future trade relations, energy security, agriculture, relations with Ukraine and Georgia, the new US Administration, and security. The biggest surprise to the EPP-ED Presidency was probably the Russian Prime Minister’s emphatic insistence on the common ground, including Christian civilisation, that forms the basis of the values Russia shares with Europe. Putin made it quite clear to the Presidency that his party, ‘United Russia’, wanted closer ties with the EPP and the Group. Reviewing the implications of this visit on his return to Brussels, Joseph Daul concluded that Vladimir Putin’s proposal should be carefully considered in consultation with the Party and that, in any event, the Group should follow closely the work of the Russian Association for the Protection of Human Rights.

The EPP-ED Chairman at the heart of the German and French Presidencies (January-June 2007 and July-December 2008)

Joseph Daul was particularly fortunate to take up his duties in January 2007, when the political players on the European stage were all familiar figures to him. The newly elected President of Parliament, Hans-Gert Pöttering, still took a keen interest in the Group’s work. He attended all the Tuesday evening meetings in Strasbourg. Most of the members of his cabinet, starting with the Head of Cabinet, Klaus Welle, had served in or were close to the Group Secretariat. The former Group Secretary-General remained in daily touch with the Group and his talents as a
strategic planner and organiser were clearly appreciated by the political directors of the Group. He was also close to the new Secretary-General, Martin Kamp, who took up his duties at Joseph Daul’s suggestion on 1 September 2007. Hans-Gert Pöttering, Joseph Daul and Klaus Welle realised early in 2007 what an enormous advantage it was for the Group to be dealing principally with the President of the Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso, who belonged to the same political family, and, from 1 January to 30 June 2007, with Angela Merkel in her capacity as President-in-Office of the Union.

The timing was all the more fortunate in the light of the forthcoming French Presidency, 1 July to 31 December 2008, which might well be conducted under the aegis of Nicolas Sarkozy. France was right in the middle of an election campaign. Sarkozy, famous for his initiative-taking, his flair for action, and the importance he attached to France’s role in Europe, was standing against the Socialist candidate, Ségolène Royal. His increasingly good showing in the opinion polls encouraged hopes that he would win. Germany and France would rarely hold the Presidency in such close succession in future, so long as the principle of six-month Presidencies held by each of the 27 States in turn continued to apply. It would be at least 13½ years, or 14 in the event of Croatian accession, before the two great founding countries took over this responsibility again. Nor was there any guarantee that the order would remain the same and that there would be such a short interval between their Presidencies.

Joseph Daul was naturally introduced at an early stage to the Chancellor, who was close to Hans-Gert Pöttering. Joseph Daul was received by Angela Merkel in Berlin on 10 January. The pro-European political line pursued by the CDU was finding a new impetus after the grandiose era of Chancellor Kohl.

The Christian Democrats and the Berlin Declaration of 24 March 2007

Europe, at the beginning of 2007, was awaiting a new initiative that would enable the Union to find a way out of the institutional crisis

---

The Barroso Commission, formed on 22 November 2004, included a former member of the Group, the Slovak, Ján Figel’, and other Commissioners close to the EPP, the Vice-President Jacques Barrot, Franco Frattini, who was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Silvio Berlusconi’s government following the election victory on 13 April 2008 and replaced by the head of the Group’s Italian Delegation, Antonio Tajani, another former member of the Group, Viviane Reding, the Greek, Stavros Dimas, the Maltese, Joe Borg, the Austrian, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, and the Latvian, Andris Piebalgs. The EPP Commissioners join the Presidency of the Group for a monthly dinner held on Tuesday during the Group’s regular week in Brussels.
– modestly described as a period of reflection – that followed the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the French and Dutch voters in the spring of 2005. The time had come for those in favour of European integration to formally affirm their attachment to the Community system.

On 24 March 2007, on Angela Merkel’s initiative, the council of EPP Heads of Government and Parties was invited to Berlin to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. The President of the Council, the President of the European Parliament and the President of the Commission signed a ‘Declaration on Europe’ which described all the benefits that European integration had brought to the people of Europe and undertook to develop a common vision for the future of the continent.

Joseph Daul attended the celebrations in Berlin. The chief concern, apart from the symbolic message of this anniversary, celebrated in the heart of the reunified continent, was what was to be done in the immediate future to relaunch the European process, which appeared to be stalled.

**The election of Nicolas Sarkozy and the increased influence of the EPP**

France was in the midst of campaigns for the presidential and legislative elections that were to take place in few weeks’ time. Nicolas Sarkozy, prompted by his loyal adviser on European matters, Alain Lamassoure, came up with a proposal: why not draft a new and much shorter treaty, containing essentially the same institutional provisions as the Constitution but avoiding the economic and social issues that had raised fears and caused misunderstandings in some sections of the public. Angela Merkel and Hans-Gert Pöttering had doubts about calling the Member States’ meticulous work into question. What did Europe need? It needed to find a way out of the crisis and move on, at a time of increasingly rapid advances in globalisation. Joseph Daul was in favour of the mini-treaty, seeing it as an exercise in simplification, a realistic move in the current political climate.

Nicolas Sarkozy’s election on 6 May 2007 and the speedy formation of a government (joined by two members of the Group, Roselyne Bachelot and Brice Hortefeux) provided the necessary impetus. Joseph Daul was close to the new French President and had direct access to him, and he was also close to the Prime Minister, François Fillon. Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, finally won over to the idea of a mini-treaty, persuaded their colleagues in the European Council to open a fresh intergovernmental conference. There must be no delay. The Portuguese Presidency took on the task, and the ICG opened in Lisbon on 23 July, with a brief to produce a ‘simplified European treaty’.
Dublin blocks the simplified treaty (13 June 2008)

The new treaty was drafted without delay. ‘A simple cut-and-paste job’, according to Alain Lamassoure. It contained essentially the same institutional reforms as those proposed by the Constitution. It only remained to secure its ratification so that the new provisions could come into effect at the same time as the European elections in June 2009 and the renewal of the Barroso Commission. All the Member States followed the procedure of ratification by parliament except for Ireland, whose Constitution required a referendum.

The bombshell came on 13 June 2008, when the Irish people rejected the treaty by a majority of 53%. Joseph Daul expressed the dismay felt by all the members of the EPP section of the Group, though some of the British members of the ED section were rather pleased with the result…

Yet another serious crisis for Europe. Another call for patience, which did not preclude a proactive approach. Two weeks after the Dublin thunderbolt, Nicolas Sarkozy found himself at the head of the Presidency-in-Office of the European Union. The Group had included a meeting with the Head of State in its plans for the Study Days to be held in Paris in the first week of July. The members of the Group were received at the Elysée at 18.00 on 2 July. Nicolas Sarkozy addressed them with great energy and determination. There were only two alternatives: either to go on or to be left behind in the race to globalisation. He wanted a strong Europe, assuming its proper responsibilities. The Irish should realise the high price everyone would pay for failing to find a way out of the impasse, the first problem being that the decision put a stop to any further enlargement. The French President exhorted the MEPs to do everything in their power to resolve the situation.\footnote{Nicolas Sarkozy took this opportunity to say that he hoped that Joseph Daul would continue his work in the Parliament after June 2009.}

The invasion of Georgia and the global economic crisis (August-October 2008)

Three weeks later, Russian tanks rolled into Georgia – a sharp reminder that Europe had a part to play in preventing a resurgence of imperialism and war. Nicolas Sarkozy rose to the occasion. A cease-fire was declared and a basis for agreement reached in rapidly convened meetings between Russians, Europeans and Americans.

The respite did not last long. There was no summer break in 2008. The financial crisis resulting from the failure of a number of American banks caused stock exchanges to crash world-wide. Here too, Nicolas Sarkozy,
The EPP-ED Group under Joseph Daul

in consultation with Gordon Brown, Angela Merkel, Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the Eurogroup, and Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, agreed in September on a plan to support the banks, which prevented widespread panic among investors and the collapse of the system. Sarkozy understood how important it was to secure the support of the European Parliament. He was invited to speak there on 22 November. His friends in the UMP party in Parliament reminded him that it was essential to invoke the community spirit in his relations with all 27 countries of the Union to avoid any fears of rule by the larger countries. There was still a strong temptation to handle European affairs with a few of the big leaders, but the Union could not function without trust. He must take the necessary time to win over the leaders, to involve them in joint decisions, otherwise there was a danger that their reservations and frustrations would encourage them to form alliances and defensive groups. The Union would fall apart. Joseph Daul, on the other hand, advocated solidarity and a united response to the crisis, ‘because Europe has always advanced in times of crisis, Europe is more united in times of crisis than it is when things are going well’.

Nicolas Sarkozy spoke again in Strasbourg on 16 December 2008, presenting the record of the French Presidency and the results of the European Council. With his customary eloquence, the French President told of the enormous efforts the 27 had made to secure the adoption of the ‘Energy-Climate Package’, designed to help reduce greenhouse gases. Sarkozy paid particular tribute to the contribution that the EPP-ED Group and its Chairman had made to the adoption of the European Parliament’s position in the codecision procedure.

Trouble in Prague: the perilous Czech EU Presidency (1 January-30 June 2009)

On 7 December 2008, the 19th ODS Party Congress in Prague adopted a resolution announcing major changes in the composition of the

---

a The custom of involving one’s partners and working as a team should also – in the Chairman’s view – extend to relations with the new member countries. Joseph Daul had given priority to contacts with the countries that joined the Union in 2004 and 2007. ‘My activities were marked by numerous visits to these countries to ensure that their integration in Europe was proceeding according to plan, so that in 2009 there would be no more talk of old and new members of the Union’. (Agence Europe interview, 3/11/2008).

These efforts bore fruit, particularly in Bulgaria and Romania: the number of members in the Romanian Delegation increased sharply after the elections of 10 December 2007, rising to 18 with the arrival in the Group of former Liberal Party members. Marian-Jean Marinescu, assisted in the Secretariat by Paolo Licandro, supported Joseph Daul in the policy of strengthening the Group’s position in Romania.
EPP-ED Group. The Czech party was a member of the ED section of the Group and one of its priorities in the June 2009 elections was to form a new, anti-federalist group in Parliament, a move that would entail the departure of members of the party who had sat with the Group since 2004. This decision by the Prime Minister and party leader Mirek Topolánek, who was to take over the Presidency-in-Office of the European Council on 1 January 2009, was connected to a large extent with domestic political rivalry between himself and the Head of State, Vaclav Klaus, a fervent admirer of Margaret Thatcher’s ultra-liberal policies, and a sovereignist prone to indulge in provocative gestures.

Joseph Daul spoke on 14 January 2009 in Strasbourg when the Czech Presidency presented its programme for the coming six months: ‘The Presidency has three major crises on its hands: the economic and social crisis, the dispute between Russia and Ukraine over gas supplies, which has serious implications for the Union and its neighbourhood, and the possibility of another war in the Middle East. Faced with these challenges, the only possible attitude for our countries to take is to close ranks, present a united front and act in a concerted and determined way’.

But the Topolánek Government itself was in serious political trouble on the home front: it was the subject of a vote of censure on 24 March 2009 and was replaced by a government of experts. This compounded the uncertainties surrounding Czech ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which had been ratified by the Chamber of Deputies on 18 February 2009 but which still had to be approved by the Senate and signed by the Head of State, who had repeatedly indicated that he was in no hurry to conclude the ratification process.

Another cause for concern in the winter of 2009, even more serious than the political situation in the Czech Republic, was the global economic crisis which generated an enormous amount of diplomatic activity after the election of Barack Obama.

**Three important summits in April 2009**

Three extremely important meetings at the highest level subsequently assured the public that the world’s leaders were committed to restoring confidence in economic operators.

First, the ‘G20’ meeting in London on 2 April brought together the 20 Heads of Government of the greatest powers in the world, representing 80% of the world economy. For the first time since the Second World War, Americans, Europeans, Chinese, Russians, Brazilians, Saudi Arabsians and other emerging economies agreed on a programme for economic revival on a massive scale and on new rules to reduce the possibility of international tax evasion and improve ethical standards
in the activities of the banking sector. This G20 meeting had been initiated by Nicolas Sarkozy during the French Presidency, and the collaboration between the French President and the German Chancellor was influential in the drafting of the final conclusions. Joseph Daul was generally pleased with the outcome. The Group Chairman stated in a press release: ‘The European centre-right is in favour of a social market economy. This means an economy governed by rules which promotes necessary social cohesion. The G20 has guided us in this direction. Europe has done well to use its influence to achieve this result and it must keep up the pressure to ensure that the decisions taken in London are implemented as soon as possible.’

The NATO summit, another eagerly awaited event held the very next day in Strasbourg and Kehl, marked France’s full reintegration in the NATO military command structure and provided an opportunity for the new US President to appeal to his allies for increased commitment to the cause of re-establishing democracy in Afghanistan. For the EPP, France’s return and its assumption of responsibility in essential strategic operations was excellent news. It marked a further step towards the Group’s long-held ideal of a balanced Atlantic Alliance relying in equal measure on its two pillars, American and European. France, a strong advocate of European defence, was now in a better position, working within NATO, to persuade its partners of the merits of a European security identity. The allocation of industrial synergies in respect of regulation and the distribution of tasks within the Alliance would now be more equitable. Political Europe took another step forward at Strasbourg.

Lastly, the EU-US Summit in Prague on 5 April gave Barack Obama another opportunity to demonstrate the United States’ new international commitment. In supporting Turkey’s application to join the European Union, he was in danger of meeting with an openly hostile response, particularly in France where it was noted that this was a matter for Europe alone to decide.

But the Swedish Presidency, scheduled for the last six months of 2009, was already on the horizon. The Group Presidency, led by Joseph Daul, visited Stockholm on 6 March 2009 for a meeting with the Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, leader of a centre-right coalition that includes the Moderate Party (Moderata Samlingspartiet), an EPP member party. For Joseph Daul, ‘The Swedish Presidency will be a crisis Presidency, but it should also give Europe new opportunities and a chance to create jobs through an ambitious climate and energy strategy and a courageous growth stimulus policy’.

525
The political preparations for the European elections in June 2009

Joseph Daul’s first priority as the new Group Chairman had been to take all necessary measures to maintain the EPP-ED Group’s substantial lead over its competitors. In this spirit, the Presidency meeting at Genval on 29 and 30 January 2007 had concluded that the EPP-ED Group must devise a political strategy based on a highly incisive and detailed programme accessible to voters in 2009. As the Group gained in strength and diversity, the task of deciding on a clear line proved to be an increasingly complex exercise. What interests and expectations did these citizens, with their increasingly heterogeneous levels of economic and social development, have in common? What did people in Helsinki and Sofia think about population decline and the future of health services and pension schemes? Was immigration a source of anxiety in Rome and Hamburg alike? These questions and many more called for careful planning and due regard to coherence.

During earlier decades, the EPP Group had identified with, and indeed helped to prepare, the successive electoral platforms adopted by the EPP Party Congress. It was incumbent on the Group since it became independent of the Party – having acquired its own resources under the Treaty of Nice and recognition for the European parties – to concentrate on its own political strategy while remaining in close contact with the Party led by Wilfried Martens.

At Genval, Jaime Mayor Oreja was entrusted with the task of drawing up a list of priorities in consultation with the committee coordinators and the chairmen of the working groups. In May 2007, the Spanish Vice-Chairman was able to present a document dubbed the ‘decalogue’ because it identified 10 priorities listed under four headings: ‘Creating a Europe of values’, ‘For a Europe of growth and prosperity’, ‘Making Europe a safer place’, and ‘Achieving greater solidarity in Europe’. The priorities then had to be examined by the national delegations, and their proposals for amendments considered. It was a long and sometimes arduous task. Jaime Mayor Oreja was often surprised to find how hard it was to obtain a response from his colleagues, let alone any agreement. He also had to take into account the work of the EIN group think tank, which had covered similar ground in its Summer Universities.

Joseph Daul held numerous meetings and the priorities were finally presented to an invited audience at a European evening organised by

---

a The Presidency had not invited James Elles to speak on 4 March and he resigned as head of the EIN on 11 March 2008.
The EPP-ED Group under Joseph Daul

the Group at the Concert Noble in Brussels on 4 March 2008. Hans-Gert Pöttering, José Manuel Durão Barroso, Wilfried Martens, Joseph Daul and Jaime Mayor Oreja presented the final document in booklet form. In the meantime, the decalogue was thoroughly studied with a view to extracting arguments that could be used in the 2009 elections. The working groups concerned adopted their reports in January 2008, the aim being to combine all the work in the Group’s election manifesto. At the same time, Othmar Karas, who was again responsible for organising the preparations for the elections, held consultations with the Group’s public relations section.

These consultations led to the adoption of a label which the Group adopted and released at a ‘European evening’ organised in the Autoworld museum in the Cinquantenaire Park in Brussels on 17 March 2009. Before an invited audience of almost 1,000 guests, the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen unveiled the subtitle that was to be appended to the Group’s name in future: ‘Europe’s driving force’. This evening event also provided an opportunity for Joseph Daul and Wilfried Martens to assure José Manuel Durão Barroso of their support for the proposal to extend his term of office as President of the Commission. Two days later, on 19 March, this support was confirmed at the EPP Summit preceding the European Council.

It now remained to deal with the institutional problem raised by Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs in the report presented by Jean-Luc Dehaene. When would the Parliament elected in June 2009 be able to invest the President of the new Commission? The EPP Group hoped to anticipate the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty by encouraging the European Council to take the results of the elections on 7 June into account when appointing the Commissioners. But the legal and political situation was a complex one and it was unfortunately difficult for voters to understand it. In purely legal terms, the Lisbon Treaty could not apply until it had been approved in the referendum to be held in Ireland, and a date for the referendum had not yet been set. The Czech Republic had not completed the process of ratification either.

The EPP Congress in Warsaw on 29 and 30 April 2009: from the Red Star of Stalin to the blue flag of Europe

The crenellated tower of the imposing Palace of Culture and Science, 230 metres high, stands in the very heart of Warsaw. This monumental example of Stalinist architecture was inaugurated in 1955 – a fraternal ‘gift’ to the Polish people from their ‘great Soviet neighbour’. Nikita Khrushchev, Ho Chi Minh and Kim Il-sung had all appeared on the platform at one time or another, and the Polish Communist Party/
Polish United Workers’ Party (POUP) Congress was always held there, from Gomulka to Jaruzelski.

At the end of the 1980s, the democratic Polish Government was reluctant to get rid of it, because of the high cost of demolition. So this hated symbol of the Communist era became a monument to liberty. On 29 April 2009, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of Poland’s accession to the European Union and the European People’s Party Congress, the building – adorned with a gigantic European flag covering one side of the tower – opened its doors to 3 000 delegates and guests representing the 74 EPP member parties.

This marked a spectacular change in the tide of history and it made a deep impression on the Polish parliamentarians and their guests. Those who had lived through the Communist era remembered the Communist red star shining night and day on the top of the tower. The blue flag with its gold stars will gradually reconcile them to the dreaded ‘Stalin building’, a brief ironic moment in a tragic tale.\(^a\)

The Group was also in Warsaw, where it had just held its Study Days. In the vast, highly decorated chamber lined with giant screens, the EPP adopted its electoral programme for the 7\(^{th}\) term and presented its election slogan: ‘Strong for the people’. At the same time, delegates were also invited to attend an impressive demonstration of the party’s political strength. Twelve Prime Ministers: Donald Tusk, Poland, François Fillon, France, Angela Merkel, Germany, Konstantínos Karamanlís, Greece, Jan-Peter Balkenende, the Netherlands, Silvio Berlusconi, Italy, Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg, Herman van Rompuy, Belgium, Fredrik Reinfeldt, Sweden, Andrius Kubilius, Lithuania, Lawrence Gonzi, Malta, and Emile Boc, Romania, represented almost half the EU Heads of Government.

The President of Parliament, Hans-Gert Pöttering, the President of the Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso, and Joseph Daul all spoke. The Prime Ministers of three candidate countries also introduced themselves: Ivo Sanader, Croatia, Nikola Gruevski, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Sali Berisha, the fiery Albanian orator standing in front of his national flag, the double-headed black eagle on a red ground, and speaking of his ‘desire to join Europe’ … Even Mikheil Saakashvili, the President of Georgia, had come to Warsaw to thank the people of Europe for their support in the recent events which had threatened his country’s territorial integrity.

The party President, Wilfried Martens, and the Secretary-General, Antonio López-Istúriz White, then called on the Deputy Prime Ministers

---

\(^a\) In the words of Zbigniew Zaleski, 6 May 2009.
of Austria, Denmark, Finland and the Czech Republic, where the EPP forms part of the ruling coalitions. The leaders of the EPP opposition parties in Spain, Cyprus, Portugal, Hungary, Ireland, Estonia and Bulgaria were also invited to speak.

The entire chamber then rose to welcome Lech Wałęsa, founder of Solidarność and former President of the Republic of Poland, with a standing ovation.

The Warsaw Congress signalled the start of the national election campaigns just a few weeks before the people cast their votes on 4 and 7 June.

A difficult election campaign: the threat of abstention and protest votes

With the IMF forecasting an average 4% reduction in GDP in the European Union in 2009, this was always going to be a difficult campaign. On the one hand, the Eurosceptics – nationalist, populist and far left – joined forces to attack EU policies and institutions and challenge the very idea of democracy at European level. On the other, members of the general public felt that they were under-informed or ill-informed, and confessed that they simply could not understand the complex machinery of the Union system. The pro-European parties’ chief concern was the danger of an increase in abstention, confirming the steady decline in voters’ interest in the European elections recorded since 1984.

Oddly enough, the antagonism between the main contenders, the EPP and the PES, took different forms in different Member States. In some, coalition governments endeavoured to deal with the effects of the crisis together. In others, Socialist governments supported the Barroso Commission while Socialist opposition parties in countries with EPP party governments condemned the outgoing Commission’s economic liberalism, blaming it for the collapse of the financial and banking system and the rise in unemployment.

The EPP had an answer for arguments of this kind: it was leading figures in the EPP, notably Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, who had set the tone at the G20 in London on 2 April, prompting the decisions to improve ethical standards in the financial sector and supporting the efforts to relaunch the economy in consultation with Europe’s principal international partners. The EPP also stressed its attachment to the concept of the social market economy and the economic theory that the market must be sufficiently competitive to create wealth, without which the redistribution essential to social solidarity becomes impossible. The rulers of the former ‘people’s democracies’ are a sharp reminder of the dire effects of state-controlled economies,
in the form of shortages of essential products and loss of individual freedoms.

The EPP stressed the substantial achievements of the last parliament, including the introduction of directives on security, the environment, health, the internal market and mobile phones, all of which had had a beneficial effect on the daily lives of European citizens. The Group was in favour of the speedy ratification and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, which represented a further step in the democratisation of the Union and strengthened its ability to take joint decisions.

On 31 May 2009, at the end of the campaign, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy took the joint initiative of publishing letters in two popular high-circulation newspapers, the ‘Journal du Dimanche’ in France and the ‘Welt am Sonntag’ in Germany. The priorities identified by the two countries corresponded closely to those adopted by the EPP in Warsaw: a responsible market economy with the emphasis on employers and employees rather than speculators, combating climate change, fair world trade based on reciprocity, a Common Defence and Security Policy, in short a ‘strong and united Europe’ and a ‘Europe that protects its citizens’.

The EPP Group’s stunning success on 7 June 2009

When the first results began to come in at about 20.00 that evening, Joseph Daul, who was at the Press Centre in the European Parliament building in Brussels to address representatives from all sections of the European press, realised the full extent of the responsibilities he would be called upon to assume in the weeks to come. The EPP achieved excellent results in Italy, France, Poland and Germany, practically all the Member States where it had presented candidates. The Socialist Group, on the contrary, suffered the heaviest losses in its history. The gap between the two main Groups in Parliament had never been wider: more than 100 seats, according to the first count. The message was clear: the electorate preferred to trust centre-right governments to deal with the challenges facing Europe in the current economic crisis. The EPP was represented in 19 of the 27 governments in place. The Socialists had not had the right programme or the requisite credibility to reassure voters and gain their support. The Liberal Group too lost a significant number of members.

Turnout was down again, from 45.4 % on average in 2004 to 43.2 % in 2009.

On a provisional count, pending news of the final make-up of the various political groups which would not be known until the inaugural
sitting, the EPP had 264 seats\(^a\) in a Parliament of 736 seats, compared with 288 out of 785 seats, not counting the 27 British MEPs and their 12 allies in the Czech ODS Party. The scale of this success was quite unexpected. The Socialist debacle and the emergence of a somewhat disorganised and incoherent Eurosceptic force meant that the EPP Group occupied a key position. Now more than ever, it would be called upon to take the initiative and assume the role of driving force in the heart of the Union.

**Joseph Daul takes matters in hand after re-election to the Group Presidency on 23 June 2009**

The first problems the EPP had to solve were tactical: who would make the best allies, political and technical, for the purpose of securing the Presidency of the European Parliament in the first part of the term? And how to ensure that José Manuel Barroso was installed as President of the Commission within a timescale that suited the European Parliament’s political interests and with a sufficient majority to ensure that the future Commission came up with a programme that would restore the voters’ confidence? And then there were the negotiations within the Group over the appointments to the principal posts: the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the Group, the President and Vice-Presidents of Parliament, the chairmen of the parliamentary committees.

The d’Hondt system traditionally employed in the distribution of posts both in Parliament and in the Group would apply as usual, taking account of the results and the new balance of power, but the formation of the Groups had to be definitively established by the inaugural sitting in July in order to be operational.

Within the Group, the position was clear the day after the ballot. The CDU-CSU was still the biggest delegation, with 42 MEPs. It was followed by the Italian delegation with a total of 35 seats, divided between the new People of Freedom party (Popolo della Libertà, PDL), the product of a merger between Forza Italia and the National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale), the UDC, already represented in the Group by Carlo Casi-\(\)ini, and the newly elected member of the South Tyrolean People’s Party (Südtiroler Volkspartei, SVP). The French delegation had made spectacular gains, from 18 seats before the elections to 29 after, on the strength of Nicolas Sarkozy’s European campaign and the electorate’s refusal to fall in with the Socialist Party and François Bayrou’s Democratic Movement (Mouvement Démocratique, MoDem) and take the

\(\)a 144 of the 264 MEPs elected, i.e. 54.5 %, were returning MEPs.
opportunity to pass a vote of censure on the government. The Civic Platform of the Republic of Poland (Platforma Obywatelska Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, PORP) led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who had just hosted the EPP Congress in Warsaw, won 25 seats and the Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) 3, putting the Polish delegation in fourth place with 28 MEPs. The Spanish People’s Party held its ground, more or less, with 23 seats, the FIDESZ in Hungary won 14 seats, a highly spectacular score which augurs well for its future as it confronts the Socialists on the home front, and the Romanian delegation with 14 MEPs completes the club of countries with more than 10 seats. Portugal (10 MEPs), Greece (8), Bulgaria (6), Austria (6), Slovakia (6), Belgium (5), the Netherlands (5), Sweden (5), Lithuania (4), Ireland (4), Finland (4), Luxembourg (3), Slovenia (3), Malta (2), Cyprus (2), the Czech Republic – suffering from the impending departure of the ODS to join the ranks of the UK Conservatives – (2), Estonia (1), Denmark (1) and Latvia (3) complete this panorama of national delegations, the United Kingdom representatives being the only ones missing on election night.

The Group’s first formal decision, taken on 17 June by unanimous agreement with one abstention, was to amend its Rules of Procedure to resume the name it had gone under before the change made at the request of the UK Conservatives in 1999: ‘Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)’.

All references to the ‘European Democrats’ and the right of a section of the Group not to respect the EPP’s constitutional commitments were deleted.

One of the first decision-making days of the new parliamentary term came on 23 June 2009. At 3 pm, the reformed Group, chaired on this occasion by Hartmut Nassauer, an outgoing Vice-Chairman who had not stood for election again, elected the new Presidency. The only candidate for Chairman was Joseph Daul. Votes were cast by the 239 of the Group’s 264 members attending the meeting in Brussels. With 11 abstentions and three votes against, Joseph Daul was re-elected for a period of two and a half years with a very comfortable 225 votes. Immediately after, the Group elected the ten Vice-Chairmen. Eleven candidates made a brief presentation to the Group. The highest number of

---

a The Group’s 264 Members, as counted at the inaugural meeting of 23 June, were therefore all subject to Article 3 of the Rules of Procedure which stresses the European commitment and values linked to membership of the EPP Group: ‘(3). Members are committed to a policy, which, on the basis of a Constitution, pursues the process of federal unification and integration in Europe, which is a constituent element of the European Union as a Union of citizens and States.'
votes went to Jaime Mayor Oreja (200), Corien Wortmann-Kool (197), József Szájer (192), Manfred Weber (195), Vito Bonsignore (183). Othmar Karas (177), Rumiana Jeleva (167), Paulo Rangel (164), Marian-Jean Marinescu (132) and Ioannis Kasoulides (121) and they were duly elected.

Five of the outgoing Vice-Chairmen were therefore re-elected as well as five new Vice-Chairmen, the only unsuccessful candidate being the outgoing Vice-Chairman Gunnar Hökmark. The Presidency now had two women rather than one. There were also more women in the new Group than before: 88 women, i.e. 33 % of the Group’s members, a figure much in line with the average for the new Parliament, whereas the figure in the old Group had been 25 %.

Following this renewed vote of confidence, Joseph Daul spoke about the assets that the Group could put to good use during the delicate political negotiations to come. The EPP had 36 % of seats, the Socialists 25 % and the Liberals 11 %. The EPP accounted for the majority of the Council and the Commission. The Group had to take the initiative to draw up, working closely with José Manuel Durão Barroso, a pact for the parliamentary term which took up the core of the manifesto that the EPP had put to electors: a social market economy placing man and not speculation at the heart of the economy, completion of the single market, a security policy including energy and food autonomy, the judicious application of subsidiarity, definition of the Union’s final frontiers and a common immigration policy.a

How could a large enough majority be found in Parliament to achieve these goals? Alliances would need to be formed for both the technical agreement which would govern the distribution of posts of responsibility within Parliament for the two halves of the parliamentary term and the political agreement under which the new Commission could be invested.

As regards the nomination of the Group’s candidate for President of Parliament, to be elected on 15 July, the Group considered, as the leading political force, that it should occupy this post for the first half of the parliamentary term. If there was no agreement by 7 July between the Italian delegation which supported Mario Mauro and the Polish delegation which supported Jerzy Buzek, a decision would be made by a vote within the Group.

From the point of view of discussions with the other Groups on the date and conditions of investiture of the President of the Commission,

a Acting on the basis of the Community model within the EU, they define their values and aims in line with the current election programme of the EPP, in accordance with principles such as freedom and democracy, as well as the rule of law, respect for human rights and subsidiarity.’
it was felt on 24 June that no decision could be made before the first official meeting of the Group Chairmen. That provided a period for thought and negotiation which could be used to find out more about everyone’s strategies. It was in that spirit that the EPP Group met in Athens in Greece from 29 to 30 July to say their farewells to the outgoing MEPs, award some of them the Schuman medal and offer the new MEPs a chance to get to know everyone.

**Intensive preparations for the inaugural session from 14 to 16 July 2009**

On returning from Athens, where 700 people had attended the meetings, the picture was clearer and the final negotiations took off. Mario Mauro announced that, in a spirit of Group solidarity and unity, he would withdraw his candidacy for President of Parliament. Jerzy Buzek would thus be the only candidate and the Group confirmed his appointment on 7 July. Joseph Daul was here, there and everywhere. After Athens, he met the new Swedish Presidency of the Union in Stockholm. The new Presidency felt that the parliamentary investiture of the President of the Commission should be delayed to July. The Group took note of this preference which was supported by a broad majority in Parliament. In the meantime, the Group Chairman had two negotiations to pursue: first with the other political Groups which were reforming in order to distribute the chairmanships of the committees and interparliamentary delegations. A technical agreement was reached with the new Socialist Group, now known as the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) to take account of the inclusion of the Italian Democrats, with 184 seats. Under this agreement, the EPP candidate would be President of Parliament during the first half of the parliamentary term and, in return, the EPP would support the S&D candidate for the second half of the term. This technical agreement also included the Liberal Group (ALDE), which had 84 seats and had just elected the former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt as its leader, as regards the distribution of committee chairmanships. The three main Groups endeavoured to find a consensus which would make it possible not to resort to the inflexible d’Hondt method and to award the chairmanships in line with the wishes and relative weight of each Group. In parallel, the Group Chairman had to convince the EPP’s national delegations as far as possible to reach amicable agreements so that the wishes of MEPs, rightly keen to obtain the responsibilities that they preferred, could be met.

The week of 7 to 10 July was largely taken up with meetings between the Presidency and the Heads of Delegations. Compromises, difficult
to reach in some cases, common sense and amicable discussions made it possible to decide who should occupy which posts during the forthcoming two and a half years.

The Group Chairman did everything he could to prevent the inevitable trade-offs surrounding the distribution of posts, the limited number of which could obviously not satisfy all the demands of MEPs, whether old hands or newly elected, from leading to frustration or disappointment. His experience and his taste for pragmatic agreements made this work easier and sustained the climate of optimism which prevailed during these two weeks in which the EPP was savouring its success in the elections.

More good news for the EPP family came on 5 July: the Group now had 265 members as it had been joined by a Finnish MEP. The parliamentary elections in Bulgaria had also given the GERB Party an absolute majority with the result that the EPP accounted for 14 serving Prime Ministers in the European Union. Wilfried Martens was thus able, on that same day, to congratulate the EPP on the fact that for first time in the history of the enlarged Union it held an absolute majority in the European Council.

**The election of Jerzy Buzek, the EPP’s first success in the new parliamentary term**

The election, on 14 July 2009, of Jerzy Buzek as President of Parliament in the first round with 555 votes against the 89 votes of his Swedish adversary, Eva-Britt Svensson, confirmed the EPP’s influence in the new Parliament. By giving such a massive majority to the EPP candidate, Parliament was paying homage to the Group’s choice of this former Prime Minister of Poland, co-founder of the Solidarność movement, whose contribution to freeing Europe from Communism had been so great. Twenty years after the democratic revolution which had freed half the continent, five years after the accession of his country and the other former ‘people’s democracies’ to the Union, his election expressed, with considerable symbolic force, Europe’s desire for freedom and turned a new page in the history of European integration.

‘*We no longer have a Western Europe and an Eastern Europe, we have a single Europe*’, concluded Joseph Daul in his speech congratulating the new President on his election. For the outgoing President, Hans-Gert Pöttering, this ‘handing on of the baton’ also had a powerful emotional significance. Parliament genuinely seemed to be, in minds and in hearts, the most promising place for durable reconciliation between peoples and for future development of the dynamic of European integration.
Explaining the meaning of the Group’s history


Our aims have been twofold:

– First, to relate and explain the main events involved in European integration over this period, breaking it down into three broad cycles in an attempt to view them as a sort of dialectic progression: post-war reconciliation, which gave western Europeans a desire for reconstruction, then the consolidation of peace through ambitious objectives such as the Single Market and the single currency, and finally the reform of the European Union after the end of Communism and the reunification of the continent of Europe. The introduction of universal suffrage as the means of appointing MEPs after 1979 was a crucial factor in changing the dynamic of the European Parliament and of the EPP Group. The democratically-elected Parliament has gradually gained greater power within the Community’s decision-making triangle, and this has brought direct benefits for the political groups as key players, especially the group that has been numerically strongest since 1999.

– Second, to make sense of this historic process by identifying the values underpinning it, which have been a constant source of energy and momentum, rescuing it from possible failure on several occasions. Every one of those involved in this history on whatever level, whether personal or otherwise, will have his or her own impression and memory of events. But they will all very probably feel sure that beyond the events themselves, all the hours and days spent in the Group and in Parliament had meaning, a profound meaning, which answered the needs of the people of Europe, improving their lives and giving them greater security and freedom.

If those who took part in the Group’s day-to-day life, its high points and its routines, its meetings and visits, who in some way identified
with the institution, feeling that they were involved in a very signifi-
cant and emotional process, if those people recognise themselves in
this book, then the author will have achieved what he set out to do.

**Crisis as symptoms of change**

The timetable of events highlights the various crises that occurred and
gives an impression of the ‘stop and go’ progress made. These are all
part of our attempt to explain the history of Europe and of the Group.
They are even a sign of the change that has been a constant factor, trig-
gering resistance, highlighting rigidity, and even leading to violent
rejection, such as the failure of the EDC in 1954, the ‘empty chair crisis’
in 1965, the vetoed British applications in 1961 and 1967, the referenda
rejecting the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark in June 1992 and the Lis-
bon Treaty in France and the Netherlands in May 2005. Crises, in the
broader sense of the serious economic and social problems that Euro-
pean countries have faced to varying degrees since 1973, the date of
the first oil crisis, and which have returned with unexpected severity since
the 2009 recession, have also been a factor of uncertainty in European
integration. They are a test of Europe's solidarity, tempting countries to
take the easy way out through protectionism and borrowing. They have
usually been overcome through cooperation and the introduction of
new mechanisms of joint action to tackle them. No-one in the EPP
Group would want to ignore the disastrous consequences that ensued
when democracies were unable to work together politically to over-
come the 1929 crisis. A protracted recession was followed by the rise of
totalitarianism and war. Today, the people of Europe will have to do
whatever is necessary to prevent such a scenario from happening
again.

**Conviction and tolerance**

Their name may have changed, but the core political principles which
inspired the generations of parliamentarians and officials described in
this history have remained the same. If they had to be summarised
in two words, however much this might be an over-simplification, they
would be conviction and tolerance.

**Conviction: Europe must always be united**

Europe is a necessity. Not an inevitable development nor a mechanical
system, much less an infernal machine run by technocrats, as it has
been described by its critics, whether pro-Soviet interventionists on the far left or nationalists on the far right, fanning the flames of xenophobia and racism and opposing any sharing of sovereignty. It is an objective necessity which merely reflects the path that world history has taken since the end of the 19th century: the quickening pace of progress and technological development has given the human race new opportunities, easing its suffering, widening the scope for initiative and giving its work greater value.

Expansion in the west energised its nations, but also had the adverse effect of spreading colonialism and encouraging the excesses that led to the outbreak of the First World War. Too much self-confidence, too much greed for territory, too much national glorification and the desire for domination all combined to produce the unthinkable: millions of men all over the continent cheerfully heading off to fight, confident of a quick victory, dragging in one republic, monarchy or empire after another from the Atlantic to the Urals and the Bosphorus, like some tragic game of dominos.

Stefan Zweig tried to explain the inexplicable in his wonderful book ‘The World of Yesterday’ (‘Die Welt von Gestern’, 1941), which describes the magnificence of the late 19th century, with universal exhibitions displaying each nation’s most spectacular achievements, the confidence in science and technology with their boundless possibilities, the splendid architecture adorning Paris, Berlin, Madrid and London, the spirit of tolerance in which Habsburg society was developing, the fraternisation between the British, Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian monarchies with their close family ties... All of that was blown to pieces in just a few short weeks, despite timid protests from pacifists who were quickly shut out of the debate. Zweig’s despair and oversensitive nature led him to commit suicide in 1943 at the height of the Second World War, worn down by the realisation that the sufferings of the First World War had not been enough to turn man against barbarity. If only he had found the patience and the hope to wait just a few months longer, for there were at the same time other men with stronger nerves, who resisted Nazism and Stalinism and glimpsed the dawn of a new era.

As early as March 1943, Jean Monnet, writing in Algiers, outlined his idea for a democratic Europe permanently freed from the mistakes of the past on the basis of a single promise: to share sovereignty within democratic, egalitarian institutions. And not, at any cost, to repeat the mistakes made after the 1918 armistice, when empires were arbitrarily plundered, paving the way for new nationalisms, when the punishment of the vanquished generated the desire for revenge, when the new
League of Nations\textsuperscript{1055} proved to be ineffective, paralysed by the use of the veto, and when democracies were weakened by repeated attacks from populists and extremists. The note from Algiers\textsuperscript{1056} formed the basis of the principles set out in the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950. The Christian Democrats were subsequently responsible for fleshing out this vision and keeping this new ‘community’ structure established by the Treaties of Paris and Rome on course. They shared with the Socialists and Liberals in Parliament the burden of protecting this consensus, even though the legitimate rivalry that pits the democratic political forces in each of our countries against each other has led each Group to pursue its own line in the day-to-day exercise of Parliament’s powers.

\textit{Families need to be tolerant}

The second key factor which explains the EPP Group’s success in its political activities is that it always respects the identity of each of its national delegations and MEPs. Without a spirit of tolerance, enshrined in its Rules of Procedure and in the approach of its leadership, and practised by Group Chairmen from Emmanuel Sassen to Joseph Daul, the Group could not have taken advantage of its pre-eminent position within Parliament.

The sociological changes in European societies over the last 60 years, as they have gone through economic reconstruction, full employment, urbanisation, the consumer society, then the first oil crises, stagflation, globalisation, financial crises, the transition to the post-industrial era and job instability, have had a considerable impact on the political forces represented in the EPP Group. The politicians who have followed one another at the head of the Group must be given credit for adapting the Group as the national parties have changed their configurations, and for integrating emerging parties in post-Communist Europe.

Three men have played a defining role in this process of adaptation, without which the Christian-Democratic Group would probably have, if not been marginalised, then at least undergone something of a decline and a loss of leadership: Helmut Kohl, Wilfried Martens and Hans-Gert Pöttering. They join the ranks of leaders capable of showing pragmatism, alongside those in the previous generation who worked to build up a powerful and pluralist group: Robert Schuman, Alain Poher, Hans-August Lücker and Egon Klepsch.
Lessons to be learned from the British episode

If tolerance is a virtue and one of the core values underpinning the Christian Democrat doctrine, it has certainly faced some stern tests over the years. The saga of the EPP Group’s tumultuous relationship with the British Conservatives has been a long and convoluted one, and given the ‘hidden march of history’, its outcome in 2009 should perhaps be seen as just the latest of its many ups and downs.

The Conservatives were initially reluctant to join the Group even though most of them were in favour of building a European Community in the 1960s and 1970s, when they were led by pro-Europeans such as Harold McMillan, Edward Heath and Chris Patten, but they finally agreed to join the ‘biggest non-socialist Group’ on 1 May 1992. At the same time a new generation of Tory leaders influenced by the neo-liberal doctrine and strong personality of Margaret Thatcher were taking control of the Conservative Party. This paradox was hard for the Christian Democrats to handle. The precautions which both Egon Klepsch and Leo Tindemans took to establish whether the new arrivals were genuinely pro-European show just how determined the Group was to retain its essential identity while taking advantage of the benefits of the growth in its numbers.

The UK’s special position in the European Community dates back to the very early days, when Clement Attlee’s Labour Government refused to support the basic principles set out in the Schuman Declaration. ‘They are non-negotiable’ they were told by Jean Monnet, who had been asked in May 1950 by Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer to sound out Britain, Italy and the Benelux countries about the Franco-German proposal. By not joining the EEC until 1973, the British undoubtedly deprived themselves of the sort of standing that comes from being a founder member of a club.

Having acquired the status of an ‘associate member’ of the Group in 1992, the Conservatives then persuaded it to become the ‘EPP-ED Group’ in 1999. They went on to test the spirit of tolerance of various Chairmen who had to manage this new configuration. Some national delegations and individual MEPs voiced their misgivings or even opposition to the concessions made to the British, particularly the 2004 changes to the Rules of Procedure which allowed them to express views that went against the Group’s overwhelming support for the European Constitution adopted by the Convention in 2003.

The departure in June 2004 of the Italians from the PPI, the French from the UDF led by François Bayrou, and Gérard Deprez, a fervent pro-European from the PSC in Belgium, had much to do with domestic
politics, but they also seized on the British problem as a reason to leave a Group which, in their view, had been too willing to compromise and had undermined the very foundation of the Christian Democrat heritage. The other delegations felt that it was worth making a few concessions to keep the Group in its dominant position, thanks to its considerable numerical superiority over the Socialist Group. The ‘mainstream’ of the EPP Group felt that the Conservatives, most of whom were working constructively in parliamentary committees away from the constitutional debate, had a place in the EPP-ED configuration. The ED section also meant that Czech MEPs from the ODS party, who shared the Conservatives’ Eurosceptic views, could be included as well.

The Conservative Party leadership, keen not to disappoint activists won over by David Cameron’s commitment to leave the EPP Group and form a new Group, applied all its powers of persuasion, and so when the outgoing Conservative MEPs, who were to stand in the elections on the basis of that commitment, left in spring 2009, the Group felt that this was simply confirming an expected split.

Strasbourg, 11 March 2009. The meeting between the Presidency and the heads of delegation began. Joseph Daul made an important announcement. He had just returned with the head of the British delegation, Timothy Kirkhope, and the Secretary-General from talks with William Hague, David Cameron’s personal representative – the same William Hague with whom Wilfried Martens, Hans-Gert Pöttering and the other EPP leaders had negotiated the Málaga agreement in July 1999 giving the British Conservatives a special status in the Group. The decision which David Cameron had announced to Joseph Daul in London in November 2008 was now definite: the British Conservatives elected on 7 June 2009 would no longer sit with the Group. They intended to set up a new Group with the Czechs from the ODS Party and other partners.

Joseph Daul summed up the situation in a few words: the Conservatives had unilaterally ended their partnership with the EPP for the coming term. It was an ‘amicable separation, not a divorce’, according to the Group Chairman, who regretted but accepted the Conservatives’ decision. The heads of delegation gave their reactions in turn, some expressing regret, others calling for clarification. The work of most of the outgoing British members was applauded in a spirit of friendship, yet the atmosphere was sombre, with everyone aware that this was a major event in the life of the Group. But thoughts needed to turn to the future. The Chairman noted that there was now no reason for the ED section of the Group to exist, that the rules would therefore be amended,
and that in future only MEPs belonging to the EPP would be admitted to the Group. It was felt essential to make this clear with the European elections approaching.

The Chairman and the head of the British delegation also agreed that a very responsible approach was needed in dealing with the cases of members of the Secretariat working for the ED section.

Any future collaboration with the new Group that the British Conservatives would try to forge would depend on their political choices and also on the alliances made by the EPP, which hoped to remain the leading party ahead of the PES in the next Parliament.

There is one simple conclusion to be drawn from the 17 years of this arranged marriage and the ensuing amicable separation: political expediency does not work in the long term if it undermines an organisation’s core values and authenticity. The Christian Democrats and the moderates who have gradually joined them, particularly from the UMP in France, Forza Italia in Italy, the Partido Popular in Spain, the Nordic Conservatives and the parties of Central and Eastern Europe, have faithfully maintained a consistent line with their voters. Since the very beginning of European integration this line has included the idea of a union that operates as a balancing force in the world and that is capable of taking action thanks to its carefully constructed unity and internal solidarity, based on strong, democratic institutions. Robert Schuman and his contemporaries laid the lasting foundations for a pro-European consensus that no party in this family can turn its back on without losing its own identity.

The voters appear to have agreed that authenticity is needed if a political message is to be credible. The EPP Group, having shed the ED section, consolidated its advantage over the Socialist Group by retaining its position as the leading political force after the June 2009 elections. The British Conservatives were not as successful as they had hoped, dropping from 27 to 25 seats, and even helped to boost the most radical, anti-European faction among the British voters, who elected 13 MEPs from the UKIP Party, which advocates the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union.

The new ‘founding members’ of a reunited Europe

The British episode cannot overshadow what has to be the Group’s most outstanding success in the first decade of this century: the progressive integration, painstakingly prepared and supported by the EPP Party and Group, of the new democratic parties of Central and Eastern Europe who joined in 2004 and, in the case of Romania and Bulgaria,
2007. It was a huge challenge and one which the EPP Group rose to brilliantly, reaping enormous rewards. But these parliamentarians from both sides of what was for so long an impenetrable Iron Curtain, divided by the violence of the Cold War, still need to listen to each other very carefully. The ‘Western Europeans’ certainly need to try to gain a greater understanding of what Communism was like, and how traumatised people felt at being abandoned after Yalta, when the West rapidly gave in to Stalin’s threats, and the pressure of his tanks and missiles. The EPP Group feels it is extremely important to recognise the suffering that people endured in Prague, Warsaw and Budapest, in the Baltic States, which were annexed, and in Bucharest and Sofia, abandoned to the whims of megalomaniac dictators. When the Group Bureau met in Gdansk on 2 September 2005, it rightly pointed out that the members of Solidarność deserved to be regarded as ‘founder members’ for the part they played in achieving this new Europe. Their spirit of resistance and their faith in the values which enabled them to emerge morally stronger from the years of persecution and isolation made them genuine Europeans. As early as 1979 Pope John Paul II had told the people of Poland and the whole of subjugated Europe: ‘Be not afraid!’. His dramatic appeal gave people heart.

The conclusion to be drawn, after revisiting all these events, is that the EPP Group is now, in 2009, dealing with an entirely new Europe. The spirit of the Founding Fathers, the core values, are still there for everyone to refer to, just as Barack Obama’s America invokes the spirit of Lincoln, Hamilton and Jefferson. But the world has changed profoundly, and with the spirit of peace now firmly rooted in society, there is no identifiable threat that might lead the younger generations to take up arms against each other, as they did in 1914. Only Jihadist terrorism has adopted a deadly and ruthless hostility towards Europe and all other democratic societies. Young people in Europe would now be absolutely astonished and frustrated if they had to face border controls, the disappearance of the euro, compartmentalised labour markets and no possibility of attending universities outside their country of origin.

The responsibility of the next generations

The seventh term of the directly elected European Parliament, which began in July 2009, will come to an end in July 2014. The EPP Group’s huge success in so dramatically consolidating its lead over the Socialist Group has given it the heavy responsibility of having to take most of the main political initiatives in the 2009-2014 term.
August 1914, July 2014: it is a strange coincidence that almost exactly a century to the day separates the collapse of ‘yesterday’s world’, so beloved of Stefan Zweig, and the birth of tomorrow’s world, of a Europe that could well be about to incorporate the western Balkans, including Bosnia and its capital, Sarajevo, where the shot rang out that set the continent ablaze and changed the course of history.

New chapters in the history of the EPP Group will be written by future generations, the MEPs elected in 2009, then in 2014 and so on for as long as representative democracy is one of the forces driving European integration. Croats, Greeks, Irish, Lithuanians, Spanish, perhaps 35 different nations will have to learn how, in a spirit of mutual respect, to run a Europe that has no choice but to play its part in the new distribution of roles between Asia, Africa, Russia, the Mediterranean and America.

There are still some huge challenges to be faced: restoring confidence and stability in the Balkans, overcoming ethnic irredentism through peace, finding ways to establish the fullest possible partnership with Turkey in the hope that this great country might one day be fully integrated into the EU if it accepts all the conditions and consequences that this entails. There will be dialogue with Russia, so strong and yet so weak, with America, undergoing such great changes, with Africa, still struggling to escape from unacceptable poverty, and with the southern Mediterranean countries, so desperate to develop, whose fate is inextricably linked to our own.

We will also, in the months and years to come, have to find the answers needed to be able to run a well-organised liberal economy in which there must be greater harmony between market forces and social forces, guaranteeing growth while also protecting those most in need.

**Five conditions for the future success of the EPP**

The conditions for the EPP Group to remain the driving force of a democratic Europe are the same ones that have stood it in such good stead up to now:

– Close cooperation between the Group and the Party, each fulfilling its own political function, but serving the same values. From the time it was set up in 1976 to the introduction of the interinstitutional rules enabling the Group to have its own funding and separate structure since 2004, the Party has been less financially dependent and has been developing an increasingly wide range of political activities. In 2009 the Party included 74 national parties in 39 different countries. Having Wilfried Martens as its President ever since 1990 has ensured an
unswervingly loyal working relationship with the Group, which he himself chaired from 1994 to 1999. However, the Group has also done everything it can to diversify its political activities beyond its traditional parliamentary duties. The most important thing is that the strategic activities of both organisations, which embody the same political family, are adequately coordinated, both in preparing for election campaigns and in diplomacy with the new parties in the candidate countries and the Neighbourhood Policy states. In ending the need for an ED section, the departure of the British and Czech members of the Group in June 2009 will make the political relationship between the Group and the Party even clearer and should make it easier for them to cooperate and to get their message across to the outside world.

– Growing openness to national parliaments and to civil society in Europe, to ensure that Parliament is not seen as an institution cut off from national realities and far removed from the day-to-day concerns of Europe’s citizens.

– Applying the culture of tolerance on a day-to-day basis, without which the ever-increasing diversity between the national delegations in the Group could generate misunderstanding and paralyse joint action.

– Respect for the Group’s values, sound knowledge of its roots, and an internal organisation that can devise strategies that the public can understand.

– A Secretariat that works for the general good of the Group. Attention should focus here on strong leadership from the Presidency and Secretaries-General, who have always ensured a spirit of supranational cooperation within the Secretariat. The Secretary-General must constantly resist pressure from the national delegations, who always try, every time there is a new Parliament and new Group leadership, to commandeer officials in the Secretariat on the basis of nationality. He is the one who tends to receive all the requests, so it is up to him to point out the rules governing the status of Secretariat staff. Without the continuity provided by the Secretariat, the Group would have no influence at all in the parliamentary committees and in plenary votes in Parliament. The Group’s credibility in its political relations with the other Groups depends on its internal discipline, the technical ability of its advisers, and its image as a partner which always follows a consistent political line. The logistics involved in the hour-by-hour operation of a structure that involves 288 MEPs and the same number of officials from 27 Member States, working in 23 languages in both Strasbourg and Brussels, require a high degree of professionalism and personal commitment. The MEPs also employ one or more personal assistants.
under special rules which have now been adopted by Parliament’s Bureau and will come into operation in July 2009.

‘Europe is a matter of war and peace’

The roots of the EPP Group lie deep within the history of Christian Democracy and the moderate parties which shaped the political landscape of Europe’s centre and centre-right, some of them even before the Second World War, and most of them just afterwards. The roots are strong because the philosophy they draw on constantly strives to reconcile freedom and solidarity, economic efficiency and respect for basic rules, initiative and respect for Judeo-Christian values.

These roots have enabled the Christian-Democratic and EPP Group to play a decisive role in the history of Parliament and European integration. The legacy handed down to the next generation of MEPs elected in 2009 is substantial. Will it be enough to meet the seemingly dangerous, if not daunting, challenges that face us in this first period of the 21st century? Our countries are being battered by the effects of global warming and ecological disasters, by outbreaks of diseases that know no borders, and by the worst financial crisis since 1929, which has shaken the global banking system to the core, ratcheted up unemployment and threatened Europe’s weakest economies with collapse and social unrest.

Now more than ever, Europe’s response must be concerted and mutually supportive. Europe is not the cause of the crisis; it was invented to respond to it on a scale and with the critical mass of resources needed in the irresistible and irreversible force that is the new global economy.

Are we facing an economic war, then? Or just a war of posturing, with all the destabilisation it brings? There will be no second chance for the people of Europe if they do not continue on the path that they have pursued so clear-sightedly and bravely for the last 60 years. ‘Europe is a matter of war and peace’, as Helmut Kohl never tires of telling us. Jean Monnet, when asked what should be done when one of the many crises that punctuated the history of European integration occurred, sapping people’s morale and will, he calmly replied ‘Carry on, carry on, carry on’.
ANNEXES
Part one: the pioneers (1952-1979)

19 September 1946  Speech by Winston Churchill in Zurich launching an appeal for Franco-German reconciliation and the integration of continental Europe; he calls for the creation of ‘a United States of Europe, or whatever name it may take’.

May-June 1947 In Chaudfontaine (Belgium), congress setting up the ‘Nouvelles Équipes Internationales’ (NEI), precursor of the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUDC). A working party is tasked with drawing up proposals for Europe’s reorganisation.

5 June 1947  Marshall Plan: US aid for Europe is refused by the USSR which also forces its satellites not to take the aid.

4 April 1949  Treaty of Washington creating the Atlantic Alliance.

9 May 1950 Declaration by Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, inspired by Jean Monnet, proposing the pooling of coal and steel production in France and Germany in a supranational organisation open to other countries: ‘the first step in the federation of Europe’.

18 April 1951  Signature of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) between the Six: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg.

27 May 1952  Signature in Paris of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) between the Six.

10 August 1952  Inauguration in Luxembourg of the High Authority with Jean Monnet as President.

10 September 1952  Inaugural session in Strasbourg of the ECSC’s Common Assembly (78 Members appointed from the six national parliaments).

11 September 1952  (Unofficial) constitution of the CD Group in the Common Assembly. Emmanuel Sassen is elected Chairman.

13 September 1952  The Common Assembly accepts the proposal by the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to create an ‘Ad Hoc Assembly’ to draw up a draft European constitution.

9 March 1953  Adoption of the draft treaty establishing a European Political Community by the Ad Hoc Assembly.

23 June 1953  Lodging of the declaration creating the CD Group in the Common Assembly and its official recognition under Rule 33 bis of the Rules of Procedure in force on that date (38 Members).

11 May 1954  Election of Alcide De Gasperi as President of the ECSC Common Assembly (he died on 19 August 1954).

20 May 1954  Appointment of Hans-Joachim Opitz (DE) as Secretary-General of the CD Group in the ECSC Common Assembly.

30 August 1954  The French Parliament rejects the EDC even though it had already been ratified by Germany and the Benelux countries.
29 November 1954  Election of Giuseppe Pella (IT) as President of the ECSC Common Assembly.
1-2 June 1955  Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Six in Messina. Political agreement on the relaunch of European integration. The Foreign Ministers decide to set up a committee chaired by Paul-Henri Spaak. The work of the Spaak Committee provides a starting point for the negotiation of the Treaties of Rome.
27 November 1956  Election of Hans Furler (DE) as President of the Common Assembly.
25 March 1957  Signature in Rome of the two Treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The signatory States wish to create, on the basis of these Treaties, 'an ever closer union among the people of Europe'.
1 January 1958  Entry into force of the Treaties of Rome. Walter Hallstein, a close colleague of Konrad Adenauer, is appointed President of the Commission of the EEC.
24 February 1958  Election of Pierre Wigny (BE) as Chairman of the CD Group in the Parliamentary Assembly.
27 February 1958  Massive vote in favour of a common assembly to supervise the three Communities. This assembly is to be known as the European Parliamentary Assembly.
19 March 1958  Meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the three European Communities. With 67 Members out of 142, the Christian Democrats are the largest Group. Robert Schuman, the only candidate from all the political groups, is elected President of the Assembly.
3-11 July 1958  Conference of Ministers at Stresa to discuss the goals of a Common Agricultural Policy.
6 October 1958  Election of Alain Poher (FR) as Chairman of the CD Group.
1 January 1960  Appointment of Carl Otto Lenz (DE) as Secretary-General of the CD Group in the Parliamentary Assembly.
4 January 1960  Stockholm Convention establishing EFTA (European Free Trade Association) between the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria and Portugal.
28 March 1960  Election of Hans Furler (CD/DE) as President of the Parliamentary Assembly.
17 May 1960  The Parliamentary Assembly adopts a draft convention on European elections by direct universal suffrage.
5 September 1960  General de Gaulle is in favour of a ‘Europe of States’.
9 August 1961  The United Kingdom applies to join the EEC.
17 April 1962  Paris Conference: failure of the plan for political union (failure of the Fouchet plan).
14 January 1963  Press conference by General de Gaulle rejecting the accession to the EEC of the United Kingdom and the other candidate countries.
21 March 1964  Election of Jean Duvieusart (CD/BE) as President of the European Parliament.
8 April 1965  The Merger Treaty providing for a single Council and a single Commission for the ECSC, EEC and Euratom.
1 July 1965  Start of the ‘empty chair crisis’: against the increase in the powers of the Commission and Parliament, France stops attending the negotiation meetings in Brussels because of differences over the financing of the CAP and the respective powers and resources of the Commission and the European Parliament.
Chronology

24 September 1965  Election of Victor Leemans (CD/BE) as President of the European Parliament.
December 1965  In Taormina, the NEI becomes the ‘European Union of Christian Democrats’ (EUDC). Mariano Rumor and Leo Tindemans are elected President and Secretary-General respectively.
28-29 January 1966  Luxembourg compromise reached by the Six to resolve the ‘empty chair crisis’. The treaties are not amended, but France manages to ensure that decisions of the Council of Ministers must still be unanimous.
1 February 1966  Appointment of Arnaldo Ferragni (IT) as Secretary-General of the CD Group.
9 March 1966  Election of Joseph Illerhaus (DE) as Chairman of the CD Group.
1 July 1966  Entry into force of the merger of the three executives of the Communities (ECSC, EEC and Euratom Commissions).
6 July 1967  Jean Rey replaces Walter Hallstein as President of the single Commission.
27 November 1967  Second veto by General de Gaulle of the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark.
1 July 1968  Inauguration of the industrial and agricultural common market.
21 August 1968  During the night, troops from the five member States of the Warsaw Pact (USSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria) invade Czechoslovakia.
27 April 1969  General de Gaulle leaves office.
17 July 1969  Agreement on the Barre plan for monetary cooperation.
1-2 December 1969  The Hague Summit (Netherlands). Adoption of the ‘triptych’: completion (agricultural financial regulation), deepening (economic and monetary union and political cooperation), enlargement (lifting of the French veto on the United Kingdom and the other candidate countries). This Summit restarts the process of European integration.
21-22 April 1970  Signature of the Treaty of Luxembourg establishing a new budgetary procedure and the agreement setting out a final financial regulation for the financing of the CAP. From 1 January 1975, the Community budget will have its own resources. The new provisions create genuine powers for Parliament, which is no longer a consultative body.
8 October 1970  Adoption of the Werner report on economic and monetary union.
December 1970  Poland: strikes and demonstrations by workers start in Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin.
22 January 1972  Signature of the Treaties of Accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway (rejected by referendum in Norway on 25 September).
24 April 1972  Creation of the European Monetary Snake (margin of fluctuation of some 2.25%).
19-21 October 1972  Paris Summit: first Summit of the Nine at which it is decided to turn the EC into the European Union. This Summit disappoints the CD Group whose goal is to step up the role of Parliament in the name of democracy.
1 December 1972  Appointment of Alfredo De Pol as Secretary-General of the CD Group.
1 January 1973  The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark become Members of the EC.
16 January 1973  The number of Members of Parliament is increased to 198.
9-10 December 1974  Second Paris Summit. At the initiative of the French President, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the European Council is created in order regularly to bring
together the Heads of State and Government, unanimity on all issues is no longer required and the EP is to be elected by universal suffrage.

21 February 1975  The EUCD asks Wilfried Martens (CVP/BE) and Hans-August Lücker to draw up a statute and a political manifesto for a 'Party of CDs of the Member States of the EC' for the forthcoming elections to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage.

22 July 1975  Signature of the second Convention amending certain budgetary provisions; the main innovations are the recognition of the EP and the Council of Ministers as the EC’s budgetary authority, the introduction of a conciliation procedure between the EP and the Council of Ministers with the participation of the Commission, and the creation of a Court of Auditors.

1 August 1975  Helsinki Final Act establishing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

9 September 1975  Alfred Bertrand (BE) is elected Chairman of the CD Group.

28 July 1977  Spain officially submits its application for accession to the EC.

7 and 10 June 1979  First elections of MEPs by direct universal suffrage (the EPP gaining 32.8 out of 111 million votes). The EPP has 107 out of a total of 410 MEPs.

17 July 1979  The Group changes its name to Group of the European People’s Party (European Democrats).

13 December 1979  The European Parliament rejects the 1980 Community budget by a majority of 288 votes to 64 with one abstention.


November 1980  The Group has 40 staff, 20 in rue Belliard and 20 in Luxembourg. 60 further staff are to be recruited. An administrative service is to be set up in the Secretariat.

1 January 1981  Greece becomes the 10th Member State of the Community. The number of MEPs is increased to 434. Members from the Nea Demokratia (New Democracy) party sit in Parliament as independents (European elections are held in Greece on 18 October 1981).


Chronology

12 January 1982    Draft treaty presented by the EPP Group (on the first phase of the European Union).
20 January 1982    Paolo Barbi is elected Chairman of the EPP Group in the European Parliament.
6 May 1982        Event entitled ‘Europe without frontiers’ organised by the EPP Group in Aachen. The EPP Group is in favour of reducing border controls.
14 February 1984  Adoption of the draft treaty establishing the European Union (Spinelli treaty) by the European Parliament with substantial support from the EPP Group.
14 and 17 June 1984 Second elections to the European Parliament. The EPP Group has 110 out of 484 MEPs.
18 July 1984      Re-election of Egon Klepsch as Chairman of the EPP Group.
January 1985      The new Commission takes office with Jacques Delors as President.
10 March 1985     Mikhail Gorbachev becomes General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR.
14 June 1985      Signature of the Schengen Agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at common borders (Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands).
9 September 1985  Opening of the Intergovernmental Conference in Luxembourg. The decision to open an intergovernmental conference was taken at the Milan Summit of 28-29 June 1985.
1 January 1986    Accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Community. Spain and Portugal become the 11th and 12th Member States of the European Communities. Members of the Portuguese CDS party and the Spanish parties Unión de Centro Democrático, Partido Nacionalista Vasco and Unió Democràtica de Catalunya join the EPP Group. Parliament has 518 MEPs. The EPP Group has 118 MEPs.
17-18 February 1986 Signature of the Single European Act (SEA) in Luxembourg.
15 March 1986     Appointment of Sergio Guccione (IT) as Secretary-General of the EPP Group.
8 July 1986       Inauguration of the Schuman Medal by the EPP Group to celebrate the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Robert Schuman.
4 December 1986   Re-election of Egon Klepsch as Chairman of the EPP Group.
20 January 1987   Election of Lord Plumb, leader of the British Conservative MEPs, as President of the European Parliament. He is elected with the support of the EPP.
9 May 1987        With reference to the date of the declaration by Robert Schuman (9 May), and following the adoption of the Adonnino report on a citizens’ Europe (28-29 May 1985), the Commission establishes 9 May as Europe Day.
14 June 1987      10 Members of the EPP Group meet 10 Members of the PES Group to work out a procedure for the implementation of the Single Act (‘The Commission’s 130 pending proposals’) and for cooperation between the two Secretariats.
1 July 1987       Entry into force of the Single European Act. From that date, the EPP Group cooperates to some extent with the Socialist Group to make it possible for Parliament to obtain the majorities that it needs if it is to play a full role in the cooperation procedure needed for the completion of the Single Market.
27 June 1988      Hanover European Council. Creation of an ad hoc committee to draw up proposals on monetary union. A Group of Experts is invited by the European Council to think about a European monetary area with a single currency. The Group is chaired by Jacques Delors.
8 August 1988     Adoption by the Presidency of the EPP Group’s new logo: ‘EPP, The Heart of Europe’.
15-18 June 1989   Third direct elections to the European Parliament. The member parties of the EPP Group (including the Spanish Partido Popular party which leaves the Conservatives for the EPP Group) win 121 seats. The EP has 518 seats.
26-27 June 1989  Madrid European Council: Decision to open an intergovernmental conference. The European Council decides to follow the Delors Plan and to open new negotiations to achieve economic and monetary union.
17 July 1989  Austria applies for accession. Re-election of Egon Klepsch (EPP/DE) as Chairman of the EPP Group.
18 October 1989  Creation by the EPP Group of the Foundation for Christian Democrat Cooperation in Europe (which becomes the Robert Schuman Foundation in 1994).
29 October-2 November 1989  The EPP Group Presidency visits Hungary.
9 November 1989  The fall of the Berlin Wall marks the end of Germany’s division.
22 December 1989  Fall of Ceauşescu in Romania.
8-12 January 1990  Meeting of the Group in Berlin (Germany). Meeting at the Reichstag and visit to East Berlin to meet representatives of CDU Est, the Churches and Demokratischer Aufbruch.
10 May 1990  Election of Wilfried Martens, Belgian Prime Minister, as President of the EPP.
19 June 1990  The Benelux countries, France and West Germany sign the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 1985 on the gradual abolition of checks at the common borders of the signatory countries.
1 July 1990  Entry into force of the first stage of Economic and Monetary Union.
3 October 1990  German reunification.
14-16 November 1990  VIIIth Congress of the European People's Party in Dublin. Adoption of the document ‘For a federal constitution of the European Union’. This EPP position is taken up by the EPP Group in the European Parliament, which is in favour of drafting a European Constitution at the intergovernmental conference.
27-30 November 1990  Rome Assizes. 21 EPP Members. While the governments are preparing negotiations for the future treaty on European Union, the European Parliament organises a meeting of parliamentarians from the European Community. MEPs from the EPP Group and national MPs sharing their political views manage to ensure that Parliament is given the role of co-legislator in the final declaration on political and monetary union and the reduction of the democratic deficit.
24 January 1991  Appointment of Gerhard Guckenberger (DE) as Secretary-General of the EPP Group
12 December 1991  The four French MEPs Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Alain Lamassoure, Jeannou Lacaze and Robert Hersant leave the Liberal Group and join the EPP Group.
14 January 1992  Election of Egon Klepsch (EPP/DE) as President of the European Parliament. Election of Leo Tindemans (EPP/BE) as Chairman of the EPP Group.
7 February 1992  Signature in Maastricht of the Treaty on European Union. The Union is founded on the European Communities (1st pillar), supplemented by two areas of cooperation (2nd and 3rd pillars): Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).
1 May 1992  32 British Conservative MEPs and 2 Danish MEPs join the EPP Group in the European Parliament as allied Members. Amendment of Article 1 of the Group’s Statute: ‘Group of the European People’s Party (Christian-Democrats) and allied members’.
2 June 1992  The Danish people refuse to ratify the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (50.7 % vote ‘no’).
20 September 1992  51 % vote ‘yes’ in the French referendum on Maastricht.
11-13 November 1992  IXth EPP Congress in Athens. Adoption by the European People’s Party of the Athens Declaration ‘The responsibility of Christian Democrats in an evolving world’. The EPP is in favour of drafting a genuine constitution for the Union based on the principles of democracy, subsidiarity and federalism.
11-12 December 1992 Decisions by the Edinburgh European Council on the seat of the institutions and the financial perspective to 1999 (adoption of the ‘Second Delors Package’).
1 January 1993 Entry into force of the Single Market.
1 February 1993 Opening of negotiations with Austria, Finland and Sweden.
18 May 1993 The Treaty of Maastricht is approved in a second referendum in Denmark.
21-22 June 1993 Copenhagen European Council. The criteria that the accession candidate countries have to satisfy are laid down in Copenhagen. A list of 10 countries meeting these criteria is presented.
1 January 1994 Beginning of the second stage of Economic and Monetary Union with the creation of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) in Frankfurt.
9-12 June 1994 Fourth direct elections to the European Parliament. The EPP Group has 157 Members. The general adjustment of the number of seats per Member State following German reunification increases the number of seats in Parliament to 567.
5 July 1994 Election of Wilfried Martens as Chairman of the EPP Group. The European Parliament approves the appointment of Jacques Santer (EPP/LU) as President of the Commission.
1 January 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden accede. The European Parliament now has 626 Members. Five parties join the EPP: the Austrian Volkspartei, the Swedish Kristdemokratiska Samhällspartiet (now Kristdemokraterna) and Moderata Samlingspartiet (Moderaterna), the Finnish Kansallinen Kokoomus and the Danish Konserervative Folkeparti. The EPP Group has 173 Members.
15-16 December 1995 The Madrid European Council decides that the single currency will be known as the ‘euro’. Confirmation of the deadline of 1999 for transition to the third stage of EMU.
11 November 1996 Nine Portuguese MEPs from the Partido Social Democrata (PSD) join the EPP Group which then has 180 Members.
14 January 1997 Election of José Maria Gil-Robles Gil Delgado of the Spanish Partido Popular (SP/EPP) as President of the European Parliament (338 votes for Gil-Robles, 117 votes for Catherine Lalumière).
10 April 1997 Appointment of Mário David (PT) as Secretary-General of the EPP Group.
12-13 December 1997 Luxembourg European Council. Decision to launch enlargement to 12 countries.
1-2 May 1998 Brussels European Council. The 11 countries qualifying for the euro are announced: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal. Appointment of the President of the European Central Bank.
9 June 1998 20 Italian MEPs from Forza Italia join the EPP Group which has 200 Members.
1 January 1999 Start of the third phase of EMU. The euro is launched on the financial markets.
8 February 1999 Appointment of Klaus Welle (DE) as Secretary-General of the EPP Group.
on the Agenda 2000 reform package concerning the Union’s finances, agricultural and regional policy, pre-accession funds and accession-related expenditure for the period 2000-2006.


5 May 1999  Investiture of Romano Prodi (IT) as President of the European Commission by the European Parliament.

3-4 June 1999  Cologne European Council. It is decided to ask a forum composed of representatives of the Heads of State and Government, the President of the Commission and national and European representatives to draw up a Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Decision to open a new IGC on the ‘residue of Amsterdam’.

Part three: the reformers (1994-2009)

10-13 June 1999  Fifth European elections. 233 MEPs from the EPP Group are elected. The EPP is the leading group.

13 July 1999  Election of Hans-Gert Pöttering as Chairman of the EPP Group.

15 July 1999  At its inaugural meeting, the Group changes its name to the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (EPP-ED) to take account of the British Conservative position. French MEPs from the RPR (Rassemblement pour la République) join the group which has 233 Members.

20 July 1999  Election of Nicole Fontaine as President of the European Parliament.

15 September 1999  Vote of confidence by the European Parliament for the new President of the Commission, Romano Prodi (404 for; 153 against; 27 abstentions).

15-16 October 1999  Tampere European Council (Finland).

This summit is devoted to the achievement of the European area of freedom, law and security.

10-11 December 1999  Helsinki European Council (Finland). Dealing largely with enlargement, this summit leads to important decisions: Turkey is recognised as a candidate for the European Union and it is decided to open accession negotiations with five further countries of Eastern and Central Europe. The countries of the former Yugoslavia are considered to be potential candidates.

17 December 1999  Inauguration of the Convention to draft the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 62 Members. Chairman: Roman Herzog.


26 February 2001  Signature of the Treaty of Nice.

7 June 2001  In a referendum in Ireland, 54 % vote ‘no’ to the Treaty of Nice.


In accordance with the European Parliament’s demand (Lamassoure Amendment), the Council sets the end of 2002 as a deadline for negotiations with the CCEEs so that the new countries can take part in the elections in June 2004.


14 November 2001  Hans-Gert Pöttering is re-elected Chairman of the Group.

14-15 December 2001  Laeken European Council (Belgium). The Council convenes a Convention to draw up a draft constitution.


21 February 2003 The Republic of Croatia applies for accession to the European Union.

20 March 2003 Launch of military action against Iraq by the USA and the United Kingdom.

5 May 2003 Official ceremony held by the EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament and the EPP Party to welcome the 69 new Members/Observers.

13 June 2003 Adoption by consensus of the Constitution by the Convention.

1 July 2003 Fiftieth anniversary of the EPP-ED Group in Strasbourg.

4 October 2003 Opening of the Intergovernmental Conference to adopt the draft European constitution.

1 January 2004 Appointment of Niels Pedersen (DK) as Secretary-General of the EPP-ED Group.

10 March 2004 Group votes to amend the Rules of Procedure concerning the ED section. Under Article 5b, Members have ‘the right to promote and defend their distinct views on institutional and constitutional issues in relation to the future of Europe’. The ED section is entitled to a Vice-Chairman of the Group.

1 May 2004 The Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia accede to the European Union. The EP has 732 Members.

10-13 June 2004 Sixth elections to the European Parliament. 450 million citizens are eligible to vote in 25 Member States. The EPP-ED Group retains its position as the largest Group in the European Parliament. It becomes the only Group to have Members from all 25 Member States and has over 200 Members.

29 June 2004 Nomination of José Manuel Durão Barroso (PT) as President of the European Commission.

13 July 2004 Hans-Gert Pöttering is re-elected Chairman of the EPP-ED Group.

The number of Vice-Chairmen increases to nine. Members of the Czech SNK Party become Members of the EPP-ED Group. The Czech ODS, Portuguese Partido Popular and Italian Partito Pensionati parties join the ED section of the EPP-ED Group. The Group then has 268 Members.

29 October 2004 Signature of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe by the Heads of State and Government in Rome.


29 May 2005 54.7 % of the French vote ‘no’ in a referendum on the draft Constitution.

1 July 2005 61.6 % of the Dutch vote ‘no’ in a referendum.

3 October 2005 Start of negotiations with Turkey and Croatia.

16-17 December 2005 Brussels European Council. Adoption of the financial perspective 2007-2013. Ceiling of 1.45 % of GDP, i.e. EUR 862 billion.

21 May 2006 Referendum on independence in Montenegro. (50.5 % vote ‘yes’).

1 January 2007 Accession of Bulgaria and Romania. The European Parliament has 785 MEPs. The Union’s population increases to 492 million. The Union has 23 official languages. The EPP-ED Group has 277 Members.

9 January 2007 Joseph Daul MEP is elected as the new Chairman of the EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament.

16 January 2007 Hans-Gert Pöttering, Member of the EPP-ED Group, is elected President of the European Parliament with 450 votes.

24 March 2007 The European leaders (Hans-Gert Pöttering MEP, President of the European Parliament, Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and
President-in-office of the Council and José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission) meet in Berlin to sign a Declaration for Europe to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. The document highlights the European Union’s successes over the preceding fifty years and sketches out a common vision for its future.

6 May 2007 Election of Nicolas Sarkozy as President of the French Republic.
6 June 2007 Following the first elections to the European Parliament in Bulgaria on 20 May 2007, five new Members from the Bulgarian GERB Party join the Group which has 278 Members.
23 June 2007 European Council, chaired by Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, agrees to convene an IGC to draw up a new treaty.
27 June 2007 Angela Merkel receives the Group’s Schuman Medal and Hans-Gert Pöttering is appointed Honorary Chairman of the EPP-ED Group.
9 July 2007 Inauguration of the Pierre Pflimlin building in Strasbourg.
23 July 2007 The Portuguese Presidency formally opens the IGC in Lisbon to draw up a new amended European Treaty.
1 September 2007 Martin Kamp is appointed Secretary-General of the EPP-ED Group.
1 January 2008 Cyprus and Malta join the eurozone which has 15 Members. Romanian representation in the Group increases and it now has 288 Members.
18 February 2008 Independence of Kosovo.
13 June 2008 The Irish vote against the Lisbon Treaty in a referendum (53 % against).
August 2008 Invasion of Georgia by Russian troops.
15 December 2008 Montenegro applies for accession to the European Union.
1 January 2009 Slovakia joins the euro which has 16 Members.
19-20 March 2009 European Council devoted to the global financial crisis.
2 April 2009 G20 Summit in London.
3 April 2009 NATO Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl.
5 April 2009 Euro-American Summit in Prague.
28-30 April 2009 EPP Congress and Group Study Days in Warsaw.
7 May 2009 The British Conservatives leave the Group.
4-7 June 2009 Seventh elections to the European Parliament. A good result for the EPP Group which wins 264 seats.
23 June 2009 Re-election of Joseph Daul as Chairman of the EPP Group.
29 June-2 July 2009 Group Study Days in Athens.
Annex 2
LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE CD, EPP AND EPP-ED GROUP SINCE 1952

Austria
Marialiese Flemming 1996-2004
Gerfried Gaigg 1995-1996
Karl Habsburg-Lothringen 1996-1999
Othmar Karas from 1999
Friedrich König 1995-1996
Milan Linzer 1995-1996
Hubert Pirker 1996-2004, from 2006
Reinhard Rack from 1995
Paul Rübig from 1996
Agnes Schierhuber from 1995
Richard Seeber from 2004
Michael Spindelegger 1995-1996
Ursula Stenzel 1996-2006

Belgium
Rika de Backer-van Ocken 1984-1989
Ivo Belet from 2004
Frieda Brepoels from 2004
Alfred Califice 1968-1972
Raphael Chanterie 1981-1999
Lambert Croux 1979-1989
Albert De Gryse 1961-1972
Jean-Luc Dehaene from 2004
Paul De Keersmaeker 1974-1981
Gérard Deprez 1984-2004
Marguerite De Riemaecker-Legot 1958-1961
Pierre De Smet 1952-1965
Emile De Winter 1965-1972
Jean Duvieusart 1958-1965
Mathieu Grosch from 1994
Michel Hansenne 1999-2004
Charles Heger 1972-1974
Jaak Henckens  1979-1981
Fernand Herman  1979-1999
Anna Hermans  1989-1994
Raymond Langendries from 2004
Victor Leemans  1958-1971
Théodore Lefevre  1952-1958
Philippe Le Hodey  1958-1961
Pol M.E.E. Marck  1981-1994
Lucien Hubert Martens  1972-1977
Wilfried Martens  1994-1999
Victor Michel  1979-1982
Henri Moreau de Melen  1965-1968
Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb  1979-1980
Alfonsine Phlix  1981-1984
Guillaume Schyns  1977-1979
Leon Servais  1968-1972
Miet Smet  1999-2004
Paul Struyve  1952-1958
Marianne Thyssen from 1991
Marcel Albert Vandewiele  1972-1973, 1974-1984
Johan van Hecke  1999-2002
Paul Vankerkhoven  1982-1984
Eric Van Rompuy  1981-1984
Joannes J. Verroken  1979-1984
Pierre Wigny  1952-1958

**Bulgaria**

Konstantin Dimitrov  2007
Martin Dimitrov  2007
Philip Dimitrov Dimitrov  2007
Rumiana Jeleva from 2007
Nickolay Mladenov from 2007
Stefan Sofianski  2007
Petya Stavreva from 2007
Vladimir Urutchev from 2007
Dushana Zdravkova from 2007

**Cyprus**

Lefteris Christoforou  2004
Panayiotis Demetriou from 2004
Ioannis Kasoulides from 2004
Ioannis Matsis from 2004

**Czech Republic**

Jan Březina from 2004
Milan Cabrnoch from 2004
List of members of the CD, EPP and EPP-ED Group since 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petr Duchoň</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hynek Fajmon</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jana Hybášková</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miroslav Ouzký</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuzana Roithová</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nina Škottová</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivo Střejček</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldřich Vlasák</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Zahradil</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomáš Zatloukal</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josef Zieleniec</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaroslav Zvěřina</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frode Nør Christensen</td>
<td>1989-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Klaus Duetoft</td>
<td>1987-1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie Jepsen</td>
<td>1992-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frode Kristoffersen</td>
<td>1994-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arne Melchior</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poul Schlüter</td>
<td>1994-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gitte Seeberg</td>
<td>2004-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunne Kelam</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raimo Ilaskivi</td>
<td>1996-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ville Itälä</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riitta Jouppila</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piia-Noora Kauppi</td>
<td>1999-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eija-Riitta Korhola</td>
<td>from 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjo Matikainen- Kallström</td>
<td>1996-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyrki Otila</td>
<td>1996-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sirpa Pietikäinen</td>
<td>from 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirsi Piha</td>
<td>1996-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirjo Rusanen</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eva-Riitta Siltonen</td>
<td>from 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Stubb</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilkka Suominen</td>
<td>1999-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyösti Toivonen</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ari Vatanen</td>
<td>1999-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Pierre Abelin</td>
<td>1984-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Aubame</td>
<td>1958-1959</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jean-Pierre Audy from 2005
Monique Badenes 1989-1994
Roselyne Bachelot-Narquin 2004-2007
Pierre Baudis 1981-1984
François Bayrou 1999-2002
Jean-Louis Bourlanges 1989-2004
Jean-Marie Caro 1976-1979
Henry Chabert 1991-1994
René Charpentier 1958-1967
André Colin 1958, 1964-1978
Francisque Collomb 1979-1984
Thierry Cornillet 1999-2004
Joseph Daul from 1999
Georges de Brémond d’Ars 1993-1999
Francis Decourrière 1994-2004
Marielle de Sarnez 1999-2004
Marie-Hélène Descamps from 2002
Christine de Veyrac from 1999
André Diligent 1979-1984
Philippe Douste-Blazy 1989-1993
Nicole Fontaine 1984-2002, from 2004
Brigitte Fouré from 2008
Jannelly Fourtou 1999-2004
Patrick Gaubert from 2004
Jean-Paul Gauzès from 2004
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 1991-1993
Françoise Grossetête from 1994
Ambroise Guéllec from 2004
Marie-Thérèse Hermange 1999-2004
Brice Hortefeux 1999-2005
Thierry Jean-Pierre 1998-2004
Roger Karoutchi 1999
Fabienne Keller 2002
Josef Kurtz 1953-1956
Alain Lamassoure 1991-1993, from 1999
Jean Lecanuet 1979-1988
Bernard Lehideux 1998-1999
Alain Madelin 1999-2002
Jacques Mallet 1984-1989
Hugues Martin 1999-2004
Véronique Mathieu from 2004
François de Menthon 1952-1958
Claude Mont 1978-1979
Elizabeth Montfort 2003-2004
Louise Moreau 1979-1984
Philippe Morillon 1999-2004
Elisabeth Morin-Chartier from 2007
Erwin Mueller 1952-1956
Jean-Thomas Nordmann 2002
Hervé Novelli 1999-2002
Olivier d’Ormesson 1979-1984
Roger Partrat 1987-1988
Alain Poher 1952-1978
Jean-Pierre Raffarin 1994-1995
Marc Reymann 1989-1994
Marie-France de Rose 1998-1999
Olivier d’Ormesson 1979-1984
Roger Partrat 1987-1988
Alain Poher 1952-1978
Jean-Pierre Raffarin 1994-1995
Marc Reymann 1989-1994
Marie-France de Rose 1998-1999

Germany

Jochen van Aerssen 1977-1989
Heinrich Aigner 1961-1988
Siegbert Alber 1977-1997
Helmut Karl Arztzinger 1965-1977
Rolf Berend from 1994
Helmut Bertram 1952-1953
Kurt Birrenbach 1957-1961
Philipp von Bismarck 1978-1989
Erik Blumenfeld 1973-1989
Reinhold Bocklet 1979-1993
Reimer Böge from 1989
Christian Ulrik von Boetticher 1999-2004
Jürgen Brand 1993-1994
Heinrich von Brentano 1952-1955
Elmar Brok from 1980
Friedrich Burgbacher 1958-1977
Daniel Caspary from 2004
Arved Deringer 1958-1970
Albert Dess from 2004
Hans Dichgans  1961-1970
Stefan Dittrich  1965-1973
Werner Dollinger  1956-1958
Manfred A. Ebel  1984-1989
Walter Eckhardt  1954-1956
Christian Ehler  from 2004
Ernst Engelbrecht Greve  1958-1962
Markus Ferber  from 1994
Karl-Heinz Florenz  from 1989
Otmar Franz  1981-1989
Fernand Friedensburg  1958-1965
Ingo Friedrich  from 1979
Isidor Früh  1973-1989
Karl Fuchs  1977-1984
Honor Funk  1989-1999
Hans Furler  1955-1973
Michael Gahler  from 1999
Hugo Geiger  1958-1961
Eugen Gerstenmaier  1952-1954
Roland Gewalt  from 2005
Anne Karin Glase  1994-2004
Lutz Goepel  from 1994
Alfred Gomolka  from 1994
Alfons Goppel  1979-1984
Ingeborg Graessle  from 2004
Maren Günther  1993-1999
Otto von Habsburg  1979-1999
Wolfgang Hackel  1985-1989
Karl Hahn  1958-1970
Wilhelm Hahn  1979-1987
Kurt Härzschel  1973-1977
Helga Haller von Hallerstein  1993-1994
Kai-Uwe von Hassel  1979-1984
Renate Charlotte Heinisch  1994-1999
Fritz Hellwig  1959
Wilhelm Helms  1979-1984
Günter Henle  1952-1953
Ruth Hieronymi  from 1999
Karl-Heinz Hoffmann  1979-1989
Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt  1989-1999, from 2004
Joseph Illerhaus  1958-1970
Richard Jaeger  1953-1954
Hans Edgar Jahn  1970-1979
Georg Jarzembowksi  from 1991
Elisabeth Jeggle  from 1999
Martin Kastler  2003-2004, from 2008
Hans Katzer  1979-1984
Hedwig Keppelhoff-Wiechert  1989-2004
Kurt Georg Kiesinger  1956-1958
Peter Kittelmann  1994-1999
Ewa Klamt  from 1999
Christa Barbara Klass  from 1994
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karsten Knolle</td>
<td>1999-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dieter Lebrecht Koch</td>
<td>from 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert W. Köhler</td>
<td>1979-1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christoph Konrad</td>
<td>from 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hermann Kopf</td>
<td>1952-1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerhard Kunz</td>
<td>1977-1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Werner Langen</td>
<td>from 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigitte Langenhagen</td>
<td>1990-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horst Langes</td>
<td>1979-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armin Laschet</td>
<td>1999-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurt Joachim Lauk</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurt Lechner</td>
<td>from 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klaus-Heiner Lehne</td>
<td>from 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerd Lemmer</td>
<td>1979-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aloys Michael Lenz</td>
<td>1953-1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marlene Lenz</td>
<td>1979-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Leverkuehn</td>
<td>1958-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Liese</td>
<td>from 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heinrich Lindenberg</td>
<td>1958-1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Löhr</td>
<td>1959-1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans August Lücke</td>
<td>1958-1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudolf Luster</td>
<td>1978-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernst Majorica</td>
<td>1979-1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurt Malangré</td>
<td>1979-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Mann</td>
<td>from 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans-Peter Mayer</td>
<td>from 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xaver Mayer</td>
<td>1994-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siegfried Meister</td>
<td>1970-1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linus Memmel</td>
<td>1965-1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winfried Menrad</td>
<td>1989-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meinolf Mertens</td>
<td>1979-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedrich Merz</td>
<td>1989-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Michael Mombaur</td>
<td>1994-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marlies Mosiek-Urbahn</td>
<td>1994-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilia Franziska Müller</td>
<td>1999-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerd Müller</td>
<td>1989-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans Werner Müller</td>
<td>1977-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josef Müller</td>
<td>1965-1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Werner Münch</td>
<td>1984-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Heinz Mursch</td>
<td>1973-1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartmut Nassauer</td>
<td>from 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angelika Niebler</td>
<td>from 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franz Josef Nordlohne</td>
<td>1979-1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josef Oesterle</td>
<td>1954-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doris Pack</td>
<td>from 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georg Pelster</td>
<td>1952-1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartmut Perschau</td>
<td>1989-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriele Peus</td>
<td>1984-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gero Pfennig</td>
<td>1979-1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerhard Philipp</td>
<td>1957-1958, 1959-1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markus Pieper</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fritz Pirkl</td>
<td>1984-1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hans Poetschki 1984-1989
Hans-Gert Pöttering from 1979
Wolfgang Pohle 1953-1957
Horst Posdorf from 2005
Bernd Posselt from 1994
Maria Probst 1958-1965
Hermann Pünder 1952-1956
Albert Pürtsen 1979-1980
Godelieve Quisthoudt-Rowohl from 1989
Renate-Charlotte Rabbethge 1979-1989
Alexander Radwan 1999-2008
Herbert Reul from 2004
Hans Richarts 1958-1973
Clemens Riedel 1965-1973
Günter Rinsche 1979-1999
Wilmar Sabass 1955-1957
Bernhard Sälzer 1979-1993
Casimir Prinz zu Sayn-Wittgenstein-Berleburg 1979-1984
Wolfgang Schall 1979-1984
Edgar Josef Schiedermeier 1993-1999
Heinrich Schild 1958-1961
Ursula Schleicher 1979-2004
Ingo Schmit 1999-2005
Horst Schnellhardt from 1994
Paul Schnitker 1979-1984
Konrad Schön 1979-1989
Jürgen Schröder from 1994
Klaus Peter Schulz 1973-1977
Andreas Schwab from 2004
Konrad Karl Schwaiger 1994-2004
Hermann Schröder 1970-1979
Renate Sommer from 1999
Leopold Späth 1984-1989
Gerd Springorum 1966-1977
Heinz Starke 1971-1979
Franz Ludwig, Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg 1984-1992
Gabriele Stauner 1999-2004, from 2006
Franz Josef Strauss 1952-1956
Anton Storch 1958-1965
Diemut Theato 1987-2004
Stanislav Tillich 1994-1999
Thomas Ulmer from 2004
Hanna Walz 1973-1984
Kurt Wawrzik 1977-1989
Manfred Weber from 2004
Rudolf Wedekind 1981-1989
Otto Weinkamm 1959-1965
Anja Weisgerber from 2004
Brigitte Wenzel-Perillo 1999-2004
Rudolf Werner 1970-1973
Rainer Wieland from 1997
Karl von Wogau from 1979
List of members of the CD, EPP and EPP-ED Group since 1952

Joachim Wuermeling 1999-2005
Hans J. Zahorka 1984-1989
Axel N. Zarges 1984-1989
Werner Zeyer 1977-1978
Jürgen Zimmerling 1999-2004, 2005
Sabine Zissener 1999-2004

Greece

Georgios Anastassopoulos 1984-1999
Emmanouil Angelakas from 2007
Stelios Argyros 1994-1999
Ioannis Averoff 1999-2004
Leonidas Bournias 1981-1984
Ioannis Boutos 1984-1985
Georgios Dimitrakopoulos from 1994
Dimitrios Evrigenis 1984-1986
Christos Foliis 1999-2004
Achillefs Gerokostopoulos 1981-1984
Kyriakos Gerontopoulos 1984-1989
Ioannis Gklavakis from 2004
Konstantinos Gontikas 1981-1984
Menelaos Hadjigeorgiou 1990-1994
Konstantinos Hatzidakis 1994-2007
Meropi Kaldí 2004
Konstantinos Kallias 1981-1984
Konstantinos Kaloyannis 1981-1984
Filotas Kazazis 1981-1984
Rod Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou from 1999
Efstathios Lagakos 1989-1994
Panayotis Lambrias 1984-1999
Ioannis Marinos 1999-2004
Manolis Mavrommatis from 2004
Nana Mouskouri 1994-1999
Marie Panayotopoulos-Cassiotou from 2004
Efstratios Papastatiou 1981-1984
Georgios Papastamkos from 2004
Ioannis Pesmazoglou 1989-1994
Filippos Pierros 1989-1994
Mihail Protopapadakis 1981-1984
Antonis Samaras 2004-2007
Georgios Saridakis 1986-1994
Pavlos Sarlis 1989-1999
Margaritis Schinas from 2007
Konstantinos Stavrou 1984-1994
Antonios Trakatellis from 1994
Ioannis Tzounis 1984-1989
Nikolaos Yalalis from 2004
Ioannis Varvitsiotis from 2004
Stavros Xarchakos 2000-2004
Christos Zacharakis 1999-2004
Nikos Zardinidis 1981
Georgios Zavvos 1990-1994

Hungary

Etelka Barsi Pataky from 2004
Zsolt László Becsey from 2004
Antonio De Blasio from 2006
Kinga Gál from 2004
Béla Glattfelder from 2004
András Gyürk from 2004
Lívia Járóka from 2004
Péter Olajos from 2004
Csaba Óry from 2004
István Pálfi 2004-2006
Pál Schmitt from 2004
György Schöpflin from 2004
László Surján from 2004
József Szájer from 2004

Ireland

Mary Elizabeth Banotti 1984-2004
Colm Burke from 2007
Mark Clinton 1979-1989
Patrick Mark Cooney 1989-1994
Simon Coveney 2004-2007
Donald Creed 1973-1977
John Walls Cushnahan 1989-2004
Avril Doyle from 1999
Thomas Dunne 1973-1977
Antony Esmonde 1972-1973
Alan Gillis 1994-1999
Jim Higgins from 2004
Gerald L’Estrange 1977-1979
John Joseph McCartin 1979-2004
Charles McDonald 1973-1979
Mairead McGuinness from 2004
Gay Mitchell from 2004
Tom O’Donnell 1979-1989
Christopher Gerard O’Malley 1986-1989
Thomas Raftery 1984-1989
Dana Rosemary Scallon 1999-2004

Italy

Pietro Adonnino 1979-1984
Gabriele Albertini from 2004
Giuseppe Alessi 1969-1972
Giulio Andreotti 1974-1976
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generoso Andria</td>
<td>2000-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armando Angelini</td>
<td>1960-1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfredo Antoniozzi</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aldo Arroni</td>
<td>1998-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Azara</td>
<td>1952-1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claudio Azzolini</td>
<td>1998-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monica Stefania Baldi</td>
<td>1998-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valerio Baldini</td>
<td>1998-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Barbagli</td>
<td>1979-1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paolo Barbi</td>
<td>1979-1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paolo Bartolozzi</td>
<td>2001-2004, from 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilio Battista</td>
<td>1955-1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giulio Battistini</td>
<td>1959-1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodovico Benvenuti</td>
<td>1952-1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silvio Berlusconi</td>
<td>1999-2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Bersani</td>
<td>1960-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerardo Bianco</td>
<td>1994-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosaria Bindi</td>
<td>1989-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Boano</td>
<td>1969-1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guido Bodrato</td>
<td>1999-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Boggiano-Pico</td>
<td>1952-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrea Bonetti</td>
<td>1989-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gian Piero Boniperti</td>
<td>1998-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paolo Bonomi</td>
<td>1958-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vito Bonsignore</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco Borgo</td>
<td>1984-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giacinto Bosco</td>
<td>1959-1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giorgio Braccesi</td>
<td>1957-1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iles Braghetto</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl Braitenberg</td>
<td>1958-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giuseppe Brienza</td>
<td>2001-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Brugger</td>
<td>1972-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renato Brunetta</td>
<td>1999-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Burtone</td>
<td>1994-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocco Buttiglione</td>
<td>1999-2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maddalena Calia</td>
<td>2008-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pietro Campilli</td>
<td>1952-1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrico Carboni</td>
<td>1954-1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Carcaterra</td>
<td>1954-1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giorgio Carollo</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giuseppe Caron</td>
<td>1954-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlo Casini</td>
<td>1984-1999, from 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pier Ferdinando Casini</td>
<td>1995-2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Luisa Cassanmagnago Cerretti</td>
<td>1976-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierluigi Castagnetti</td>
<td>1994-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giuseppe Castiglione</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Cavalli</td>
<td>1953-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorenzo Cesa</td>
<td>2004-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luigi Cesaro</td>
<td>1999-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauro Chiabrando</td>
<td>1984-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vittorino Chiusano</td>
<td>1984-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michelangelo Ciancaglini</td>
<td>1984-1988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mario Cingolani 1952-1954
Paolo Cirino Pomicino 2004-2006
Luigi Cocilovo 1999-2004
Arnaldo Colleselli 1979-1984
Ombretta Colli 1998-1999
Maria Paola Colombo Svevo 1994-1999
Felice Contu 1989-1994
Maria Teresa Coppo Gavazzi 1993-1994
Francesco Cosentino 1984
Raffaele Costa 1999-2004
Roberto Costanzo 1979-1989
Joachim Dalsass 1979-1994
Giampaolo D'Andrea 1994-1998
Alessandro Danesin 1998-1999
Francesco De Bosio 1958-1969
Alcide De Gasperi 1954
Umberto Delle Fave 1959-1960
Marcello Dell’Utri 1999-2004
Aldo De Matteo 1992-1994
Luigi Cirriaco De Mita 1984-1988 et 1999-2004
Antonio De Poli 2004-2005
Lorenzo De Vitto 1989-1994
Alfredo Diana 1979-1984
Armando Dionisi 2004-2006
Francesco Dominedo 1952-1954
Michl Ebner 1994-2009
Sergio Ercini 1982-1989
Amintore Fanfani 1954-1956
Antonio Fantini 1989-1994
Carlo Fatuzzo 1999-2009
Francesco Ferrari 1959-1969
Enrico Ferri 1995-2004
Renzio Eligio Filippi 1979-1984
Livio Filippi 1994-1999
Mario Fioret 1976-1979
Francesco Fiori 1999-2004
Raffaele Fitto 1999-2000
Luigi Andrea Florio 1998-1999
Alessandro Fontana 1996-1999
Arnaldo Forlani 1989-1994
Roberto Formigoni 1984-1993
Mario Forte 1989-1994
Gerardo Gaibisso 1984-1994
Paola Gaiotti De Biase 1979-1984
Giulio Cesare Gallenzi 1989-1994
Bortolo Galletto 1958-1959
Luigi Michele Galli 1969-1976
Elisabetta Gardini from 2008
Giuseppe Gargani from 1999
Giuseppe Garlato 1960-1969
Riccardo Garosci 1998-1999
List of members of the CD, EPP and EPP-ED Group since 1952

Jas Gawronski 1999-2009
Vitaliano Gemelli 1999-2004
Erisia Gennai Tonietti 1961-1969
Alessandro Gerini 1954-1957
Alberto Ghergo 1979-1984
Giovanni Giavazzi 1979-1989
Luigi Girardin 1969-1976
Giovanni Giraudo 1969-1976
Vincenzo Giummarra 1979-1989
Guido Gonella 1979-1982
Luigi Granelli 1976-1979
Pier Antonio Graziani 1994-1999
Dante Graziosi 1959-1969
Teresio Guglielmone 1954-1959
Francesco Guidolin 1989-1994
Antonio Iodice 1984-1994
Francesco Lamanna 1992-1994
Silvio Lega 1979-1984
Innocenzo Leontini 2008
Giacomo Leopardi 1998-1999
Giancarlo Ligabue 1998-1999
Giosuè Ligios 1972-1989
Salvatore Lima 1979-1992
Giorgio Lisi 1999-2004
Eleonora Lo Curto 2008-2009
Calogero Lo Giudice 1989-1994
Raffaele Lombardo 1999-2008
Tarcisio Longoni 1959-1961
Luigi Macario 1979-1984
Franco E. Malerba 1998-1999
Franco Malfatti 1972-1974
Mario Mantovani 1999-2008
Francesco Marenghi 1960-1969
Franco Marini 1999-2004
Clemente Mastella 1999-2004
Mario Mauro from 1999
Pietro-Paolo Mennea 2002-2003
Domenico Mennitti 2001-2004
Roberto Mezzaroma 1998-1999
Pietro Micara 1959-1969
Alberto Michelini 1984-1994
Karl Mitterdorfer 1969-1976
Alfeo Mizzau 1984-1989
Marcello Modiano 1979-1984
Lodovico Montini 1952-1954
Lino Gerolamo Moro 1959-1969
Angelo Giacomo Mott 1952-1954
Francesco Musotto 1999-2008
Vito Napoli 1994
Angelo Narducci 1979-1984
Giuseppe Nisticò 1999-2004
Luigi Noé 1969-1979
Paolo Pastorelli 2001-2004
Aldo Patriciello from 2006
Giuseppe Pella 1954-1958
Dino Penazzato 1959-1961
Attilio Piccioni 1956-1969
Flaminio Piccoli 1979-1984
Mariano Pintus 1969-1972
Giuseppe Pisicchio 1999-2004
Nino Pisoni 1984-1994
Guido Podestà 1998-2009
Danilo Poggioioli 1994-1999
Mario Pomilio 1984-1989
Giovanni Ponti 1960-1961
Ernesto Pucci 1976-1979
Pietro C. Restagno 1959-1960
Cristoforo Ricci 1969-1972
Camillo Ripamonti 1976-1979
Roland Riz 1976-1979
Luigi Candido Rosati 1972-1976
Enrico Roselli 1957-1959
Leopoldo Rubinacci 1958-1969
Mario Giovanni Guerriero Ruffini 1989-1990
Mariano Rumor 1979-1984
Italo Mario Sacco 1952-1954
Natale Santero 1958-1971
Sebastiano Sanzarella 2008-2009
Amalia Sartori from 1999
Mario Sassano 1979-1984
Gabriele Sboarina 1989-1994
Umberto Scapagnini 1998-2004
Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza 1961-1972
Decio Scardaccione 1969-1972
Mario Scelba 1959-1979
Guglielmo Schiratti 1958-1959
Carlo Secchi 1994-1999
Mariotto Segni 1994-1995
Gustavo Selva 1984-1989
Vittorio Sgarbi 1999-2001
Giovanni Starita 1984-1989
Carlo Stella 1981-1984
Bruno Storti 1959-1969
Antonio Tajani 1998-2008
Amor Tartufoli 1958-1963
Luisa Todini 1998-1999
Giuseppe Togni 1952-1956
Zefferino Tomé 1958-1959
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Travaglini</td>
<td>1979-1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michele Troisi</td>
<td>1958-1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniele Turani</td>
<td>1958-1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athos Valscicchi</td>
<td>1958-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armando Veneto</td>
<td>from 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riccardo Ventre</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincenzo Vernaschi</td>
<td>1972-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcello Vernola</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mario Vetrone</td>
<td>1969-1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guido Viceconte</td>
<td>1999-2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincenzo Viola</td>
<td>1995-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benigno Zaccagnini</td>
<td>1979-1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raul Zaccari</td>
<td>1969-1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iva Zanicchi</td>
<td>from 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stefano Zappala’</td>
<td>1999-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ortensio Zecchino</td>
<td>1979-1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincio Ziino</td>
<td>1952-1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mario Zotta</td>
<td>1959-1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valdis Dombrovskis</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silva Golde</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aldis Kuškis</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liene Liepiņa from 2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rihards Pīks</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inese Šlesere</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laima Andrikienė</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vytautas Landsbergis</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Bech</td>
<td>1959-1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Estgen</td>
<td>1979-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc Fischbach</td>
<td>1979-1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcel Fischbach</td>
<td>1959-1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Pierre Glesener</td>
<td>1969-1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Grégoire</td>
<td>1958-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erna Hennicot-Schoepges</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Herr</td>
<td>1959-1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Kollwelter</td>
<td>1969-1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcelle Lentz-Cornette</td>
<td>1980-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernand Loesch</td>
<td>1952-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Lucius</td>
<td>1967-1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astrid Lulling</td>
<td>1989-1999, from September 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Margue</td>
<td>1952-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Mühlen</td>
<td>1984-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camille Ney</td>
<td>1974-1979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Viviane Reding 1989-1999
Jacques Santer 1974-1979, 1999-2004
Emile Schaus 1968-1969
Jean Spautz 1979-1980, from 2004

Malta
Simon Busuttil from 2004
David Casa from 2004
Mario De Marco 2004

Netherlands
Marius J.J. van Amelsvoort 1970-1971
Bouke Beumer 1979-1994
Barend Willem. Biesheuvel 1961-1963
Pieter A. Blaisse 1952-1967
Jacob Boersma 1967-1971
Cornelis Boertien 1967-1971
Elise C. A. M. Boot 1979-1989
Corstiaan A. Bos 1969-1973
Cees Bremmer 2003-2004
Tiemen Brouwer 1967-1973
J.A.H.J. S. Bruins Slot 1952-1955
Philippus van Campen 1958-1967
Petrus Cornelissen 1984-1999
Bert Doorn from 1999
Camiel Eurlings 2004-2007
W. F. de Gaay Fortman 1978-1979
Frans van der Gun 1971-1981
Cornelis P. Hazenbosch 1955-1961
Johan Wilhelm van Hulst 1961-1968
Marinus M.A.A. Janssen 1956-1963
Sjouke Jonker 1979-1984
Marga A.M. Klompe 1952-1956
Friedrich de Koning 1971-1977
Esther de Lange from 2007
Pierre J. Lardinois 1963-1967
Wilhelm F. Lichtenauer 1957-1961
Albert Jan Maat 1999-2007
Maria Martens from 1999
Durk F. van der Mei 1976-1977
Lambert van Nistelrooij from 2004
Harry Notenboom 1971-1984
Ria Oomen-Ruijten from 1989
Arie Oostlander 1989-2004
Karla Peijs 1989-2003
Jean J. M. Penders 1979-1994
Peter Pex 1994-2004
List of members of the CD, EPP and EPP-ED Group since 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cornelis J. van der Ploeg</td>
<td>1958-1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joop Post</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartho Pronk</td>
<td>1989-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornelis E.P.M. Raedts</td>
<td>1967-1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willem Rip</td>
<td>1952-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yvonne van Rooy</td>
<td>1984-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacqueline C.Rutgers</td>
<td>1963-1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pieter J.A. van der Sanden</td>
<td>1973-1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuel M.J.A. Sassen</td>
<td>1952-1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willem Scholten</td>
<td>1973-1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willem J. Schuift</td>
<td>1958-1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Sonneveld</td>
<td>1989-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teun Tolman</td>
<td>1978-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilhelmus Gijsbertus (Wim) van Velzen</td>
<td>1994-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willem J. Vergeer</td>
<td>1978-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maxime Verhagen</td>
<td>1989-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornelis Visser</td>
<td>from 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Vixseboxe</td>
<td>1952-1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theodorus E. Westerterp</td>
<td>1967-1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corien Wortmann-Kool</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Poland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jerzy Buzek</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zdzisław Kazimierz Chmielewski</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urzula Gacek</td>
<td>from 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Małgorzata Handzlik</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krysztof Hołowczyc</td>
<td>from 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanisław Jałowiecki</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filip Kaczmarek</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogdan Klich</td>
<td>2004-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbara Kudrycka</td>
<td>2004-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zbigniew Krzysztof Kuźmiuk</td>
<td>2004-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janusz Lewandowski</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Olbrycht</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pawel Bartłomiej Piskorski</td>
<td>2004-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zdzisław Zbigniew Podkański</td>
<td>2004-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacek Protasiewicz</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacek Saryusz-Wolski</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czesław Adam Siekierski</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogusław Sonik</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janusz Wojciechowski</td>
<td>2004-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zbigniew Zaleski</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadeusz Zwiefka</td>
<td>from 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Portugal**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teresa Almeida Garrett</td>
<td>1999-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regina Bastos</td>
<td>2000-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>António Capucho</td>
<td>1996-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raquel Cardoso</td>
<td>2003-2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
José Vicente Carvalho Cardoso 1987-1994
Carlos Coelho from 1998
Carlos Costa Neves 1996-2002
Arlindo Cunha 1996-2003
Eurico de Melo 1996-1999
Maria da Assunção Esteves from 2004
Duarte Freitas from 2004
José Augusto Gama 1987-1989
João Gouveia 2003-2004
Vasco Graça Moura from 1999
Francisco António Lucas Pires 1986-1998
Sérgio Marques from 1999
José Mendes Bota 1998-1999
Nélvio Mendonça 1996-1999
Jorge Moreira da Silva 1999-2003
José Pacheco Pereira 1999-2004
Carlos Pimenta 1996-1999
João de Deus Pinheiro from 2004
Joaquim Piscarreta 2002-2004
Manuel Porto 1996-1999
Luís Queiró from 2004
Fernando Reis 1999-2000
José Ribeiro E Castro from 2004
Manuel dos Santos Machado 1987-1989
José Albino Silva Peneda from 2004
Helena Vaz da Silva 1996-1999

Romania

Roberta Alma Anastase 2007-2008
Sebastian Valentin Bodu from 2007
Nicodim Bulzesc from 2007
Călin Cătălin Chiriţă from 2008
Dragoş Florin David from 2007
Constantin Dumitriu from 2007
Petru Filip 2007-2008
Sorin Frunzăverde 2007-2008
Daniel Petru Funeriu from 2008
Ovidiu Victor Gant 2007
Ioan Lucian Hâmbăşan from 2009
Monica Maria Iacob-Ridzi 2007-2008
Atilla Béla Ladislau Kelemen 2007
Sândor Kónya-Hamar 2007
Adrian Manole from 2008
Marian-Jean Marinescu from 2007
Josif Matula from 2008
Alexandru Nazare from 2008
Rareş-Lucian Niculescu from 2007
Dumitru Oprea 2007-2008
Maria Petre from 2007
Mihaela Popa 2007-2008
Nicolae Vlad Popa from 2007
Flaviu Călin Rus from 2008
List of members of the CD, EPP and EPP-ED Group since 1952

Csaba Sógor from 2007
Teodor Dumitru Stolojan from 2007
Károly Ferenc Szabó 2007
Radu Tîrle 2007
Iuliu Winkler from 2007
Marian Zlotea 2007-2009

Slovakia

Edit Bauer from 2004
Július Brocka 2004
Árpád Duka-Zólyomi from 2004
Gal’a, Milan from 2004
Tomáš Galbavy 2004
Ján Hudacká from 2004
Miroslav Míkolášik from 2004
Zita Plešinská from 2004
Peter Šťastný from 2004
Anna Záborská from 2004
Slovenia

Mihael Brejc from 2004
Romana Jordan Cizelj from 2004
Ljudmila Novak from 2004
Alojz Peterle from 2004

Spain

Alejandro Agag Longo 1999-2002
Julio Añoveros Trias de Bes 1994-1999
Javier Areitio Toledo 1993-1999
Miguel Arias Cañete 1989-1999
Maria Antonia Avilés Perea 1999-2004
Maria del Pilar Ayuso González from 1999
Juan José Bayona de Perogordo 2002-2004
Daniel Bautista from 2009
Francisca Bennasar Tous 1994-1999
Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo y Bustelo 1986-1987
Luis Campoy Zueco 1994-1999
Pilar del Castillo Vera from 2004
Mercedes de la Merced Monge 1994-1995
Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra from 2004
Josep Antoni Duran I Lleida 1986-1987
Laura de Esteban Martín 1994-1999
Arturo Juan Escuder Croft 1989-1992
José Antonio Escudero Lopez 1991-1999
María Teresa Esteve Bolea 1994-1999
Juan Manuel Fabra Vallés 1994-2000
Gerardo Fernández-Albor 1989-1999
Fernando Fernández Martín from 1994
Concepció Ferrer I Casals 1987-2004
Gerardo Galeote from 1994
Manuel García Amigo 1989-1994
José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil from 1994
Cristina García Orcoyen Tormo 1999-2004
Salvador Garriga Polledo from 1994
José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado 1989-2004
Luis de Grandes Pascual from 2004
Cristina Gutiérrez-Cortines from 1999
Julen Guíñez-Ugartechea 1986-1987
José Salvador Hernández Mollar 1995-2004
María Esther Herranz García from 2002
Luis Francisco Herrero-Tejedor from 2004
Carlos José Iturraigur Angulo from 2004
José María Lafuente Lopez 1991-1994
Carmen Llorca Vilaplana 1989-1994
Cesar Llorens Barges 1986
Antonio López-Istúriz White from 2004
Florencio Luque Aguilar from 2008
Ana Mato Adrover 2004-2008
Abel Matutes Juan 1994-1996
Jaime Mayor Oreja from 2004
Íñigo Méndez de Vigo from 1992
Francisco José Millán Mon from 2004
Etoni Monforte Arregui 1986-1987
Cristóbal Montoro Romero 2004-2008
Juan Andrés Naranjo Escobar 1999-2004, from 2008
Antonio Navarro 1989-1994
Juan Ojeda Sanz 1999-2004
Marcelino Oreja Aguirre 1989-1993
Marcelino Oreja Arburúa 2002-2004
Leopoldo Ortiz Climent 1989-1993
Ana Palacio Vallelersundi 1994-2002
Loyola de Palacio Vallelersundi 1999
Manuel Pérez Álvarez 1999-2004
Encarnación Redondo Jiménez 1994-2004
Mónica Ridruejo Ostrowska 1999-2004
Carlos Ripoll y Martínez De Bedoya 1999-2004
Carlos Robles Piquer 1989-1999
Domènec Romera I Alcazar 1989-1994
Luisa Fernanda Rudi Ubeda 2004-2008
José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra from 1994
Salvador Domingo Sanz Palacio from 2008
Joaquín Sisó Cruellas 1989-1999
Fernando Suárez González 1989-1994
Jaime Valdivielso de Cué 1994-2004
José Valverde López 1989-1999
Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna 1994-2009
Luis Vega y Escandon 1986-1987
Alejo Vidal-Quadras from 1999
José Vila Abelló 2004
List of members of the CD, EPP and EPP-ED Group since 1952

Celia Villalobos Talero 1994-1995
Theresa Zabell 1999-2004

Sweden

Per-Arne Arvidsson 1999-2004
Steffan Burenstam Linder 1995-2000
Guinilla Carlsson 1995-2002
Charlotte Cederschiöld from 1995
Karin Falkmer 1995
Christofer Fjellner from 2004
Lisbeth Grönfeldt Bergman 2000-2004
Holger Gustafsson 1995
Gunnar Hökmark from 2004
Anna Ibrisagic from 2004
Lennart Sacrédeus 1995
Ivar Virgin 1995-1999
Peder Wachtmeister 2002-2004
Anders Wijkman from 1999
Lars Wohlin from 2006

United Kingdom

Richard Ashworth 2004-2009
Sir Robert Atkins 1999-2009
Richard A. Balfe 2002-2004
Peter Beazley 1992-1994
John Bowis 1999-2009
Philip Charles Bradbourn 1999-2009
Philip Bushill-Matthews 1999-2009
Martin Callanan 1999-2009
Sir Fred Catherwood 1992-1994
Giles Chichester 1994-2009
John Corrie 1994-2004
Margaret Daly 1992-1994
Nirj Deva 1999-2009
Brendan Patrick Donnelly 1994-1999
Den Dover 1999-2009
James Elles 1992-2009
Jonathan Evans 1999-2009
Jacqueline Foster 1999-2004
Robert Goodwill 1999-2004
Daniel J. Hannan 1999-2008
Malcolm Harbour 1999-2009
Christopher Heaton-Harris 1999-2009
Roger Helmer 1999-2005
Paul Howell 1992-1994
Caroline Jackson 1992-2009
Christopher Jackson 1992-1994
Syed Salah Kamall 2005-2009
Sajjad Karim 2007-2009
Edward Kellett-Bowman 1992-1999
Bashir Khanbhai 1999-2004
Timothy Kirkhope 1999-2009
Graham Mather 1994-1999
Anne McIntosh 1992-1999
Neil Parish 1999-2009
Ben Patterson 1992-1994
Roy Perry 1994-2004
The Lord Plumb 1992-1999
Derek Prag 1992-1994
Peter Price 1992-1994
Sir Christopher Prout 1992-1994
James Provan 1994-2004
John Purvis 1999-2009
Patricia Rawlings 1992-1994
Sir James Scott Hopkins 1992-1994
Tom Spencer 1992-1999
John Stevens 1992-1999
Struan Stevenson 1999-2009
The Earl of Stockton 1999-2004
Robert Sturdy 1994-2009
David Sumberg 1999-2009
Charles Tannock 1999-2009
Ian Twinn 2003-2004
Geoffrey Van Orden 1999-2009
Theresa Villiers 1999-2005
Michael Welsh 1992-1994
### List of members of the CD, EPP and EPP-ED Group since 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF MEMBERS BY NATIONAL DELEGATION SINCE 1952&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<sup>a</sup> Table drawn up from EPP-ED Group and European Parliament data as at 27 April 2009.

<sup>b</sup> Ari Vatanen was a Finnish Member during the 5th term and a French Member during the 6th term.
Annex 3

PARLIAMENTARY TERMS, CHAIRMEN, SECRETARIES-GENERAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Secretary-General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 Member States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 September 1952</td>
<td>Inaugural sitting of the Common Assembly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 September 1952</td>
<td>Emmanuel SASSEN (NL)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 June 1953</td>
<td>Official constitution of the CD Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20 May 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1953</td>
<td>36 Members(^{1057})</td>
<td>Hans-Joachim OPITZ (DE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1954</td>
<td>38 Members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 February 1958</td>
<td>Pierre WIGNY (BE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 March 1958</td>
<td>Inaugural sitting of the Parliamentary Assembly (ECSC, EEC, Euratom)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>67 Members(^{1058})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 October 1958</td>
<td>Alain POHER (FR)</td>
<td>1 January 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Carl Otto LENVZ (DE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 September 1963</td>
<td>CD Group 61 Members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 January 1966</td>
<td>CD Group 62 Members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 March 1966</td>
<td>Joseph ILLERHAUS (DE)</td>
<td>1 February 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arnaldo FERRAGNI (IT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November 1969</td>
<td>Hans-August LÜCKER (DE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 December 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 September 1975</td>
<td>Alfred BERTRAND</td>
<td>1 October 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Giampaolo BETTAMIO (IT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May 1977</td>
<td>Egon KLEPSCH (DE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1(^{st}) PARLIAMENTARY TERM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-10 June 1979</td>
<td>107 Members(^{a})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^{a}\) The EPP Group has 107 Members of seven different nationalities: 42 Germans, 30 Italians, 10 Belgians, 10 Dutch, 8 French, 4 Irish and 3 Luxembourgers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member States</th>
<th>23 December 1981&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>117 Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 January 1982</td>
<td>Paolo BARBI (IT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; PARLIAMENTARY TERM</td>
<td>14 -17 June 1984</td>
<td>110 Members&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 July 1984</td>
<td>Egon KLEPSCH (DE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Member States</td>
<td>January 1986</td>
<td>118 Members&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; PARLIAMENTARY TERM</td>
<td>15 March 1986</td>
<td>Sergio GUCCIONE (IT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15-18 June 1989</td>
<td>121 Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 January 1991</td>
<td>Gerhard GUCKENBERGER (DE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 December 1991&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>128 Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 January 1992</td>
<td>Leo TINDEMANS (BE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 May 1992&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>162 Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Member States</td>
<td>1 January 1995</td>
<td>173 Members&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 November 1996</td>
<td>182 Members&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 April 1997</td>
<td>Mário DAVID (PT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 1998</td>
<td>200 Members&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; PARLIAMENTARY TERM</td>
<td>8 February 1999</td>
<td>Klaus WELLE (DE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8-13 June 1999</td>
<td>233 Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13 July 1999</td>
<td>Hans-Gert PÖTTERING (DE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 May 2003</td>
<td>(+ 69 Observers)&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Member States</td>
<td>10-13 June 2004</td>
<td>268 Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26 September 2005</td>
<td>(+ 13 Observers)&lt;sup&gt;j&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26 September 2006</td>
<td>264 Members&lt;sup&gt;k&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 January 2007</td>
<td>Joseph DAUL (FR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Member States</td>
<td>January 2007</td>
<td>277 Members&lt;sup&gt;l&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 June 2007</td>
<td>278 Members&lt;sup&gt;m&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January 2008</td>
<td>289 Members&lt;sup&gt;n&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 September 2007</td>
<td>Martin KAMP (DE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<sup>a</sup> The Delegation of the Greek party Nea Demokratia joins the EPP. The Danish Democratic Centre (one representative) leaves the ED Group and joins the EPP Group.

<sup>b</sup> The EPP Group has 110 Members of nine different nationalities: 41 Germans, 27 Italians, 9 Greeks, 9 French, 8 Dutch, 6 Belgians, 6 Irish, 3 Luxembourgers and 1 Dane.

<sup>c</sup> Following the accession of Spain and Portugal, four new parties join the EPP: 3 Spanish parties: Partido Democrata Popular (PDP), Unio Democràtica de Catalunya
Parliamentary terms, chairmen, secretaries-general

(UDC) and Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), as well as the Portuguese Centro Democrático Social (CDS). The Group has 8 new Members – the list of 1 January 1986.

d 4 French Members from the UDF, formerly members of the Liberal Group, join the EPP Group.

e 32 British Conservative Members and 2 Danish Conservative Members joins the ED Group within the EPP Group.

f Following the official accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the European Union, the ÖVP (6 Members), the National Coalition Party (4 Members), the KdS (1 Member) and the Rassemblement modéré (5 Members) join the EPP Group.

g The Portuguese PSD becomes a full member of the EPP and its Members join the EPP Group.

h The 20 Forza Italia Members join the EPP Group.


k The Member Lars Wohlin (Sweden) joins the EPP-ED Group.

l 13 new Members from Bulgaria (9) UDF, DSB and DP and Romania (4) PD, DP, UDMR and DFDR become Members of the EPP-ED Group.

m Following the European elections in Bulgaria, 5 Members (instead of 4 previously) from the GERB Party join the EPP-ED Group.

n Election of new Romanian Members.
Annex 4

WINNERS OF THE ROBERT SCHUMAN MEDAL

E. M. J. A. Sassen 08.07.86
Alain Poher 08.07.86
Hans-August Lücke 08.07.86
Alfred Bertrand 08.07.86
Paolo Barbi 08.07.86
Pierre Pflimlin 08.07.86
Leo Tindemans 08.07.86
Emilio Colombo 08.07.86
Helmut Kohl 08.07.86
Jacques Santer 08.07.86
Konstantinos Mitsotakis 23.09.86
Konstantinos Karamanlis 23.09.86
Willem Vergeer 18.02.87
Giulio Andreotti 02.03.87
Flaminio Piccoli 04.03.87
Mariano Rumor 24.03.87
Piet Bukman 01.04.87
Karl-Josef Hahn 10.04.87
Miquel Coll I Alentorn 09.05.87
Bruno Heck 02.07.87
Pierre Werner 02.07.87
Kai-Uwe von Hassel 11.02.88
Francesco Cosentino 13.12.88
Lorenzo Natali 13.12.88
Peter Sutherland 13.12.88
Karl-Heinz Narjes 13.12.88
Nicolas Mosar 13.12.88
Lord Plumb 24.07.89
Hanjia Maij-Weggen 01.05.90
Jean-Claude Juncker 08.07.91
Norbert Schmelzer 08.07.91
Ruud Lubbers 11.12.91
Egon A. Klepsch 14.01.92
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 13.07.93
Filippo Maria Pandolfi 08.09.93
Jean Dondelinger 08.09.93
Frans Andriessen 08.09.93
Abel Matutes Juan 13.12.94
Raniero Vanni d’Archirafi 13.12.94
Peter Schmidhuber 13.12.94
Ioannis Paleokrassas 13.12.94
René Steichen 13.12.94
Jacques Delors 18.01.95
Manuel García Amigo 27.03.95
Menelaos Hadjigeorgiou 27.03.95
Horst Langes 27.03.95
Ferruccio Pisoni 27.03.95
Rudolf Luster 15.05.95
Günter Rinsche 13.07.95
Hans-Gert Pöttering 15.09.95
Margaretha af Ugglas 03.10.95
Carlos Robles Piquer 03.10.95
Georgios Anastassopoulos 03.10.95
José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado 03.10.95
Antonio Graziani 03.10.95
Nicolas Estgen 03.10.95
Lord Kingsland 03.10.95
Otto Bardong 03.10.95
Wilfried Martens 07.11.95
Efthimios Christodoulou 30.04.96
Miltiades Evert 30.04.96
Panayotis Lambrias 30.04.96
Siegbert Alber 27.07.96
The RT Hon Sir Edward Heath 17.09.96
John Bruton 14.01.97
Hans von der Groeben 14.05.97
Manuel Fraga Iríbarne 27.08.97
Gerardo Fernández Albor 16.09.97
Franjo Komarica 16.12.97
Ursula Schleicher 15.05.98
Aníbal Cavaco Silva 08.07.98
Poul Schlüter 13.04.99
Radio B2 92, Belgrade (received by Veran Matic) 14.12.99
Martin M.C. Lee (Chairman of the Democratic Party of Hong-Kong) 18.01.00
Libet Werhahn-Adenauer 01.12.00
Yelena Bonner 03.04.01
Karl von Wogau 14.11.01
Nicole Fontaine 15.01.02
Ingo Friedrich 26.01.02
Władysław Bartoszewski 26.02.02
José María Aznar 01.07.02
Hans van den Broek 02.11.02
Wim van Velzen 15.01.03
Bendt Bendtsen 24.06.03
Anders Fogh Rasmussen 24.06.03
Bertel Haarder 24.06.03
Per Stig Møller 24.06.03
Lord Bethell 21.10.03
John Joseph McCartin 06.07.04
Franz Fischler 26.10.04
Loyola de Palacio Vallelersundi 26.10.04
Chris Patten 26.10.04
Mario Monti 26.10.04
Winners of the Robert Schuman medal

Viviane Reding 26.10.04
Pope John Paul II 30.11.04
Natalya Estemirova 13.01.05
Sergey Kovalev 13.01.05
Erwin Teufel 19.01.05
Tadeusz Mazowiecki 16.02.05
Wolfgang Schäuble 29.06.05
Michel Barnier 06.12.05
Vytautas Landsbergis 13.12.05
Tunne Kelam 04.07.06
Angela Merkel 27.06.07
Guido de Marco 04.07.07
Marianne Thyssen 30.06.09
Jaime Mayor Oreja 30.06.09
Hartmut Nassauer 30.06.09
João de Deus Pinheiro 30.06.09
Ioannis Varvitsiotis 30.06.09
José Manuel Durão Barroso 30.06.09
Jacques Barrot 30.06.09

Awarded posthumously to:
Adelino Amaro da Costa 25.06.87
Guido Gonella 04.03.88
Alberto Ghergo 04.03.88
Angelo Narducci 04.03.88
Mario Sassano 04.03.88
Heinrich Aigner 12.04.88
Bernhard Sälzer 28.06.93
Lorenzo De Vitto 28.06.93
Francisco António Lucas Pires 05.02.99
Annex 5

REPRESENTATION OF THE EPP GROUP WITHIN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND BREAKDOWN OF THE NATIONAL DELEGATIONS WITHIN THE GROUP

1979 Elections
410 seats

European Parliament

EPP Group

[Diagram showing the representation of the EPP Group with pie charts and percentages for each country and party]

SOC 113 27%
PPE 107 26%
ED 64 16%
COM 44 11%
LD 40 10%
DEP 22 5%
CDI 11 3%
NI 9 2%

[Diagram showing the representation of the EPP Group with pie charts and percentages for each country]
Accession of Greece 1981
434 seats

European Parliament

EPP Group
Representation of the EPP-ED Group within the European Parliament

1984 Elections
434 seats

European Parliament

EPP Group
Accession of Spain and Portugal 1986
518 seats

European Parliament

EPP Group
Representation of the EPP-ED Group within the European Parliament

1989 Elections
518 seats

European Parliament

EPP Group
1994 Elections
567 seats

European Parliament

EPP Group

DE 47
30%

ES 30
19%

GB 19
12%

FR 13
8%

IT 12
8%

IE 4
3%

NL 10
6%

GR 9
6%

BE 7
4%

DK 3
2%

LU 2
1%

PT 1
1%

PSE 198
34%

PPE 157
28%

ELDR 43
8%

ARE 19
3%

EDN 19
3%

NI 27
5%

RDE 26
5%

FE 27
5%

GUE 28
5%

PSE 198 34%
PPE 157 28%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 19 3%
NI 27 5%
RDE 26 5%
FE 27 5%
GUE 28 5%
ELDR 43 8%
ARE 19 3%
EDN 3%
Representation of the EPP-ED Group within the European Parliament

Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden 1995

626 seats

European Parliament

EPP Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSE</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPE</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELDR</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPE</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUE-NGL</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PSE 214 35%
PPE 201 33%
ELDR 42 7%
UPE 34 6%
GUE-NGL 34 5%
V 27 4%
ARE 21 3%
I-EDN 15 2%
NI 38 6%
1999 Elections
626 seats

European Parliament

EPP-DE Group

EPP-DE 233
PSE 180
ELDR 50
V-ALE 48
GUE-NGL 42
UEN 30
EDD 16
NI 27

DE 53
GB 37
IT 34
ES 28
FR 21
GR 9
NL 9
PT 9
AT 7
SE 7
BE 6
IE 5
FI 5
LU 2
DK 1
Representation of the EPP-ED Group within the European Parliament

2004 Elections
732 seats

European Parliament

EPP-ED Group

PPE-DE 268
36%

PSE 200
27%

ALDE 88
12%

V-ALE 42
6%

GUE-NGL 41
6%

IND/DEM 37
5%

UEN 27
4%

NI 29
4%

DE 49
18%

GB 28
10%

ES 24
9%

IT 24
9%

PL 19
7%

FR 17
6%

CY 3
1%

LU 3
1%

LV 3
1%

LT 2
1%

DK 0%

EE 1
0%

SE 5
2%

FI 4
1%

SL 4
1%

NL 7
3%

SK 8
3%

GR 11
4%

HU 13
5%

CZ 14
5%

PT 9
3%

AT 6
2%

BE 6
2%

IE 5
2%

SE 5
2%

FR 17
6%

PL 19
7%

IT 24
9%

DE 49
18%

GB 28
10%

ES 24
9%

IT 24
9%

PL 19
7%

FR 17
6%

CY 3
1%

LU 3
1%

LV 3
1%

LT 2
1%

DK 1
0%

EE 1
0%

SE 5
2%

FI 4
1%

SL 4
1%

NL 7
3%

SK 8
3%

GR 11
4%

HU 13
5%

CZ 14
5%

PT 9
3%

AT 6
2%

BE 6
2%

IE 5
2%

SE 5
2%

FR 17
6%

PL 19
7%

IT 24
9%

DE 49
18%

GB 28
10%

ES 24
9%

IT 24
9%

PL 19
7%

FR 17
6%

CY 3
1%

LU 3
1%

LV 3
1%

LT 2
1%

DK 1
0%

EE 1
0%

SE 5
2%

FI 4
1%

SL 4
1%

NL 7
3%

SK 8
3%

GR 11
4%

HU 13
5%

CZ 14
5%

PT 9
3%

AT 6
2%

BE 6
2%

IE 5
2%

SE 5
2%

FR 17
6%

PL 19
7%

IT 24
9%
Accession of Bulgaria and Romania – January 2007
785 seats

European Parliament

EPP-ED Group
Representation of the EPP-ED Group within the European Parliament

Following the elections in Bulgaria and Romania
December 2007 – 785 seats

European Parliament

EPP-ED Group

[Pie chart showing the distribution of seats among different groups, with PPE-DE 288 at 36% and PSE at 28%]
2009 Elections
736 seats

European Parliament

EPP-ED Group

ECP 54

GUE/NGL 35

ALDE 55

V/ALE 55

S&D 184

S&D 184

11%

PPE 265

PPE 265

36%

25%

EFD 32

GUE/NGL 35

EFD 32

4%

11%

ECR 54

V/ALE 55

ECR 54

7%

7%

ALDE 84

ALDE 84

11%

NI 27

VI 27

NI 27

4%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%
Representation of the EPP-ED Group within the European Parliament

LEGEND OF CHARTS

A. Country code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Code</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. The Groups in the European Parliament

1979

SOC  Socialist Group
PPE  Group of the European People’s Party (Christian-Democratic Group)
DE   European Democratic Group
COM  Communist and Allies Group
LD   Liberal and Democratic Group
DEP  Group of European Progressive Democrats
CDI  Group for the Technical Coordination and Defence of Independent groups and Members
NI   Non-attached

1981

SOC  Socialist Group
PPE  Group of the European People’s Party (Christian-Democratic Group)
DE   European Democratic Group
COM  Communist and Allies Group
LD   Liberal and Democratic Group
DEP  Group of European Progressive Democrats
CDI  Group for the Technical Coordination and Defence of Independent Groups and Members
NI   Non-attached

1984

SOC  Socialist Group
PPE  Group of the European People’s Party (Christian-Democratic Group)
DE   European Democratic Group
COM  Communist and Allies Group
LDR  Liberal and Democratic Group
RDE  Group of the European Democratic Alliance
ARC  Rainbow Group: Federation of the Green-Alternative European Link
GDE  Group of the European Right
NI   Non-attached

1986

SOC  Socialist Group
PPE  Group of the European People’s Party (Christian-Democratic Group)
DE   European Democratic Group
COM  Communist and Allies Group
ELDR Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group
RDE  Group of the European Democratic Alliance
ARC  Rainbow Group: Federation of the Green-Alternative European Link
GDE  Group of the European Right
CDI  Group for the Technical Coordination and Defence of Independent Groups and Members
NI   Non-attached
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1989 | SOC: Socialist Group  
      | PPE: Group of the European People’s Party (Christian-Democratic Group)  
      | ELDR: Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group  
      | DE: European Democratic Group  
      | VERTS: The Green Group in the European Parliament  
      | GUE: Group for the European Unitarian Left  
      | RDE: Group of the European Democratic Alliance  
      | DR: Technical Group of the European Right  
      | CG: Left Unity  
      | ARC: Rainbow Group: Federation of the Green-Alternative European Link  
      | NI: Non-attached |
| 1994 | PSE: Group of the Party of the European Socialists  
      | PPE: Group of the European People’s Party (Christian-Democratic Group)  
      | ELDR: Group of the European Liberal Democratic and Reformist Party  
      | GUE: Confederal Group of the European United Left  
      | FE: Forza Europa Group  
      | RDE: Group of the European Democratic Alliance  
      | V: The Green Group in the European Parliament  
      | ARE: Group of the European Radical Alliance  
      | EDN: Europe of Nations Group (Coordination Group)  
      | NI: Non-attached |
| 1995 | PSE: Group of the Party of the European Socialists  
      | PPE: Group of the European People’s Party (Christian-Democratic Group)  
      | ELDR: Group of the European Liberal Democratic and Reformist Party  
      | GUE-NGL: Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green left  
      | V: The Green Group in the European Parliament  
      | ARE: Group of the European Radical Alliance  
      | I-EDN: Independent Europe of Nations Group (Coordination Group)  
      | NI: Non-attached |
| 1999 | PPE-DE: Group of the European People’s Party (Christian-Democrats) and European Democrats  
      | PSE: Group of the Party of the European Socialists  
      | ELDR: Group of the European Liberal Democratic and Reformist Party  
      | V-ALE: Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance  
      | GUE-NGL: Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green left  
      | UEN: Union for a Europe of Nations Group  
      | EDD: Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities  
      | NI: Non-attached |
| 2004 | PPE-DE: Group of the European People’s Party (Christian-Democrats) and European Democrats  
      | PSE: Group of the Party of the European Socialists  
      | ALDE: Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe  
      | V-ALE: Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance  
      | GUE-NGL: Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green left  
      | IND/DEM: Independence/Democracy Group  
      | UEN: Union for a Europe of Nations Group  
      | NI: Non-attached |
Representation of the EPP-ED Group within the European Parliament

2007

PPE-DE  Group of the European People's Party (Christian-Democratic) and European Democrats
PSE  Group of the Party of the European Socialists
ALDE  Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
UEN  Union for a Europe of Nations Group
V-ALE  Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
GUE-NGL  Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green left
IND/DEM  Independence/Democracy Group
NI  Non-attached

2008

PPE-DE  Group of the European People's Party (Christian-Democratic) and European Democrats
PSE  Socialist Group in the European Parliament
ALDE  Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
UEN  Union for a Europe of Nations Group
V-ALE  Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
GUE-NGL  Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green left
IDN/DEM  Independence/Democracy Group
NI  Non-attached

2009

PPE  Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats)
S&D  Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament
ALDE  Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
GREENS/EFA  Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
ECR  European Conservatives and Reformists Group
GUE-NGL  Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left
EFD  Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group
NI  Non-attached

Sources: EPP Group archives, Group minutes, minutes of the European Parliament, list of Members of the European Parliament, International Organisation for Standardisation (iso.org)
## Annex 6

### EXTERNAL MEETINGS OF THE EPP GROUP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Meeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11.1957</td>
<td>Rome (IT)</td>
<td>Bureau and Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1961</td>
<td>Stresa (IT)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1961</td>
<td>Paris (FR)</td>
<td>Bureau and Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1962</td>
<td>The Hague (NL)</td>
<td>Bureau and Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1962</td>
<td>Cologne (DE)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1963</td>
<td>Rome (IT)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1964</td>
<td>Paris (FR)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1963</td>
<td>Luxembourg (LU)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1964</td>
<td>Rome (IT)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1965</td>
<td>Rouen (FR)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1965</td>
<td>Ostend (BE)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1966</td>
<td>Paris (FR)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1970</td>
<td>Lüttich (LU)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1971</td>
<td>Luxembourg (LU)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1971</td>
<td>Catania (IT)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1972</td>
<td>Rennes (FR)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1972</td>
<td>Stuttgart (DE)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1973</td>
<td>Florence (IT)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1973</td>
<td>Namur (BE)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1973</td>
<td>Bonn (DE)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1974</td>
<td>Dublin (IE)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1974</td>
<td>Berlin (DE)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1975</td>
<td>The Hague (NL)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1975</td>
<td>Cala Gonone (IT)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1976</td>
<td>Bonn (DE)</td>
<td>Bureau and Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1976</td>
<td>The Hague (NL)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1976</td>
<td>Rome (IT)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1976</td>
<td>Bruges (BE)</td>
<td>Bureau and Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1976</td>
<td>Munich (DE)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1976</td>
<td>Koblenz (DE)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1977</td>
<td>Madrid (ES)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1977</td>
<td>Bressanone (IT)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/7.1977</td>
<td>Paris (FR)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1977</td>
<td>London (UK)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1977</td>
<td>Bonn (DE)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1978</td>
<td>The Hague (NL)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1978</td>
<td>Berlin (DE)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1978</td>
<td>Dublin (IE)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1978</td>
<td>Berlin (DE)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1978</td>
<td>Mandelieu La Napoule (FR)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1978</td>
<td>Rome (IT)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1978</td>
<td>Regensburg (DE)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.1978</td>
<td>Oporto (PT)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1979</td>
<td>Rome (IT)</td>
<td>Administrative Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1979</td>
<td>Killarney (IE)</td>
<td>Group meeting / Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1979</td>
<td>Mainz (DE)</td>
<td>Administrative Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1979</td>
<td>Boat on the Rhine</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1979</td>
<td>Maastricht (NL)</td>
<td>Study Days and Administrative Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1979</td>
<td>Echternach (LU)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1980</td>
<td>Berlin (DE)</td>
<td>Enlarged Bureau and Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1980</td>
<td>La Grande Motte (FR)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1980</td>
<td>Palermo (IT)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4.1981</td>
<td>Rome (IT)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/5.1981</td>
<td>Rotterdam (NL)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1981</td>
<td>Aachen (DE)</td>
<td>Study Days and Administrative Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1981</td>
<td>Naples (IT)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.1981</td>
<td>Bonn (DE)</td>
<td>Enlarged Bureau and Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1982</td>
<td>Copenhagen (DK)</td>
<td>Bureau and Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1982</td>
<td>Limerick (IE)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1982</td>
<td>Florence (IT)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1982</td>
<td>Athens (GR)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1983</td>
<td>Lisbon (PT)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1983</td>
<td>Rhodes (GR)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1983</td>
<td>Berlin (DE)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1983</td>
<td>Munich (DE)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1984</td>
<td>Bonn (DE)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1984</td>
<td>Amsterdam (NL)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1984</td>
<td>Rome (IT)</td>
<td>Group meeting/ 5th EPP Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.1984</td>
<td>Dublin (IE)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1985</td>
<td>Athens (GR)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1985</td>
<td>Luxembourg (LU)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1985</td>
<td>Toulouse (FR)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1986</td>
<td>The Hague (NL)</td>
<td>Group meeting/ 6th EPP Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1986</td>
<td>Lisbon (PT)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.1986 Porto Carras (GR) Study Days
10.1986 Florence (IT) Enlarged Bureau
11.1986 Bonn (DE) Group meeting
3.1987 Rome (IT) Group meeting
5.1987 Madrid (ES) Group meeting
5.1987 Copenhagen (DK) Enlarged Bureau
6.1987 Berlin (DE) Study Days
9.1987 Konstanz (DE) Study Days
10.1987 Paris (FR) Group meeting
2.1988 Annecy (FR) Bureau
5.1988 Galway (IE) Study Days
5.1988 Rome (IT) Enlarged Bureau
6.1988 London (UK) EPP and ED Symposium
9.1988 Palermo (IT) Study Days
10.1988 Berlin (DE) Bureau
2.1989 Athens (GR) Study Days
3.1989 Lisbon (PT) Group meeting
4.1989 The Hague (NL) Bureau
5.1989 Barcelona (ES) Group meeting
7.1989 Madeira (PT) Study Days
10.1989 Athens (GR) Bureau
1.1990 Berlin (DE) Group meeting
3.1990 Rome (IT) Group meeting
3.1990 Dublin (IE) Bureau
5.1990 Crete (GR) Study Days
6.1990 Copenhagen (DK) Bureau
9.1990 Vienna (AT) Bureau
11.1990 Dublin (IE) Group meeting/ 8th EPP Congress
11.1990 Rome (IT) Assize and Bureau
4.1991 Santiago de Compostela (ES) Study Days
5.1991 Lourdes (FR) Bureau
9.1991 Sirmione (IT) Study Days and Bureau
12.1991 The Hague (NL) Bureau
4/5.1992 Granada (ES) Study Days
6.1992 Stockholm (SE) Bureau
9.1992 London (UK) Study Days
11.1992 Athens (GR) Group meeting
12.1992 Malta (MT) Bureau
2.1993 Copenhagen (DK) Bureau
5.1993 Valencia (ES) Study Days
6.1993 Vienna (AT) Group meeting
8/9.1993 Schwerin (DE) Study Days
12.1993 Antwerp (BE) Group meeting
3.1994 Rome (IT) Bureau
4.1994 Paris (FR) Bureau
6/7.1994 Estoril (PT) Study Days
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>City/Date/Location</th>
<th>Event/Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1995</td>
<td>Cannes-Mandelieu (FR)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9.1995</td>
<td>Bruges (BE)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1995</td>
<td>Madrid (ES)</td>
<td>Group meeting/ 11th EPP Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/5.1996</td>
<td>Vouliagmeni (GR)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1996</td>
<td>Malta (MT)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1996</td>
<td>Helsinki (FI) and Tallinn (EE)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1997</td>
<td>Rome (IT)</td>
<td>Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1997</td>
<td>Meran (IT)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1997</td>
<td>Santiago de Compostela (ES)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1997</td>
<td>Stockholm (SE)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1997</td>
<td>Toulouse (FR)</td>
<td>Group meeting/12th EPP Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.1997</td>
<td>Thessaloniki (GR)</td>
<td>Dialogue with the Ecumenical Patriarch, EPP, UEDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1998</td>
<td>Warsaw (PL)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1998</td>
<td>Berlin (DE)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1998</td>
<td>Bucharest (RO)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1998</td>
<td>Vilamoura (PT)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1998</td>
<td>Lisbon (PT)</td>
<td>Interparliamentary Forum EPE-ODCA Europe/Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1999</td>
<td>Vienna (AT)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1999</td>
<td>Madrid (ES)</td>
<td>Presentation of EPP members heading lists for 1999 elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1999</td>
<td>Dublin (IE)</td>
<td>Presentation of EPP members heading lists for 1999 elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1999</td>
<td>Marbella (ES)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2000</td>
<td>Thessaloniki (GR)</td>
<td>EPP/EDU/ED Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2000</td>
<td>Paris (FR)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2000</td>
<td>Istanbul (TR)</td>
<td>Dialogue with the Orthodox Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2000</td>
<td>Bratislava (SK)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.2000</td>
<td>Riga (LV)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2001</td>
<td>Berlin (DE)</td>
<td>Study Days/14th EPP Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2001</td>
<td>Nicosia (CY)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2001</td>
<td>Thessaloniki (GR)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2001</td>
<td>Crete (GR)</td>
<td>Dialogue with the Orthodox Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2001</td>
<td>Santiago de Compostela (ES)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2001</td>
<td>Rome (IT)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.2001</td>
<td>Budapest (HU)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2002</td>
<td>Prague (CZ)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2002</td>
<td>Saariselkä (FI)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2002</td>
<td>Edinburgh (UK)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2002</td>
<td>Bucharest (RO)</td>
<td>Dialogue with the Orthodox Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2002</td>
<td>Oxford (UK)</td>
<td>EIN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
External meetings of the EPP Group

9.2002 Ljubljana (SI) Bureau
10.2002 Estoril (PT) Group meeting/ 15th EPP Congress
3.2003 Regensburg (DE) Bureau
4.2003 St Etienne (FR) Bureau
5.2003 Warsaw (PL) Bureau
6.2003 Copenhagen (DK) Study Days
9.2003 El Escorial (ES) EIN
9.2003 Madrid (ES) Study Days
10.2003 Istanbul (TR) Dialogue with the Orthodox Church
3.2004 Vienna (AT) Study Days
7.2004 Budapest (HU) Study Days
9.2004 Berlin (DE) EIN
10.2004 Thessaloniki (GR) Dialogue with the Orthodox Church
4.2005 Sofia (BG) Bureau
6.2005 Bucharest (RO) Bureau
9.2005 Gdansk (PL) Bureau
9.2005 Lisbon (PT) EIN
10.2005 Istanbul (TR) Dialogue with the Orthodox Church
3.2006 Rome (IT) Study Days/ EPP Congress
5.2006 Split (HR) Bureau
6.2006 Bordeaux (FR) Bureau
9.2006 Lyon (FR) EIN
11.2006 Bratislava (SK) Dialogue with the Orthodox Church
1.2007 Berlin (DE) Presidency
4.2007 Granada (ES) Bureau
6.2007 Ponta Delgada - Azores (PT) Bureau
6.2007 Lisbon (PT) Presidency
7.2007 Malta (MT) Study Days
7.2007 Washington (USA) Presidency
9.2007 Warsaw (PL) EIN
12.2007 Sarajevo (BA) Bureau
1.2008 Ljubljana (SL) Presidency
2.2008 Nicosia (CY) Bureau
17-18.3.2008 Tbilisi (GE) Regional Dialogue with the Orthodox Church
4.2008 Portorož (SL) Bureau
5.2008 Paris (FR) Presidency
7.2008 Paris (FR) Study Days
17.7.2008 Kiev (Ukraine) Regional Dialogue with the Orthodox Church
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-20.9.2008</td>
<td>Fiuggi (IT)</td>
<td>EIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-17.10.2008</td>
<td>Iasi (RO)</td>
<td>Dialogue with religions and cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2008</td>
<td>Réunion (FR)</td>
<td>Presidency and Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.2008</td>
<td>Prague (CZ)</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2009</td>
<td>Sofia (BG)</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2009</td>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-17.4.2009</td>
<td>Tallinn (EE)</td>
<td>Presidency and Heads of National Delegations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-29.4.2009</td>
<td>Warsaw (PL)</td>
<td>Study Days/EPP Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.6/2.7.2009</td>
<td>Athens (GR)</td>
<td>Study Days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SUMMARY BY COUNTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRIA (AT)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM (BE)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (BA)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BULGARIA (BG)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROATIA (HR)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYPRUS (CY)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZECH REPUBLIC (CZ)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENMARK (DK)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTONIA (EE)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND (FI)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE (FR)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEORGIA (GE)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY (DE)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREECE (GR)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY (HU)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND (IE)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY (IT)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATVIA (LV)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITHUANIA (LT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUXEMBOURG (LU)</td>
<td>4 + 20(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALTA (MT)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETHERLANDS (NL)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAND (PL)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTUGAL (PT)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA (RO)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOVAKIA (SK)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOVENIA (SI)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN (ES)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN (SE)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY (TR)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKRAINE (UA)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM (UK)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>223</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Meetings in Luxembourg since 1979.
MEETINGS IN LUXEMBOURG SINCE 1979

2.1979  Group and Bureau meeting
5.1979  Group and Bureau meeting
10.1979 Group meeting
4.1980  Group meeting
6.1980  Group meeting
9.1980  Bureau
11.1980 Group and Bureau meeting
12.1980 Group and Bureau meeting
2.1981  Group meeting
9.1981  Group meeting
6-7.1982 Group meeting
5.1984  Group meeting
7.1985  Group and Bureau meeting
2.1986  Group meeting
7.1987  Group meeting
11.1988 Group meeting / 7th EPP Congress
6-7.1992 Bureau
7.1993  Bureau
7.1996  Bureau
7.1997  Bureau and Interparliamentary Conference EPP Group, EUCD and EDU
## Annex 7
### INDEX OF NAMES

**A**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abelin Jean-Pierre</td>
<td>pages 226, 563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adamakis Emmanuel</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adenauer Konrad</td>
<td>19, 23, 33, 46, 50, 51, 57, 69, 143, 153, 156, 166, 280, 369, 457, 477, 500, 501, 507, 541, 551, 552, 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adler Peter</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adonnino Pietro</td>
<td>169, 191, 194, 196, 226, 236, 237, 555, 570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>af Ugglas Margaretha</td>
<td>327, 581, 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agag Longo Alejandro</td>
<td>341, 579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agard Atilla</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aigner Heinrich</td>
<td>94-96, 167, 175, 191, 193, 198, 214, 269, 565, 591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Turki Abdullah bin Abdul</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allassaf Nassir</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alber Siegbert</td>
<td>166, 175, 181, 207, 565, 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albertini Gabriele</td>
<td>352, 570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albertini Pierre</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aldaya Etxeburua José María</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alessi Giuseppe</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almeida Garrett Teresa</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alphandéry Edmond</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alphonso XIII</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alvargonzales Mercedes</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amato Giuliano</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anastase Roberta Alma</td>
<td>355, 578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anastassopoulos Georgios</td>
<td>214, 215, 569, 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andreotti Giulio</td>
<td>180, 227, 280, 301-303, 570, 589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andria Generoso</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andriessen Franz</td>
<td>202, 303, 434, 498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrikienė Laima Liucija</td>
<td>354, 575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angelakas Emmanouil</td>
<td>351, 569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angelini Armando</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Añoveros Trias de Bes Julio</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antall József</td>
<td>279, 281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoniozzi Alfredo</td>
<td>168, 352, 571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoniozzi Dario</td>
<td>152, 168, 187, 251, 571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archbishop of Toledo</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areitio Toledo Javier</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arens Markus</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argalas Andrís</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argyros Stelios</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arias Cañete Miguel</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armand Louis</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aron Raymond</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arroni Aldo</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artzinger Helmut Karl</td>
<td>94, 565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arvidsson Per-Arne</td>
<td>343, 581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashworth Richard</td>
<td>351, 581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atkins Robert (Sir)</td>
<td>338, 581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attale Il Philadelphia</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attlee Clement</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aubame Jean</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audy Jean-Pierre</td>
<td>351, 564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Averoff Ioannis</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviles Perea Maria Antonia</td>
<td>340, 579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayuso González María del Pilar</td>
<td>340, 579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azara Antonio</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aznar López José María Alfredo</td>
<td>111, 262, 263, 265, 303, 324, 334, 340, 345, 350, 359, 495, 501-503, 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azzolini Claudio</td>
<td>333, 571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bachelot-Narquin Roselyne</td>
<td>351, 521, 564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badénes Monique</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baduel Glorioso Maria Fabrizia</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldi Monica Stefania</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldini Valerio</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balfe Richard A.</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende Jan-Peter</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balladur Édouard</td>
<td>434, 502</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bourlanges Jean-Louis 270, 284, 314, 325, 341, 342, 348, 351, 384, 399, 409, 419, 564
Bournias Leonidas 569
Boutos Ioannis 215, 569
Bowis John 338, 581
Boyden Gray Clayland 503
Braccesi Giorgio 571
Bradbourn Philip Charles 338, 581
Braghetto Iles 352, 571
Brainbridge Thimothee 266
Braun-Moser Ursula 247, 565
Brejc Mihael 354, 579
Bremmer Cees 576
Brepoels Frieda 351, 561
Brezina Jan 354, 562
Brittan of Spennithorne Leon (Lord) 498, 499
Brocka Július 579
Brouwer Tiemen 576
Brown Gordon 523
Brugger Peter 84, 571
Bruis Slot J. A. H. J. S. 576
Brunetta Renato 340, 431, 571
Bruton John 302, 336, 398, 590
Bukman Piet 589
Buzesc Nicodim 355, 578
Burenstam Linder Staffan 343, 374
Burgbacher Friedrich 85, 88, 565
Burke Colm 352, 570
Burtone Giovanni 571
Busek Erhard 372
Bushill-Matthews Philip 338, 581
Busuttil Simon 353, 576
Buttiglione Rocco 340, 418, 419, 571
Buzeck Jerzy 37, 353, 354, 378, 497, 503, 577

C
Cabanillas Gallas Pio 579
Cabrnoch Milan 354, 562
Caetano Marcelo 107
Calia Maddalena 352, 571
Califice Alfred 561
Callanan Martin 338, 581
Calvo-Sotelo y Bustelo Leopoldo 579
Cameron David 349, 542
Camisón Asensio Felipe 579
Campilli Pietro 571
Campoy Zueco Luis 579
Capucho António 577
Carboni Enrico 571
Carcaterra Antonio 571
Cardoso Raquel 577
Carlsson Gunilla 581
Carn Alena 362
Carnogursky Jan 371, 497
Caro Jean-Marie 564
Carollo Giorgio 352, 571
Carron Giuseppe 64, 65, 571
Carrington (Lord) 293
Carro Delia 272
Carvalho Cardoso José Vicente 578
Casa David 353, 576
Casini Carlo 214, 327, 352, 571
Casini Pier Ferdinando 571
Caspari Daniel 350, 565
Cassanmagno Cerretti Maria Luisa 164, 169, 172, 175, 181, 245, 247, 251, 253, 258, 284, 293, 309, 571
Cassidy Bryan 581
Castagnetti Pierluigi 326, 333, 336, 571
Castiglione Giuseppe 352, 571
Catherwood Fred (Sir) 581
Cavaco Silva Aníbal António 496, 502, 590
Cavalli Antonio 571
Ceausescu Nicolae 275, 556
Cecchini Paolo 230
Cederschiöld Charlotte 327, 394, 472, 581
Cerexhe Étienne 497
Ceric Moustapha 487
Cerulli Irelli Giuseppe 571
Cesa Lorenzo 352, 571
Cesaro Luigi 340, 571
Chabert Henry 296, 564
Chanterie Raphaël 215, 261, 272, 282, 561
Charpentier René 51, 70, 79, 564
Chatenet Pierre 62
Chiabrando Mauro 571
Chichester Giles 325, 427, 581
Chirac Jacques 163, 326, 332, 335, 390, 508
Chiriță Călin Cătălin 578
Chiusano Vittorino 571
Chmielewski Zdzisław Kazimierz 353, 577
Christensen Frode Nør 563
Christodoulou Efthimios 96, 215, 374, 436, 439, 498, 569, 590
Index of names

de Veyrinas Françoise 565
De Vito Lorenzo 572, 591
De Winter Émile 561
Debatisse Michel 134, 203, 214, 216, 277, 564
Decourrière Francis 341, 564
Dehaene Jean-Luc 334, 351, 383, 389, 396, 398, 409, 422, 499, 527, 561
Dehecq Jean-François 498
Dehousse Fernand 154
del Castillo Vera Pilar 350, 579
Del Duca Antonio 572
Delahaye Marie-Claude 358
Delle Fave Umberto 572
Dell’Utri Marcello 340, 572
Delors Jacques 217, 225, 235, 236, 282, 301, 311, 409, 435, 492, 555, 590
Demetriou Panayiotis 562
Deprez Gérard 215, 272, 302, 348, 541, 561
Deringer Arved 565
Deriu Marilena 177
Dermendjieva Mina 362
Descamps Marie-Hélène 564
Deschamps Pierre 132, 133, 207, 249, 561
Dess Albert 350, 565
Detourbet Christine 272
Deva Nirj 338, 581
Dewulf Maurice 561
Di Prima Pietro Antonio 572
Diana Alfredo 168, 201, 572
Díaz de Mera García Consuegra Agustín 579
Dichgans Hans 566
Diepgen Eberhard 496
Diligent André 172, 186, 187, 211, 564
Dimas Stavros 498, 520
Dimitrakopoulos Georgios 327, 569
Dimitrov Konstantin 562
Dimitrov Martin 562
Dimitrov Philip Dimitrov 562
Dionisi Armando 352, 572
Dittrich Stefan 566
Dollinger Werner 566
Dombrovskis Valdis 354, 575
Dominedo Francesco 572
Don Sturzo 51, 477
Donck Véronique 272
Dondelinger Jean 589
Donnelly Brendan Patrick 581
Donner Jan Pieter Hendrik 499
Dooge James 221, 222, 226, 227
Doorn Bert 576
Dos Santos Machado Manuel 578
Douste-Blazy Philippe 496, 564
Dover Den 338, 581
Doyle Avril 570
Dreute Oliver 361
Duchon Petr 354, 563
Duetoft Peter Klaus 563
Duisenberg Wim 441, 442
Duka-Zólyomi Árpád 354, 579
Dumitriu Constantin 355, 578
Duncan Smith Iain 347
Dunne Thomas 570
Dupont Joseph 561
Duran I Lleida Josep Antoni 219, 302, 579
Durão Barroso José Manuel 268, 358, 406, 417-419, 445, 502, 503, 520, 522, 527-529, 559, 560, 591
Duveiusart Jean 49, 57, 71, 552, 561
Dzurinda Mikuláš 492, 497

E
Ebel Manfred A. 566
Ebner Michl 326, 374, 572
Eckhardt Walter 566
Eden Anthony 100
Efstathopoulos Spyros 272
Ehler Christian 350, 566
Elles James 96, 267, 343, 349, 412, 413, 431, 500, 503, 513, 526, 581
Elles Diana 186, 267
Engelbrecht Greve Ernst 566
Ercini Sergio 572
Erdogan Recep Tayyip 459
Ergma Ene 381
Erhard Ludwig 55
Escuder Croft Arturo Juan 579
Escudero Lopez José Antonio 579
Esmonde Anthony 104
Estemirova Natalya 591
Estevan Bolea María Teresa 579
Esteves Maria da Assunção 352, 578
Estgen Nicolas 172, 214, 216, 575, 590
Etzel Franz 60
Eurlings Camiel 353, 458, 576
Evans Jonathan 338, 581
Evert Miliadies 590
Evisor Marek 359
Evrigenis Dimitrios 215, 247, 569
Eyadéma Gnassingbé 257

F
Fabra Vallés Juan Manuel 456, 579
Fajmon Hynek 354, 563
Falkmer Karin 581
Fanfani Amintore 146, 572
Fantini Antonio 572
Fatuzzo Carlo 340, 572
Faure Maurice 154
Fenech Adami Eddie 303
Ferber Markus 323, 566
Fernandez-Albor Gerardo 281, 579
Fernández Martín Fernando 579
Ferragni Arnaldo 136, 144-146, 149, 150, 361, 367, 553, 585
Ferrari Francesco 572
Ferr i Casals Concepció 262, 288, 324, 336, 349, 579
Ferrero-Waldner Benita 498, 520
Ferré Maurice 154
Fernández Martín Fernando 579
Ferrandi-Björn Bjarne 124
Ferretti Giorgio 340, 572
Ferrandis-Blosset María Dolores 324, 333
Ferrándiz Guisán 221
Ferhati Tazi 352, 579
Fernández Martín Fernando 579
Ferrero-Waldner Benita 498, 520
Ferry Maria 352
Ferrari Francesco 340, 343, 473, 572
Fischbach Marc 575
Fischbach Marcel 575
Fischer Joschka 389, 417
Fischler Franz 371, 432, 498, 590
Fitto Raffaele 340, 572
Fitzgerald Garret 221
Fitzhenry Robert 177, 266, 363
Fjellner Christofer 353, 581
Flanagan Maria 148
Flemming Marialiese 431, 561
Florenz Karl-Heinz 267, 566
Florio Luigi Andrea 572
Folias Christos 569
Folz Andrea 363
Folz Jean-Marie 503
Fontaine Nicole 37, 126, 220, 237, 238, 247, 325, 341, 345, 346, 351, 416, 417, 438, 448, 457, 558, 564, 590
Fontaine Pascal 20, 177, 330, 358, 361, 500
Fontana Alessandro 572
Fontanini Mariangella 272
Forlani Arnaldo 265, 302, 572
Formigoni Roberto 214, 244, 281, 572
Forte Mario 572
Foster Jacqueline 339, 581
Fouchet Christian 69-72, 552
Fourçans André 326, 439, 564
Fouré Brigitte 351, 564
Fourtou Janelly 341, 342, 564
Fraga Estévez Carmen 324, 325, 343, 350, 364, 580
Fraga Iribarne Manuel 111, 262, 324, 590
Franco (général) 107, 110, 496
Franz Otmar 86, 214, 566
Frassoni Monica 507
Fratini Franco 498, 520
Frei Eduardo 252
Freitas Duarte 352, 578
Friedensburg Fernand 566
Friedrich Ingo 35, 86, 166, 394, 478, 566, 590
Froment-Meurice François 242, 564
Fröh Isidor 83, 84, 200, 210, 434, 566
Frunzăverde Sorin 355, 578
Fuchs Karl 566
Fugmann Friedrich 148, 189
Fukuyama Francis 502
Funeriu Daniel Petru 578
Funk Honor 566
Furler Hans 49, 57, 58, 60, 73, 74, 94, 123, 131, 143, 552, 566
G
Gacek Urzula 353, 577
Gahler Michael 337, 379, 450, 566
Gaibisso Gerardo 572
Gaigg Gerfried 561
Gaiotti de Biase Paola 172, 245, 572
Gál Kinga 354, 570
Galbavy Tomáš 354, 579
Galeote Quecedo Gerardo 324, 333, 346, 364, 471, 512, 580
Gallenzi Giulio Cesare 572
Galletto Bortolo 572
Galli Luigi Michele 572
Gama José Augusto 578
Ganga Zandzou Jean 256
Gangoiti-Llaguno Juan Antonio 580
Gant Ovidiu Victor 578
Garcia Amigo Manuel 273, 580, 590
Garcia Orcoyen Tormo Cristina 340, 580
García-Margallo y Marfil José Manuel 325, 426, 580
Gardini Elisabetta 352, 572
Gargani Giuseppe 572
Garlato Giuseppe 572
Garosci Riccardo 572
Garriga Polledo Salvador 325, 580
Gaubert Patrick 351, 474, 564
Gauzès Jean-Paul 351, 564
Gawronski Jas 379, 573
Gazzo Emmanuel 142
Geiger Hugo 498, 566
Geimer Hortense 141
Gemelli Vitaliano 573
Gennai Tonietti Erisia 573
Genscher Hans-Dietrich 168, 187-190, 554
Gent Christopher Charles (Sir) 499
Georgitsopoulos Theodoros 362
Gerini Alessandro 573
Gerokostopoulos Achillefs 569
Gerontopoulos Kyriakos 569
Gersony Amarylli 358
Gerstenmaier Eugen 43, 566
Gewalt Roland 502, 503
Ghani Ashraf 215, 247, 569
Gera Giovanni 117, 164, 190, 573, 591
Georgitsopoulos Theodoros 362
Gennai Tonietti Erisia 573
Genscher Hans-Dietrich 168, 187-190, 554
Gent Christopher Charles (Sir) 499
Georgitsopoulos Theodoros 362
Gerini Alessandro 573
Gerokostopoulos Achillefs 569
Gerontopoulos Kyriakos 569
Gersony Amarylli 358
Gerontomaier Eugen 43, 566
Gewalt Roland 350, 566
Ghan Ashraf 502, 503
Ghergo Alberto 573, 591
Giannakou-Koutsikou Marietta 215, 247, 569
Gianazzi Giovanni 214, 277, 504, 573
Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado José María 37, 269, 271, 325, 326, 332, 395, 498, 557, 560, 590
Gillis Alan 570
Giordani Francesco 60
Girardin Luigi 117, 573
Giraudo Giovanni 573
Giummarra Vincenzo 573
Glavakis Ioannis 351, 569
Glas Anne Karin 566
Glatzfelder Béla 354, 570
Glesner Jean-Pierre 575
Gclowski Tadeusz 497
Goelz Knut 359
Goepel Lutz 566
Golde Silva 575
Gomolka Alfred 566
Gomulka Wladyslaw 528
Gonella Guido 164, 190, 573, 591
Gontikas Konstantinos 569
González Felipe 262, 303
Gonziz Lawrence 528
Goodwill Robert 339, 581
Goppel Alfons 566
Gorbachev Mikhail 276-278, 280, 285-287
Goria Giovanni 573
Goumy Claude 498
Gouveia João 578
Graça Moura Vasco 342, 578
Grassles Ingeborg 350, 566
Granelli Luigi 573
Graziani Antonio 590
Graziani Pier Antonio 326, 330, 573
Graziosi Dante 573
Green Pauline 414
Gregoire Pierre 575
Grönlund Bergman Lisbeth 581
Grosch Mathieu 561
Grossetête Françoise 326, 341, 343, 496, 564
Gruenvski Nikola 528
Gryskov Boris 518
Guccione Sergio 219, 220, 271, 361, 555, 586
Guccione Stefano 358
Guckenberger Gerhard 136, 148, 220, 271, 272, 357, 358, 361, 556, 586
Guemel Ambroise 351, 564
Guglielmone Teresio 573
Guidolin Francesco 573
Guimon Ugartechea Julen 580
Gu Abdullab 459
Günther Maren 566
Gustafsson Holger 581
Gutiérrez-Cortines Cristina 580
Gysen Greet 362
György András 354, 570

H

Haarder Bertel 590
Habsburg-Lothringen Karl 561
Hackel Wolfgang 566
Hadjigeorgiou Menelaos 273, 569, 590
Haerzschel Kurt 566
Haglund Jesper 359
Hague William 336, 345, 347, 542
Hahn Karl 64, 566, 589
Hahn Wilhelm 566
Haider Jörg 346
Haller von Hallerstein Helga 566
Hallstein Walter 57, 59, 64, 66, 73, 74, 78, 139, 552, 553
Hämbašan Ioan Lucian 578
Hamilton Alexander 544
Handzlik Malgorzata 353, 577
Hannan Daniel J. 339, 512, 581
Hänisch Klaus 186
Hansenne Michel 431, 561
Harbour Malcolm 338, 428, 581
Hare Martin 361
Hartmann Andreas 272
Hatzidakis Konstantinos 569
Havel Vaclav 278, 284
Hazenbosch Cornelis P. 115, 576
Heath Edward 103, 104, 264, 541, 590
Heaton-Harris Christopher 338, 581
Heck Bruno 589

623
Hecké Marianne 148
Heger Charles 561
Heinisch Renate Charlotte 566
Hellwig Fritz 66, 566
Helmer Roger 339, 581
Helms Wilhelm 566
Henckens Jaak 562
Henle Günter 566
Hennicot-Schoepges Erna 246, 352, 575
Herman Fernand 86, 170, 176, 216, 223, 239, 304, 305, 308, 309, 314, 370, 396, 397, 411, 421, 433, 434, 436, 439, 440, 562
Henning Marie-Thérèse 341, 564
Hermans Anna 238, 562
Hernández Mollar Jorge Salvador 580
Herr Joseph 575
Herranz García María Esther 580
Herrero-Tejedor Luis 350, 580
Hersant Robert 271, 556, 564
Herzog Roman 496
Hieronymi Ruth 337, 431, 566
Higgins Jim 352, 570
Hildebrandt Arthur 177, 361
Hirsch Étienne 61, 62
Hitler Adolf 214
Ho Chi Minh 527
Hoffmann Karl-Heinz 566
Hökmark Gunnar 353, 509-511, 581
Holán Vilém 376
Holbrooke Richard 297
Holowczyc Krysztof 353, 577
Hölvenyi György 359
Honecker Erich 279
Hoppenstedt Karsten Friedrich 350, 439, 566
Horteheux Brice 351, 474, 521, 564
Howell Paul 581
Hrusovsky Pavol 381
Hu Jia 244
Hudacký Ján 354, 579
Hudig Dirk 499
Hybášková Jana 354, 563
Iturgaiz Angulo Carlos José 350, 580
Iacob-Ridzi Monica Maria 355, 578
Ibrisagic Anna 353, 581
Ilaskivi Raimo 563
Illerhaus Joseph 62, 75, 102, 136, 138, 553, 566, 585
Imaz San Miguel Josu Jon 324, 580
Inglewood (Lord) 582
Ioannidis (général) 107
Iodice Antonio 261, 271, 573
Isaacs Adam 359
Itälä Ville 352, 563
Ivánov Igor 297
Izetbegović Alija 297
J
Jackson Caroline 267, 582
Jackson Christopher 582
Jaeger Richard 566
Jahn Hans Edgar 126, 566
Jakobsen Erhard V. 563
Jalowiecki Stanislaw 353, 577
Jansen Thomas 182, 281, 303, 332
Janssen van Raay James L. 576
Janssen Marinus M.A.A. 576
Jarecka-Gomez Joanna 361, 362
Járóka Livia 354, 570
Jaruzelski Wojciech 278
Jarzembowski Georg 267, 463, 566
Jean-Pierre Thiery 341, 564
Jefferson Thomas 544
Jeggle Elisabeth 337, 566
Jelewa Rumiana 355, 562
Jenkins Roy 88, 90
Jepsen Marie 563
Johansson Leif 498
John Paul II (Wojtyla Karol Józef) 159, 481-483, 497, 544, 554, 591
Jonker Śjouke 175, 186, 576
Jordan Cizelj Romana 354, 579
Jouppila Riitta 563
Jović Borislav 290
Juan Carlos I (Don Juan de Borbón y Borbón) 110, 111
Juncker Jean-Claude 86, 302, 334, 423, 424, 444, 445, 523, 528, 589
Juppé Alain 326, 335, 508
K
Kaczmarek Filip 353, 577
Kaladjis Angela 177
Kaldi Meropi 351
Kallias Konstantinos 181, 569
Kaloyannis Konstantinos 201, 569
Kamall Syed 351, 582
Kandolf Harald 272
Karamanlis Konstantinos 109, 180, 215, 528
Karadžić Angela 342, 424, 425, 443, 488, 509, 510, 518, 527, 561
Karim Sajjad 351, 582
Karoutchi Roger 341, 564
Kasoulides Ioannis 353, 497, 562
Kasparov Garry 503
Index of names

Kastler Martin 566
Katzer Hans 164, 566
Kauppi Piia-Noora 563
Kavalierakis Elias 272
Kazazis Filotas 569
Kears Fiona 177
Kekkonen Urho 313
Kelam Tunne 281, 354, 563, 591
Kelemen Attila Béla Ladislau 578
Keller Fabienne 564
Kellersmann Klaus 272
Kellett-Bowman Edward 330, 582
Kelam Tunne 281, 354, 563, 591
Kelemen Atilla Béla Ladislau 578
Keller Fabienne 564
Kellersmann Klaus 272
Kellett-Bowman Edward 330, 582
Kempe Frederick 502
Kennedy John F. 66, 67, 124
Keppelhoff-Wiechert Hedwig 566
Kerhofs Jan 499
Khanbhai Bashir 339, 582
Khol Andreas 495
Khrushchev Nikita S. 123, 278, 527
Kiesinger Kurt Georg 566
Kim Il-sung 527
Kingsland (Lord) 590
Kirk Peter 104
Kirkhope Timothy 338, 394, 398, 400, 542, 582
Kittelmann Peter 430, 566
Klamt Ewa 337, 566
Klass Christa 566
Klaus Vaclav 524
Klich Bogdan 353, 450, 451, 454, 577
Klinker Hans Jürgen 566
Klompé Margaretha 43, 100, 122, 142, 266
Knolle Karsten 567
Koch Dieter-Lebrecht 567
Kohl Helmut 146, 166, 265, 278, 280-282, 300, 302, 303, 305, 315, 320, 328, 329, 331, 334, 374, 416, 434, 435, 469, 492, 520, 540, 547, 589
Köhler Herbert W. 567
Kolane J.T. 256
Kollwelter Nicolas 575
Komarica Franjo 590
König Friedrich 282, 561
Konrad Christoph 567
Kónya-Hamar Sándor 578
Kopf Hermann 43, 44, 114, 137, 567
Korhola Eija-Riitta 563
Korthoudt Guy 177
Kostov Ivan 497
Kovács László 418
Kovalyev Sergey 591
Krasovskaya Iryna 451
Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou Rodi 342, 450, 569
Kristoffersen Frode 563
Kroes Neelie 418
Krögel Werner 177, 220
Kubilius Andrius 528
Kuchma Leonid 452
Kudrycka Barbara 353, 577
Kundera Milan 38
Kunz Gerhard 567
Kurtz Josef 564
Kužišis Alžis 354, 453, 575
Kužmiuk Zbigniew Krzysztof 353, 577
Kyprianou Marcos 351

L

Lacaze Jeannou 271, 556, 564
Lafuente Lopez José María 580
Lagakos Efstathios 569
Lamanna Francesco 573
Lamassoure Alain 271, 341, 376, 377, 390, 396-399, 401, 404, 405, 499, 521, 522, 556, 558, 564
Lambrias Panayotis 214, 215, 233, 277, 330, 569, 590
Lamfalussy Alexandre 441
Lamy Pascal 432
Landsbergis Vytautas 285, 288, 354, 450, 451, 455, 575, 591
Langen Werner 323, 567
Langendries Raymond 351, 562
Langenhagen Brigitte 567
Langes Horst 96, 167, 181, 191, 251, 254, 281, 492, 567, 590
Lardinois Pierre J. 576
Laschet Armin 454, 567
Laskava Andrea 362
Lauk Kurt Joachim 350, 567
Laurila Ritva Tellervo 563
Le Hodey Philippe 562
Le Pen Jean-Marie 213
Lecanuet Jean 106, 172, 253, 342, 564
Lechnert Kurt 337, 567
Lee Martin M.C. 590
Leemans Victor 49, 57, 553, 562
Lefèvre Théodore 44, 53
Lega Silvio 573
Lehideux Bernard 564

625
Lehne Klaus-Heiner 473, 567
Lemmer Gerd 567
Lentz-Cornette Marcell 216, 575
Lenz Aloys Michael 567
Lenz Carl Otto 102, 136, 143, 144, 166, 361, 552, 585
Lenz Marlene 166, 172, 214, 244-247, 5, 6
Leo XIII (Pecci Vincenzo Gioacchino Raffaele Luigi) 306
Leontini Innocenzo 352, 573
Leo XIII (Pecci Vincenzo Gioacchino Raffaele Luigi) 306
Leontini Innocenzo 352, 573
Leopardi Giacomo 573
Lepage Henri 500
Lequiller Pierre 495
L'Estrange Gerald 570
Leverkuehn Paul 567
Levi-Sandri Lionello 66
Lévy Bernard-Henri 503
Lewandowski Janusz 353, 577
Licandro Paolo 177, 179, 359, 361, 523
Lichtenauer Wilhelm F. 576
Liepin ¸ a Liene 575
Liese Peter 567
Ligabue Giancarlo 573
Ligios Giosuè 81-84, 168, 175, 201, 573
Liikanen Erkki 414
Lincoln Abraham 544
Lindenberg Heinrich 567
Linzer Milan 561
Lipowicz Irena Ewa 402
Lisí Giorgio 340, 573
Litvinenko Alexander 455
Llorca Vilaplana Carmen 580
Llorens Barges Cesar 580
Lo Curto Eleonora 352, 573
Lo Giudice Calogero 272, 573
Loesch Fernand 575
Löhr Walter 567
Lombardo Raffaele 340, 573
Longoni Tarcisio 573
Lopez de Pablo Pedro 359
López-Istúriz White Antonio 350, 528, 580
Lubbers Ruud 171, 265, 271, 302, 303, 305, 589
Lucas Pires Francisco António 219, 327, 591
Lucius Joseph 575
Lukachenko Alexander 450, 451
Lukaszewski Jerzy 497
Lulling Astrid 269
Luque Aguilar Florencio 350, 580
Luster Rudolf 167, 178, 567, 590
M
Maat Albert Jan 576
Macario Luigi 573
MacMillan Harold 100, 101, 339
Madelin Alain 341, 499, 502, 564
Majonica Ernst 567
Major John 264, 265, 303, 305, 411
Makarios III (Khristodóúlou Moúskos Mikhail) 109
Malangré Kurt 166, 238, 567
Malenkov Gueorgui 121
Malerba Franco E. 573
Malfatti Franco 573
Mallet Jacques 210, 564
Mandela Nelson 244
Mann Thomas 431, 489, 567
Manole Adrian 578
Mansholt Sicco 66, 78, 81
Mantovani Agostino 573
Mantovani Mario 340, 573
Marchenko Anatoli 244
Marck Pol M. E. E. 562
Marenghi Francesco 573
Margue Nicolas 43, 44, 142, 575
Marin Manuel 414
Marin Marilena 331
Marinescu Marian-Jean 355, 453, 486, 510, 523, 578
Marini Franco 340, 573
Marinos Ioannis 569
Maritain Jacques 477
Marković Ante 289
Marques Mendes Luis 502
Marques Sérgio 342, 578
Marshall George 121, 551
Martens Lucien Hubert 562
Martens Maria 576
Martin Hugues 341, 496, 564
Martinelli Mario 573
Martínez Casañ Guillermo 364, 500
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martino Edoardo</td>
<td>74, 573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martonyi János</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mastella Clemente</td>
<td>340, 573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mather Graham</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathieu Véronique</td>
<td>351, 564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matic Veran</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matikainen-Kallström Marjo</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mato Adrover Ana</td>
<td>350, 580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matonte (marquis de)</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsis Ioannis</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mattiazzo Antonio</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matula Iosif</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matutes Juan Abel</td>
<td>293, 325, 498, 580, 589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauro Mario</td>
<td>340, 419, 573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mavrommatis Manolis</td>
<td>351, 569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayer Hans-Peter</td>
<td>337, 567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayer Xaver</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor Oreja Jaime</td>
<td>350, 475, 503, 509, 510, 513, 518, 526, 527, 580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazowiecki Tadeusz</td>
<td>278, 591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazza Luigi</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCartin John Joseph</td>
<td>173, 192, 273, 570, 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCreery Charlie</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McDonal Charles</td>
<td>104, 570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGuiness Mairead</td>
<td>352, 570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McIntosh Anne</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McMillan-Scott Edward</td>
<td>267, 487, 505, 582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Méhaignerie Pierre</td>
<td>302, 332, 463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meister Siegfried</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melchior Arne</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melia Michèle</td>
<td>177, 633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memmel Linus</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendes Bota José</td>
<td>471, 578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Méndez de Vigo Íñigo</td>
<td>324, 384, 387, 394, 395, 397-400, 402, 406, 437, 580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendonça Nélio</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mennea Pietro-Paolo</td>
<td>340, 573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mennitti Domenico</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menrad Winfried</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkel Angela</td>
<td>349, 404, 445, 491, 501, 502, 520, 521, 523, 528-530, 559, 560, 591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mertens Meinolf</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merz Friedrich</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mezzaroma Roberto</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micara Pietro</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michel Victor</td>
<td>207, 253, 255, 562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michelini Alberto</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mikolásik Miroslav</td>
<td>354, 579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mikulić Branko</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milinkevich Alexandre</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millán Mon Francisco José</td>
<td>350, 580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milošević Slobodan</td>
<td>289, 290, 292, 295, 297, 447, 448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mintoff Dom</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitchell Gay</td>
<td>352, 570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitsotakis Konstantinos</td>
<td>265, 302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitterdorfer Karl</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitterrand François</td>
<td>190, 280, 281, 303, 305, 435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizzau Alfeo</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mladenov Nickolay</td>
<td>355, 453, 562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mladić Ratko</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mocke Alois</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modiano Marcello</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moller Per Stig</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moller Poul</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mombaur Peter Michael</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mommersteeg Joseph A.</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monforte Arregui Andoni</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monnet Jean</td>
<td>19, 20, 23, 45-48, 55, 75, 100, 102, 142, 159, 231, 330, 388, 391, 539, 541, 547, 551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moreau de Melen Henri</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moreau Gisele M.H.</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moreau Jacques</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moreau Louise</td>
<td>172, 211, 564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moreira da Silva Jorge</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morillon Philippe</td>
<td>341, 342, 564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morin-Chartier Elisabeth</td>
<td>351, 565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moro Lino Gerolamo</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosar Nicolas</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosiek-Urbahn Marlies</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mott Angelo Giacomo</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mottola Giuseppe</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mounier Emmanuel</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouskouri Nana</td>
<td>327, 569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mueller Erwin</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mühlen Ernst</td>
<td>216, 575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Müller Emilia Franziska</td>
<td>338, 567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Müller Gerd</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Müller Günther</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Müller Hans Werner</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Müller Josef</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Müller-Hermann Ernst</td>
<td>44, 85, 90, 118, 567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Münch Werner</td>
<td>237, 238, 567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mundie Craig</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mursch Karl Heinz</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
N
Musotto Francesco 340, 573
Nagy Imre 278
Napoli Vito 573
Naranjo Escobar Juan Andrés 350, 580
Narducci Angelo 253, 574, 591
Narjes Karl-Heinz 225, 498
Nassauer Hartmut 323, 346, 429, 430, 464, 466, 468, 470, 472, 509, 510, 518, 567
Natali Lorenzo 498, 589
Navarro Antonio 580
Nazare Alexandru 578
Nemtsov Borys 382
Newton Dunn William Francis 582
Ney Camille 575
Nicholson James 582
Niculescu Rareș-Lucian 355, 578
Niebler Angelika 567
Niinistö Sauli 496
Nistico Giuseppe 340, 574
Nixon Richard 87, 553
Noé Luigi 133, 574
Nordlohne Franz Josef 567
Nordmann Jean-Thomas 565
Notenboom Harry 86, 90, 91, 96, 118, 171, 191, 193, 195, 576
Notchbell Charles-Ferdinand 562
Novak Ljudmila 354, 579
Novelli Hervé 341, 565

O
Obama Barack 524, 525, 544
O’Donnell Tom 570
Oesterle Josef 567
O’Hagan (Lord) 582
Ojeda Sanz Juan 340, 580
Olajos Péter 354, 570
Olbricht Jan 353, 577
O’Malley Christopher Gerard 570
Oostlander Arie 238, 248, 291, 294-296, 370, 375, 576
Opitz Hans-Joachim 136, 138, 141-143, 361, 551, 585
Oprea Dumitru 355, 578
Orbán Viktor 497, 515
Ordoñez Gregorio 466
Oreja Aguirre Marcelino 261, 262, 271, 308, 324, 325, 385, 498, 580
Oreja Arburúa Marcelino 580
Orlov Yuri 205
Ortega y Gasset José 387
Ortiz Climent Leopoldo 580
Ortoli François-Xavier 133
Órly Csaba 354, 570
Otula Jyrki 563
Ouzký Miroslav 354, 563
Owen (Lord) 295, 296

P
Paasikivi Juho Kusti 313
Pacheco Pereira José 578
Pack Doris 268, 269, 290-292, 296, 297, 448, 449, 567
Palach Jan 278
Palacio Valdelersundi Ana 324, 398, 467, 498, 502, 580
Palassof Carlo 272
Paleokrassas Ioannis 590
Pálfi István 354, 570
Palli-Petralia Fanny 246
Panayiotis Demetriou 353, 471, 472
Panayotopoulos-Cassiotou Marie 351, 569
Pandolfi Filippo Maria 498, 589
Pannella Marco 178
Papaefstratou Efratios 201, 569
Papaligouras Georgios 351, 432, 569
Papi-Boucher Miguel 359, 361
Pappalardo Salvatore 497
Parish Neil 338, 582
Parisotto Orazio 358
Parodi Eolo 574
Partl Alois 496
Partrat Roger 565
Pastorelli Paolo 574
Pasty Jean-Claude 333
Patriciello Aldo 352, 574
Patten Christopher 265, 498, 502, 541
Patterson Ben 226, 232, 582
Paul VI (Montini Giovanni) 481, 497
Paulson Henry 444
Pawlak Waldemar 516
Pedersen Merete 266
Pedersen Niels 136, 266, 357, 359, 361-363, 559, 586
Pedini Mario 61, 62, 130, 168, 574
Péguy Charles 368
Peijs Karla 576
Pekkarinen Mauri 429
Pella Giuseppe 49, 54, 55, 57, 552, 574
Pelster Georg 43, 567
Penazzato Dino 574
Penders Jean J. M. 171, 207, 210, 229, 283, 369, 370, 458
Perben Dominique 503
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pérez Alvarez Manuel</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perissinotto Giovanni</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perry Roy</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perschau Hartmut</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesmazoglou Ioannis</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peterle Alojz</td>
<td>291, 354, 400, 486, 515, 579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petersen Helveg</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petre Maria</td>
<td>355, 578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pêtre René</td>
<td>119, 562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroni Emma</td>
<td>31, 358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrucci Walter</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peus Gabriele</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pex Peter</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pfennig Gero</td>
<td>189, 567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pfitzner Stefan</td>
<td>177, 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pflimlin Pierre</td>
<td>23, 37, 72, 172, 177, 208, 217, 221, 222, 235, 249, 256, 277, 282, 391, 507, 560, 565, 589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philibert Géraldine</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philipp Gerhard</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phlix Alfonzine</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piccioni Attilio</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piccoli Flaminio</td>
<td>190, 574, 589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piebalgs Andris</td>
<td>498, 520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pieper Markus</td>
<td>350, 567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierros Filippos</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pietikäinen Sirpa</td>
<td>352, 563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piha Kirsi</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piks Rihards</td>
<td>354, 575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pimenta Carlos</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinheiro João de Deus</td>
<td>352, 353, 509, 510, 578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinochet (général)</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pintus Mariano</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinxten Karel</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirker Hubert</td>
<td>352, 464, 465, 467, 473, 474, 561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirkl Fritz</td>
<td>281, 567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piscarreta Joaquim</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picchichio Giuseppe</td>
<td>340, 574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piskorski Pawel Bartlomiej</td>
<td>353, 577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisoni Ferruccio</td>
<td>84, 118, 214, 271, 421, 574, 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisoni Nino</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pithart Peter</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleštinská Zita</td>
<td>354, 451, 579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plumb Henry</td>
<td>37, 270, 330, 409, 555, 582, 589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pocket Monique</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podestà Guido</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podkański Zdzisław Zbigniew</td>
<td>353, 454, 577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poetschki Hans</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poggiolini Danilo</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poher Alain</td>
<td>44, 49, 53, 57, 71, 74-76, 80, 136, 137, 143, 144, 342, 540, 552, 553, 565, 585, 589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pohle Wolfgang</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politkovskaïa Anna</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pómes Ruiz José Javier</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomilio Mario</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pompidou Georges</td>
<td>99, 105, 138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponti Giovanni</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popa Mihaela</td>
<td>355, 578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popa Nicolae Vlad</td>
<td>355, 578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porretta Alessia</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portelli Hughes</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto Manuel</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posdorff Horst</td>
<td>350, 568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posselt Bernd</td>
<td>323, 568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Joop</td>
<td>353, 577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prag Derek</td>
<td>189, 582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preto Antonio</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price Peter</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probst Maria</td>
<td>266, 568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prodi Romano</td>
<td>265, 389, 414-417, 558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pronk Bartho</td>
<td>285, 577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protasiewicz Jacek</td>
<td>353, 452, 577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protopapadakis Mihail</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prout Christopher (Sir)</td>
<td>263, 265, 266, 270, 582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provan James</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pucci Ernesto</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purvis John</td>
<td>339, 582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putin Vladimir</td>
<td>452, 512, 518, 519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pünder Hermann</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pürtsen Albert</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Q**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Queiró Luís</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quermonne Jean-Louis</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quisthoudt-Rowohl Godelieve</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**R**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rabbethge Renate-Charlotte</td>
<td>172, 245, 253, 257, 568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rack Reinhard</td>
<td>327, 561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radi Abdelwahad</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicová Iveta</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radwan Alexander</td>
<td>337, 568</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Index of names

Scarascia Mugnozza Béatrice  177
Scarascia Mugnozza Carlo 64, 177, 498, 574
Scardaccione Decio  574
Scelba Mario 49, 103, 123, 190, 553, 574
Schaffner Anne-Marie  565
Schall Wolfgang 210, 249, 568
Schärer Albert  498
Schäuble Wolfgang  345, 499, 591
Schmidhuber Peter  498, 590
Schmidhuber Willem  577
Scholten Willem  189
Schön Konrad 191, 194, 196, 198, 568
Scholtes Aloyse  148
Schüssel Wolfgang  185, 187, 189, 190, 217, 222, 228, 234
Schütz Mario  358
Schurter Philippe 136, 172, 181, 182, 185, 187, 190, 217, 222, 228, 234
Schwartz Wladimir  172, 181, 182, 185, 187, 190, 217, 222, 228, 234
Schweizer Jörg  136, 172, 181, 182, 185, 187, 190, 217, 222, 228, 234
Štastný Peter 354, 579
Stauner Gabriele 338, 350, 568
Stavreva Petja 355, 562
Stavrou Konstantinos 285, 569
Steel David 266
Steen Edward 331
Stechen René 590
Stekke Alain 354, 563
Stella Carlo 574
Stenmarck Per 581
Stenzel Ursula 352, 379, 448, 561
Sterling Bruce 502
Stevens John 308, 582
Stevenson Struan 339, 349, 451, 509, 510, 512
Stewart-Clark Jack (Sir) 464, 466, 470, 582
Stockton (The Earl of) 339, 582
Stoloian Teodor Dumitru 355, 579
Storbeck Jürgen 535
Storch Anton 568
Storti Bruno 579
Strange Alwyn 111
Strasser Romain 272
Strauss Franz Josef 43, 44, 568
Strejček Ivo 354, 563
Struye Paul 562
Stubb Alexander 352
Sturdy Robert 325, 432, 582
Suárez González Fernando 580
Suarez Adolfo 111
Suchoka Hanna 371
Sudre Margie 341, 342, 403, 490, 565
Sumberg David 339, 582
Suominen Ilkka 430, 563
Surján László 354, 371, 570
Süssmuth Rita 246
Sutherland Peter 498, 589
Svensson Eva-Britt 535
Szabó Károly Ferenc 579
Szájer József 325, 355, 509, 510, 570
Széchy Balázs 362
T
Tabone Antonio 381
Tajani Antonio 398, 509, 520, 574
Tandler Gerold 302
Tannock Charles 339, 449, 450, 452-454, 582
Tartufoli Amor 574
Tassinari Gabriella 148
Teasdale Anthony 266, 500
Teitgen Pierre-Henri 53, 60, 137, 153, 154
Temimi Abdeljelil 489
Teufel Erwin 591
Thatcher Margaret 158, 264, 524
Theato Diemut 269, 412, 413, 568
Thollon Baptiste 31
Thorn Gaston 198, 257
Thyssen Marianne 425, 426, 509, 510, 562, 591
Tillich Stanislav 568
Timonen Antti 362
Tirle Radu 579
Tito Josip Broz 289, 297
Todini Luisa 574
Togni Giuseppe 574
Toivonen Kyösti 472, 563
Tolkounov Lev 277
Tolman Teun 202, 203, 214, 577
Tomé Zeffino 574
Tonetti Erisia 266
Topolánek Mirek 349, 382, 524
Török-Ilyes Botond 362
Toubon Jacques 351, 565
Trakatellis Antonios 327, 410, 569
Travaglini Giovanni 575
Trichet Jean-Claude 445, 523
Troisi Michele 575
Tuđman Franjo 297
Turani Daniele 575
Turner Amédeé 470, 582
Tusk Donald 382, 516, 528
Twinn Ian 582
Tymochenko Yulia 452, 453
Tzounis Ioannis 210, 215, 569
U
Ulmer Thomas 350, 568
Urutchev Vladimir 355, 562
V
Vagnorius Gediminas 497
Vahl Anne 272
Vakalis Nikolaos 351, 569
Valdivielso de Cué Jaime 580
Valentin Micheline 141
Valsecchi Athos 575
Valverde López José 580
van Aerssen Jochen 185, 186, 565
van Amelsvoort M. J. J. 576
van Campen Philippus 79, 576, 647
van Den Brande Luc 496
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>van den Broek Hans</td>
<td>371, 373, 374, 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van der Gun Frans</td>
<td>175, 576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van der Mei Durk F.</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van der Ploeg Cornelis J.</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van der Sanden Pieter</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Hecke Johan</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Hulst Johan Wilhelm</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Miert Karel</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Nistelrooij Lambert</td>
<td>353, 576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Orden Geoffrey</td>
<td>339, 380, 582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Reeth George</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Rompuy Eric</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Rompuy Herman</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Rooy Yvonne</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Velzen Wim</td>
<td>302, 327, 343, 346, 371, 378, 424, 425, 432, 485, 577, 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vance Cyrus</td>
<td>295, 296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandewiele Marcel Albert</td>
<td>207, 562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vankerkhoven Paul</td>
<td>209, 562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanlenenberghe Jean-Marie</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanni d’Archirafi Raniero</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varela Suanzes-Carpegna Daniel</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varvitsiotis Ioannis</td>
<td>109, 351, 569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasile Radu</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vatanan Ari</td>
<td>351, 563, 565, 583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaz da Silva Helena</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vega y Escandon Luis</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veil Simone</td>
<td>157, 163, 180, 216, 245, 247, 261, 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veneto Armando</td>
<td>352, 575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ventre Riccardo</td>
<td>352, 575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vergeer Willem J.</td>
<td>164, 169, 171, 175, 181, 214, 253, 255, 256, 589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verhaegen Joris</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verhagen Maxime</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verhofstadt Guy</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vernaschi Vincenzo</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vernola Marcello</td>
<td>352, 575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verroken Joannes J.</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertriest Paulette</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verwaerde Yves</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vetrone Mario</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viacorka Vincuk</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viceconte Guido</td>
<td>340, 575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vidal-Quadras Alejo</td>
<td>340, 580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vignon Jérôme</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Abelló José</td>
<td>350, 580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villalobos Talero Celia</td>
<td>422, 581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villiers Theresa</td>
<td>339, 582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viola Vincenzo</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virgin Ivar</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visser Cornelis</td>
<td>353, 577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vixseboxe G.</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlasák Oldřich</td>
<td>354, 563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlasto Dominique</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>von Bismarck Philipp</td>
<td>165, 181, 210, 565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>von Bötticher Christian Ulrik</td>
<td>338, 565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>von Brentano Heinrich</td>
<td>53, 70, 141, 144, 156, 565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>von der Groeben Hans</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>von Goethe Johann Wolfgang</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>von Habsburg Charles</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>von Habsburg Otto</td>
<td>165, 166, 171, 210, 244, 247, 248, 253, 284, 291, 292, 294, 295, 323, 566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>von Hassel Kai-Uwe</td>
<td>111, 165, 211, 250, 566, 589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>von Stauffenberg Franz Joseph</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>von Stauffenberg Franz Ludwig Schenk Graf</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>von Weizsäcker Richard</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warren Deborah</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wawrzik Kurt</td>
<td>253, 254, 255, 568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weber Manfred</td>
<td>350, 474, 568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedekind Rudolf</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weinkamm Otto</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weisgerber Anja</td>
<td>350, 568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welle Klaus</td>
<td>136, 220, 266, 331-334, 341, 343, 357-359, 361, 362, 519, 557, 586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welsh Michael</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wenzel-Perillo Brigitte</td>
<td>338, 568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Werhahn-Adenauer Libet</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Werner Pierre</td>
<td>86, 100, 589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Werner Rudolf</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westenbroek Jan</td>
<td>96, 148, 220, 358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westerterp Theodorus E.</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wieland Rainer</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wigny Pierre</td>
<td>43, 44, 53, 54, 57, 59, 60, 63, 129, 136, 137, 552, 562, 585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wijkman Anders</td>
<td>343, 431, 581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winkler Iuliu</td>
<td>355, 579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winston David</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wirtz Nicole</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wohlin Lars</td>
<td>581, 587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wojciechowski Janusz</td>
<td>353, 577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood John</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodard Stephen</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wortmann-Kool Corien</td>
<td>353, 577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wuermeling Joachim</td>
<td>337, 431, 569</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Wurtz Francis 507
Wynands Kai 362
X
Xarchakos Stavros 569
Y
Yeats Mickael B. 156, 157
Yeltsin Boris 284-286
York von Wartenburg Wolf 148
Yushchenko Victor 382, 452, 453, 498
Z
Zabell Theresa 340, 581
Záborská Anna 354, 579
Zaccagnini Benigno 575
Zaccari Raul 575
Zacharakis Christos 569
Zahorka Hans-Jürgen 311
Zahradil Jan 354, 563
Zaleski Zbigniew 353, 453, 528, 577
Zanicchi Iva 352, 575
Zappala’ Stefano 575
Zardinidis Nikos 570
Zarges Axel N. 569
Zarifopoulou Fani 362
Zatloukal Tomáš 354, 563
Zavvos Georgios 570
Zdravkova Dushana 355, 562
Zecchino Ortensio 189, 575
Zeller Adrien 281, 283, 565
Zeyer Werner 569
Zieleniec Josef 354, 563
Ziino Vinicio 575
Zimmerling Jürgen 569
Zissener Sabine 569
Zlotha Marian 355
Zotta Mario 575
Zumer Klemen 362
Zvěřina Jaroslav 354, 563
Zweig Stefan 539, 545
Zwiefka Tadeusz 353, 454, 577
Annex 8
LIST OF GROUP STAFF
ON 31 DECEMBER 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group staff</th>
<th>Took up post on</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maria Flanagan</td>
<td>01/10/1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriele De Bondt</td>
<td>01/01/1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marianne Hecké Weber</td>
<td>01/05/1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriella Tassinari</td>
<td>01/01/1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulette Vertriest</td>
<td>01/09/1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Hildebrandt</td>
<td>01/09/1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michèile Melia</td>
<td>01/11/1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guy Korthoudt</td>
<td>15/01/1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pascal Fontaine</td>
<td>01/03/1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Béatrice Scarascia Mugnozza</td>
<td>01/04/1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christina Englert</td>
<td>15/04/1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Werner Kroegel</td>
<td>15/04/1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Fitzhenry</td>
<td>01/05/1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paolo Licandro</td>
<td>01/05/1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monique Poket</td>
<td>01/09/1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angela Kaladjis</td>
<td>23/12/1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charilaos Palassofo</td>
<td>23/12/1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astride Rohr</td>
<td>15/01/1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marilena Deriu</td>
<td>15/04/1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiona Kearns</td>
<td>01/12/1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miguel Seabra</td>
<td>01/04/1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catarina Caldeira da Silva</td>
<td>15/06/1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Rosa Llovet – Madrid</td>
<td>01/07/1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne Vahl</td>
<td>01/09/1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klaus Lorenz</td>
<td>01/10/1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romain Strasser</td>
<td>17/11/1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andreas Hartmann</td>
<td>01/05/1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katrin Diemer</td>
<td>05/01/1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deborah Warren</td>
<td>01/03/1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pascaline Raffegeau</td>
<td>27/06/1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Kamp</td>
<td>03/01/1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karina Kessler</td>
<td>03/01/1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johan Ryngaert</td>
<td>06/03/1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klaus Kellersmann</td>
<td>17/05/1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yolanda Baruque</td>
<td>01/01/1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delia Carro</td>
<td>01/01/1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guillermo Martínez Casañ</td>
<td>01/01/1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Toledo</td>
<td>01/01/1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ioannis Sambatakos</td>
<td>16/07/1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Véronique Donck</td>
<td>09/01/1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariangela Fontanini</td>
<td>01/05/1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Petrucci</td>
<td>01/05/1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katrin Ruhrmann</td>
<td>14/10/1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernadette Mertens</td>
<td>06/01/1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christine Detourbet</td>
<td>07/01/1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Biesmans</td>
<td>01/05/1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricia Halligan</td>
<td>01/05/1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carla Troiani</td>
<td>01/05/1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricia Walsh</td>
<td>01/05/1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gail Wilmet</td>
<td>01/05/1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathalie Blancquaert</td>
<td>13/06/1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie Louise Dairomont</td>
<td>01/07/1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedwige Petre</td>
<td>01/09/1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Preto</td>
<td>12/10/1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorge Soutullo Sanchez</td>
<td>01/01/1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduardus Slootweg</td>
<td>01/04/1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Teasdale</td>
<td>01/04/1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pietro Cappeddu</td>
<td>01/05/1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harald Kandolf</td>
<td>17/01/1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concetta Guasto</td>
<td>01/06/1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annick Jarles</td>
<td>19/07/1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leo Cox</td>
<td>01/05/1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taina Mertalo</td>
<td>01/09/1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heidrun Ebner</td>
<td>15/10/1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.Manuel Salafranca</td>
<td>16/10/1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bettina Blasig</td>
<td>01/02/1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Véronique de Jonghe</td>
<td>01/02/1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teresa Larrinaga – Madrid</td>
<td>01/02/1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria José Izquierdo</td>
<td>01/06/1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana Rosa Vega</td>
<td>01/06/1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rupert Krietemeyer</td>
<td>01/09/1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Lukyamuzi</td>
<td>01/11/1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana Maria Millan Camino</td>
<td>01/11/1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joao Costa de Sousa</td>
<td>06/11/1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stavros Perdikis</td>
<td>01/03/1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frédéric Dumont</td>
<td>17/03/1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ioannis Zografos</td>
<td>01/07/1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timothy Beyer Helm</td>
<td>01/09/1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Botella Serrano</td>
<td>01/09/1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver Dreute</td>
<td>01/12/1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Scheinert</td>
<td>01/12/1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petra Nawroth – Borsalino</td>
<td>01/01/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Subelack</td>
<td>01/01/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Françoise Verburg Petit</td>
<td>01/01/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Heister</td>
<td>01/02/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amarylli Gersony</td>
<td>22/06/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stefano Guccione</td>
<td>22/06/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luigi Mazza</td>
<td>22/06/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orazio Parisotto – Rome</td>
<td>22/06/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emma Petroni</td>
<td>22/06/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alessia Porretta</td>
<td>22/06/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mario Schwetz</td>
<td>22/06/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claire Mc Nally</td>
<td>09/09/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoine Ripoll</td>
<td>20/07/1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natacha Scriban Cuvelier</td>
<td>20/07/1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonia Giarrizzo</td>
<td>04/08/1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anita Linnemann (formerly Ulonska)</td>
<td>01/10/1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andreas Folz</td>
<td>15/10/1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie-Claude Delahaye – Paris</td>
<td>01/02/2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josefina Pelaez Jimeno</td>
<td>01/02/2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Hare</td>
<td>03/04/2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesper Haglund</td>
<td>05/06/2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philipp Schulmeister</td>
<td>01/07/2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosalie Vasco</td>
<td>01/07/2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laura Projetti</td>
<td>01/09/2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Géraldine Philibert</td>
<td>01/11/2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbara Müller</td>
<td>13/11/2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markus Arens – Berlin</td>
<td>01/12/2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knut Goelz</td>
<td>01/01/2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Isaacs</td>
<td>01/01/2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Günnar Larsson</td>
<td>01/01/2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedro Lopez de Pablo</td>
<td>01/02/2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elena Zuffellato</td>
<td>01/02/2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adriaan Bastiaansen</td>
<td>15/02/2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julia Bohm</td>
<td>01/03/2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mario Sestito</td>
<td>01/03/2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Temple Smithson - London</td>
<td>01/03/2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorte Hansen</td>
<td>01/04/2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sébastien Jauquet</td>
<td>01/05/2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gianfranco Emanuele</td>
<td>01/06/2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astrid Worum</td>
<td>27/08/2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrea Strasser</td>
<td>01/10/2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christiana Vancoillie</td>
<td>15/11/2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corinna Zehler</td>
<td>15/11/2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Jager</td>
<td>01/01/2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleni Diamantoudi</td>
<td>01/02/2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen Woodard</td>
<td>01/02/2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria García Escomel</td>
<td>06/05/2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Olympia Pari</td>
<td>01/07/2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alwyn Strange</td>
<td>15/07/2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Almiñana</td>
<td>01/11/2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonas Kraft</td>
<td>01/11/2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicole Teixeira</td>
<td>16/01/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasmina el Houssine</td>
<td>01/02/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jill Bewsher</td>
<td>17/03/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miguel Papí-Boucher</td>
<td>24/03/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebecca Milsom – London</td>
<td>01/04/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clare de Wit</td>
<td>01/05/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katja Schroeder</td>
<td>01/09/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alice Famerée-Vanier</td>
<td>01/04/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>György Hövenyi</td>
<td>15/05/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atilla Agardi</td>
<td>15/06/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marek Evison</td>
<td>15/06/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tereza Pinto de Rezende</td>
<td>01/08/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabienne Rimbaut</td>
<td>01/08/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edina Tóth</td>
<td>01/09/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ina Lommel</td>
<td>01/10/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberto Andrades Villegas</td>
<td>01/01/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisa Atkins</td>
<td>01/01/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosalia Capobianco</td>
<td>01/01/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Bickl</td>
<td>01/02/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kai Wynands</td>
<td>01/02/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Chianese</td>
<td>14/02/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eva Buda</td>
<td>15/02/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martina Klugóva</td>
<td>01/03/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertrand Mercier</td>
<td>01/03/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ieva Eggink</td>
<td>01/04/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbara Bandelow</td>
<td>13/04/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophie Tsoraklidis</td>
<td>18/04/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theodoros Georgitsopoulos</td>
<td>01/05/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katarzyna Klaus</td>
<td>01/05/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christine Stoeckl</td>
<td>15/06/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Adler</td>
<td>01/07/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eugenia Bellino</td>
<td>01/07/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amanda Said</td>
<td>01/07/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greet Gysen</td>
<td>01/09/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeanne Krmeck Rados</td>
<td>29/09/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Speiser</td>
<td>03/10/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandra Carreira</td>
<td>24/10/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alena Carna</td>
<td>01/12/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidonia Jedrzejewska</td>
<td>01/01/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marzena Rogalska</td>
<td>01/01/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joanna Jarecka-Gomez</td>
<td>01/02/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrea Laskava</td>
<td>01/02/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fani Zarifopoulou</td>
<td>01/02/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boglarka Bólya</td>
<td>01/04/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucienne Huber</td>
<td>01/04/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulla Liesimaa</td>
<td>01/04/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klemen Zumer</td>
<td>01/05/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simona Falso – Rome</td>
<td>01/06/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercedes Alvargonzalez</td>
<td>01/07/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie-Christine Amiot Romero</td>
<td>01/07/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauro Belardinelli</td>
<td>01/07/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graeme Carter</td>
<td>01/07/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Hahn</td>
<td>01/07/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelia Mitsopoulou</td>
<td>01/07/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miriam Orsagova</td>
<td>01/07/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Willem Vlasman</td>
<td>01/07/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joelle Meunier</td>
<td>01/09/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zsofia Lipthay</td>
<td>16/10/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mateja Miksa</td>
<td>01/11/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilona Stasienko</td>
<td>01/11/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krisztina Laszlo</td>
<td>01/12/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katerina Desasy Klepsova</td>
<td>01/01/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniela Senk</td>
<td>16/01/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balázs Széchy</td>
<td>16/01/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antti Timonen</td>
<td>01/03/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfredo Sousa de Jesus</td>
<td>01/04/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie-Anne Lepape</td>
<td>01/06/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klaudia Prorias-Arbe tova</td>
<td>01/06/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jasmin Chehab – Berlin</td>
<td>15/07/2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tobias Linnemann 15/07/2007
Stephan Mock - Berlin - 01/09/2007
Lisa Mutke 01/09/2007
Nicole Wirtz 01/09/2007
Mina Dermendjieva 16/10/2007
Sevil Terzi 16/10/2007
Botond Törok-Ilyes 16/10/2007
Maria Amparo Baviera 01/01/2008
Kristina Klimentova 16/01/2008
Biliana Tzarnoretchka 01/02/2008
Maria Nieves Aguirre 01/04/2008
Karine Piffert 01/05/2008
Annex 9
LIST OF MEMBERS ELECTED ON 7 JUNE 2009

Germany – 42 seats

CDU – 34 seats
Burkhard Balz
Reimer Böge
Elmar Brok
Daniel Caspary
Christian Ehler
Karl-Heinz Florenz
Michael Gahler
Ingeborg Graessle
Peter Jahr
Elisabeth Jeggle
Christa Klass
Dieter-Lebrecht Koch
Werner Kuhn
Werner Langen
Kurt Lechner
Klaus-Heiner Lehne
Peter Liese
Thomas Mann
Hans-Peter Mayer
Doris Pack
Markus Pieper
Hans-Gert Pöttering
Godelieve Quisthoudt-Rowohl
Herbert Reul
Birgit Schnieber-Jastram
Horst Schnellhardt
Andreas Schwab
Renate Sommer
Thomas Ulmer
Sabine Verheyen
Axel Voss
Rainer Wieland
Hermann Winkler
Joachim Zeller

CSU – 8 seats
Albert Dess
Markus Ferber
Monika Hohlmeier
Martin Kastler
Angelika Niebler
Bernd Posselt
Manfred Weber
Anja Weisgerber

Italy – 35 seats

PDL – 29 seats
Gabriele Albertini
Roberta Angelilli
Alfredo Antoniozzi
Raffaele Baldassarre
Paolo Bartolozzi
Sergio Berlato
Vito Bonsignore
Antonio Cancian
Giovanni Collino
Lara Comi
Carlo Fidanza
Elisabetta Gardini
Salvatore Iacolino
Giovanni La Via
Clemente Mastella
Barbara Matera
Mario Mauro
Erminia Mazzoni
Cristiana Muscardini
Alfredo Pallone
Aldo Patriciello
Crescenzio Rivellini

---

a List drawn up on 14 July 2009.
Licia Ronzulli
Potito Salatillo
Marco Scursria
Amalia Sartori
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris
Salvatore Tatarella
Iva Zanicchi

UDC – 5 seats
Magdi Cristiano Allam
Antonello Antinoro
Carlo Casini
Luigi Ciriaco De Mitia
Tiziano Motti

SVP – 1 seat
Herbert Dorfmann

France – 29 seats
UMP - Majorité présidentielle – 29 seats
Damien Abad
Jean-Pierre Audy
Michel Barnier
Dominique Baudis
Christophe Béchu
Nora Berra
Sophie Briard Auconie
Jean-Marie Cavada
Alain Cadec
Arnaud Danjean
Rachida Dati
Joseph Daul
Gaston Franco
Marielle Gallo
Jean-Paul Gauzès
Françoise Grossetête
Pascale Gruny
Brice Hortefeux
Philippe Juvin
Alain Lamassoure
Véronique Mathieu
Elisabeth Morin-Chartier
Maurice Ponga
Dominique Riquet
Tokia Saïfi
Marie-Thérèse Sanchez-Schmid
Michèle Striffler
Christine de Veyrac
Dominique Vlasto

Poland – 28 seats
PO – 25 seats
Piotr Borys
Jerzy Buzek
Małgorzata Handzlik
Jolanta Emilia Hübner
Danuta Maria Hübner
Danuta Jazłowiecka
Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrezejewska
Filip Kaczmarek
Lena Barbara Kolarska-Bobińska
Janusz Lewandowski
Krzysztof Lisek
Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska
Bogdan Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz
Sławomir Witold Nitrzas
Jan Olbrycht
Jacek Protasiewicz
Jacek Saryusz-Wolski
Joanna Katarzyna Skrzypulec
Bogusław Sonik
Róża Gräfin von Thun Und Hohenstein
Rafał Kazimierz Trzaskowski
Jarosław Leszek Wałęsa
Paweł Zalewski
Artur Źasada
Tadeusz Antoni Zwiejka

PSL – 3 seats
Andrzej Grzyb
Jarosław Kalinowski
Czesław Adam Siekierski

Spain – 23 seats
PP – 23 seats
Pablo Arias Echeverría
Pilar Ayuso
Pilar del Castillo Vera,
Agustín Diaz de Mera García Consuegra
Rosa Estarás Ferragut
Santiago Fisas Ayxela
Carmen Fraga Estévez
José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Salvador Garriga Polledo
Luís de Grandes Pascual
Cristina Gutiérrez-Cortines,
Esther Herranz García
Carlos José Ituraga Angulo
Teresa Jimenez-Becerril Barrio
Veronica Lope Fontagné
Antonio López-Istúriz White
Gabriel Mato Adrover
Jaime Mayor Oreja
Íñigo Méndez de Vigo
Francisco José Millán Mon
José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra
Alejo Vidal-Quadras
Pablo Zalba Bidegain

Hungary – 14 seats

*FIDESZ* – 14 seats
János Áder
Tamás Deutsch
Kinga Gál
Béla Glattfelder
Enikő Győri
András Gyürk
Ágnes Hankiss
Lívia Járóka
Ádám Kósa
Csaba Óry
Pál Schmitt
György Schöpflin
László Surján
József Szájer

Romania – 14 seats

*PDL* – 10 seats
Elena - Oana Antonescu
Sebastian -Valentin Bodu
Petru - Constantin Luhan
Monica - Luisa Macovei
Marian - Jean Marinescu
Iosif Matula
Rareş - Lucian Niculescu
Cristian - Dan Preda
Theodor - Dumitru Stolojan
Traian Ungureanu

*UDMR* – 3 seats
Csaba Sógor
László Tökés
Iuliu Winkler

*Independent* – 1 seat
Elena Băsescu

Portugal – 10 seats

*PSD* – 8 seats
Regina Bastos
Maria da Graça Carvalho
Carlos Coelho
Mário David
José Manuel Fernandes
Maria do Céu Patrão Neves
Paulo Rangel
Nuno Teixeira

*CDS-PP* – 2 seats
Diogo Feio
Nuno Melo

Greece – 8 seats

*Nea Demokratia* – 8 seats
Marietta Giannakou
Georgios Koumoutsakos
Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou
Georgios Papanikolaou
Georgios Papastamkos
Konstantinos Poupakis
Theodorus Skylakakis
Ioannis Tsoukalas

Bulgaria – 6 seats

*GERB* – 5 seats
Iliana Ivanova
Rumiana Jeleva
Mariya Nedelcheva
Emil Stoyanov
Vladimir Urutchev

*Blue Coalition (UDF + DSB + United Agrarians-Mrs Moser)* – 1 seat
Nadezhda Mihaylova (UDF)

Austria – 6 seats

*ÖVP* – 6 seats
Othmar Karas
Elisabeth Köstinger
Hella Ranner
Paul Rübig
Slovakia – 6 seats

**SDKU-DS – 2 seats**
- Eduard Kukan
- Peter Šťastný

**SMK-MKP – 2 seats**
- Edit Bauer
- Alajos Mészáros

**KDH – 2 seats**
- Miroslav Mikolášik
- Anna Záborská

Belgium – 5 seats

**CD&V – 3 seats**
- Ivo Belet
- Jean-Luc Dehaene
- Marianne Thyssen

**CDH – 1 seat**
- Anne Delvaux

**CSP/CDH – 1 seat**
- Mathieu Grosch

Netherlands – 5 seats

**CDA – 5 seats**
- Wim van de Camp
- Esther de Lange
- Lambert van Nistelrooij
- Ria Oomen-Ruijten
- Corien Wortmann-Kool

Sweden – 5 seats

**Moderate Party (M) – 4 seats**
- Anna Maria Corazza Bildt
- Christofer Fjellner
- Gunnar Hökmark
- Anna Ibrisagic

Christian Democrats (KD) – 1 seat
- Alf Svensson

Ireland – 4 seats

**Fine Gael – 4 seats**
- Jim Higgins
- Seán Kelly
- Mairead Mc Guinness
- Gay Mitchell

Lithuania – 4 seats

**Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats – 4 seats**
- Laima Liucija Andrikiene
- Vytautas Landsbergis
- Radvilė Morkūnaitė
- Algirdas Saudargas

Finland – 4 seats

**Kokoomus – 3 seats**
- Ville Itälä
- Eija-Riitta Korhola
- Sirpa Pietikäinen

**Suomen kristillisdemokraatit – 1 seat**
- Sari Essayah

Latvia – 3 seats

**New Era (Jaunais Laiks) – 1 seat**
- Arturs Krišjānis Karinš

**Civic Union – 2 seats**
- Sandra Kalniete
- Inese Vaidere

Luxembourg – 3 seats

**CSV – 3 seats**
- Georges Bach
- Frank Engel
- Astrid Lulling
List of members elected on 7 June 2009

Slovenia – 3 seats

SDS (Slovenska Demokratska Stranka – Slovenian Democratic Party) – 2 seats
Romana Jordan Cizelj
Milan Zver

NSi (Nova Slovenija - New Slovenia) – 1 seat
Alojze Peterle

Czech Republic – 2 seats

KDU-ČSL – 2 seats
Jan Březina
Zuzana Roithová

Cyprus – 2 seats

Democratic Rally – 2 seats
Ioannis Kasoulides
Eleni Theocharous

Malta – 2 seats

PN – 2 seats
David Casa
Simon Busuttil

Denmark – 1 seat

Konservative Folkeparti – 1 seat
Bendt Bendtsen

Estonia – 1 seat

Pro Patria and Res Publica Union – 1 seat
Tunne Kelam
Annex 10

ENDNOTES

2 AC/GDC/PV5, Common Assembly of the ECSC, Christian-Democratic Group minutes, 5th sitting, 23 June 1953, Maison de l’Europe, Strasbourg.
6 Interview given by Hans-August Lücker in Bonn, 16 March 2004.
7 Pöttering, Hans-Gert, address to mark the 50th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, 9 May 2000.
15 Colloquy with Ministers, *Cahiers européens*, January 1960, No 1, p. 3.
16 Clarification was required because the Rome treaties used terms equivalent to ‘European Parliament’ in German and Dutch while the corresponding wording in the French and Italian versions meant ‘Parliamentary Assembly’.
26 AC/GDC/PV/52, Minutes of the meeting of the Christian-Democratic Group, 12 March 1956, Brussels, p. 2.
27 AC/GDC/PV/52, Minutes of the meeting of the Christian-Democratic Group, 12 March 1956, Brussels, p. 3.
35 Reports by Fernand Dehousse and Emilio Battista on political cooperation among the Member States, and report by René Pleven on the draft treaty establishing a union of the peoples of Europe, European Parliamentary Assembly debates, June 1961, September 1961 and December 1961, Nos 42, 44 and 50, pp. 118-122, 112-117 and 63-64.
38 Idem, p. 11.
43 Idem, p. 56.
47 On 9 September 1965, General de Gaulle called a press conference at the Élysée Palace to spell out France’s role in the process of European integration and to explain the reasons for its ceasing to sit in the Council of Ministers from 1 July 1965.
56 Document No 3, 1960-1961, of the European Parliamentary Assembly, report by Hans-August Lücker on behalf of the Committee on Agriculture on the situation of agriculture and the basic principles of a CAP.
59 Idem, p. 22.
68 Idem, p. 10.
69 Idem, p. 12.
71 Idem, p. 47.
77 The College of Presidents was made up of the President of the Court of Justice, the President of the High Authority, the President of Parliament and the President of the Council.
84 Debates of the Common Assembly of the ECSC, Ordinary part-session 1954-1955, of the ECSC Common Assembly, verbatim report of the sitting of 14 May 1955, OJ No 9, p. 470 et seq.
86 Group news, Cahiers européens, No 12, Year 1962, p. 39.
89 Negotiation process in Brussels, 5 February 1963, Débats du Parlement européen, IV/63, No 61, p. 36.
97 Following the Irish elections of 28 February 1973, the Irish delegation to the European Parliament did not change (5 Fianna Fáil, 3 Fine Gael and 2 Labour). In PV/803/73/MMs, Minutes of the Group meeting of Monday, 12 March 1973 in Strasbourg, p. 2.
98 PV/784/73/MMs, Minutes of the meeting of the Bureau of the Group, Monday, 15 January 1973 in Brussels, p. 3.
99 PV/786/73/MMs, Meeting of the administrative bureau of the Group with the bureau of the Conservatives, Tuesday, 16 January 1973 in Strasbourg, p. 2.
102 Idem.
103 Doc. PE 323/77.
108 Those of 25 April 1975 were held only to elect the constituent Assembly.
111 The National Technical University of Athens.
114 Quoted by Hans-August Lücker, CD-Europe Bulletin, April 1975, No 4, p. 15.
116 Debates of the Common Assembly, op. cit.
118 Memorandum from the High Authority on housing questions (Luxembourg, 12 October 1953).
119 ‘La CECA lance un programme de logement ouvriers’, Communauté européenne, April-May 1961, No 4-5.
120 Report of proceedings of the extraordinary sitting of the ECSC Assembly on 29 November 1956, Discussion of the report drawn up by Mr Nederhorst, on behalf of the Committee on Social Affairs, on the creation, function and composition of one or more parity committees in the framework of the Community.
123 Debates of the European Parliamentary Assembly, op. cit., p. 121.
130  Minutes of the Group’s meeting of 25 April 1955, Luxembourg.
132  Minutes of the Group’s meeting of 10 June 1960, Brussels.
135  At the beginning of 1978, for example, Erik Blumenfeld, in a report on European political cooperation, called for the European Parliament to take part in the formulation of guidelines for a common foreign policy. In European Parliament, Secretariat of the Christian-Democratic Group, Rapport sur les activités du Groupe DC du Parlement européen (Groupe du PPE) pour la période entre le 1er et le 2e congrès du PPE, mars 1978-février 1979, p. 8.
140  Papers from the congress held at Freiburg im Breisgau, ACDP IX-002-013.
141  Idem.
142  Minutes No 2 of the meeting of the Christian-Democratic Group in Strasbourg on Friday, 19 June 1953, p. 1.
143  Minutes of the meeting of the Group Bureau in Strasbourg on 14 October 1960.
149  The encyclical Pacem in Terris was issued by Pope John XXIII on 11 April 1963.
150  See, for example, ‘La position du parti PSC belge (Démocrates-Chrétiens) sur les relations Est-Ouest dans les Résolutions finales du XXIIe Congrès national du PSC belge’, in Cahiers européens, April 1967, p.103-105.
153  Andreotti, Giulio, ‘La coopération politique dans le domaine de la politique extérieure et des relations Est-Ouest’, in Cahiers européens, No 33, June 1974, p. 44.
159 Rapport sur les activités du Groupe DC du Parlement européen (Groupe du PPE) pour la période entre le 1er et le 2e congrès du PPE, mars 1978-février 1979, p. 7.
162 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Articles 131 et seq. and Article 238.
164 Debates of the European Parliamentary Assembly, op. cit., p. 47.
178 Deschamps, Pierre, op. cit., p. 5.
179 For the Christian Democratic point of view, see Pierre Deschamps, ‘Communication on human rights and the new Convention of Lomé’, in European Digest, No 41, July 1978, pp. 54-56.
See, for example, Pierre Deschamps, ‘Human rights and apartheid’ in ‘Communication on human rights and the new convention of Lomé’, in European Digest, No 41, July 1978, p. 46.


Bulletin DC Europe No 4, 1979, p. 3.


‘Draft European Act’, op. cit., point (3) in Part Two.


idem, p. 220.


idem, p. 225.

Doc. 1-648/82.

Lambert Croux identified four points on which Parliament must remain vigilant: ‘1. We in this House believe that the decision-making and voting procedures of the Council as laid down in the Treaties must be respected. 2. When it comes to strengthening the role of Parliament, the resolutions passed by Parliament itself in 1981 and 1982 on improving inter-institutional relations under the existing Treaties must be taken into consideration. 3. On no account […] can Parliament allow decisions to be taken on the role of Parliament without itself being consulted. 4. Parliament draws particular attention to its own work, particularly in the Committee on Institutional Affairs, on the reform of the Treaties and realisation of a European Union. We see no contradiction between the draft European Act and Parliament’s own institutional work and longer-term objectives […]”, in Debates of the European Parliament, 1982-1983 Session, verbatim report of proceedings of the sittings of 11 to 15 October 1982, OJ No 1-289, p. 236


208 Ibidem.
218 Ibidem, p. 41.
221 Daily bulletin of Europe Agence Internationale, No 3545, 11 February 1983, p. 5-5 bis.
232 Ibid.
233 EPP Group, Europe: The Challenge, op. cit., p. 50.
234 Ibidem, p. 51.
236 Doc. PE 1-397/79.
237 Doc. PE 1-278/82, Doc. PE 1-667/81 and Doc. PE 1-412/82.
238 Doc. PE 1-396/79.
239 Doc. PE 1-720/79.
240 Doc. PE 1-566/81.
241 Doc. PE 1-731/81.
242 Doc. PE 1-41/80.
243 Doc. PE 1-392/81 and Doc. PE 1-413/82.
244 Doc. PE 1-57/81.
246 Doc. PE 1-411/82, Report on behalf of the Committee on Agriculture, on the Commission proposal to the Council (doc. 1-36/82 COM(82) 408 final) for a regulation on the acceleration of agricultural development in certain regions of Greece.
250 EPP Group, Europe: The Challenge, op. cit., p. 54.
252 COM(85) 333.
254 Doc. A2-185/85.
263 Doc. 1-778/79 rev. II.
267 Doc. A2-38/86.
277 Doc. 1-957/83.
278 Doc. 1-956/83.
281 EPP Group, ‘Explanation of vote by Paul Vankerkhoven (CSP-EPP/B) on the proposal for a resolution on the deployment of missiles in Western Europe’, op. cit., p. 1.
283 Doc. 2-1206/84.
284 Doc. 2-1206/84.
287 Lecanuet, Jean, CD Europe, April 1984, p. 17.
293 Doc. 1-119/80.
297 Leo Tindemans, President of the Council of Ministers, 22 January 1987.
298 European Council of 25/26 June 1984 in Fontainebleau, Europa-Rapid Press Statements, DOC/84/2.
301 Doc. A 2-17/85.
304 Declaration following the conference of Heads of State and Government and the Presidents of Member Parties of the EPP, Rome, 19 and 20 June 1985, Rapport sur les


306 Meeting of the EPP Group in Aix-la-Chapelle, 6 May 1982.

308 Doc. 2-704/84.


312 European Digest, No 50, May 1985, p. 54.

313 Doc. A2-50/85.


317 Resolution embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the convening of a conference of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States as decided by the European Council in Milan on 29 June 1985, OJ No C 229, p. 29-30.


323 Art. 7(2) of the Single European Act, OJ, No L 169 of 29 June 1987.


333 Doc. A3-0102/91.
334 Doc. A3-0417/92.


336 Study Days, Galway, 2-6 May 1988, European Digest, No 56, p. 7.

338 European Council of 25/26 June 1984 in Fontainebleau, Europa-Rapid Press Statements, DOC/84/2.
339 Report by the ad hoc Committee on ‘People’s Europe’ to the European Council, SN/848/6/85 (EDC), EP 98.125.
342 Doc. A2-139/85.
343 Doc. A2-133/85.
345 Doc. A2-18/89.
347 Doc A3-199/91.
348 Doc. 1-78/83 A+B.
349 Doc. A2-109/86.
350 Doc. A3-92/91.
351 Doc. A3-73/90.
352 Doc. A3-305/90. The report proposes increases in the budget appropriations for the ERASMUS, COMETT, LINGUA and TEMPUS programmes, and additional measures for economically and socially disadvantaged students.
353 Doc. A2-119/86.
354 Doc. A3-139/92. The report contains provisions for combating illiteracy, encouraging study and learning foreign languages, as well as the recognition of qualifications and study periods.
357 Doc. A3-0300/91.
358 Doc. A3-0298/92.
361 Doc. A3-0133/94.
366 The own-initiative report on this issue was submitted even before the Commission’s proposal (Doc. A2-197/87) and put to the vote on 15 December 1987.
368 Lecanuet, Jean, ‘Our attachment to democracy is inspired by our vision of Man’, CD Europe, No 3, 1980, p. 12.
369 OJ No C 103 of 27 April 1977.


375 OJ No C 46 of 20 February 1984, p. 42.


377 COM (81) 758 final.


379 Doc. A 2-95/87.


387 Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission against racism and xenophobia, June 1986.

388 Docs. B3-518-546-578 and 595/90.

389 Docs. B3-932-969-987-988-989 and 1012/90.

390 Docs B3-973 and 1049/92.


399 Doc. A2-117/85, vote on the report held 22 October 85.


Ibidem, p. 135.


Ibidem, p. 135.

Ibidem, p. 141.

In her speech in the debate on Community development policy, Renate-Charlotte Rabbethge said: ‘Our European Parliament has been united in its desire to fight poverty and hunger in the world; the decision is clear: The hungry are never free’. In Groupe du PPE, 30 Années. 1953-1983, June 1983, p. 48.


Doc. 1-327/79.


Doc. 1-223/79.

Doc. 1-284/80.

Doc. 1-821/80; Doc. 1-177/80.

Doc. 1-734/79.


Idem, p. 35.


Idem.

Martens, Wilfried, Mémoires pour mon pays, op. cit., p. 295.
Gil-Robles, Gil-Delgado, José-Maria, *Passion d'Europe*, Bruxelles, Racine, PPE-DE.
Minutes of the meeting of the Group Presidency, 29 October 1989.
Ibidem.
Ibidem.
Ibidem.
Ibidem.
Ibidem.
Ibidem.
Ibidem.
Ibidem.
Ibidem.
Crete Study Days, 30 April-4 May 1990, *European Digest*, No 59, April/May 1990, p. 42
EPP Group, Schwerin Study Days, 30 August to 3 September 1993.


EPP Group, Minutes of the Group meeting of Tuesday, 9 July 1991, Strasbourg, Doc. FR\PV\114153.JR, p. 1.

Doc. A3-109/93.


The Serbs, for instance, were opposed to complete independence for each League of Communists in each of the Republics and wanted to retain a centralised Federal Communist League. The Slovenes, however, no longer wished to be answerable to a federal body and submitted a proposal for restructuring the federal party to guarantee the autonomy of the Leagues in the Republics. European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, *The Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia*, Luxembourg, 1993, p. 21.


*Idem*, p. 22.

*Idem*, p. 22-23.

*Idem*, p. 23.

*Idem*, p. 23.

*Idem*, p. 23.

Expressed on 15 September 1991.

Expressed on 15 October 1991.


*Ibidem*.

*Ibidem*.

*Ibidem*.


EPP Group, ‘Urgences’, *Flash Session*, sittings of 9 to 13 March 1992, p. 27.


Doc. A3-208/92.


*Ibidem*, p. 17.

*Ibidem*.

*Ibidem*.

*Ibidem*.


*Ibidem*.


*Ibidem*.

*Ibidem*.


*Ibidem*.

*Ibidem*.


The EPP Group believed that if the European Parliament awarded the 1993 Sakharov Prize to the editors of the newspaper *Oslobodjende*, it would demonstrate not just Parliament’s support for freedom of opinion and freedom of the press, which were essential in a democracy, but also its unreserved condemnation of the human rights violations and, in particular, the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, where women, men and children were suffering all sorts of atrocities on a daily basis. In the midst of this war-stricken world, *Oslobodjende* remained a beacon of hope and humanity. Group of the European People’s Party, ‘Le Groupe du PPE propose la candidature du quotidien Oslobodjenje de Sarajevo pour le prix Sakharov 1993 du Parlement européen’, *Flash Session*, sittings of 13 to 17 September 1993, p. 3.

Doc PE 215.213.

Doc PE 215.213.

Doc PE 215.213.


‘Manifiste “Europe 2000”’, Luxembourg Parliamentary Conference, 4-6 July 1990, EPP Group, Research and Documentation Service, def./II.


*Ibidem*.

*Ibidem*, p. 185.


*Ibidem*, p. 32.

*Ibidem*, p. 29.


Preamble to the Draft Treaty: ‘Intending to entrust common institutions, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only with those powers required to complete successfully the tasks they may carry out more satisfactorily than the States acting independently’. Article 12: ‘The Union shall only act to carry out those tasks which may
be undertaken more effectively in common than by the Member States acting separately, in particular those whose execution requires action by the Union because their dimension or effects extend beyond national frontiers.’

536 EPP-ED Group, Leo Tindemans. L’Européen, Research and Documentation Service, p. 98.
538 Flash, 9 September 1992, III/588/92.
539 Flash, 23 September 1992, III/624/92/LT.
540 Flash, 30 June 1992, III/92/477/AV-mm.
543 Ibidem.
544 Idem, p. 131.
545 Idem, p. 127.
548 Flash, 1 June 1988, II/308/88/YP/hv.
551 Article J.4(1) of the Maastricht Treaty: ‘The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.’
552 Foreword to the documents on Enlargement, EPP Group, Research and Documentation Service, February 1993.
553 ‘How compatible is the neutrality of certain applicant countries with the establishment of a common foreign and security policy?’, Working Document, Research and Documentation Service, October 1993, p. 3.
555 How compatible is the neutrality of certain applicant countries with the establishment of a common foreign and security policy?’, Working Document, Research and Documentation Service, October 1993, p. 4.
557 Herman, Fernand, Europa Patria Mea, op. cit., p. 28.
559 Flash, 8 April 1992, III/277/92/CL/hv.
560 Doc. A3-0189/92.
562 Idem, p. 189.

Resolution adopted on 9 February 1994 on the state of enlargement negotiations with Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway.


Notably François Froment-Meurice, Jean-Louis Bourlanges and Fernand Herman.


Idem, p. 306.

Idem, p. 323.

Idem, p. 314.

Idem, p. 317.


Martens, Wilfried, Mémoires pour mon pays, op. cit., p. 338.

Ibidem, p. 338.

Minutes of the EPP Group meeting of 13 July 1999 in Brussels.


See next chapter.


See the account given by Nicole Fontaine in Mes combats à la présidence du parlement européen, Plon, 2002.

Minutes of the Presidency meeting of 29 August 2006.

See p. 145 et seq.


Conclusions of the Presidency.


Doc. A4-0081/94.


The road to an enlarged Europe - 1993-2003, p.10.

Helsinki Study Days 26-30 August 1996, speech by Hanna Suchocka, Member of the ‘Union of Liberty’, Poland, p. 47.


The road to an enlarged Europe – 1993-2003, p. 11.


Idem, p. 129.

Ibidem.

The road to an enlarged Europe – 1993-2003, p. 11.


Proposal of the EPP Group to the EPP Congress from 9 to 11 November 1997 in Toulouse, The European Union and its enlargement must be a success in the interest of all Europeans, 11 November 1997.


EPP Group Study Days, 4 to 6 May 1998 – Berlin, p. 5.

Idem, p. 41.

Idem, p. 51.


Document PE 285.644, amendment to the Brok report on enlargement.

The road to an enlarged Europe - 1993-2003, p. 20.

Idem, p. 20.

Idem, p. 25.


Minutes of the Group meeting of 3 May 2004, Strasbourg.

EPP-ED Group Study Days in Budapest, 5-8 July 2004, a Documentation – Publications - Research Service publication, p. 5.


Doc. A4-0102/95.

The Group coordinators in the EP committee decided after lengthy negotiations that the two largest political groups in the European Parliament, the EPP and the PES, should draft the report. Seventeen working documents on specific subjects drawn up by different members of the committee were added to the report to satisfy the other political groups. In Report on the Activities of the European People’s Party (CD Group), July 1994-July 1995, p. 230.


With Raymonde Dury (a Belgian Socialist).

Doc. A4-0068/96.


Title from the article which appeared in the publication *Libre Belgique*: ‘Ombres et lumière du nouveau traité’, 19 June 1997, No. 170, p. 2.


Ibidem.


Doc. A4-0347/97.

With Dimitris Tsatsos (a Greek member of the European Socialist Party Group).


Speech by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, former President of the French Republic, to the Study Days of the EPP-ED Group in Paris (6-9 March 2000), an EPP Group publication, pp. 76-77.


*A Constitution for a Europe that works*, Text presented by the ‘European Policy’ Working Group to the EPP Political Bureau on 6 December 2001 in Brussels, original version: English, p. 15.

Endnotes

665  Alain Lamassoure, *op. cit.*, p. 84.
667  *Idem*, pp. 11-12.
668  *Idem*, pp. 10.
671  Alain Lamassoure, *op. cit.*, p. 308.
674  Alain Lamassoure, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
679  *Yearbook of the EPP-ED Group, op. cit.*, p. 172.
680  With Dimitris Tsatsos (PES - Greece).
683  Andrew Duff (UK - Liberal) and Klaus Hänsch (Germany - Socialist). To this Group should also be added Lamberto Dini, an eminent figure in Italian politics and a former Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was a Senator at the time in question.
684  Statement by Elmar Brok, Lamberto Dini, Andrew Duff, Klaus Hänsch and Alain Lamassoure, Members of the Convention.
689  Only 137 MEPs voted against and 40 abstained. See Minutes of the sitting of 12 January 2005, Doc. PE 352.981, p. 4.
691  Press release of 30 May 2005 by the Chairman of the EPP-ED Group, Wilfried Martens.
692  PV\569576EN, Minutes of the EPP-ED Group Meeting, P3C050 Brussels, 1 June 2005, 11:00-13:00.
694  PV\570281EN, Minutes of the meeting of the EPP-ED Group, 6 June 2005, Strasbourg. This was also the date on which Mr Helmer, a member of the ED strand of the group, was expelled from the Group.
695  Meeting of the Bureau of the EPP-ED Group, Bordeaux, 29-30 June 2006, Research and Documentation Department of the EPP Group, December 2006, p. 11.
696  *What does the future hold for the Constitutional Treaty: how can the deadlock be broken?*, Hearing held by the EPP-ED Group, Brussels, 8 March 2007, Research and Documentation Department of the EPP Group, June 2007, pp.6-9.
Paragraph 11 of the preamble to the Berlin Declaration.


EPP press release of 13 June 2008: EPP disappointed with Irish referendum result – EPP summit will assess treaty impasse. See minutes of the meeting of the Group on 16 June 2008, PV\730297EN.


Bulletin Quotidien Europe No 9758, 10 October 2008.


With Biagio de Giovanni (PES, Italy).

Doc. A4-0003/95.


With Biagio de Giovanni (PES, Italy).

Doc. A4-0003/95.


Wilfried Martens, Mémoires pour mon pays, op. cit., p. 325.


Reimer Böge, in the minutes of 18 November 1997, p. 17.


Doc. A4-0097/98.

Doc. A4-0240/99.

Doc. A4-0502/98.

Wilfried Martens, Mémoires pour mon pays, op. cit., p. 325.


One was Socialist and another was lodged by 65 PES MEPs and by the Group leader Hervé Fabre-Aubrespy (Europe of Nations, France).


Wilfried Martens, Mémoires pour mon pays, op. cit., p. 326.

See EPP Group press release, 30 June 1999, EPP Group will not vote for a politically unbalanced Commission.


The agreement (C5-0349/2000) was adopted by 365 votes to 100, with 45 abstentions in the plenary. In fact, a large majority of Parliament voted in favour. The EPP-ED Group supported the proposal en masse, whilst the PES Group was divided (51 votes against and 11 abstentions).


Fontaine, Nicole, *op. cit.*, p. 78.


See specifically its present Article I-27(1): ‘Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members. If he does not obtain the required majority, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall within one month propose a new candidate who shall be elected by the European Parliament following the same procedure. […].’


Speech by Hans-Gert Pöttering, 26 October 2004.


For the two documents, see the meeting of the EPP Group of 7 September 1993, Brussels, Documentation Service, 6 September 1993.


Doc. A3-0122/94.


Doc. A3-0384/93.


Infodoc, Employment after the Luxembourg European Council, December 1997, p. 4-5.


Doc. A4-0307/97.


Infodoc, Job creation in Europe – EPP priorities and conclusions of the Cologne Summit, p. 1.

Infodoc, Employment after the Luxembourg European Council, December 1997, p. 4.
766 Idem, p. 5.
768 Speech at the Study Days in Rome in March 2006.
769 Presidency minutes, 10 December 2002.
773 2006 Yearbook of the EPP-ED Group, p. 130.
775 Press release, Key priorities for the European Parliament: Europe must stand firm
781 Debates of the European Parliament, 2006-2007 Session, verbatim report of pro-
ceedings of the sitting of 14 March 2007.
of 27 June 2007 on roaming on public mobile telephone networks within the Commu-
nity.
785 Debates of the European Parliament, 2006-2007 Session, verbatim report of pro-
ceedings of the plenary sitting of 23 May 2007.
789 See, in particular, the minutes of the Group meeting of Wednesday 8 February
790 This figure was announced in Parliament by the President of the sitting. See
791 Verbatim report of proceedings of the sitting of 14 February 2006.
793 Debates of the European Parliament, 2006-2007 Session, verbatim report of pro-
ceedings of the sitting of 15 November 2006.
794 Ibidem.
795 Szájer, Jozsef, Bureau of the EPP-ED Group, Note de synthèse-Directive européenne
sur les substances chimiques (directive ‘REACH’), 15 February 2005.
797 Press releases of the EPP-ED Group, Hartmut Nassauer, 2 December 2004 and 28
March 2005.
798 Joszef Szájer MEP, Bureau of the EPP-ED Group, Note explicative-Directive commu-
nautaire sur les produits chimiques (REACH), 30 August 2005, p. 3.
799 Interview with Tanja Valentin, parliamentary attaché to Hartmut Nassauer,
17 June 2008.
800 Hartmut Nassauer, Draft Opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and
Consumer Protection for the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food
Safety on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Endnotes

concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), 2003/0256, 4 May 2005.

801 Hartmut Nassauer, Clear vote in the internal market committee: compromise on REACH is on track, Press Office, Flash, Brussels, 14 September 2005.

802 Doc. T4-0595/1996.
803 2000 EPP-ED Yearbook, p. 204.
808 2003 Yearbook of the EPP-ED Group, pp. 235-236.
809 Concepció Ferrer, Wim van Velzen, Ilkka Suominen, Paul Rübig and Michel Hansenne.
811 Yearbook of the EPP-ED Group, p. 318.
812 Yearbook of the EPP-ED Group, p. 191
813 Title taken from Wilfried Martens, Mémoire pour mon pays, op. cit., p. 247.
814 In 1969, the Heads of State or Government decided, in The Hague, to adopt a multi-stage plan to establish an economic and monetary union (Werner Plan of 1970). In 1972 the currency snake was created, to be replaced in 1979 by the European Monetary System. Coupled with the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (FECOM, 1974) throughout the 1980s and after the difficult 1970s (oil crises, international monetary crises) it provided a period of currency stability in Europe: low inflation, exchange-rate stability, prevention of monetary speculation risks etc.
815 For example, this was already reflected in its political programme for 1979. See, inter alia, Elections directes 1979, Eléments d’information sur la politique européenne vue par le Groupe Démocrate-Chrétien (Groupe du Parti Populaire Européen) du Parlement européen, pp. 167 et seq.
816 Wilfried Martens, Mémoires pour mon pays, op. cit., p. 247.
821 Doc. A4-132/95.
823 Doc. A4-0066/95.
824 Doc. A4-0112/95.
825 COM(95)333 final.
830 Infodoc, The EPP Group and the changeover to the single currency, July 1995, p. 5.
835 Infodoc, Towards a single currency (Post Madrid), March 1996, pp. 3-4.
836 Nicole Fontaine, op. cit., p. 145.
840 Doc. A4-0371/96.
841 Doc. A4-0352/96.
842 Doc. A4-0192/97.
845 Doc. A4-0375/96.
848 Fernand Herman, ‘The costs and benefits of Economic and Monetary Union, speech given at the Crete Study Days’, European Digest, op. cit., p. 18.
850 See, more particularly, Article 109B.
851 Doc. A4-0372/96.
860 Ibidem.


See, in particular, the press release of 10 February 1999: ‘We must not miss the last chance for a solution in Kosovo – Involvement of NATO must be maintained’, Doris Pack, MEP.


Ibidem.


Paragraph 67 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Santa Maria da Feira European Council held on 19 and 20 June 2000.


2006 EPP-ED Group Yearbook, Brussels, p. 112.


PV\597850EN, Minutes of the meeting of the EPP-ED Group of 11 January 2006, Brussels, p. 4.

Ibidem.


Minutes of the meeting of the EPP-ED Group of 28 October 2004, Strasbourg.


Minutes of the meeting of the EPP-ED Group of 7 July 2004, Strasbourg, p. 1.

Minutes of the meeting of the EPP-ED Group of 8 October 2005, Strasbourg.

Minutes of the meeting of the EPP-ED Group of 1 February 2006, Brussels.


Minutes of the meeting of the EPP-ED Group of 16 March 2006, Strasbourg.
Minutes of the meeting of the EPP-ED Group of 5 September 2006, Strasbourg.

Minutes of the meeting of the EPP-ED Group of 24 October 2006, Strasbourg.


Minutes of the meeting of the EPP-ED Group of 5 January 2005, Brussels.

Press release by Vytautas Landsbergis of 9 August 2008, ‘Russian expansionist doctrine is becoming a reality’.


Minutes of the meeting of the EPP-ED Group of 21 February 2005, Strasbourg.


Minutes of the meeting of the EPP-ED Group of 13 June 2007, Brussels, p. 2.

Minutes of the meeting of the EPP-ED Group of 7 November 2007, Brussels, p. 1.


European Digest, Vouliagmeni Study Days, 29 April-3 May 1996, EPP Group, p. 55.

Ibidem.

Ibidem.

Ibidem.

Ibidem.
941 ibidem.
947 Doc. B3-0171/94; Doc. B3-0200/94.
953 Eleven EPP Group members were permanent members of the Committee; it was also an Italian member of the EPP Group, Maria Paola Colombo Svevo, who was appointed Vice-Chairman of the Committee.
956 Doc. A4-0136/95.
959 See introduction to the Stewart-Clark report (A4-0136/95), op. cit.
961 Doc. A4-0157/98.


Doc. A4-0368/96.

Idem, p. 11.


Doc. B3-1461/91; Doc. B3-0432/92.

Doc. A3-0382/92.


Doc. B3-1691/93; Doc. B3-1692/93; Doc. B3-1724/93.


Doc. A4-0335/95.

Idem, p. 10.


See below.

Doc. A4-0110/99.


Idem.


Ibidem.

Ibidem.


Doc. A4-0315/96.


Endnotes


1009 See Chapter 34.


1012 Pöttering, Hans-Gert, presentation of the EPP-ED Group to His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI, address given at the audience in the Vatican in Rome, 30 March 2006.


1018 Nassir Al-Assaf, Saudi Ambassador and doyen of the Arab Ambassadors, Aïcha Belarbi, Moroccan Ambassador, Abdulazeez Al-Sharikh, Kuwaiti Ambassador, Soliman Awaad, Egyptian Ambassador, Alia Bouran, Jordanian Ambassador, Chawki Armali, Palestinian General Delegate, and Mohamed Zaaaf, Head of the Liaison Office of the League of Arab States in Brussels.


With a wide variety of topics including reform of public services, competitiveness and innovation, economic, monetary and fiscal policy, the challenges of global security, demographic developments and immigration, globalisation, creating jobs in Europe, European governance, terrorism and internal security, energy and environment policies, the digital economy, and the geographical limits of the European Union.

On sustainable agricultural production and food security.

With a wide variety of topics including reform of public services, competitiveness and innovation, economic, monetary and fiscal policy, the challenges of global security, demographic developments and immigration, globalisation, creating jobs in Europe, European governance, terrorism and internal security, energy and environment policies, the digital economy, and the geographical limits of the European Union.
This book invites you to discover the role played by one of the major political forces to have grown up in the European Parliament, from its creation in 1953 to its comprehensive victory in the European elections in June 2009.

The Christian Democrat Group, which subsequently became the Group of the European People’s Party, brings together most of the centre, moderate and Conservative parties in the Europe of 27. Its views have a decisive and growing influence on EU decision-making. The EPP Group, which has played a part in major European events from the birth of the Community in the midst of the Cold War to the introduction of the Single Market and the euro, from the reunification of the continent after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the impact of globalisation and the economic crisis, is above all a collection of men and women who share the same values and the same commitment to European integration.

Drawn from unpublished archives and interviews, the book is a valuable source of information for anyone wanting a better knowledge and understanding of the history of European integration.